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ABSTRACT
This study investigates the intertextual use of the fairy tale in postmodern 
fiction. I contend that the fairy tale, whether Grimm, Andersen or Perrault, is an 
important intertext in many texts considered canonical postmodernist fiction, 
especially Midnight’s Children, Waterland and Nights at the Circus. I demonstrate 
that the fairy tale is used in novels to raise concerns that Hutcheon and McHale 
characterise as postmodern: questions about reality and representation, how 
language affects the way humans perceive the world, and the necessity of 
storytelling.
The study first addresses issues of intertextuality, examining re-tellings of 
“Bluebeard” specifically. Drawing upon the theories of Genette and Bakhtin, chapter 
one defines eight elements of intertextuality. John Fowles’ The Collector &. A.S. 
Byatt’s Babel Tower are closely examined here, as is Margaret Atwood’s 
“Bluebeard’s Egg” and Kurt Vonnegut’s Bluebeard.
Chapter two highlights that fairy tale intertexts can create magic realism. A 
close reading of Kate Atkinson’s Human Croquet leads to a discussion of the formal 
features of magic realism, informed by definitions of that genre from Chanady and 
Faris.
Magic realism is also a theme in chapter three, where the concept of the 
storyteller is explained. This chapter examines fictions which depict oral narration, 
including Atwood’s The Handmaid’s Tale and Atkinson’s Emotionally Weird and 
notes the storyteller in these texts’ similarity to the archetypal storyteller of the 
Arabian Nights, Scheherazade. Chapter four explains why the process of storytelling 
is depicted, and highlights the metafictive effects raised by this feature. The final 
chapter examines how fairy tale revisions can be subversive by looking at how Terry 
Pratchett’s Witches Abroad critiques the “classic fairy tale” exemplified by Disney. 
The conclusion looks at how fairy tale film can be analysed in the same way that I 
have examined the novel, by briefly studying Shrek and its sequel, and Tim Burton’s 
Big Fish.
Informed throughout by contemporary criticism of the fairy tale by Jack Zipes 
and Marina Warner, this study isolates the different ways fairy tale intertexts are 
used, and suggests reasons why they are important.
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Introduction
“The novel in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has always incorporated 
forms of myths and fairy tales” as A.S. Byatt writes in On Histories and Stories, “Fanny 
Price is Cinderella” (2001: 130). And Byatt is entirely correct, and perhaps even 
understates the case; the history of popular fiction, from Shakespeare to Shrek is 
suffused with fairy tales, those simple stories that function in the vernacular as a 
synonym for lies. In last three decades, however, there has been a perceptible shift in 
the use of the fairy tale by novelists and filmmakers. Rather than being something that 
underlies a narrative and informs its structure, or a handy metaphor, the fairy tale has 
become central to the work. Interrogating the fairy tale, examining the way in which 
formulaic stories hold a grip over the human imagination has become increasingly 
popular among novelists and film-makers, to the extent that it is necessary to examine 
precisely why the fairy tale has become so important. That is the aim of this study. I 
will contend that the fairy tale is being intertextually used for ends which can be called 
postmodern.
The title of this thesis invokes three contentious categories: intertextuality, 
postmodernism and the fairy tale. Each of these terms is a battleground of 
interpretation, and familiarity with the debates raging in each subject area leads me to 
think that attempting to settle upon a unitary definition of “postmodernism”, 
“intertextuality” or indeed, “the fairy tale” would be the work of an entire book, leaving 
little space for the study of those texts that piqued my interest in this area in the first 
place. For this reason, the understanding of postmodernism I will use within this study 
is derived primarily from ‘historiographic metafiction’, Linda Hutcheon’s coinage in A 
Poetics o f Postmodernism, although other theorists or critics of postmodernism will be 
mentioned when the need arises. Chapter one will demonstrate my approach to the 
term “intertextuality”, opting for a pragmatic view of how individual texts relate to others, 
rather than a view of all literature, all language in fact, as fundamentally interconnected.
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The main area that needs to be addressed in this introduction is precisely what I mean 
when I use the term fairy tale.
A working definition of fairy tale
One of the problems of attempting to locate a fairy tale intertext, is the plurality 
and over-determination of the fairy tale. The term fairy tale itself is an ill defined 
construction lacking any sort of stable definition, much like the terms intertext and 
postmodern. The English term “Fairy Tale”, which has been part of the English 
language since the mid-eighteenth century, is a translation derived from the French 
Contes de fee, which was first used in the title of Madame D’Aulnoy’s collection of 
1697. This was just one of the terms used to describe fantastic narratives based upon 
folkloric stories that caught on during the ascendancy of the fairy tale as a fashionable 
form at the court of Louis XIV, and was used interchangeably with other terms such as 
Contes des oye. As all critics invariably point out, when defining the fairy tale one of 
the main problems with the term is that many stories considered emblematic don’t 
contain a single fairy (Thompson 1977: 8, Carter 2001b: ix). J.R.R. Tolkien addresses 
this problem when he writes:
The definition of a fairy-story -  what it is, or what it should be -  does not, then, 
depend on any definition or historical account of elf or fairy, but upon the nature of 
Faerie\ the Perilous Realm itself, and the air that blows in that country. I will not 
attempt to define that, nor to describe it directly. It cannot be done. Faerie cannot 
be caught in a net of words; for it is one of its qualities to be indescribable, though 
not imperceptible. It has many ingredients, but analysis will not necessarily 
discover the secret of the whole. Yet I hope that what I have later to say about the 
other questions will give some glimpses of my own imperfect vision of it. For the 
moment I will say only this: a "fairy-story" is one which touches on or uses Faerie, 
whatever its own main purpose may be: satire, adventure, morality, fantasy. Faerie 
itself may perhaps most nearly be translated by Magic - but it is magic of a peculiar 
mood and power, at the furthest pole from the vulgar devices of the laborious, 
scientific, magician. There is one proviso: if there is any satire present in the tale, 
one thing must not be made fun of, the magic itself. That must in that story be 
taken seriously, neither laughed at nor explained away.
(Tolkien 1965: 16)
For Tolkien, fairy stories take place in the realm of Faerie, a statement that 
suggests they would come under the category of the Marvelous in Tzvetan Todorov’s 
infamous structuralist attempt to define the fantasy genre. If we assign the tales to an 
imaginary world where animals can speak and magic is accepted as normal, then the 
term “fairy tale” is a shorthand for a type of fantasy that predates the literary fantastic.
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This raises one obvious problem: it places magical events in an entirely other world, as 
though all listeners of fairy tales assume that magic can only take place in such a 
place, ignoring the possibility that once upon a time perhaps the distinction between 
fairy tale and realism was not so clear cut. I will return to this problem when we 
address the thorny issue of magic realism in chapter two.
But some tales that are regarded as fairy tales are less fantastic than others. In 
Charles Perrault’s “La barbe-bleue” (translated as “Bluebeard”), for example, there is 
little obvious magic: no witches, no spells, no talking animals, no wishes, and no fairies. 
To some influential fairy tale critics, such as Bruno Bettelheim, this means that it is not 
a fairy tale, but Bettelheim also believes that any story without a happy ending is also 
not a “true” fairy tale. This disqualifies Perrault’s version of “Little Red Riding Hood”, 
where the Wolf wins and need fear no fortunately-within-earshot woodsman who just 
happens to rescue the girl and granny. Bettelheim’s exclusive application of the term 
“fairy tale” to those stories that centre around the numinous or uncanny is also taken up 
by Maria Tatar in The Hard Facts of Grimms’ Fairytales, where she creates a binary 
division between “marvellous” fairy tales and folk tales, are naturalistic in character 
(Tatar 1987: 33). This approach to the term fairy tale takes the term “fairy” as a 
metonym signifying the otherworldly and magical, and sets up a binary opposition 
between what Tolkien would call those tales set in the realm of faery and those set in 
the real world. She argues that the term “fairy tale [...] is above all reserved for 
narratives set in a fictional world where preternatural events and supernatural 
intervention are taken wholly for granted. A fairy tale can thus belong to the category 
of folktales, but it stands in contrast to the folk tale which is sharply biased in favor of 
earthy realism” (33)1. Once again, the fairy tale is defined as part of the fantasy genre, 
and a dichotomy is set up between those texts that are clearly fantastic and those 
which are not. In practice, this binary seems artificial and counterintuitive. Perrault’s 
“Red Riding Hood” is, apparently, no longer a fairy tale but a folk tale, although perhaps
1 Rather confusingly Tatar uses the word “ folklore”  to refer to the entire field o f collected narratives o f 
oral cultures and the phrase “ fo lk lore”  to refer to those fo lkloric narratives that are realistic rather than 
fantastic in nature.
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the Grimm’s “Red Cap”, in which the little girl and her grandmother are rescued from 
the digestive tract of the sleeping wolf, is a borderline case. As Stith Thompson 
highlights, “ It is not always easy to tell, in tales of the marvelous, whether we are 
dealing with magic or with mere exaggerations of actual qualities” (Thompson 1977:
81).
Some critics, especially folklorists, prefer to use the German term Marchen to 
refer to the fairy tale. Thompson defines the Marchen as “a tale of some length 
involving a succession of motifs or episodes. It moves in an unreal world without 
definite locality or definite creatures and is filled with the marvelous. In this never- 
never land humble heroes kill adversaries, succeed to kingdoms and marry princesses” 
(1977: 8). However, although Thompson himself prefers the term Marchen to fairy tale 
he undercuts any notion of the German term being more precise when he notes that it 
is used in the German language to cover not only stories like “Cinderella”, but also 
legends of saints, pious tales from the middle ages and jokes and anecdotes, much like 
the imprecision of the English “fairy tale” (22). Despite Marchen’s use by folklorists, 
combined with the reassuring strangeness that the term has for English speaking 
tongues, it does not resolve the problem of vagueness that we have with the more 
familiar “fairy tale”, derived from the French. Because it does not have general 
currency in English, we may use the term to refer only to those tales that comply with 
the formal characteristics outlined by Thompson above. But this gain in specificity is a 
false one, and can also be seen as an unnecessary jargonisation of the critical lexicon: 
especially when German Folklorists like Max Luthi use the term Zaubermarchen (or 
“wonder tale”) to refer to what Thompson would call simply Marchen2.
Another problem muddying the possibility of definition is the use of ‘fairy tale’ to 
refer indiscriminately to collected folklore that has magical characteristics, such as the 
Grimms’ “Aschenputteh, along with literary tales authored by individuals such as Hans 
Christian Andersen’s “The Little Mermaid”. Several critics have offered up alternative
2 This is because o f the term Marchen’s vagueness in the German language: Luthi is attempting to be
more specific and talk about “ wonder tales”  (those in magic worlds featuring magic) rather than simply 
“ Marchen”  which, as we have noted above, can include legends and jokes.
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terms to distinguish between tales derived from folklore and those that have an 
identifiable author with whom the tale originated. Gail De Vos and Anna E Altman, 
drawing from the work of Maria Tatar and Max Luthi, suggest a distinction between 
these different sources by referring to fairy tales that have been written down and 
collected as “book folktales” or “book fairytales” and “original literary fictions that draw 
on or imitate traditional folktales, like those of Hans Christian Andersen” as “literary 
folktales” or “literary fairy tales” (2002: 7-8). In his introduction to The Oxford 
Companion to Fairy Tales Jack Zipes suggests an opposition between the oral folk tale 
and the literary fairy tale:
In his first short monograph, [Jens] Tismar set down the principles for a 
definition of the literary fairy tale (das Kunstmarchen) as genre: (1) it distinguishes 
itself from the oral folk tale (das Volksmarchen) in so far as it is written by a single 
identifiable author; (2) it is thus synthetic, artificial, and elaborate in comparison to 
the indigenous formation of the folk tale that emanates from communities and 
tends to be simple and anonymous; (3) the differences between the literary fairy 
tale and the oral folk tale do not imply that one genre is better than the other; (4) in 
fact, the literary fairy tale is not an independent genre but can only be understood 
and defined by its relationship to the oral tales as well as to the legend, novella, 
novel, and other literary fairy tales that it uses, adapts, and remodels during the 
narrative conception of the author.
(Zipes 2000:xv)
Tismar’s definition is key to Zipes’ own discussion of the fairy tale as he too 
insists on an absolute difference between the fairy tale as manifest in an oral culture, 
and the literary fairy tale. Certainly, for my purposes, it is important to acknowledge 
that the fairy tales manifested as intertexts in postmodern fictions have been shaped 
and influenced by the written genre of the fairy tale. Oral transmission of traditional 
narratives is not a common activity in a culture that relies upon the easy dissemination 
of mass produced fictions, and it is therefore necessary to realise that the fairy tales we 
recognise are more part of a literary tradition than an oral one.
If the definition of fairy tale a major problem, so too is the plurality and over­
determination of the fairy tale. There are thousands of collected folktales and many of 
those collected are variations on the same tale. I have already mentioned the 
difference between the Perrault’s “Little Red Riding Hood” and the Grimms’ “Red Cap”. 
This leads to the thorny problem of which version of an intertext is being used. Not
only are there variations between the different versions, but difference is also
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significant in the case of the Grimms, where the first edition of their collection, an 
academic publication, is significantly less punitive against wrongdoers and less literary 
in its style than the later editions that were aimed at children. Mahdi highlights the fact 
that the Arabian Nights in particular is a polymorphous and shifting collection, shifting 
significantly in terms of structure, amount of stories and even which stories are 
included every time it is edited. For example, the Sinbad tales, the most famous and 
recognisable tales for westerners reading the Nights, were found and added by Antoine 
Galland and were not part of the “original” manuscript he claimed to be translating 
(Mahdi 1995: 38).
Comparing literature with fairy tale is problematic because there is no definitive 
text for any fairy tale that has folkloric roots. Maria Tatar gives two examples of critics 
being misled in their interpretations of fairy tales by assuming that they can treat fairy 
tales in the same way as literature. Bruno Bettelheim’s and Ernest Jones’s 
interpretations of the “Frog King” identifies the frog with “clammy sensations” 
associated with the male sexual organ, overlooking the dozens of tales where the frog 
turns into a princess. Similarly, Erich Fromm’s interpretation of “Red Riding Hood” 
hinges upon the bottle she carried in her hand-basket despite the fact that many 
versions of the tale do not feature this object. Tatar uses these examples to illustrate 
the fact that:
[a]ny attempt to unearth the hidden meaning of fairy tales is bound to fail 
unless it is preceded by a rigorous, if not exhaustive, analysis of a tale type and its 
variants. That analysis enables the interpreter to distinguish essential features 
from random embellishments and to identify culturally determined elements that 
vary from one regional version of a tale to the next.
(Tatar 1987: 43)
This is an unusual position for anyone trained in the study of literature, where the 
solidity and permanency of the text is taken for granted. We do not usually feel the 
need to study all editions of Our Mutual Friend before making claims about meaning 
that hinge upon a certain word in the text, even though there were inevitably variations 
between different editions of the text. In the cases where there exists more than one 
version of a text, for example, Hardy’s Tess of the D ’Uben/illes, arguments are used to
prioritise a certain version depending on either how close it is to the author’s “original 
intentions”. Ultimately, despite any problems, the literary text is viewed as a stable 
matrix, where instances of individual words or signifiers can be used to generate 
meaning. It is entirely possible to claim meaning for a literary text by analysing the 
recurrence of a single word or image. Literary criticism, at least before post­
structuralism, relied on the premise that one can generate stable, unequivocal readings 
of texts. No such illusion can be sustained when examining orally transmitted tales, 
whose meaning changes in every iteration.
Of course, this problem is nullified in the cases of those identifiable authors who 
write “original” fairy tales, like those of Hans Christian Andersen, although even in this 
case there is the problem of “versions” as the sources of many of Andersen’s original 
tales were Danish folk tales collected and retold by his immediate predecessors 
J.M.Thiele, Adam Oehlenshlager and Bernard Ingemann (Zipes 2000: 14). Though, as 
literary critics, we may be certain that an individual image is pivotal in studying one of 
Andersen’s texts, because we can identify it as a single version whose form is fixed (as 
long as we are studying the Danish version: translation is another minefield of 
meaning), it is also possible to look at the sources for Andersen’s versions and study 
the differences between the collected folkloric version and the literary version.
Despite the problems with the term, in this study I will retain the use of the word 
fairy tale. I will not attempt to re-define what is and isn’t a fairy tale, by, for example, 
ruling out tales with unhappy endings or those fairy tales that aren’t magical enough.
To my mind, this sort of tampering, although well intentioned, only further muddies the 
water, meaning that the general public and the scholarly community denote altogether 
different things when they talk about fairy tales. Furthermore, these attempts always 
seem to involve a certain ideological attempt to specify an “ideal” fairy tale that may 
exclude tales that have been regarded as fairy tales, printed in fairy tale collections for 
centuries. To be told that according to Bettelheim’s categories “Little Red Riding Hood” 
isn’t a fairy tale because it doesn’t have a happy ending (sometimes), or that
“Bluebeard” isn’t a fairy tale because it isn’t “magic” enough, seems a Canute-like
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attempt to turn the tides. Though we may yearn for more solid and clear-cut
differentiations between the literary fairy tale, oral fairy tale, folktale, and myth, there is
little to no chance that this more precise terminology will have any effect upon
language outside the community of scholars who have time to argue about such things.
In this study I will focus on well-known fairy tale intertexts, rather than obscure or
lesser-known tales. This is an important point: the fictions that I will analyse utilise fairy
tales that are easily recognisable by their target audiences as fairy tales because it is
important that the reader catches the reference. “Bluebeard”, “Cinderella”, “Sleeping
Beauty”, “Little Red Riding Hood”, and the Arabian Nights will be the most frequently
occurring fairy tales in this analysis
Critical approaches to the intertextual use of fairy tales
There are a number of standard ways of examining fairy tales in contemporary
literature. One of these is to examine a particular tale and how it is intertextually used
in contemporary fiction. Casie Hermansson’s Reading Feminist Intertextuality through
Bluebeard Stories is one of these, where the author identifies one particular tale as
particularly important and then proceeds to build up a monograph about that particular
tale and its intertextual uses by feminist writers. The same strategy is used to a lesser
extent in Cristina Bacchilega’s Postmodern Fairy Tales, where each chapter tackles a
particular fairy tale: one chapter for ‘Snow White’, one for ‘Red Riding Hood, one for
‘Bluebeard’ and so on.
Another approach is to concentrate on an individual author’s use of fairy tale
intertexts, as in Sharon Rose Wilson’s Margaret Atwood’s Fairy-Tale Sexual Politics.
This would take the form of either an entire work about the uses of fairy tale in one
author’s oeuvre, or perhaps one chapter on how, say, Angela Carter uses her fairy tale
intertexts, followed by one on how Salman Rushdie uses his.
This study could easily have been conceived along lines relating to a particular
critical theory: for example as an examination of fairy tale intertexts as they appear in
post-colonial works, feminist works, positing a ‘group’ of ‘feminist’ or ‘postcolonialist’
writers who may or may not constitute a ‘school’ and then attempting to find
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commonalities or differences between members of this school and what this means 
about their works. Such a technique is used in Zipes’s Don’t Bet on the Prince, a 
collection which presents a group of feminist fairy tale revisions, and feminist fairy tale 
criticism.
Finally, it is conceivable that a historical approach could be taken as an 
organising principle, beginning with the ‘first’ postmodern texts that utilise intertexts and 
then charting the spreading influence chronologically, perhaps beginning with Ann 
Sexton’s poetry, moving through Carter’s short stories, until we reach a cut off date if a 
cut-off date for postmodernism can be found.
I have rejected these approaches for various reasons, but mainly because I find 
the intertextual use of the fairy tale in postmodern fiction to be too diverse and 
unpredictable to comfortably fit into any of these arbitrary divisions. Organising the 
thesis around individual tales is not feasible because my interests are less to do with 
the revision of individual tales, and more to do with the use of the fairy tale as a genre. 
Sticking to one particular author is not appealing because what interests me is the 
range of different authors, all of whom use the fairy tale in considerably different ways. 
Instead of utilising any of these safer, and perhaps easier, approaches for structuring 
my thesis, I have taken a more ambitious approach. The thesis does not therefore 
follow a conventional structure where each chapter can be viewed as a discrete entity, 
but functions in a more fluid manner with each chapter explaining a point of interest 
that was raised in the previous one.
The starting point for this thesis will provide its theoretical groundwork. In chapter
one, I will investigate the crucial issue of intertextuality, utilising and expanding upon
the theories of Gerard Genette and Mikhail Bakhtin, in an attempt to find a way of
making intertextuality a useful critical tool that can help me define my object of study.
This chapter will sketch out 8 different ‘elements’ of intertextuality, providing textual
examples for each category, and then attempt to highlight which of these elements are
particularly important for the postmodern texts that I will be examining. Chapter two will
follow on from an area of interest raised by chapter one, looking at the mode of magic
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realism, and taking Kate Atkinson’s Human Croquet as an example of a magic realist 
novel where the magic realism is formed in no small part by its use of fairy tale 
intertextuality.
Chapter three addresses the metafictional element of fairy tale intertextuality, 
defined in chapter one, by using the tools of narratology to sketch out a narrative 
situation which depicts a kind of ‘fairy tale within the text’ that is based upon the frame 
story of the Thousand and One Nights. I call this narrative situation ‘the storyteller’, 
and this chapter is primarily concerned with defining ‘the storyteller’ and providing 
examples of texts where this storytelling frame, which depicts characters telling ‘the 
fairy tales of their lives’, is important.
Chapter four goes on to explain the importance of the storyteller with relevance to 
critical theory in order to explain why the storyteller is a postmodern trope. It is in this 
chapter that the idea of realism is interrogated, as I attempt to explain the importance 
of the fairy tale, a genre which is usually opposed to realism and functions in the 
vernacular to refer to lies and other forms of fiction-making. Storytelling is an essential 
human activity, and the way in which storyteller operates in the texts under analysis 
highlights the importance of storytelling as a way of understanding one’s life and place 
in the world.
If chapter four sees the fairy tale as a liberating framework that allows 
postmodern subjects a form flexible and easily adaptable for them to narrate their life 
stories, chapter five shows how the fairy tale can also operate as what Roland Barthes 
called ‘myth’, and be a repressive and normative mechanism.
Before chapter five the fictions I examine are all based in the real world, even if
they do cause us to question what reality is, and the extent to which the real is
intertextually constituted by pre-existing stories, what Barthes would call the already
read or deja lu. There are 3 reasons for this bias. Firstly, using these texts allows me
to set up a strategy for defining the intertextual use of fairy tales even in texts that do
not necessarily appear fairy tale like at first sight. Secondly, some of the texts
analysed are canonical examples of postmodern literature, and therefore highlighting
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their usage of the fairy tale intertext is of obvious benefit to my thesis. Finally, the 
analysis of fantasy literature is still somewhat frowned upon, due to it being seen as 
escapist or, as Lucie Armitt correctly suggests, a “mere narrative formula” (Armitt 2000: 
15). In chapter five, which closely analyses the use of fairy tale in Terry Pratchett’s 
Witches Abroad, we will see how these “mere narrative formulae” actually work to 
shape and structure our understanding of the world.
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Chapter One: The Eight Elements of Intertextual use of 
Fairy Tales
The fairy tale has always been a popular form of literature, and it is possible to 
find examples of works throughout the canon that utilise fairy tale intertexts. If we were 
to make a list of every text that contained a reference to fairy tale plots we would end 
up with a list of thousands containing samples from every genre and every period. 
However, it is my thesis that the fairy tale has been used in as an intertext in interesting 
ways for various purposes by a certain group of writers whose work is typically called 
“postmodern”. In order for me to make this claim, I must be able to differentiate 
between texts in which the fairy tale intertext is important and contributes a significant 
amount to our understanding of the story, and those texts in which the fairy tale is 
simply one intertext among many and does not affect our reading of the text to a great 
extent.
In defining the ways in which these intertexts operate, I will draw upon various 
theories of intertextuality. My exploration of intertextuality will be mostly informed by 
the theories of Gerard Genette, due to his attempts to differentiate between different 
types of intertextuality, or as he calls it, transtextuality.
Genette differentiates between 5 sub-categories of transtextuality: “Kristevan” 
intertextuality, which covers allusion as well as quotation and plagiarism; paratextuality, 
which covers the relations between the “text itself” and its titles, epigraphs, illustrations, 
and even factors which we usually judge as separate to the text itself, for example 
reviews and author interviews; metatextuality, which concerns the relationship between 
commentary and its object; architextuality, the relationship between a text and its 
nominal genre, a tacit, perhaps even unconscious gesture to genre demarcations, and 
hypertextuality which is the relationship between a late-coming text and its pre-text 
(Still and Worton 1990: 23).
As Genette states, and this chapter will demonstrate, these different categories 
rarely exist in isolation, although the focus of this inquiry will necessarily gravitate
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towards the field of hypertextuality, “a field of literary works the generic essence of 
which lies in their relation to previous works” (Allen 2000: 108). I will discuss Genette’s 
categories when relevant, but will not be using his term transtextuality over the more 
readily accepted intertextuality.
Drawing upon Genette’s categories, I suggest that there are eight identifiable 
ways in which the fairy tale can operate as an intertext within mass-produced fictions.
1. Authorised: Explicit reference to a fairy tale in the title.
2. Writerly: Implicit reference to a fairy tale in title.
3. Incorporation: Explicit reference to a fairy tale within the text.
4. Allusion: Implicit reference to a fairy tale within the text.
5. Re-vision: putting a new spin on an old tale
6. Fabulation: crafting an original fairy tale
7. Metafictional discussion of fairy tales.
8. Architextual/ Chronotopic: “Fairy Tale” setting/ environment
I will call these eight categories “elements”, in order to reflect the complexity of 
intertextuality and to reflect that they can be found in numerous different combinations. 
The OED defines an element as “a component part of a complex whole”, which I find a 
satisfactory label for these eight types of intertextuality.
The eight elements I propose are all based on one of Genette’s categories of 
intertextuality. Elements one and two, with their concern for the title as the most 
prominent piece of text within the text are examples of paratextuality, discussed at 
length by Genette in Paratexts. Elements three and four are examples of the 
hypertextuality that Genette discusses in Palimpsests. Element five combines the idea 
of the palimpsestic text with the notion of architextuality, the relationship between a 
work and genre, and element six relies further on the idea of architextuality, as does 
Element eight. Element seven demonstrates the use of metatextual intertextuality as it 
discusses a kind of criticism in the text, and element eight also shows some signs of 
this feature.
As can be deduced, I have put forward two categories for every one of Genette’s 
except for his category of “Kristevan” intertextuality. This is because Genette’s
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category of “Kristevan” intertextuality covers quotation and plagiarism. Where 
quotation is usually seen as an acceptable practice because it (sometimes) overtly 
signals its source, plagiarism as unacknowledged quotation or “the wrongful 
appropriation or purloining, and publication as one’s own, of the ideas, or expression of 
the ideas [...] of another” (OED) is viewed generally as taboo in many areas, 
especially, as we will see, the field of literary production. But the borderline between 
the two is not always cut and dried. Sometimes quotation is not referenced to its 
source, and the only way for a reader to recognise it as a quotation is if they already 
know the source from which it derives. Therefore, Kristevan intertextuality appears in 
this study as the binary opposition between explicit and implicit intertextuality1 with 
elements one and three representing explicit intertextuality (where the source is 
acknowledged so it therefore approximates quotation) and elements two and four 
representing implicit intertextuality, which approximates an un-referenced quotation or 
plagiarism.
Due to the simplification I have enforced on elements one through to six, 
however, it is necessary to point out that it is impossible for a text to contain all the 
elements I have identified. Unless a title is particularly long it would be difficult for it to 
be both authorised and writerly, although it is possible for a text to both incorporate a 
fairy tale intertext, and to allude to the same intertext2. Nevertheless, identifying these 
eight elements allows me to specify the way(s) in which a text uses its fairy tale 
intertext(s), which facilitates comparison with others of the same type, but also helps 
rule out texts where the fairy tale intertext is not overly important. It is entirely possible 
for a text to exhibit more than one of these elements, and the more elements a text 
displays the safer it is to say that the fairy tale is a major intertext that is worth 
investigating rather than perhaps one among many intertexts that a text may or may 
not have.
' Although, as I w ill demonstrate, a binary opposition between explicit and implicit is an 
oversimplification, but perhaps a necessary simplification i f  we are to find the idea o f intertextuality 
useful.
2 Byatt’ s Babel Tower, as we w ill see, proves this. When reading it, I was constantly aware o f allusions 
to “ Bluebeard” , but it is only later in the narrative that this intertext is explicitly revealed.
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In order to demonstrate the eight ways a fairy tale intertext can be used, I will 
concentrate on one of the most popular fairy tale intertexts in contemporary fiction, 
“Bluebeard”. The fairy tale “Bluebeard” has been used as an intertext in many fictions 
in recent years and has proved a fertile field of criticism for feminist critics due to its 
explicit patriarchal message. The fact that “Bluebeard” criticism is a well-ploughed 
furrow is here an advantage rather than a disadvantage. By using a single fairy tale, 
the exposition of the different ways that fairy tales can be used as an intertext does not 
rely on the reader’s knowledge of dozens of significant fairy tales, and the criticism can, 
to some extent, excuse me from repeating arguments about “Bluebeard” again here, 
which are covered in depth in studies such as Casie Hermansson’s Reading Feminist 
Intertextuality through Bluebeard Stories (2001). Before I go on to discuss in further 
detail the eight ways in which fairy tales can be used as intertexts, it is necessary to 
provide a little historical information about “Bluebeard”.
“Bluebeard” made its literary debut in Charles Perrault’s 1697 Flistoires ou contes 
du temp passe. Perrault was not a “collector” of fairy tales, like the Brothers Grimm3, 
and he freely adapted and changed oral tales for his own purposes. His collection was 
also one of the first to address a double audience of adults and children. Before 
Perrault most literary fairy tales were written by and for adults, ranging from the 
medieval bawdy of Boccaccio and the risque tales of Basile and Straparola to the 
works of the erudite and aristocratic Saloniers Madame D’Aulnoy and Madame 
L’Heritier; the concept of the fairy tale as educational children’s literature did not arise 
until the nineteenth century, although we can certainly recognise Perrault as a 
precursor of this trend. While supposedly written for children, the writer takes up a faux 
naif style of narration that winks knowingly at adult readers4. Although Perrault’s 
precise sources are unknown, it is generally agreed that the tale(s) that Bluebeard was
’The Grimms have been criticised for not being true to their sources. Though they saw themselves as 
collectors rather than fabricators or adapters o f fo lk tales, when they came upon multiple versions or 
fragments o f a tale they would create their own hybrid “ ideal”  form, and their editing was heavily 
influenced by the values o f their time, See Zipes (1988) The Brothers Grimm.
4 A dual voice which is brought out by the narrator’s identification o f the w o lf in Red Riding Hood with 
young men in the moralistic verses that occur at the close o f that tale (see Zipes 1993).
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based on was/ were well known, and existed for some time before Perrault’s 
adaptation.
Various historical sources have been suggested as the basis of the tale, from the 
murderous Baron Gilles De Rais, who confessed to murdering 140 young boys and 
burying their remains about his castle, to Cunmar (or Comorre, the spelling seems to 
vary) the accursed, who decapitated a succession of wives as soon as they became 
pregnant (see Warner 1994a: 261, Windling 2002: 14-5). It is possible that Perrault 
knew of the legends surrounding these historical figures and incorporated details from 
the legends to add to his own tale, or it is just as possible that he knew similar stories 
that we now have no record of. Whatever his sources it is generally agreed that the 
remarkable facial hair of the murderous husband was Perrault’s invention. A version of 
Perrault’s tale, including the titular blue beard, was also reprinted in the 1812 first 
edition of Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm’s Kinder und Hausmarchen, but was removed 
from later editions, according to Maria Tatar, because its obvious French heritage 
clashed with the illusion of a uniquely German folklore that the Grimms were attempting 
to portray (Tatar 1987: 157). It is ironic, then, that in her article on Bluebeard in the 
Oxford Companion to Fairy Tales, Maria Tatar identifies two tales in the Grimm 
collection as representative of the pre-Perrault French Bluebeard stories:
The French versions of ‘Bluebeard’ that pre-date Perrault’s story reveal a 
close relationship to two tales recorded by the Brothers Grimm. The first of these, 
‘Fitcher’s Bird’, shows the youngest of three sisters using her ‘cunning’ to escape 
the snares set by a clever sorcerer [... ] The heroine of “The Robber Bridegroom 
also engineers a rescue, mobilizing her mental resources to thwart the thieves with 
whom her betrothed consorts
(Tatar 2000: 56)
The Grimms’ “Fitcher’s Bird” (KHM 46: AT 311), and “The Robber Bridegroom” 
(KHM 40: AT 955) have been linked with Bluebeard for many years. In the introduction 
to the 1888 edition of Perrault’s Popular Tales, Andrew Lang highlighted the similarities 
between Perrault’s tale about a murderous husband and those collected in the Kinder 
und Hausmarchen. We will return to the question of how we identify the relationship 
between fairy tales later, but the fact that Lang in 1888 felt it necessary to spell out an 
intertextual relationship between these tales is important.
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1. Authorised
Element one, the fairy tale as an authorised intertext is the most obvious use of 
fairy tale as an intertext. The use of a proper name of a fairy tale in the title acts as an 
authorial sanction that the text is to be understood in its relevance to a prior, pre­
existing fairy tale. No one would be surprised by an article ‘revealing’ the importance of 
“Bluebeard” to Margaret Atwood’s “Bluebeard’s Egg”, for example. There are 
numerous examples of this relationship that one may cite: Kurt Vonnegut’s Bluebeard, 
Max Frisch’s Bluebeard, Donald Barthelme’s Snow White, Margaret Atwood’s The 
Robber Bride and Robert Coover’s Briar Rose. However, although there are 
thousands upon thousands of collected folk tales that can be categorised as fairy tales 
there are relatively few fairy tales that are known by a proper name5, and there is 
therefore a sliding scale of recognition with the Disney popularised titles such as 
Sleeping Beauty, Cinderella and Beauty and the Beast operating as extremely explicit 
references, and with lesser known tales such as Briar Rose and The Girl Who Trod on 
a Loaf operating at the more ambiguous end of the scale. This difference can be seen 
in Atwood’s The Robber Bride, where one of the narrators of the text describes the 
story of the Grimm fairy tale, “The Robber Bridegroom”. Because this fairy tale 
intertext is not as obvious or well known as the most popular fairy tales that have been 
adapted by Disney, it is necessary for the author to explain or make the intertextual title 
explicit within the text itself by explaining it. Furthermore, it is entirely possible that an 
author may mislead the reader: a text may, in theory, be called Snow White and yet
5 This can be seen in the different names given to certain stories. The Grimms’ version of “Little Red Riding Hood” 
is called “Little Red Cap”. Due to difficulties in translation stories even within the Grimm collection are known by 
different names. One fairy tale has been translated as “Thousand Furs”, “Thousandfurs”, ’’All Fur” or left in the 
original German as “Allerle irauh” (All kinds of fur). Another tale, a variant of Bluebeard we will see more of below 
is known as “Fitcher’s Bird” or “Fowler’s Fowl” depending on the whim of the translator and the edition of the text 
used by the critic. It was this indeterminacy of naming that led to the practice of referring to tales by the numbers by 
which they appear within the Grimms’ collection, so a reader can tell that by “Thousandfurs” they mean the tale 65 
which is labelled in other books as “Thousand furs”. The Grimms had no such idea in mind, however, and their 
collection is not organised with tales grouped like- w ith -like, and the adoption of the tale numbers led to some critics 
comparing tales from other cultures with the Grimms’ “number 3”.
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have absolutely nothing to do with the fairy tale6. This suggests that the difference 
between Element one and two is arguably one of degree and not of type.
Due to the importance of the title of a work to the way in which we understand it, 
the examples above act as an exaggerated form of what happens any time a 
recognisable fairy tale name appears within a text. A critic might argue that Frederick 
Clegg in John Fowles’s The Collector is a Bluebeard figure, but without a direct 
reference to the fairy tale such an assertion lacks explicit authorial sanction7. The critic 
would have no such problems in trying to link the protagonist of Max Frisch’s Bluebeard 
with the eponymous fairy tale ogre. The case of Kurt Vonnegut’s Bluebeard is also 
illuminating. In this text there are several characters that may be likened to Bluebeard. 
As Casie Hermansson points out, the hyper-realistic advertising artist and Mussolini- 
admirer, Dan Gregory, to whom the narrator is apprenticed, even has his own 
forbidden chamber (Hermansson 2001: 179), “Your loving Papa asked just one thing of 
you as an expression of your loyalty: ‘Never go into the Museum of Modern Art’” 
(Vonnegut 1988: 166). This odious character whose violence, conservatism, misogyny 
and fascism seem in character with the monstrous nature of the fairy tale villain, is a 
complete contrast to the curmudgeonly, but likeable narrator, Rabo Karabekian, whose 
identification with Bluebeard is assured when he utters the words “ I am Bluebeard, and 
my studio is my forbidden chamber as far as you’re concerned” (47).
The explicit use of a fairy tale name in the title of Vonnegut’s Bluebeard allows 
the reader to see the narrator as Bluebeard despite the fact that neither he, nor Dan
6 Thus far, this remains a theoretical possibility as I have yet to come across such a text. Furthermore, 
even i f  this case did exist, the same mechanisms o f reading would be set up in the mind o f a reader who 
already knew o f the existence o f the identically titled predecessor text. The reader would still read the 
text attempting to attribute the character o f Snow White, the prince, the dwarves to different characters 
and in this way even i f  the new text bore no relevance whatsoever in the view o f the author the reader 
would still read the text intertextually, with reference to patterns imported from the prior text.
7 This seems an archaic point to be making in an era after the criticism o f Barthes’ “ The Death o f the 
Author” , but paradoxically, the author’s explicit sanction still seems to be the difference between an 
accepted (and perhaps somewhat boring) reading o f the intertextual relation between two texts and a 
critic ’s speculative interpretation. The case o f The Collector is interesting because the title is the only 
place an author could link the novel to the fairy tale. Due to the novel’s mode o f narration by the 
perpetrator (Clegg) and the victim (Miranda), neither o f these would particularly want to compare their 
situation to Bluebeard. Clegg, deluded and barely literate might not have heard o f the tale, and constantly 
denies responsibility for his actions where Miranda who optimistically fools herself into thinking there is 
a possibility o f release obviously prefers not to consider the possibility o f her death.
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Gregory, are serial killing maniacs who prey on young women. The use of the fairy tale 
title as the title of the novel, allows the reader to generate a reading of the text that 
appears uncontentious and even common sense. It also allows a degree of 
ambivalence, for despite his identification with the fairy tale ogre, the narrator appears 
as a wholly sympathetic character and we may object that it is perhaps Gregory, or 
even Gregory’s abusive mentor Beskudnikov, who is the real ogre in the tale. This 
readerly ambivalence over role allocation, to make the new version (hypertext) fit with 
its predecessor (hypotext), is neatly highlighted in Barthelme’s Snow White when the 
narrator forces the reader to acknowledge one character as a version of the Prince:
QUESTIONS:
1. Do you like the story so far? Yes ( ) No ( )
2. Does Snow White resemble the Snow White you remember? Yes ( ) No ( )
3. Have you understood, in reading to this point that Paul is the prince-figure? Yes
( ) N o (  )
4. That Jane is the wicked stepmother-figure? Yes ( ) No ( )
(Barthelme 1996 [1965]: 88)
The title of Barthelme’s Snow White refers the reader instantly to one of the most 
popular and recognisable (and Disneyfied) fairy tales, and the novella features a 
character called Snow White8, whose resemblance to the Snow White we remember is 
in question. In the extract above, Barthelme makes the reader consider characters in 
the light of the fairy tale, placing Paul up against the prince (a comparison that doesn’t 
much help Paul) and Jane against the wicked stepmother. If we had not the above 
clarification, we could argue about which characters fulfil those roles, but the author’s 
playful intervention helps relate the novella to the fairy tale and allocate characters to 
familiar roles9.
An explicit intertextual reference within the title, then, sets up a whole set of 
mechanisms whereby the reader automatically assumes that this intertextual reference 
is somehow relevant to the following text, the default setting may indeed be to assume
8 A  feature which, in a novel, is not necessary at all. The 1997 Film Snow White: A Tale o f  Terror has the 
protagonist/ Snow White character given the name Lilliana Hoffman, a change from folkloristic allegoric 
naming to the non-allegoric naming that Philippe Hamon identifies as one o f the major features o f 
realistic narrative. (Hamon, 1992: 168)
9 It is interesting the way Barthelme frames this question: “ Have you understood that Paul is the prince.”  
While suggesting that Paul is the prince, the question also allows the possibility that the reader who 
answers yes has been mistaken.
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that the new text is a version of the earlier, identically titled text. This is the most 
obvious sign of an author explicitly indicating the intertextual relation between his or her 
text and a predecessor. It is also a fairly rare phenomenon, due to the problems of 
copyright law, marketing, and the concept of originality. Though we may not see any 
problem with an author titling his or her text Bluebeard, Sleeping Beauty or Briar Rose, 
or even Ulysses, it is likely that we, and the courts, would find a new novel taking the 
name The Great Gatsby or Midnight’s Children a more problematic situation10. In the 
cases where a new novel does take on the plot of a previous tale, if the new text does 
wish to refer itself to its predecessor it is more likely to signal this intent through a use 
of element two.
2. W riterly
Element 2, an implicit or writerly reference within the title, may seem a 
contradiction in terms but the difference is one of reference. A direct reference to a 
well-known fairy tale in the title, as we have seen above, instantly generates an 
interpretation of the text that carries a certain authority (because it obviously has the 
author’s overt sanction), but the use of a more implicit reference allows for some 
interpretation. For example, John Fowles’ The Collector has been read as a version of 
“Bluebeard” (see Grace 1984 and Hermansson 2001), and in this argument its title can 
be used to substantiate this claim. Bluebeard is a collector of wives, and by this 
interpretation the unhinged protagonist of Fowles’ text can be viewed as a latter-day 
Bluebeard. However, by being at one remove from an explicit reference, the title 
allows more ambiguity: though we might argue, as Sherrill Grace does, that The 
Collector’s Clegg is a Bluebeard figure because he “collects women”, (1984: 254) it is 
entirely possible to say that the title is derived from his other hobbies, namely his habit 
of butterfly collecting11.
10 The one major exception I can think o f to this is in the world o f Hollywood remakes, where revisions 
(or remakes) o f old films are relatively common, and what is more, usually signal their relationship to the 
original by way o f having an identical title.
11 An interpretation given weight by the cover o f the 1998 Vintage edition o f the text which features a 
painting o f a butterfly with a number presumably identifying it, in a decaying wood frame.
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Other examples of a writerly reference in the title of a text could be Angela 
Carter’s Nights at the Circus and Salman Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children. The titular 
“Nights” of both these texts can be seen as cryptic intertextual references towards the 
Arabian Nights, an argument backed up by the references to Scheherezade and 
Nights-Wke storytelling in both texts. Again, the overlap between elements can be 
demonstrated by the fact that Angela Carter’s short story collection is called The 
Bloody Chamber, an implicit reference to the secret room of Bluebeard’s castle. 
Although the tale “The Bloody Chamber” is obviously a revision (element 6) of 
“Bluebeard”, the nexus between Perrault’s story and Carter’s is not explicit in the title of 
the short story.
Both element one, the explicit (authorised) reference, and element two, the 
implicit (writerly) reference, would be considered, according to Genette’s categories, 
examples of Peritextual transtextuality. “Peri” is, like Genette’s other terms, derived 
from Greek and roughly translated means “around” or “round about” (OED). He uses it 
to discuss elements that we might not normally consider part of the text itself: for 
example the title, front and back cover, chapter titles, epigraphs, forewords, after­
words, “about the author” prefaces, footnotes, endnotes, type-faces and illustrations. 
This term makes up one half of the two subclasses of Genette’s Paratextuality, with its 
opposite, Epitextual transtextuality referring to the halo of texts that surround a text 
and orient the reader towards it in meaningful ways, texts such as author interviews, 
reviews and criticism. Two good examples of the way in which peritextual features can 
influence a reader’s experience of the text are suggested by Graham Allen in his book, 
Intertextuality. He points to the example of Thackeray’s Henry Esmond where the 
book’s typeface was chosen by the author to closely resemble the typeface used in 
gothic literature of the time (Allen 2000: 104). This choice of font added something of 
meaning to the reader at the time that is lost in modern reprints that do not use the 
same lettering. Joyce’s decision to remove the chapter titles in the book edition of 
Ulysses again, changed the reader’s experience of the text. Where in serial-form the
title of each instalment stated the author’s Homeric model for that chapter, in book form
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these readily available and author sanctioned “sources” were obfuscated, depriving the 
reader of each chapter’s Homeric model, although Joyce did work to recirculate these 
chapter titles and reaffirm the relation between the two texts (2000: 106).
The difference between the authorised and writerly types of intertext in the title is 
an accentuated version of what happens in the text proper. Peritextual features that 
explicitly refer to the title (or other major, recognisable feature) of a well-known fairy 
tale are more prominent than similar references that occur within the main text itself. 
There may be hundreds of thousands of words in a novel, but only one title. There can 
be hundreds of allusions, but if the allusion is in the title, foreword or epigraph, it stands 
out from the rest of the text and assumes a certain importance.
We can therefore attribute a certain level of importance to the different types of 
peritextual intertextuality according to how prominent they are, assuming that the most 
prominent and explicit intertextual references affect the reader’s expectations of the 
text the most. The most obvious form of this is re-using a well-known fairy tale name in 
a prominent position (like the title, or subtitle), which either suggests the affinity of this 
text with a fairy tale intertext, or signals that this is a revision of the previous text, a 
supplementary version. A (named) fairy tale epigraph, a foreword by the author that 
mentions a fairy tale, or a chapter title that refers to a fairy tale, act in the same way as 
the next level down of explicitness. Implicit peritextual features that point towards a 
fairy tale intertext come further down the scale, and are less evident to the reader, and 
therefore may require more argument if a critic wishes to highlight the importance of an 
intertext pointed to by peritextual references. A graphical representation of the scale 
of explicitness would look something like the following:
i M ain  body o f  novel Chapter title  Foreword/Preface T itle
Chapter Epigraph Epigraph B lu rb
; Less e xp lic it M ore e xp lic it
This diagram however, only concerns peritextual features. It is doubtless true 
that epitextual features also affect the reader’s approach to a text. In the example of
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The Collector, for example, critics have had access to an interview that Fowles gave in 
which he mentioned Bela Bartok’s Duke Bluebeard’s Castle as one of the primary 
sources that he drew on when writing the novel (Newquist 1964). In cases like this, 
texts that are typically viewed as extraneous can fundamentally alter one’s perception 
of a novel. Furthermore, the line between epitextual and peritextual features can be 
blurred. Consider modern editions of Ulysses that feature footnotes concerning the 
changes between versions and drafts, essays, and Joyce’s own criticism of the text, 
from various personal letters.
3. Incorporation
The most obvious way a fairy tale can be explicitly referred to is incorporation of 
the fairy tale into the novel. The following example from Kurt Vonnegut’s Bluebeard 
is a case in point:
I have now returned to this typewriter from the vicinity of the swimming pool, 
where I asked Celeste and her friends in and around that public teenage athletic 
facility, if they knew who Bluebeard was. I meant to mention Bluebeard in this 
book. I wanted to know if I had to explain, for the sake of young readers, who 
Bluebeard was.
Nobody knew. While I was at it, I asked them if they recognized the names of 
Jackson Pollock, Mark Rothko, or Terry Kitchen, or Truman Capote, or Nelson 
Algren, or Irwin Shaw, or James Jones, all of whom had figured not only in the 
history of arts and letters but in the history of the Hamptons. They did not. So 
much for achieving immortality via the arts and letters.
So: Bluebeard is a fictitious character in a very old children’s tale, possibly 
based loosely on a murderous nobleman of long ago. In the story he has married 
many times. He marries for the umpteenth time, and brings his latest child bride 
back to his castle. He tells her that she can go into any room but one, whose door 
he shows her.
Bluebeard is either a poor psychologist or a great one, since all his new wife 
can think about is what might be behind the door. So she takes a look when she 
thinks he isn’t home, but he really is home.
He catches her just at the point she is gazing aghast at the bodies of all his 
former wives in there, all of whom he has murdered, save for the first one, for 
looking behind the door. The first one got murdered for something else.
(Vonnegut 1988: 46)
Here, not only is Bluebeard explicitly mentioned, but a full synopsis of the tale is 
included to drive home the importance of the intertext. If the reader, like Celeste and 
her friends, did not know the title of the book, Bluebeard, was an intertextual reference 
to a fairy tale, they will certainly appreciate that fact after the above synopsis. The 
narrator and fictional autobiographer, Rabo Karabekian, feels that the fairy tale is 
important to his own story as we can see in his later remark to his visitor who is curious
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about his locked studio: “Look: think about something else, anything else. I am 
Bluebeard, and my studio is my forbidden chamber as far as you’re concerned” (47).
The technique of embedding a synopsis of a fairy tale is also used in Margaret 
Atwood’s The Robber Bride which contains a synopsised account of “The Robber 
Bridegroom” (KHM 40) and her short story “Bluebeard’s Egg” which contains a short 
version of “Fitcher’s Bird” (KHM 46). In each case, the reader is explicitly alerted to the 
existence and importance of a particular intertext.
The fairy tale in both these cases acts as a supplement to the story and fulfils the 
paradoxical nature of the supplement highlighted by Derrida; although it may appear 
supplementary (or dispensable) the fairy tale plot takes on greater importance, 
becoming a model by which the reader can understand the text. As W.J.Keith 
suggests, Atwood’s “Bluebeard’s Egg” shows how the “Bluebeard” story affects its 
protagonist’s world view (Keith 1994: 252), and indeed, the assignment given the 
protagonist in her creative writing class “a version of Bluebeard, set in the present day 
and not using the universal narrator” is an apt description of the short story.
In those cases where a fairy tale is incorporated into a novel, it often fulfils the 
function of the mise en abyme. A mise en abyme is defined by Lucien Dallenbach as 
“any internal mirror that reflects the whole o f the narrative by simple, repeated or 
‘specious’ (or paradoxical) duplication" (Dallenbach 1977: 36 author’s emphasis).
Other uses of incorporating a fairy tale, or other story, into a novel is to give an 
insight into the narrator’s psychological state and the intersubjective material that has 
influenced their expectations. The following quotation from Charlotte Bronte’s Jane 
Eyre is a good example of this technique, where the reader is introduced to the legend 
of the Gytrash and the mysterious Mr. Rochester at the same time:
In those days I was young, and all sorts of fancies bright and dark tenanted 
my mind: the memories of nursery stories were there amongst other rubbish; and 
when they recurred, maturing youth added to them a vigour and vividness beyond 
what childhood could give. As this horse approached, and as I watched for it to 
appear through the dusk, I remembered certain of Bessie’s tales wherein figured a 
North-of-England spirit, called a ‘Gytrash’; which, in the form of a horse, mule, or 
large dog, haunted solitary ways, and sometimes came upon belated travellers, as 
this horse was now coming upon me.
It was very near, but not now in sight; when, in addition to the tramp, tramp, I 
heard a rush under the hedge, and close down by the hazel stems glided a great
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dog, whose black and white colour made him a distinct object against the trees. It 
was exactly one mask of Bessie’s G y t r a s h a  lion-like creature with long hair and 
a huge head: it passed me, however, quietly enough; not staying to look up, with 
strange pretercanine eyes, in my face, as I half expected it would. The horse 
followed, -a  tall steed, and on its back a rider. The man, the human being, broke 
the spell at once. Nothing ever rode the Gytrash: it was always alone; and goblins, 
to my notions, though they might tenant the dumb carcasses of beasts, could 
scarce covet shelter in the common-place human form. No Gytrash was this, -  
only a traveller taking the short cut to Millcote.
(Bronte C 1996: 128 Volume 1 Chapter 12)
4. Allusion
Element 4 is titled allusion due to the problematic nature of that term. Allusion 
is part of the standard toolkit of literary criticism and such a long-standing feature of 
literary criticism that it is very infrequently defined; no mention of it graces the pages of 
The Oxford Companion to English Literature or even Katie Wales’s Dictionary of 
Stylistics. It suits my needs to term implicit uses of intertexts as allusion because of the 
implicit nature of the allusion as defined by the OED. The OED contains four meanings 
for the word, three of them obsolete: 
t1  Illusion. Obs.
t2 . A play upon words, a word-play, a pun. Obs.
t3 . A symbolical reference or likening; a metaphor, parable, allegory. Obs.
4. A covert, implied, or indirect reference; a passing or incidental reference (cf. 
Allude v. 5). Also attrib. In allusion book, a collection of references to a writer or 
his works.
(OED)
As the only non-archaic sense of the word makes clear, an allusion is typically 
covert or indirect. Where the dictionary uses the terms overt and covert, I substitute 
my preferred terms, explicit and implicit. Clearly, the incorporation of a fairy tale 
(element 3) cannot be described as covert, implied, indirect, passing or incidental. This 
type of intertextuality is of the kind that is usually termed intertextuality because of its 
obvious links with other texts, and it is for this reason that I term it explicit.
Intertextuality that is closer towards the implicit end of the scale (because, as we saw 
above, there is a scale of explicitness, it is not a clear binary) is considered allusion. 
Intertextuality that cannot be missed or ignored is more likely to be given its proper 
name.
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4.1 Quotation
Quotation is one of the classical types of allusion, and falls under Genette’s 
category of “Kristevan” intertextuality. Indeed, Genette has written about the practice 
of quotation at length in Paratexts and I cannot hope to cover it at anything like the 
same depth here. Quotations are most obvious to the reader when they occur marked 
with quotation marks with references attributing them to their source (attributions to an 
author are common; telling the reader the book, edition and page number less so). 
When quotations are presented in this way, they accentuate their intertextuality (as 
they are, after all, references to another text) and can be considered an example of 
explicit intertextuality. However except in academic volumes very few quotations are 
presented in this manner, and when they are, the reader assumes that the quotation 
has a special significance.
Due to the recognisable tone of fairy tales, quotations tend to be easily 
recognisable. When the line “All the better to see you with” occurs in “The Bloody 
Chamber” few readers need to be told that this is the refrain from the fairy tale 
generally known as Little Red Riding Hood (Carter 1992: 17).
4.2 Character names, the proliferation of signifiers
This implicit intertext can be as small as a single word: When Philip Pullman in 
his novel The Amber Spyglass names one character Baruch, and another Metatron, 
these character names act as allusions, linking the text with Old Testament myth and 
the Apocrypha, just as the character Jibreel Farishta in Salman Rushdie’s Satanic 
Verses links that text with the Koran. Calling a character, or even mentioning the name 
Satan brings up a whole slew of intertextual references, from folklore to the King 
James’ Bible and Milton’s Paradise Lost
It is helpful, at this point to recall the distinction made by the Russian formalists 
between sjuzet and fabula. The sjuzet is the surface text, the way in which the events 
of the narrative are narrated, and the fabula is the events depicted, the underlying 
events that are narrated. These terms are sometimes used interchangeably with story
and histoire, the French structuralist equivalents (Wales 1997: 169).
26
An allusory character name is an example of an intertextual reference that can be 
located on the surface of the text. The signifier used to refer to a character in one text 
is recognisably the same as the signifier used to refer to a character in another text. As 
allusions go, this type of allusion is fairly explicit, assuming that the reader recognises 
the name is also used in another text. Once again, we can see a sliding scale of 
recognition, where using the name of particularly famous characters like Emma Bovary, 
Hamlet or Cinderella occupies the explicit end and less famous characters like Trabb’s 
boy, or any number of minor characters from the panoply of the novel genre the implicit 
end.
If all readers were omniscient we could assume that any character name that had 
been used in a previous book would be an explicit intertext, but unfortunately for us this 
is not the case. The term allusion is useful here precisely because it deals with a 
liminal area between two texts; a text might contain a reference to Bluebeard directly 
by name, but we cannot assume that the reader knows who Bluebeard is12. In cases 
like this, the intertext is a cryptogram. It is only activated when the reader has the 
knowledge to decode it.
Allusions that exist on the level of the sjuzet may be cryptograms, but they are 
hidden in plain sight. A handy metaphor for this form of intertextuality is the practice of 
steganography. As Singh defines it, “Secret communication achieved by hiding the 
existence of a message is known as steganography, derived from the Greek words 
stegano, meaning ‘covered’, and Graphein, meaning to write” (Singh 1999: 5 my 
emphasis). Steganography, although a term originally used interchangeably with 
cryptography, has taken on specialised meaning in recent years. The term refers to 
the practice of hiding information within other information that may appear innocuous at 
first sight. The only way to decode a steganogram is to have foreknowledge of the 
secret code. One everyday example of this is the practice of watermarking, where a 
picture when treated in a special way (held up to the light) reveals a hidden message,
12 And it is for this reason that I consider texts incorporating a synopsis o f the fairy tale as the only 
examples where the reader is forced to acknowledge an intertext. Lack o f prior knowledge, and indeed 
the reader’s own familiarity with the intertext is rendered triv ia l by this method.
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in this case the message that this piece of currency is genuine. More historical 
examples of steganography can be seen in the communications between the British 
government and the French Resistance in the Second World War. The BBC would 
include secret messages like “the chair is against the wall” in their broadcasts. This 
innocuous seeming phrase would not raise anyone’s attention unless the listener knew 
this to be a secret code, which signalled the target for that night’s Allied bombing (Lau 
2003: 4). In this way, operatives could receive messages without it ever becoming 
clear to those who heard the broadcast but were not aware of the key that a secret 
transmission had occurred. An allusion on the surface level of the text, be it a 
character name, place name, or even an unreferenced quotation is very much like a 
steganogram: it is hidden in plain sight, and obvious to everyone who has the 
foreknowledge necessary to decode it. To those who lack this knowledge the 
communication makes sense only in its relation to other events on the sjuzet, rather 
than being an active link to extended meaning.
It is no great insight to say that fictional characters, whether from folklore like 
Little Red Riding Hood or from literature, like Tom Jones, exist only as words. Things 
become more complicated when we begin to see characters with the same names as 
real people. The phenomenon of characters in a work of fiction being ‘borrowed’ from 
the books of others (like Emma Bovary in Woody Allen’s The Kugelmass Experiment) 
or recognisably real personages being depicted in works of fiction highlight the 
philosophical problems of intertextuality. When, in A.S. Byatt’s “The Djinn in the 
Nightingale’s Eye” the narrator meets Gerard Genette and Tzvetan Todorov, we see a 
kind of ontological clash13. How much of this is historically true? What part of it is real? 
Cases like these foreground ontological questions about the novel, and history itself. 
For the vast majority of people, famous people, like literary characters, exist only as 
words or images. This overlap between the fictional and the historical is one of the 
major sources of what Hutcheon calls historiographic metafiction, or postmodernism.
13 Assuming, o f course, that the reader knows that these names also refer to well known structuralist 
critics.
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Sometimes, as in Pat Barker’s Regeneration, the representation of literary characters 
who share the same name as historical personages is based upon real events and 
sometimes, as in D.M.Thomas’s The White Hotel, it is a total fabrication. How can the 
reader know the truth of events without referring outside the text? How can the reader 
trust the texts outside the text, which are also words?
Brian McHale, for whom the key distinction between Modernism and 
Postmodernism is the former’s emphasis on questions of epistemology and the latter’s 
emphasis on ontology calls this phenomenon of “borrowed” characters, transworld 
characters, because they make the reader question the boundaries between one 
world (reality) and another (history or fiction). Postmodernism has been especially 
identified with the use of intertextuality, as in Hassan’s famous list of the key terms of 
modernism and postmodernism (Hassan 1993: 152), despite the fact that the novel as 
a genre has been shot through with intertextuality, from Don Quixote onwards and that 
Modernism too was essentially intertextual, especially if we look at the examples of The 
Wasteland or Ulysses. It is perhaps because of the phenomenon of transworld 
characters, names that the reader recognises from one discourse (history), that 
postmodernism has been so heavily linked with intertextuality. The names operate as 
an intertext which forces the reader to question the nature of reality (did this event 
really happen) and the nature of representation (which discourses are considered 
‘authoritative’ and why?).
4.3 Character description
If a character name allusion can be highly explicit types, slightly less explicit is 
character description. Margaret Atwood when discussing The Handmaid’s Taleu 
once asked, “What do you think of when you see someone in red carrying a basket?” 
(Wilson 1993: 271). The answer, to most people, is the heroine of that perennially 
popular fairy tale, Little Red Riding Hood. Recognising an intertextual link between one 
character and another is an operation that takes place on the threshold between fabula
14 The cover to one American edition o f The Handmaid’s Tale which Atwood described as “ a knock-out!”  
helps readers recognise the fairy tale intertext, as it depicts two red-robed handmaids carrying baskets 
(Wilson 1993: 379).
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and sjuzet, although any description necessarily takes place on the surface of the text, 
recognition usually takes place by comparing the fabula description of one character 
with another. If a character has two ugly sisters who mistreat her, we will be put in 
mind of Cinderella. If a character is portrayed as an old miser who is nasty even about 
Christmas (like the character Mr. Potter in Frank Capra’s It’s A Wonderful Life) we 
might be put in mind of Ebenezer Scrooge.
One of the interesting things about allusions to fairy tales that operate via 
character names is that they have the capacity to be extremely explicit. The vast 
majority of western readers will instantly recognise references to Cinderella and 
Rapunzel, for example. But these names, like the vast majority of fairy tale character 
names are metonyms, a way of recalling a major facet of that tale in a “part for whole” 
keyword. Cinderella is named after the cinders that she is covered in (hence the name 
of the Grimm version, Aschenputtel), Rapunzel is named after the herb that her mother 
craved during her pregnancy, whose theft leads to her real parents being forced to give 
their child to the witch. Sleeping Beauty is almost a summary of the story rather than a 
description of the protagonist’s personal qualities. The difference between character 
names and character definitions is very slight in the fairy tale due to the oral origins of 
the tales. A character may be given a different name by every narrator who tells their 
story, but what really identifies them is the actions that they take. For this reason, we 
have come to know characters by names that derive from either their actions, or by 
particular features that stand out as important in a tale: for example Little Red Riding 
Hood is metonymically named by her attire due to the intense symbolic nature of that 
garment15.
On the other hand, identifying a character as fairy tale-like can also be 
problematic. The example of Bluebeard is one where the character’s murderous 
activities are typically the basis of comparison, especially when the murderer preys on 
women. However, the trope of the male serial killer is so common in contemporary
15 The riding hood is an addition by Perrault, but it is significant that it was adopted and became an 
important part o f both literary and oral retellings o f the tale after Perrault (Levorato 2003: 6-7)
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fiction, from cinematic horror to pulp novels, that almost any murderer could be linked 
to Bluebeard.
This leads to a need for expanded linkage. The character of Bluebeard is not 
only defined by his distinctive mane/name but has various other characteristics, such 
as his wealth and his isolated castle16. In some stories using “Bluebeard” as an 
intertext, it could be argued that a character is Bluebeard-like due to these features.
For example, in A.S. Byatt’s Babel Tower {he character Nigel is aristocratic, rich, 
violent, misogynistic and owns a house that is (like a castle) surrounded by a moat, a 
list of qualities highly reminiscent of the fairy tale ogre.
These “Bluebeard”-like qualities correspond with resemblances between the plot 
of “Bluebeard” and Babel Tower, in which the protagonist, Frederica uses a “sharp 
toothed” little key to open a suitcase in one of her husband, Nigel’s “secret places”.
She discovers not human remains, as in the fairy tale, but a stash of sadomasochistic 
pornography which is presented in the same way: “ It is like finding trunks of butchered 
limbs, she tells herself wildly, hands and feet under the floorboards” (Byatt 1997: 101). 
Of course, it helps the reader to recognise Bluebeard as an intertext when the narrator 
describes Nigel as having blue stubble, and when later on the fairytale villain’s name is 
used as an analogy, first by Frederica and then by her husband’s divorce lawyer. In 
the case of Babel Tower then, the reader is aided in recognising Bluebeard as an 
intertext through the description of Nigel and through similarities between the two texts 
on the structural level.
4.4 Pattern Recognition (Structure)
Fairy tales are usually short in length and typically quite simple in terms of 
structure and character. They are perhaps the best example of formulaic narratives, 
which explains why formalist and structuralist critics have analysed them in such depth. 
The best-known example of structuralist criticism of the fairy tale is Vladimir Propp’s 
Morphology o f the Folk Tale in which Propp, after analysing 600 Russian folk tales
16 Wealth and an isolated home are also characteristics o f the wizards in “ Fitcher’ s bird” , and Calvino’s 
“ Silver Nose” , and the robber in “ The Robber Bridegroom”  and “ M r Fox” .
31
identifies 31 functions which are found in all the tales. After observing that names and 
dramatis personae change from tale to tale but that neither their actions nor functions 
change, he rules that it is therefore possible to study the tale according to the functions 
of its dramatis personae where function is understood as “an act of character, defined
from the point of view of its significance for the course of the action” (Propp 1973: 21).
To adapt this point for my own focus on Bluebeard, it is evident that whether the ogre is 
called Bluebeard, Fitcher or Silver-nose, his function within the tale is identical: he is a 
murderous ogre who gives an interdiction to the protagonist that she will disobey. 
Likewise, the item given to the heroine that betrays her actions can be anything from 
an egg to a key items with vastly different symbolic connotations, but which fulfil 
precisely the same role within the tale as markers of disobedience.
Propp goes on to make four key claims about the fairy tale:
1. Functions of characters serve as stable, constant elements in a tale, 
independent of how and by whom they are fulfilled. They constitute the 
fundamental components of a tale.
2. The number of functions known to the fairy tale is limited [... ]
3. The sequence of functions is always identical [...]
4. All fairy tales are of one type in regard to their structure.
(Propp 1973: 21-24)
Point 4 deserves special consideration due to the enormity of the claim that 
Propp makes: All fairy tales are fundamentally constructed by a limited number of 
functions that occur in an identical sequence and there is no exception. Propp’s work 
is an act of pattern recognition on the level of the text’s structure. Details on the text’s 
surface about where the hero is from, the hero’s name or motivations, are irrelevant 
compared to the similarities on the structural level of the text. As an example, we might 
think of difference between the interdictions given by Bluebeard to his wives and that 
given to Sleeping Beauty. At first sight they appear fundamentally different in nature; 
where one is the command of a murderous husband, the other is the order of an 
overprotective parent. Propp recognises that even though these interdictions seem to 
be fundamentally different, structurally they play an identical role: it is in the nature of 
the interdiction in the fairy tale (indeed, in almost any type of story you care to mention)
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to be violated, and therefore both of these interdictions would fall under the function he 
designates as “y”: “An interdiction is addressed to the hero".
Recognising patterns on the level of structure is an innate critical reaction that is 
shared by almost all audiences. On the most simplistic level we recognise a play 
where the lead characters get married at the end as a form of comedy. A play where 
the lead character dies in the final act we recognise as tragedy. We compare books 
that contain flying saucers to other books with flying saucers, books set in the drawing 
room milieu of the early nineteenth century with other books set in the same 
environment. Pattern recognition is one of the key ways we identify genre; it is what 
Genette identifies as a book’s Architext.
4.5 Patterns or motifs? The Aarne-Thompson index
Folklorists regularly use a system that is based upon pattern recognition. The 
Aarne-Thompson index is a system used to classify folklore according to content, by 
assigning numbers to tale types that are recognisably derived from oral culture. Tales 
are grouped thematically, with animal tales occupying type numbers 1-299, ordinary 
folk tales (including fairy tales) numbers 300-1199, jokes and anecdotes 1200-1999. 
The Aarne-Thompson index covers a larger range of texts than Propp’s study, covering 
all folklore, not just the fairy tale. It is also much larger in scope than Propp’s 
Morphology. Where Propp reduces all fairy tales to 31 functions, Aarne and Thompson 
catalogue thousands of different tale types. One reason for this major difference is that 
folklorists in the eighteenth, nineteenth and even early twentieth century, tended to be 
concerned with the genealogy of a tale. Where Propp is concerned with the inner 
workings, the grammar of storytelling in general, folklore has traditionally been 
concerned with the origin and evolution of a certain tale type. We may recognise this 
as a major fault-line between two techniques that attempt to utilise a scientific model: 
where, according to Saussure’s terminology, Propp’s model is synchronic; the 
conventional model for folklorists is diachronic. The model governing Propp’s study is 
grammar; the model for Aarne and Thompson is ethno-botany.
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In the Aarne-Thompson index there is one unit smaller than the tale, and this is 
the motif. An extended quotation from Thompson himself explains the difference 
between the type and the motif:
A type is a traditional tale that has an independent existence, that can be told 
as a complete narrative and does not depend for its meaning on any other tale [... ]
A motif is the smallest element in a tale having a power to persist in tradition.
In order to have this power it must have something unusual and striking about it.
Most motifs fall into three classes. First are the actors in a tale— gods, or unusual 
animals, or marvelous creatures like witches, ogres or fairies, or even the 
conventionalised human characters like the favorite youngest child or the cruel 
stepmother. Second come certain items in the background of the action— magic 
objects, unusual customs, strange beliefs and the like. In the third place there are 
single incidents— and these comprise the great majority of motifs. It is this last 
class that can have an independent existence and that may therefore serve as true 
tale types. By far the largest number of traditional types consist of these single 
motifs. For the purpose of furnish a basis for the survey of traditional narrative in 
an area having a large common store of tales a type index is necessary; the 
principal use of a motif-index is to display identity or similarity in the tale elements 
in all parts of the world so that they can be conveniently studied. A type-index 
implies that all versions of a type have a genetic relationship; a motif index makes 
no such assumption.
(Thompson 1977; 415-6) 
Motifs, then, are highly important elements. A tale type can consist simply of one 
motif, or a chain of motifs linked together. The removal or addition of a certain motif 
may be the difference between one tale type and another. But for all the proposed 
scientific exactness that an index of motifs proposes, it cannot get round the fact that 
recognising a motif is an act of pattern recognition. It depends on the folklorist or critic 
recognising a “striking” feature and then comparing tales that utilise this striking event 
or something like it. The actual motif does not need to be exactly the same thing. The 
AT index is therefore an ideal model of the way that audiences and critics recognise 
patterns on the level of a story’s structure.
In this index, the tale named “Bluebeard” is given the number 312, placing it 
within the realm of tales that feature a “supernatural adversary”. The motifs identified 
in the AT index are:
I. G400, Person falls into ogre’s power. R11.1. Princess (maiden) abducted 
by monster (ogre). G81. Unwitting marriage to cannibal. T721.5. Subterranean 
castle. C611. Forbidden chamber. Person allowed to enter all chambers except 
one. C311.1.1. Tabu: looking at ghosts. C227. Tabu: eating human flesh. C913.
Bloody key as sign of disobedience.
II. C920. Death for breaking tabu.
(Aarne and Thompson 1964: 102)
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In identifying the introductory motifs of Bluebeard (AT312), Aarne and Thompson 
refer to a tale type that has long since been associated with Bluebeard, and which is 
best known as the Grimms’ “Fitcher’s Bird” (AT311), and the index works to further 
accentuate the similarities between the two tales by presenting them in close proximity 
and interlinking 312 with 311 with the phrase “For introductory motifs, see type 311” 
(103). The following motifs are given as being specific to type 312:
S62.1. Bluebeard. K551. Respite from death granted until prayer is finished.
G551.1. Rescue of sister from ogre by brother. G652. Rescue from ogre by helpful 
animals.
(103)
As a cursory inspection of the motifs that are included in “Bluebeard”, we can first 
see that many motifs are not found in the best-known example of the tale.
Motif In “Bluebeard In “Hare’s 
Bride”
G400 yes yes
R11.1. no yes
G81 no no
T721.5 no no
C611 yes no
C311.1.1 no no
C227 no no
C913 yes no
C920 yes no
S62.1. yes no
C551.1. yes no
C652. no no
Statistically, Perrault’s “Bluebeard” only contains 50% of the motifs that 
supposedly characterise the tale17. This paltry score may be increased if we consider
17 This figure is, o f course, questionable. Some o f the motifs may be cases o f either/ or particularly the 
two Tabus (a tale with a prohibition on looking at ghosts and eating human flesh is harder to imagine) 
although i f  the protagonist were a princess and the ogre a cannibal, then the criteria for G400, R11.1 and 
G 81 would be fulfilled.
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the secret room as being an example of C311.1.1 although if that is the case “looking 
at ghosts” is a strange summary to give of the motif, and “looking at corpses” would be 
more apt. This confusion over what to count as a motif is increased when stories are 
read symbolically. Marina Warner suggests that cannibalism in “Bluebeard” is a 
metaphor for promiscuity, pointing to cases where, despite being labelled a cannibal, 
the protagonist finds the intact remains of the ogre’s previous wives, raising the 
question of what exactly the cannibal has eaten (Warner 1994a: 259). To explain this 
consumption, Warner reads the cannibalistic urge as a form of male promiscuity where 
the woman is “consumed” in the symbolic sense, although as she later explains, this 
symbolic cannibalism is almost as dangerous to the woman as the real thing, given the 
likelihood of death during childbirth before the early twentieth century. But cannibal is 
also used in everyday language to refer to the uncultured, a synonym for “savages”. In 
The Collector Miranda even mockingly refers to her captor as Caliban, poking fun at his 
lack of urbanity, a fact that can be used to connect that novel with Bluebeard, if we 
read symbolically rather than literarily18. We may question the classification of tale 
types even further when analysing the second example of type 312 given in the AT 
index, the Grimms’ “The Hare’s Bride” (KHM 66).
This story tells of a girl who sits on the tail of a hare and is carried away to its little 
hut. Then the hare forces her to cook for the wedding guests, twice entering the 
kitchen telling her to hurry, the girl dresses up a straw doll to take her place, and 
escapes. The next time the hare tells the girl to hurry up, he furiously strikes the head 
off the straw doll, at which point the cap falls off the doll and the hare realises he has 
been duped and is sad.
The connection between this story and Bluebeard seems tenuous in the extreme. 
Instead of a mass murderer we have an unpleasant hare, there is no secret chamber,
18 In a chain o f analogy where Caliban = Cannibal (suggested anagrammatically in The Tempest even 
though there is no evidence that Caliban has ever tasted human flesh) = M o tif G81 = Bluebeard. The 
representation o f the Bluebeard figure as uncultured is also a feature o f B ya tf s Babel Tower, where the 
husband doesn’t understand poetry, Atwood’ s Bluebeard’s Egg with its naive heart surgeon (!), and even 
Carter’s Nights at the Circus where the duke may be rich, but his taste is also rather gauche and 
meretricious.
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no dead brides and no sentencing to death. In fact, if “Bluebeard” matches the motif 
list only by 50%, this tale scores a paltry 17%, featuring only motif G400 and R11.1 
(and those only if you accept the hare represents an ogre19, which is quite an 
imaginative leap). The latter part of the tale even resembles tale type 311 more than 
312, particularly motifs G501 "Stupid ogre” and K525 “Escape by use of substituted 
object”. The only unifying theme between the two tales seems to be “bad husband”, 
and even this is an over-generalisation, given that the husband in the second tale is a 
hare and the protagonist and her nemesis aren’t even married. Saying that the two 
tales are of the same type seems counterintuitive.
The Aarne-Thompson index was designed to organise folk tales, so that tales of 
the same family, or with the same subject could be organised in a logical manner, as 
Aarne himself implies:
How much would it facilitate the work of the collector of tales if all the 
collections of folk-tales thus far printed should be arranged according to the same 
system. The scholar would be in a position to discover in a moment the material for 
which he has the need in any collection, whereas at present he is compelled to 
look through the entire work if he wishes to acquaint himself with the contents. [... ]
If now the classification of types issued by the Folk-Lore Fellows, in their 
collections and catalogues to appear in the future, should come into general use, 
the collecting of material would thereby be made very much easier.
(Aarne quoted in Thompson 1977: 415)
As we have seen, however, the classification of types can sometimes seem a 
haphazard and arbitrary arrangement. In a collection ordered according to the AT type 
index, a story about a nasty bunny would be right next to one of the darkest tales of 
serial murder in popular fairy tales. Furthermore, you would have to skip several 
hundred pages to find another tale type that has been linked with “Bluebeard” for 
centuries. “The Robber Bridegroom”, or a tale resembling it, has been suggested as a 
possible source that Perrault drew on when writing his tale by some critics (see 
Windling 2002 :15-21, Tatar 2000: 56), and the English version of the tale, “Mr. Fox”, is
19 Indeed the definition o f ogre is also problematic within the Aarne-Thompson m otif index. The ogre 
can be a giant, a serial killer, a witch, a queen and apparently, it seems, even a hare. This flex ib ility  
resembles Propp’s system o f terming characters as “ functions” , in that it does not matter to the structure 
o f the story what name the villa in is, he is the villa in because he behaves villainously. Nevertheless, it is 
odd that a villa in who happens to be a robber, is treated entirely differently to one who is not.
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alluded to in Much Ado About Nothing, proving that this story predates Perrault’s late 
17th century collection (Carter 2001a:230).
Because the protagonist’s fiance in this tale is a robber, a natural rather than 
supernatural adversary, we find the tale amongst the other tales of robbers allocated 
the number 955. Here a relationship between tales (possibly in the traditional sense of 
source criticism) is obscured due to the non-magical nature of the villain, even though it 
is hard to see exactly what is magical about Perrault’s Bluebeard, where only the key 
(and perhaps the blue beard) appears supernatural. Whether tales are related to each 
other seems always to be decided by the individual critic. If Aarne and Thompson 
judged the marital relationship between protagonist and villain more important than 
whether the villain was realistic (a robber) or unrealistic (a wizard or ogre) we can 
easily imagine the tales would be closer together in classification. Similarly, we can 
imagine that different critics might find different motifs the most important aspect of a 
tale, as Maria Tatar writes, critics have constantly focused on the “bloody key as a sign 
of disobedience” as the major motif in the “Bluebeard” fairy tales (Tatar 1987: 166,
2000: 56). It is clear that Aarne and Thompson did not share this view, due to the 
allocation of “The Hare’s Bride” to type 312, and the fact that this motif does not occur 
therein.
If anything, the Aarne-Thompson index’s greatest utility and its greatest flaws 
come because it is modelled upon the operations that take place in the human mind. 
When watching Disney’s Pinocchio20 anyone who has heard the story of Jonah and the 
Whale automatically recognises the similarity between the two stories, just as the 
reader of fairy tales recognises similarities between Odysseus’ theft from Polyphemus 
and Jack’s theft from the giant. The AT index assigns these events a motif number to 
formally link the tales, where the human mind makes the link in a more ineffable 
manner, recognising the similarity between the two tales without having to bridge them
20 The Disney revision o f Collodi’s serial/ novel, makes this reading more obvious to the modern day 
viewer substituting a whale for the original story’s ‘terrible fish’ . However, what popular belief specifies 
as a ‘whale’ is referred to in the book o f Jonah as a ‘great fish’ , a description that most whales would 
object to, being as they are, fully-paid-up members o f the mammalian club (Wunderlich and Morrisey 
2002).
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with the thought “ah motif number G610”. The mind is able to recognise the patterns in 
one story and another, just as we are able to recognise film re-makes, or dramatic 
versions of novels. Pattern recognition is increasingly stressed in modern psychology 
of the type practiced by MIT professor Stephen Pinker, and which suggests that the 
human brain is uniquely engineered by natural selection to recognise patterns, an 
ability that facilitates what Noam Chomsky called the Language Acquisition Device 
(Pinker 1994: 15-24). But it is the mind’s superior ability to recognise patterns that 
also shows the faults with the AT index. Andrew Lang recognised the similarities 
between “The Robber Bridegroom” and “Bluebeard”, but as we have already noticed, 
the AT index is obliged to place them at opposite ends of the book due to one tale 
featuring a robber and the other featuring an “ogre”. Likewise, Marina Warner 
recognises KHM 3, “Mary’s Child”, as related to “Bluebeard”, despite it featuring the 
Virgin Mary in the role of “Bluebeard” and therefore appearing as type 710 (Warner 
1994a: 244).
It is not only folklorists who attempt to chart relationships between texts by 
identifying patterns. A common strategy in literary criticism is “revealing” the influence 
of text a upon text b, or recognizing text a as an update of text b. So it is not surprising 
when we see, for example, Sherrill Grace referring to John Fowles’ The Collector as an 
update of “Bluebeard”. It shares certain themes (the murderous and rich man, the 
secret room, the isolated location) but in other ways it lacks some features that have 
been seen as the definitive (such as the prohibition to enter the secret room, the 
previously murdered wives, the bloody key as sign of disobedience). Casie 
Hermansson gets around this problem by reducing Bluebeard to two key elements, the 
murderous male and the secret chamber, much like a folklorist identifying the motifs 
that they consider to be most important to a tale (Hermansson 2003).
Despite problems with the Aarne-Thompson index, it is possible to use it in order 
to show the similarities (or differences) in structure between one fairy tale and another. 
It is also useful for highlighting structural similarities between a novel and fairy tale, as
the following table comparing “Bluebeard” and Babel Tower shows.
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Motif “Bluebeard Babel Tower
G.81
Unwitting
marriage
to
cannibal
G400.
Person 
falls into 
ogre’s 
power
After being courted, the protagonist marries 
Bluebeard
Frederica marries 
Nigel
S621.1.
Bluebeard
The husband’s unusual blue beard Nigel’s blue stubble
C611.
Forbidden
chamber.
“Open them all; go into all and every one of 
them, except that little closet, which I forbid you, 
and forbid it in such a manner that, if you happen 
to open it, there's nothing but what you may 
expect from my just anger and resentment."
Frederica invades 
Nigel’s “secret places”
C311.1.1
Tabu: 
looking at 
ghosts (!)
The slaughtered wives:
“Coming to the closet-door, she made a 
stop for some time, thinking upon her husband's 
orders, and considering what unhappiness might 
attend her if she was disobedient; but 
the temptation was so strong she could not 
overcome it. She then took the little key, and 
opened it, trembling, but could not at first see 
anything plainly, because the windows were shut. 
After some moments she began to perceive that 
the floor was all covered over with clotted blood, 
on which lay the bodies of several dead women, 
ranged against the walls. (These were all the 
wives whom Bluebeard had married and 
murdered, one after another.) She thought she 
should have died for fear, and the key, which she 
pulled out of the lock, fell out of her hand.”
Frederica finds Nigel’s 
stash of
Sadomasochistic 
pornography in a 
suitcase inside his 
wardrobe; “It is like 
finding trunks of 
butchered limbs, she 
tells herself wildly, 
hands and feet under 
the floorboards.” (101)
C913.
Bloody 
key as 
sign of 
disobedie 
nee
After several goings backward and forward 
she was forced to bring him the key. Bluebeard, 
having very attentively considered it, said to his 
wife, "How comes this blood upon the key?"
"I do not know," cried the poor woman, 
paler than death.
"You do not know!" replied Bluebeard "I 
very well know. You were resolved to go into the 
closet, were you not? Mighty well, madam; you 
shall go in, and take your place among the ladies 
you saw there."
N/A
C920.
Death for
breaking
Tabu.
Bluebeard sentences his wife to death Nigel rapes Frederica 
and when she runs 
away threatens her 
with an axe which he 
hurls at her. The flat 
of the axe hits her ribs, 
but gashes her leg as 
she and it fall to the 
ground. (121)
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K551.
Respite
from
death
granted
until
prayer is 
finished
Wife delays death by asking to pray. Calls her 
brothers.
Frederica telephones 
her friends for 
assistance, though 
she claims she is 
going to the chemists 
(124)
G551.1
Rescue of 
sister 
from ogre 
by brother
“At this very instant there was such a loud 
knocking at the gate that Bluebeard made a 
sudden stop. The gate was opened, and 
presently entered two horsemen, who, drawing 
their swords, ran directly to Bluebeard. He knew 
them to be his wife's brothers, one a dragoon, the 
other a musketeer, so that he ran away 
immediately to save himself; but the two brothers 
pursued so close that they overtook him before 
he could get to the steps of the porch, when they 
ran their swords through his body and left him 
dead.”
Frederica, with son 
Leo, is rescued by her 
“brothers” from 
Cambridge (129)
The above table shows both the strengths and weaknesses of the Aarne- 
Thompson index. For example, although I believe it helps to show similarities between 
the two stories on the structural level, several of the comparisons are clearly 
problematic. A collection of pornography is not objectively the same thing as a 
chamber of dead women, even if symbolically it may serve as a metaphor for Nigel’s 
Bluebeard-like misogyny. Furthermore, as the page references demonstrate, the AT 
index has here acted like a filter, focusing on certain events that occur in the first 130 
pages of a 600 page novel. However, it does provide a way to externalise the process 
of recognition that a reader undergoes when reading, and works better to show the 
similarities in structure between two texts than close reading, or by synopses of both 
texts written by a (hardly impartial) critic. The above table, I think, helps highlight the 
structural similarities between “Bluebeard” and Babel Tower in an effective way, 
providing a point-by-point comparison between the two texts.
In cases like these, Genette’s metaphor of the palimpsest is particularly apposite.
A palimpsest is a piece of writing that is on top of a previous piece of writing, the term
derived from the medieval practice of having a piece of parchment that was reused
over and over again to prepare early drafts. Genette adapts this term to apply to
intertextuality, denoting the original text the hypotext (hypo from underneath) and the
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text that supersedes it the hypertext. Just as one can sometimes see the traces of a 
piece of writing that has been scribbled over by indentations in paper, critics often look 
below the surface of a text to remark upon the pre-existing structures, thereby 
discerning a particular intertext as what lies “beneath” the new text.
4.6 The unconscious of the text
If we accept the possibility of the palimpsestic text, a story that borrows its 
structure from a previously existing intertext, then we have to accept the possibility that 
texts can have a “hidden meaning”. This viewpoint is so commonsense that it has 
entered the critical lexicon; we speak of text’s “deeper” meaning, or having a “deeper” 
understanding of a work, as though reading was a form of archaeology where the 
skilled reader is the equivalent of the diligent and knowledgeable archaeologist 
reconstructing the past from pottery fragments.
Indeed, the idea of the intertext owes a great deal to the absorption of Freudian 
theory into everyday thought. Just as the latent meaning of dreams may be “unearthed” 
through careful analysis of condensation and displacement, so critics argue that a 
text’s “real” meaning can be discovered through the same techniques:
Freud, in his analysis of dreams, argued that they tend to focus through 
condensation and displacement. In condensation one sign collects into itself a 
host of meanings or signifiers; in displacement a sign from another area of 
signification stands in for the real content of the dream. A ring in a dream might 
symbolically condense ideas and desires concerning a host of aspects of life: 
marriage, religious faith, sexual desire, economic stability or instability. A surreal 
dream centring on a cake might be a symbolically displaced working-through of the 
dreamer’s desires for a person associated in the unconscious with cakes.
Condensation and displacement can, then, be seen as two operations in the 
semiotic process. Kristeva, in Revolution in Poetic Language, styles intertextuality 
as a third operation within the semiotic process. Intertextuality is thus understood 
as ‘the passage from one sign system to another’ which involves ‘an altering of the 
thetic position -  the destruction of the old position and the formation of a new one’
(1984a: 59). Keen to avoid the reduction of intertextuality to the traditional notions 
of influence, source study and simple ‘context’, Kristeva now drops the term 
intertextuality in favour of a new term, transposition {ibid: 59-60).
(Allen 2000: 52-3)
In constructing a reading of The Collector as a work that is structured upon 
Bluebeard we may draw parallels that help illustrate how these Freudian concepts work 
when ‘revealing’ the unconscious intertext. We may suggest that The Collector’s 
epigraph “que fors aus ne le sot riens nee”, (rough translation: “no one but them knew
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about it”) which is from a thirteenth century French Romance, La Chastelaine De Vergi, 
is exceptionally important in reading the text because it is from a tale of the type of La 
princesse lointaine, “the princess in a tower”, a classic fairy tale motif found in the 
popular fairy tale “Rapunzel” (Foster 1994: 24, Loveday 1985: 13). In doing this, we 
are suggesting that, like in a dream, condensation has taken place. We privilege one 
part of the work above the rest of it due to it being perceived as the “key” to the 
meaning of the text as a whole. There is a fairy tale incorporated within The Collector 
(a version of Beauty and the Beast told by Miranda) and it uses Shakespeare’s The 
Tempest as an overt intertext, and yet, Sherrill Grace, Casie Hermansson and Marina 
Warner talk of its relation to a fairy tale that is not explicitly mentioned anywhere in the 
text. Again, we could argue that this is an example of displacement: both narrator- 
protagonists are choosing to mention the fairy tale of the princess in the tower because 
the alternative (that Clegg may see himself for what he is, a Bluebeard, or that Miranda 
may recognise the menace in her captor) is too distressing.
Through the techniques of condensation and displacement critics can argue that 
a text has a hidden, or unconscious, meaning. The literary critic then becomes the 
psychoanalyst whose insight allows them to discover “deeper” or hidden meaning, 
whether that meaning is to do with the psychology of the author, the reader or even the 
social systems that are unconsciously represented in the text. Riffaterre is quite 
explicit about this when he writes, in a chapter tellingly titled “The Unconscious of 
Fiction”:
It should be clear by now that the intertext of the narrative acts as the 
unconscious of fiction and that readers recover or discover that intertext because 
the narrative itself contains clues leading back to it. This is in no way different from 
the process that leads the analyst from anomalies, inconsequences, and non- 
sequiturs in the analysand’s monologue to a key to the latter’s symbols and 
symptoms. It must also be clear that the narrative is produced by repressing and 
displacing the intertext, and that the visible sign of this repression or displacement 
at the surface of the fictional text is the loss of narrative.
(Riffaterre 1990b: 91)
It is understandable that this should be the case. Literary critics have a hard job 
justifying their role even to university bureaucrats, let alone to the general public. The 
idea of hidden meaning gives the critic an almost mystical power, like a medieval
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fortune-teller, viewing through arcane arts the secret signs hidden in the mundane.
Just as Freudian psychoanalysis changes the arbiter of meaning from the originator of 
an utterance to the critical listener, locating “hidden” intertexts shifts the balance of 
power from the author to the critic; it does not matter whether the author mentions the 
intertext explicitly or not, the critic can locate the hidden text through a kind of literary 
dreamwork. By extending this line of argument we might even say that it doesn’t 
matter whether an intertext is explicitly mentioned: the author may have used the 
intertext unconsciously, without being aware of the relevance of the intertext. This 
argument is used by Harold Bloom in his discussion of the intertextual ‘family romance’ 
between writers when he suggests that a poet need not have actually read the work of 
a predecessor for it to impact in ways upon his (because Bloom’s cosmogony is 
concerned mainly with male poets) own writing (Bloom 1973).
4.7 The two approaches to intertextuality: centrifugal and centripetal 
There are ultimately two ways to approach intertextuality; either to suggest the 
impossibility of any single meaning, reducing the status of the author as the source of 
all meaning; or to suggest that the author still controls the reader’s response to the text 
through the use of intertexts. This clash of ideas is demonstrated within the study 
Intertextuality: Theories and Practices where two opposing views about this question in 
are demonstrated in two consecutive essays. The first suggests that:
[T]he identification of an intertext is an act of interpretation. The intertext is 
not a real and causative source but a theoretical construct formed by and serving 
the purposes of a reading. There are no moments of authority and points of origin 
except those which are retrospectively designated as origins and which, therefore, 
can be shown to derive from the series for which they are constituted as origin.
(Frow 1991: 46)
According to this statement, the intertext is a subjective supposition, determined 
by the reader. The source of the intertext is to be located in the reading process, and a 
reader does not ‘miss’ intertexts that an author has consciously or unconsciously ‘put 
into’ his or her own text, rather the reader creates intertexts through the process of 
reading. The direct opposite point of view is expressed in the following essay by 
Michael Riffaterre -a  critic who has devoted much of his career addressing the problem
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of intertextuality -who begins his essay with the statement “An intertext is one or more 
texts which the reader must know in order to understand a work of literature in terms of 
its overall significance” (Riffaterre 1990a: 56).
Here, intertextuality is not something that the reader puts in to the text, but 
something inherent in the text, which if the reader is not aware of, he or she cannot 
fully understand the text. The article is titled “Compulsory Reader Response: the 
Intertextual Drive” which suggests that the reader has no choice but to recognise 
intertexts, and to respond to them either in terms of activating a knowledge of the 
recognised intertexts in their reading of this text, or in being aware that they are 
missing a piece of the jigsaw that gives meaning to the text.
[W]e must distinguish between the actual knowledge of the form and content 
of that intertext, and a mere awareness that such an intertext exists and can 
eventually be found somewhere. This awareness in itself may be enough to make 
readers perceive the text's literariness. They can do so because they perceive that 
something is missing from the text: gaps that need to be filled.
(Riffaterre: 56-7)
The question of intertextuality has become tied in with debate about the source of 
meaning in literature. On the one side of the debate are critics who wish to preserve 
the author as the source of meaning, and the possibility of definitive meaning:
Riffaterre, Bloom and (perhaps) Genette. On the other side are critics who wish to 
point to the plurality of meaning: Barthes, Kristeva and Derrida. Graham Allen uses the 
language of Barthes and Kristeva to typify these anthithetical viewpoints, terming the 
former group centripetal, and the latter centrifugal, which highlights how one group 
uses intertextuality to enshrine the work as the centre of all interpretation, and the other 
suggests a more diffuse process wherein the reader and other texts have as much 
control over a text’s meaning than the author. For one group, we may suggest, 
intertextuality is a literary technique and like metaphor or rhyme, is a tool utilised by the 
author that increases the ‘literariness’ of his or her work. For the other group, 
intertextuality is a phenomenon that is an essential part of language. When Barthes 
says that every text is a tissue of quotations, he is not disparaging the author as 
‘unoriginal’ but highlighting the paradoxical nature of language; that it always “other” , as
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Bakhtin points out in “The Problem of Speech Genres”; even everyday utterances take 
the form of “well worn words”, so that even the most intimate and personal utterances 
(“ I love you” being a prime example) is a quotation of a quotation of a quotation 
(Bakhtin 1994).
The difference between explicit and implicit intertexts is the difference between 
author-sanctioned intertextuality and critic ‘discovered’ intertextuality. Where the 
intertext is explicit, as in Atwood’s The Robber Bride, the importance of the fairy tale 
intertext is impossible to deny, but when an intertext is implicit, as in Fowles’s The 
Collector it is impossible to definitively confirm its importance.
This is an important paradox. Those texts which are explicit about their 
intertextuality are the ones that seem to be most limited in terms of interpretation, and 
therefore are also the texts where the author has delimited the possibilities of reading.
In other words, in fictions that are explicitly intertextual the explicit intertext “put in” by 
the author reduces the possibilities of alternative readings. And yet, in explicitly 
utilising intertextuality the author also effaces his or herself as Allen points out,
“explicitly intertextual forms of literature, Kristeva and Barthes argue, foreground the 
fact that they are not original works written by unique authors of great genius, but 
rather that they are the product of split subjects” (Allen 2000: 50). Rather than being 
the sole creator of meaning, the genius coming up with new stories, authors explicitly 
naming their intertexts acknowledge their debt to other stories, especially when the 
other stories they acknowledge are mythic or folkloric. In becoming a storyteller rather 
than an “author”, they emphasise their place in a tradition of storytelling as old as 
humankind itself. On the other hand, those authors who do not explicitly “authorise” 
intertexts, by denying the influence of others in their work also allow their text to be 
analysed through a myriad of possible intertexts21.
21 It is perhaps for this reason that Joyce worked so hard to circulate his own ideas about Ulysses. After 
removing the chapter titles that were used in serial publication (e.g. “ Oxen o f the Sun” ) and that linked 
Joyce’s work with its Homeric hypotext, he made sure that his ideas about the text were circulated by 
writing anonymously to various critics who then disseminated these ideas about the importance and 
relevance o f the Homeric intertext to the public in general. What Joyce takes away with the one hand, he 
gives with the other. It is also interesting that Fowles feels the need to “ reveal” his source, thereby giving
46
Graham Allen hits upon this very problem when he writes:
[l]t is one thing to examine the hypertextual relations and functions of a text 
which explicitly foregrounds its reliance on and transformation of a hypotext; it is 
quite another to deal with a text which hides its hypotext or depends upon a 
hypotext no longer available or known by modern readers.
(Allen 2000: 111)
Where we can feel quite safe about commenting on the relationship between 
hyper- and hypo- text when we know fora fact that such a relationship exists and that 
meaning can be gleaned from this analysis, it is quite another thing to create an 
intertextual reading of a text that does not have this position of certainty. Hidden or 
coded meanings are always open to debate and contention.
One of the most fascinating and contentious cases of intertextuality, Saussure’s 
anagrams, could be an example of steganography. Saussure argued that certain 
examples of Greek and Latin poetry “worked on non-representational levels in which 
groups of letters and phonemes (sounds), such as the first and last letters of 
consecutive lines, arranged themselves into deep textual units, often the names of 
gods or heroes” (Allen 2000: 43-4). So, in analysing one of Livy’s poems, Saussure 
discovers the name Apollo even though the sun god is never explicitly mentioned by 
name in that poem (45). Saussure’s reading of these poems assumes that he has 
rediscovered a hidden meaning within these poems, an intertextual element that exists 
at the level of the structure. Here, signifiers do not relate to stable signifieds but are 
linked to an endless chain of further signifiers, a view of intertextuality that both Derrida 
and Kristeva recognised as foreshadowing their own work (44).
Saussure’s anagrams are a good example of the problems we find when 
attempting to locate an implicit intertext: the impossibility of “proving” the thesis. 
Saussure never published his work on anagrams, as he never proved the case to his 
own satisfaction.
his own authoritative view o f the text. Genette in Paratexts suggests that the function o f the preface is 
that it allows the author to control the reader’s reading o f a text, and he points to interviews that act as a 
preface to a text: this was certainly my experience o f Fowles’s The Collector which I read after the 
interview with Newquist because I was researching novels with fairy tale intertexts, and which therefore 
orientated my reading towards finding points o f similarity between Fowles’ s text and its supposed 
predecessor.
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5. Revision
Element 5 covers texts where the hypertext is mainly concerned with revising the 
hypotext with all that this implies in terms of structural similarities between the two 
tales. Any “new” version of a fairy tale counts as a revision, whether it is the Disney 
version of Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs or whether it is Donald Barthelme’s Snow 
White. Fairy tales have been revised over the centuries for any number of reasons; 
Zipes (1988), Tatar (1987) and Bottigheimer (1987) all document the way that the 
Brothers Grimm revised the tales they published to make them more suitable for the 
nineteenth-century bourgeoisie. Zipes also highlights the way that Walt Disney’s Snow 
White revises its fairy tale “hypotext”22, (KHM 53) uSneewittchen” (usually translated as 
“Little Snow White”) in order to make a version of the tale that reflects American values 
(Zipes 2001:84-5).
In Fairy Tale as Myth: Myth as Fairy Tale, Zipes suggests a definition of revision 
that is helpful here:
According to the Oxford Universal Dictionary, revise means “To look or read 
carefully over, with a view to improving or correcting 1611,” “To go over again, re­
examine, in order to improve or amend.” The purpose of producing a revised fairy 
tale is to create something new that incorporates the critical and creative thinking 
of the producer and corresponds to changed demands and tastes of audiences.
As a result of transformed values, the revised classical fairy tale seeks to alter the 
reader’s views of traditional patterns, images, and codes. This does not mean that 
all revised classical fairy tales are improvements and progressive. Revision for the 
sake of revision is not necessarily a change for the better of stimulating. However, 
the premise of a revision is that there is something wrong with an original work and 
that it needs to be changed for the better.
(Zipes 1994: 9-10)
The term revision, then, can be applied to Hollywood remakes or to subversive 
short stories alike, although as we will see, just because a text is a revision, this does 
not necessarily make the link between the two texts an explicit one. Particularly 
important to this study are the revisions of fairy tales that started appearing in the 
1970s and which coincided with the increasing importance of the second wave feminist 
movement23.
22 The title credits refer to it as “ The Brothers Grimm’s Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs
2_’ It is impossible to overstate to which this study is indebted to feminist revisions o f the fairy tale. It is 
the rise o f feminism which led to the first socio-political criticism o f the fairy tale, and the patriarchal 
messages that are embedded within it. The feminist correctives to fairy tales which placed women in
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Element 5, the re-visioning of “old” fairy tales is best represented by Angela 
Carter’s short story collection, The Bloody Chamber, perhaps the best known book of 
contemporary fairy tales revisions. The story which begins the collection, “The Bloody 
Chamber”, is a good example of revision, as it retells the story of “Bluebeard” with few 
deviations. Although told in the first person and in Carter’s characteristically opulent 
prose, it is possible to recognise the tale as a version of “Bluebeard” because the 
events in the two tales are almost identical.
In the case of re-visions the question is always why. Why re-write “Bluebeard” 
with a layer of psychological complexity and in a greatly lengthened form? In this 
case, we already have a gamut of explanation, given the reams of critical material on 
Angela Carter. Although Carter’s relationship with feminism was always uneasy, as 
evidenced in her still controversial The Sadeian Woman, the book has been ascribed 
an intent in line with that of second wave feminism; to reclaim fairy tales for women by 
highlighting the underlying misogyny of certain stories, or the way in which these 
stories have been used against women.
There was a great spate of feminist revision of fairy tales by women during the 
1970s, a sample of which is represented in Jack Zipes’s collection Don’t Bet on The 
Prince (1986) and also The Trials and Tribulations o f Little Red Riding Hood (1993). 
Some of these re-workings were meant to displace the patriarchal originals, others to 
criticise and subvert those originals by putting women in a more active role, although 
despite the merits of the Merseyside Fairy Story Collective version of “Little Red Riding 
Hood” it has not supplanted the Grimms’ version as “the” fairy tale. In fact, the revision 
most often takes the stance of a supplement, as Still and Worton observe, “[e]very 
literary imitation is a supplement which seeks to complete and supplant the original and 
which functions for later readers as the pre-text of the ‘original’” (Still and Worton 1990: 
7). Therefore even revisions which have successfully supplanted their hypotexts, like
stronger roles, in addition to the criticism o f the fairy tale form led to the contemporary criticism o f Zipes, 
Warner, Tatar et al which have proved invaluable to my thesis. It is not a coincidence that Hutcheon 
considers feminism and other types o f counter-cultural theory that grew in prominence in the latter ha lf o f 
the twentieth century the force that created postmodernism.
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the Disney fairy tale movies that function as “the original” for most modern children are 
supplementary in nature.
Carter’s version of “Bluebeard” is not intended to displace the original in every 
sense. It is novelistic, with dense description and significant attention paid to making 
the characters psychologically realistic, and is obviously not supposed to replace 
Perrault’s version in modern fairy tale collections. But it is a supplement because it 
relies to a large part for effect upon the reader’s knowledge of a pre-text.
One of the most interesting things about Carter’s re-vision of “Bluebeard” is the 
tenuous way in which it is explicitly connected to the original. Its title is of the writerly 
type (element 2), able to be decoded by those who already know {he tale that is 
famous for its “bloody chamber” but liable to remain cryptic to those who do not24. This 
is an important point, because re-visions that intend to replace or supplement an 
original usually signal this intention in the title. The Merseyside Fairy Story Collective 
and Roald Dahl used the title of their revisions of “Little Red Riding Hood” (“Red Riding 
Hood” and “Little Red Riding Hood and the Wolf” respectively) to signal to the reader 
that this is intended to replace, or conflict with the version they already know (Levorato 
2003: 151). Jane Yolen’s Sleeping Ugly signals its relationship with “Sleeping Beauty” 
in its title by clever use of the “opposite” antonym. As in all cases, the title is the best 
place to identify an intertextual relationship between one text and another, whether the 
example is Ulysses or Faust among Equals. Margaret Atwood’s “Bluebeard’s Egg, 
where the intertextual relationship between the two texts (hypo/hyper) is authorised by 
its title, and which incorporates a synopsis of “Fitcher’s Bird” is an example of a short 
story that signals clearly its status as a revision of the fairy tale.
The plot of “The Bloody Chamber” is almost identical to Perrault’s ’’Bluebeard”, 
although transplanted to the early twentieth century, and without siblings. Sister Anne, 
that strangely redundant figure in Perrault’s version, is absent although an ineffectual 
piano tuner (to whom the narrator is later affianced) provides companionship for 
Bluebeard’s bride. Likewise it is the mother, not the brother, who rides in to the rescue
24 In fact, the only title that acts as an ‘authorised’ intertextual element is the story “ Puss in Boots”
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and slaughters the monstrous husband. These alterations do not significantly alter the 
underlying structure of the tale, although we can already see the obvious difference in 
meaning. In other words, this re-vision is implicit, rather than explicit. Students I have 
taught have been unaware of the hypertextual nature of this version, a fact arising from 
the implicit nature of the title and the increasing rarity of “Bluebeard” in modern fairy 
tale collections. To be fair, this is not the only tale in the collection that has a writerly, 
rather than an authorised title, but the average (intended) reader would have no trouble 
in figuring out the hypotext of “The Courtship of Mr Lyon” when the protagonist is called 
“Beauty” and Mr Lyon is called “Beast”25. It is safe to say that those who are unaware 
of the existence of the fairy tale “Bluebeard” will not have their attention called to its 
pre-existence.
One explicit reference to “Bluebeard” occurs in “The Bloody Chamber” and this is 
almost a passing aside that occurs at the denouement of the tale and does not leap out 
at the reader26. When the protagonist’s mother rides in to rescue the daughter,
You never saw such a wild thing as my mother, her hat seized by the winds 
and blown out to sea so that her hair was her white mane, her black lisle legs 
exposed to the thigh, her skirts tucked round her waist, one hand on the reins of 
the rearing horse while the other clasped my father’s service revolver and, behind 
her, the breakers of the savage, indifferent sea, like the witnesses of a furious 
justice. And my husband stood stock-still, as if she had been Medusa, the sword 
still raised over his head as in those clockwork tableaux of Bluebeard that you see 
in glass cases at fairs.
(Carter 1992: 40)
And that’s it. The one, solitary allusion to the model of the tale occurs at its 
climax, and is overshadowed by the description of the mother. It’s Medusa versus 
Bluebeard and Bluebeard doesn’t stand a chance. But this throwaway line (one among 
dozens of intertextual allusions in the story) is the “key” to the text, the one moment 
where an uninformed reader is informed of the hypotext, and the fact that this key is so 
diminished is of the utmost significance to how Carter uses Bluebeard. For if the
25 As we saw above, some allusory character names are more explicit than others.
26 There is an earlier reference to “ the Castle o f Murder” , a tale o f the Bluebeard genus but which is 
obscure enough for me to discount here. Only a folklore enthusiast would know that this is the title o f 
one o f the tales that was featured in the first edition o f the Grimms’ Kinder Und Hansmarchen to be 
discarded in the later editions (Carter: 33).
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protagonist knows the tale of Bluebeard, we may wonder, why does she still open the 
forbidden chamber?
The traditional reading of “Bluebeard” propagated in nineteenth century editions 
was that it was a tale of the ill-effects of female curiosity, indeed it was often subtitled 
“The Fatal Effects of Curiosity” or “The Effect of Female Curiosity” (Warner 1994a:
244). This tradition presented it as a variant of the story of Pandora or Eve, where 
female curiosity causes all the evil in the world, and Carter playfully invokes this 
reading in her tale through allusions and foreshadowing. Carter’s heroine while looking 
through her husband’s library finds books with titles like “T/?e Initiation, The Key of 
Mysteries, The Secret o f Pandora’s Box”, and a pornographic tome featuring a naked 
prostrated woman and an oriental man with erect penis and scimitar that bears the 
caption “Reproof of Curiosity” (16-7). When she is in the bloody chamber she feels 
“the eye of God— his eye” upon her (29). Considering her fate she compares her 
discovery to “the secret of Pandora’s box” (34) and on the eve of execution when she 
discusses her fate with the blind piano tuner, and objects that she was being punished 
for only doing what her husband knew she would, he responds, “Like Eve” (38).
So why, if she is aware of all this precedent, if she knows the story of Bluebeard, 
does she enter the bloody chamber? It is not a question you can ask, as Maria Tatar 
explains:
Prohibition/violation: these paired functions stand as one of the fairy tale’s 
most fundamental plot sequences. As soon as we learn about the dire 
consequences that will attend the mere touching of a spindle, we know that Briar 
Rose will somehow search out and find the only spindle left in her father’s 
kingdom. When the dying monarch in “Faithful Johannes” tells his servant to show 
his son every room save “the last room on a long corridor, where the portrait of the 
Princess of the Golden Roof is hidden,” it is almost certain that that particular room 
will be the only one to pique the curiosity of the young prince. The mother of the 
Goose Girl has only one word of advice to give her daughter on her journey to a 
foreign kingdom: to guard with care a snippet of white cloth stained with three 
drops of her mother’s blood. Needless to say, the first event of consequence on 
the girl’s journey is the loss of the cloth. In fairy tales, violations of prohibitions are 
the order of the day.
(Tatar 1987: 165)
And, if we take a closer look at Perrault’s “Bluebeard”, we begin to see that the
heroine is not exactly punished for her curiosity. The scimitar does not fall, the
protagonist escapes the fate of her predecessors and inherits a castle through her
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husband’s death, as Marina Warner puts it, “ ’Bluebeard’ is a version of the fall where 
Eve gets away with it” (1994: 244). Carter’s version accentuates the complicity that 
Warner detects between Perrault and his heroine, and reclaims the feminist nature of 
the tale. It is, after all, a tale in which the male plot of subjugation is defeated. Those 
who suggested the tale was a warning to women got it wrong, oversimplifying the 
prohibition/ violation pairing into a tale that hinges upon the woman’s act of 
disobedience rather than the man’s rather more serious habit of immolating his wives. 
We feel little sympathy for the violation of the ogre’s right to privacy, and it can hardly 
be suggested that it would be better to ignore the fact that one’s husband is a serial 
killer. It is for this reason, then, that Carter throws the line in a position where it is 
overshadowed. The heroine is aware of precedent, but leaving the door unopened is 
not a real choice, and ignoring the secret door would not lead to “happily ever after” as 
some readers of the tale have implied. Vladimir Propp, in fact, suggested that the 
interdiction fulfils exactly the same function in the folk tale as the “order”, a fact 
highlighted by Carter, as her Bluebeard almost draws his wife a map to the chamber.
All is yours, everywhere is open to you -  except the lock that this single key 
fits. Yet all it is is the key to a little room at the foot of the west tower, behind the 
still-room, at the end of a dark little corridor full of horrid cobwebs that would get 
into your hair and frighten you if you venture there. Oh, and you’d find it such a 
dull little room! But you must promise me, if you love me, to leave it well alone. It 
is only a private study, a hideaway, a “den”, as the English say, where I can go, 
sometimes, on those infrequent yet inevitable occasions when the yoke of 
marriage seems to weigh too heavily on my shoulders. There I can go, you 
understand, to savour the rare pleasure of imagining myself wifeless.
(Carter 1992: 21)
The heroine of this tale is strangely passive and acquiescent and not, we might
think, a suitable candidate for a feminist story at all and the numerous references to
Pandora show how she is locked into a patriarchal way of seeing herself. She does not
resist her husband, and literally puts her own head on the block when he commands.
She also internalises “Bluebeard’s” faults, speculating that “he might have chosen me
because, in my innocence, he sensed a rare talent for corruption” (20), an
acknowledgment of the husband’s perversity, but also a phrase suggests that it is the
heroines own fault, her hitherto unknown “talent for corruption” that singled her out.
The passive heroine is reminiscent of those women who blame themselves for their
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husband beating them, and comparing this protagonist with those in Carter’s novels or 
in the other stories in this collection leads us to the conclusion that Carter’s revision, 
rather than being a feminist re-vision that empowers the heroine as a modern woman, 
draws out the feminist implications of the original tale. No-one reading the tale 
correctly can believe that it is the woman’s fault, and drawing parallels between 
Bluebeard, Pandora and the story of the Fall allows Carter (an avowed atheist) to 
return to a theme she has written about previously, the unfairness of God’s role in the 
fall, and the way women are blamed for something entirely God’s own fault. The only 
major change in Carter’s revision is that her deus ex machina is not the brothers but 
the tiger-slaying mother on a white charger who represents the “new woman” found in 
Carter’s other works27. So, although this re-vision seems to change very little, it in fact 
accentuates and re-presents the feminist nature of Perrault’s original. Though the new- 
woman is the usual protagonist of Carter’s later works (Nights at the Circus, Wise 
Children), whether this would have worked in a revision of this particular tale is doubtful 
(supposing she had the bad sense to marry a murderer, such a heroine would 
doubtless kill him as soon as she had opened the chamber, leaving the story bereft of 
its memorable tension), here by highlighting the heroine’s absurd passivity and 
stressing the analogy between Bluebeard and God, Carter reinstates the tale of 
Bluebeard as one that has meaning for feminists28.
As the above discussion of revision shows, revision is not different in technique 
from any other type of intertextuality. “The Bloody Chamber” utilises a writerly title, 
allusive character description, and borrows its plot directly from its hypotext, with a few 
minor differences. The main difference between a revision and any other intertextual 
usage of fairy tales is to do with the extent to which a revision draws upon the structure
27 Loma Sage points out that the “ new woman”  has always been part o f Carter’s work: “New Woman had 
been on the margins o f Carter’s picture since the beginning; there’s a minor character, Emily, who walks 
away unscathed from the murderous mess at the end o f Shadow’ Dance and she does it because she’s 
already an adept, she knows the story in advance: ‘ I found this key in one o f his trouser pockets, see, and
I though, you know, o f Bluebeard’”  (Sage 2001: 234)
28 It is a matter o f interest that Carter prefers to use the tales o f Perrault as intertexts, where Atwood 
prefers the Grimms. Though Atwood prefers the resourceful heroines o f the Grimm tales, Carter seems to 
see a subversive playfulness in Perrault that she identifies with.
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of a pre-existing tale, whether this is explicit or implicit. For example, I would not call 
Babel Tower a revision of “Bluebeard”, even though it has significant structural 
similarities with the fairy tale and, later in the text, explicitly signals the intertextual 
relationship between itself and the fairy tale because despite these structural parallels, 
the “Bluebeard” intertext takes up only part of the first 130 pages of a 600 page book. 
For this reason, the importance of structure, most revisions of fairy tales tend to be 
short, approximating the fairy tale in comparative length29. This is another reason why 
Carter’s The Bloody Chamber is an excellent example of how revision operates with 
regards to the fairy tale. Nevertheless, I believe revision deserves separate study from 
elements one to four, because I see a revision of a story that draws intensively from 
one pre-existing story as a phenomenon quite different from intertextuality that draws 
from innumerable sources. Fairy tale revision is the creation of new fairy tales that are 
based upon old ones, and as such, deserves a category of its own, just as the creation 
of entirely new fairy tales (tabulation) does.
Re-vision is an interesting testing ground for one aspect of the use of fairy tales. 
Genette noted that plagiarism is a kind of intertextuality, and he covers it under the 
category of “Kristevan”, along with Quotation and Allusion. But what is plagiarism other 
than when the new version (hypertext) is identical to the old (hypotext)? The 
controversy over Graham Swift’s Last Orders focused around the fact that its subject 
matter and structure was “stolen” from Faulkner’s As I Lay Dying. More recently, Yann 
Martel’s Life o f Pi (2002) was criticised when the author admitted that the idea for the 
book’s story was pilfered from a review he had read of a book by a Brazilian author 
(which he had not read). The inane brouhaha over these two texts shows that it is not 
only the surface of the text that matters, but even structure and subject matter (for the 
texts concerned are not word for word facsimiles of the earlier texts but share only 
structure or subject matter).
Yet the same critical reaction, bemoaning a book’s lack of originality is not found 
when the “theft” is from fairy tale. In the vast amount of negative criticism of The
29 Revision o f other oral forms, such as myth, can be considerably longer.
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Bloody Chamber, none of it brought up the fact that Carter had “stolen” material. This 
reaction did not arise, even though one of the tales (“The Snow Child”) -  though not the 
Snow White familiar from Disney -  had hardly been changed from the source30. The 
idea of plagiarism does not seem to extend to fairy tales, a fact that made the fairy tale 
popular amongst nineteenth-century publishers as a hack writer could be employed 
and costly authors’ royalties avoided (see Zipes 1997a). The fact that obvious fairy tale 
intertexts do not generally lead to the author being castigated as a plagiarist shows that 
fairy tale intertexts are still regarded as fair game for re-telling.
6. Fabulation
Up to this point we have seen intertextuality primarily as a relationship between 
two identifiable texts, what Genette termed the hypertext and the hypotext. Elements 
one through five talk of the intertextual relationship between two works, whether that 
relationship is made clear explicitly through an authorised element or incorporation 
or whether the relationship between two texts is more implicit, writerly or allusive.
Element 6 the fabulation of a “new” fairy tale is where we see what Genette 
called architextuality arise. Genette defines architextuality as the relationship 
between the individual text and its genre. We recognise a “new” fairy tale precisely by 
these generic markers. The following exercise helps one to understand what Genette 
means by the “Unconscious” or “Tacit” nature of architextuality.
Imagine that you have been asked to write a fairy tale. The temptation would be 
to start the first line with the customary distancing devices used in fairy tales, “Once 
upon a time”. If you did not you would be consciously avoiding it, probably to avoid the 
cliches that we see so often. Your newly crafted fairy tale is also likely to be short in 
length, to take place in an unspecified archaic world rather than the modern day, and 
feature motifs that occur in traditional fairy tales, such as having 3 sisters, magical 
helpers and a happy ending connected with great wealth or marriage.
30 This version o f “ Snow White”  is summarised by Bettelheim (1976: 200), and first appeared in a letter 
written by Jacob Grimm to Friedrich Carl Von Savigny and his daughter, affectionately referred to as 
Pulettechen, on April the tenth 1808. Marked by Jacob as “ Another Beginning for Snow White”  
(Kamenetsky 1993: 43-44)
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These are the architextual features that we use to recognise the fairy tale, and we 
can say that a tale is “new” if it does not closely follow the plot of a previous fairy tale. 
The practice of the ‘literary fairy tale’, an original artistic work which is written by a 
historically recognisable individual, falls under this category, and Oscar Wilde’s “The 
Happy Prince” belongs here as much as Margaret Atwood’s Princess Prunella and the 
Purple Peanut.
For the purposes of this study, architextual intertextuality in the form of “new” 
fairytales is only of interest if they are fulfil the criterion of being postmodern in some 
sense. A good example of this can be seen in Jeanette Winterson’s Oranges Are Not 
The Only Fruit. At key stages, the narrative shifts from the realistic portrayal of the 
narrator’s evangelical, Lancastrian upbringing to fantastic stories which bear all the 
hallmarks of the fairy tale that do not have anything to do with Jeanette’s story, but 
relate to it in a more allegorical manner.
The first of these “new” fairy tales occurs early in the novel, and can be easily 
recognised by its opening paragraph, “Once upon a time there was a brilliant and 
sensitive princess so sensitive that the death of a moth could distress her for weeks on 
end” (Winterson 2001 [1985]: 9). We know that we are entering the world of the fairy 
tale by the customary opening “Once upon a time” and its dramatis personae, a 
troubled princess and an old hunchback. The tale relates how the princess loses her 
sensitivity after she takes over the role of the hunchback as advisor and friend to a 
nearby village, goat-milker, and song-composer. With this work, and the perks of a 
stool, the hunchback’s books, and her harmonium, the princess soon forgets her 
previous hyper-sensitivity.
This brief fairy tale occurs shortly after Jeanette gives the story of her mother’s 
conversion to evangelical Christianity. More importantly, it occurs sandwiched between 
her mother as a child wondering what to do with her life, and a paragraph in which she 
decides to “get a child, train it, build it, dedicate it to the Lord” (10). The tale therefore 
seems to serve as an allegory, accounting for Jeanette’s mother’s conversion from her
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frivolous, piano playing, French-speaking (sensitive) youth to the missionary zeal she 
displays as an adult.
This is the first of three fairy tales within the novel, and the shortest in the 
sequence, each of which is longer than the last. The second tale is about a prince who 
searches for the perfect woman, and becomes so bound up in the philosophy of 
perfection that he forgets what the search was about in the first place (58-65) and 
finally, a story about a young girl who is tricked by a sorcerer (137-144, 148-9, 154-5).
In Oranges these invented fairy tales occur at key points thematically linked to 
events in the first-person, realistic narrative and serve to break up the realistic text and 
place it in an polyphonous intertextual environment. These invented fairy tales occur in 
a book that has chapter names derived from Old Testament book names (Genesis, 
Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, Joshua, Judges, Ruth) and which quotes liberally from the 
religious sources. The ever escalating complexity of the fairy tales that occur in the 
narrative reflect Jeanette’s ability to question the grand narratives that most children 
are subjected to in childhood (the Bible and fairy tales). In his early work, Jack Zipes 
suggested that the fairy tale has been used to ‘civilize’ children, punishing the indolent 
and rewarding the good characters, who by broad coincidence tend to have the values 
that make children easier to look after (see Zipes 1979, 1991). The above extract also 
shows the young Jeanette’s awareness of some of the latent issues of sexuality 
embedded in the fairy tale which have been edited out over the centuries in order to 
make fairy tales suitable for children, and which will become increasingly important to 
the main narrative as Jeanette falls in love with her best friend, Melanie. It is highly 
significant that none of the protagonists in the three fairy tales end up married or living 
‘happily ever after’.
This use of invented fairy tales as an allegoric mirror of the main diegetic layer of
the story is a technique also to found in A.S.Byatt’s Possession where the love story
between Roland and Maud is punctuated by four invented fairy tales supposedly
written by the fictional character Christabel Lamotte. The effect is in one sense
metafictional, used to highlight the way in which we use stories to interpret experience,
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or to make particular experiences transmissible to other people. The other effect is to 
highlight the way in which we read, what Barthes would call the hermeneutic code 
(Barthes 1974). If we encounter textual fragments that are not part of the main story, 
whether these are embedded tales or snippets of poetry written by fictional characters, 
then, the reader puzzles over their significance. We do not like to think of such ‘extras’ 
as mere padding, or pointless pages, but try to attribute a meaning to them. Why, the 
reader must ask, is this fairy tale appearing in a narrative that has been otherwise 
realistic? Why does the narrator not say, “I wrote a poem”, in for example, John 
Fowles’ The Magus rather than writing out the poem in full? If it is there, we reason, it 
must be there for a reason.
There is another type of “invented” fairy tale, as we shall see in Chapter 3 -  the 
fairy tale of someone’s life. The fairy tale told by Crick’s mother in Waterland is one 
that has been invented, real experience converted into fairy tale. This sort of “new” fairy 
tale draws attention to the way in which humans understand the world through stories, 
and the need to make experience transmissible. The battle between language and 
experience is here played out, as the storyteller uses the well worn words of the 
fairytale, an architext used for hundreds of years in mainland Europe, in order to make 
their own story understandable.
One final point must be made about fabulation with regards to its relationship to
revision. There are areas where the line between the two is hard to distinguish, simply
because of the nature of the fairy tale. The fairy tale is, as we have seen, a highly
formulaic genre, and therefore the structure of any new fairy tale will most likely be very
similar to that of its precursors (which is exactly what architextuality demands).
Furthermore, the typical characters and typical elements are all already documented,
so having a prince, princess, or tailor protagonist comes with its own motif number,
making it very hard to imagine a truly “new” fairytale. We can see this in John Fowles’
The Collector, when Miranda attempts to enlist the sympathy of her captor by telling
him a fairy tale, beginning “Once upon a time” (187). On the one hand, this is a fairy
tale that the character has made up in order to reflect her current dire predicament, but
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on the other hand, it is also recognisably a version of “Beauty and the Beast”, where 
the ugly monster turns into a handsome prince. Therefore, I would suggest that this 
particular example is actually a revision, which shows Miranda’s attempts to change 
her own situation with the power of words by offering up a corrective story.
Similarly, the fairy tales that punctuate Byatt’s Possession, and which are 
reprinted in The Djinn in the Nightingale’s Eye also toe a thin line. “The Glass Coffin”, 
has a tailor protagonist, contains recognisable motifs of testing, where the protagonist 
must impress a donor character into providing aid, and the glass coffin of the title. All 
of these are traditional and recognisable fairy tale motifs, but they are brought together 
in a sequence that is a “new” combination of the formula. That is, they do not replicate 
a pre-existing fairy tale in its entirety, and therefore this can be seen as an example of 
fabulation.
7. M etafictional
Metafictional intertextuality occurs when a fairy tale is commented upon, or when 
the fairy tale is analysed in a critical way. This ‘criticism in the text’ is what Genette 
would categorise as metatextual, the type of intertextuality we usually find between 
commentary or criticism and the text it comments upon. This type of intertextuality can 
be related to a specific tale, therefore approximating the link between hyper and 
hypotext above, like the narrator’s thoughts on “Little Red Riding Hood”, or about fairy 
tales in general, approximating the link between text and architext as Genette suggests 
when he defines it, “[Metatextuality] unites a given text to another, of which it speaks 
without necessarily citing it (without summoning it), in fact sometimes even without 
naming it” (Genette 1997a: 4).
An example of the metafictional use of a fairy tale intertext, can be seen in 
Oranges Are Not The Only Fruit, where the narrator considers fairy tales about 
marrying beasts:
In this story, a beautiful young woman finds herself the forfeit of a bad bargain 
made by her father. As a result, she has to marry an ugly beast, or dishonour her 
family forever. Because she is good, she obeys. On her wedding night, she gets 
into bed with the beast, and feeling pity that everything should be so ugly, gives it a
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little kiss. Immediately, the beast is transformed into a handsome young prince, 
and they both live happily ever after.
I wonder if the woman married to a pig had read this story. She must have 
been awfully disappointed if she had. And what about my Uncle Bill, he was 
horrible, and hairy, and looking at the picture, transformed princes aren’t meant to 
be hairy at all.
Slowly I closed the book. It was clear that I had stumbled on a terrible 
conspiracy.
There are women in the world.
There are men in the world.
And there are beasts.
What do you do if you marry a beast?
Kissing them didn’t always help.
And beasts are crafty. They disguise themselves like you and I.
Like the wolf in ‘Little Red Riding Hood’.
Why had no one told me? Did that mean no one else knew?
Did that mean that all over the globe, in all innocence, women were marrying 
beasts?
[...] If only there was some way of telling, then we could operate a ration 
system. It wasn’t fair that a whole street should be full of beasts.
(Winterson 2001: 70-1)
This quotation, comparing “happily ever after” fairy tale marriage to the rather 
more depressing and realistic institution Jeanette is familiar with, occurs straight after 
the ironic fairy tale of the prince who is in search of the perfect woman (and who has 
her executed after he finds her). In the same section of the book we discover that 
Jeanette’s experience of Jane Eyre — a novel whose plot has been compared with 
“Bluebeard”, “Beauty and the Beast” and “Cinderella” — has been very different to 
most readers because Jeanette’s mother has removed the final section of the book, 
and left the text at the point where it looks like Jane will marry St John Rivers, to go to 
glory (and death) in India as a missionary. This metafictional discussion of a particular 
fairy tale then, is tied thematically with the events that surround it within the text and 
helps highlight that the fabulated fairy tale which precedes it enacts the concerns of the 
realistic primary narrative on an allegoric plane that serves to heighten the metafictive 
and philosophical tone of the novel. The metafictional relationship between a text and 
a fairy tale it comments upon or criticises can be as short as a sentence or can be a 
running concern throughout the text. Margaret Atwood’s “Bluebeard’s Egg contains a 
good example of metafictional commentary upon the fairy tale when Sally is 
considering how to write the assignment she has been given, to transpose “Bluebeard” 
into modern setting:
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At first she thought the most important thing in the story was the forbidden 
room. What would she put in the forbidden room, in her present-day realistic 
version? Certainly not chopped-up women. It wasn’t that they were too unrealistic, 
but they were certainly too sick as well as being too obvious. She wanted to do 
something more clever. [...] [I]t comes to Sally that the intriguing thing about the 
story, the thing she should fasten on, is the egg. Why the egg? From the night 
course in Comparative Folklore she took four years ago, she remembers that the 
egg can be a fertility symbol, or a necessary object in African spells, or something 
that the world hatched out of. Maybe in this story it’s a symbol of virginity, and that 
is why the wizard requires it unbloodied. Women with dirty eggs get murdered, 
those with clean ones get married.
(Atwood 1996a: 156-7)
These examples make clear exactly which fairy tales they are commenting 
upon, and could be seen as specific to those texts. Other examples of the 
metafictional/metatextual use of fairy tale intertexts are less concerned with individual 
stories, but the practice of storytelling that is typified by the fantastic, formulaic fairy 
tale. “What is the use of stories that aren’t even true?” asks one character in Salman 
Rushdie’s Haroun and the Sea of Stories, a question that bugs not only Haroun but all 
literary critics from the days of Spenser’s Defense of Poesie to modern times (1991: 
20). Haroun is an engaging example of the metafictional link between text and fairy 
tale. Though it also has several explicit fairy tale intertexts including a parody of 
“Rapunzel” (73), the novel sets about answering the question posed above, and the 
final answer seems to stress the subversiveness of tale-telling. When Haroun finds 
himself in a fantastic world, and in confrontation with Khattam-Shud, who is attempting 
to destroy all stories, the key lines are spoken:
‘But why do you hate stories so much?’ Haroun blurted, feeling stunned.
‘Stories are fun ... ’
The world, however, is not for Fun,’ Khattam-Shud replied. The world is for 
Controlling.’
‘Which World?’ Haroun made himself ask.
‘Your world, my world, all worlds,’ came the reply. They are all there to be 
Ruled. And inside every single story, inside every Stream in the Ocean, there lies 
a world, a story-world, that I cannot Rule at all. And that is the reason why.’
(Rushdie 1991: 161, capitalisation replicated)
As Haroun demonstrates, it is possible for there to be a metatextual relationship
between a fiction and the fairy tale without this being portrayed as a long critical aside
about a specified text. A metafictional examination of a certain fairy tale can take
place on the diegetic or narrative level; it can be integral to the story or it can be an
aside by the narrator that does not directly further the plot.
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8. Architextual/ Chronotopic
In elements one through to five we saw intertextuality as a relationship between 2 
identifiable texts. We have noted events in various fictions that remind us of a 
particular fairy tale, “Bluebeard”. This is not possible for the more nebulous nature of 
intertextuality that I have termed here chronotopic. This element occurs when we 
recognise “fairy tale-like” qualities in a fiction, without knowing a specific fairy tale to 
which this text relates. This is a type of intertextuality that leads the reader to recall a 
genre, rather than specific examples of that genre.
Element 8 is evoked every time a critic remarks upon the “fairy tale” qualities of a 
work, whether they refer to its tone or to the type of world presented in a text. We 
noticed when discussing the fabulation of “new” fairy tales that there are certain 
architextual features that we associate with the fairy tale, such as the traditional 
opening, the indeterminate time and place of its setting, the dramatic personae and the 
presence of magical items or events. Another term, similar in essence to 
Architextuality in its necessarily fuzzy definition, but this time from the work of Mikhail 
Bakhtin, helps describe this kind of intertextuality.
The chronotope is a term coined by Mikhail Bakhtin in the essay “Forms of Time 
and the Chronotope in the Novel” and is used by Bakhtin to investigate the 
representation of time in literary writing. The term means, when translated from the 
Greek “space time”, and is derived partially from Einsteinian mathematics (Bakhtin 
1994: 84). It is used by Bakhtin, as by Einstein, to stress the fundamental 
interconnectedness of time and space.
It is for this reason that the concept of the chronotope can be difficult to 
understand. As Sue Vice explains, “[t]he concept of the chronotope may be puzzling or 
hard to grasp because it seems omnipresent to the point either of invisibility or of 
extreme obviousness” (Vice 1997: 201); Vice suggests the easiest example to grasp of 
the chronotope is the road movie, where movement along the road is also movement in 
time. In chronotopic situations like this, “Time, as it were, thickens, takes on flesh,
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becomes artistically visible; likewise, space becomes charged and responsive to the 
movements of time, plot and history” (Bakhtin: 84).
The chronotope is not, however, solely a device of analysing temporal 
representation within fiction. Bakhtin also claims “it is precisely the chronotope that 
defines genre and generic distinctions, for in literature the primary category in the 
chronotope is time” (85). He goes on to argue, “any and every literary image is 
chronotopic. Language, as a treasure-house of images, is fundamentally chronotopic” 
(251). In this immense essay, he sketches out the evolution of different chronotopes, 
from the “road” chronotope that characterises folklore to the chronotope of the sitting 
room that began to dominate in the early nineteenth century.
8.1 Chronotopic Objects (Castles)
An example of a chronotopic image is the castle. Lucie Armitt suggests in 
Contemporary Women’s Fiction and the Fantastic that:
The chronotope is, in its simplest terms, a fictive spatio-temporal framework.
At its most formulaic it might, say in the context of the gothic, crime fiction, the 
classical quest narrative, be summed up as a nineteenth century haunted castle, a 
contemporary metropolis and an ancient Greek citadel respectively
(Armitt 2000: 35)
When we think of genres where castles play a major role our mind inevitably 
goes to the medieval romance, the fairy tale, and the gothic, it does not, generally 
speaking, remind us of realistic narratives of domestic violence set in the mid 1960s, 
which is why the presence of a castle in Byatt’s Babel Tower suggests that we are not 
dealing with traditional literary realism. Richard Todd, in his study of Byatt mistakenly 
calls “Bluebeard”, “Bluebeard’s Castle” emphasising how important the castle is in the 
fairy tale (1997: 41). The title of Bartok’s opera, Duke Bluebeard’s Castle and George 
Steiner’s polemic In Bluebeard’s Castle both attest to the importance that suitably 
gothic real-estate plays within the fairy tale31. The castle is an image that attests to the 
power of the chronotope, a solid object which usually signifies a particular genre.
31 It could be argued that this is for purely pragmatic purposes, after all, where would you hide all the 
bodies in a bijou open plan apartment?
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Nigel Reivers lives in a country house with a moated grange named “Bran 
House” that has been in his family for several generations. It is not, in any literal 
sense, a castle, and yet it is described as such. “Bran House, the sinister Bluebeard’s 
castle”, writes Richard Todd, connecting the house with the fairy tale (66). The power 
of the castle chronotope is such that, like literal murder, including it in the narrative of 
Babel Tower would lead readers to have a significantly changed perception of the 
novel’s genre. Rather, a castle is suggested through the imagery. Bran House is, like 
a feudal lord’s home, hereditary. It is encircled by a moat, isolating those within from 
the outside world.
The use of imagery that links a home with the castle chronotope is not a new 
technique. In Jane Eyre, the narrator is anxious to point out the gothic architecture of 
Mr Rochester’s ancestral home, Thornfield, its “battlements” and “grey front” and 
“seclusion” (Vol I Ch XI). If we had not fathomed the connection between Thornfield 
and Bluebeard’s castle, then Bronte soon clarifies this link:
Mrs Fairfax stayed behind a moment to fasten the trap door; I, by dint of 
groping, found the outlet from the attic, and proceeded to descend the narrow 
garret staircase. I lingered in the long passage to which this led, separating the 
front and back rooms of the third story: narrow, low, and dim, with only one little 
window at the far end, and looking, with its two rows of small black doors all shut, 
like a corridor in some Bluebeard’s castle.
(Bronte C 1996 [1847]: 122 Volume 1 Chapter 11)
In Jane Eyre’s case, the allusion to Bluebeard foreshadows the later revelation 
that Mr Rochester’s home contains a bloody chamber, only in this case the previous 
wife is still alive and kicking. The description both heightens the sense of menace that 
lies beneath the surface at Thornfield and gives the reader an indication of Jane’s 
character. The castle as a chronotope, however, is particularly important to reading 
Rochester, as it is to Nigel. The “castle” marks its owner out as respectable, or at least 
at a high level in society. It suggests the isolation of the “squirearchy” from the 
peasantry, “old” country money and inheritance against new “city” wealth. It links the 
modern day aristocrat with his feudal forebears, linking current social formations with 
patriarchy and primogeniture in its purest, most brutal form.
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The castle is an example of a physical object that carries symbolic baggage (to 
the extent that our reaction to the physical object is determined by its fictional 
representations) there are also chronotopic events, or actions that remind us of the 
fairy tale. It is these events that Tzvetan Todorov concentrates on in his attempt to 
define the fantastic in his seminal study The Fantastic (1973).
8.2 Chronotopic Events (Magic)
Todorov proposes a three-fold division between types of fantasy, which can 
briefly be summarised as:
1. The uncanny, where an unusual event is a one-off supernatural 
happening in an otherwise realistic world.
2. The marvellous, a world that is not our own, where the supernatural is 
the norm.
3. The fantastic, in which the reader cannot decide whether the events 
described fall under the category of the uncanny or the marvellous.
Under Todorov’s groupings, the fairy tale would appear in the category of the 
marvellous. It is a world that appears to have different rules from the everyday rational 
world. This is not a one-off unusual event, like the transformation of Gregor Samsa in 
Kafka’s “Metamorphosis”, but an entirely different world that defies quotidian 
expectations of realism.
Or is it? Todorov’s categories are predicated upon an entirely western and 
rationalist expectation of what reality is:
In a world which is indeed our world [...] a world without devils, sylphides, or 
vampires, there occurs an event which cannot be explained by the laws of this 
same familiar world. The person who experiences the event must opt for one of 
two possible solutions [...] Either the devil [or vampire] is an illusion, or an 
imaginary being; or else [s/]he really exists [...] The fantastic occupies the duration 
of this uncertainty.
(Todorov 1973: 25)
This framework assumes that magic is an outmoded concept that has been 
entirely suppressed by the rise of empiricism and science. But not everyone believes 
in this strictly rational world. To take the obvious example, Todorov precludes the
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existence of the devil in “our” world, something that I might agree with him on, but we 
might speculate that some Christians would not.
Wendy B Faris suggests a similar objection to the Todorovian binary when she 
discusses Todorov’s idea of the pure fantastic occurring when a reader hesitates 
between the uncanny and the marvellous; “some readers in some cultures will hesitate 
less than others” (Faris 1995: 171). She later reinforces this opinion when, in her ten 
point scheme of “accessory specifications” of magic realism she makes point seven,
“In magical realist narrative, ancient systems of belief and local lore often underlie the 
text” (182). We hardly need reminding that the fairy tale represents both ancient 
systems of belief and local lore.
Many of the texts that I will discuss in later chapters have been classified as 
magic realist narratives. Salman Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children, Graham Swift’s 
Waterland and Angela Carter’s Nights at the Circus all feature as examples in the 
essays of Magical Realism: Theory, History, Community (1995). As Fredric Jameson 
remarked, the term “magic realism” despite its theoretical vagueness and shortcomings 
still “retains a strange seductiveness” (1986: 302) a statement that becomes 
increasingly apt as magic realism becomes a buzz word used to describe fictions that 
fit unproblematically in Todorov’s influential categories of the uncanny, fantastic or 
marvellous. Anyone reading the newspapers will have seen the increasingly imprecise 
usage of the term, with Harry Potter, Buffy the Vampire Slayer and even the Lord o f the 
Rings being labelled magic realist.
However, many of those texts that are not accounted for in Todorov’s system,
that question the margins between what is ‘real’ and what is ‘magic’, also tend to utilise
the fairy tale as an intertext. I believe that it is no coincidence that the books by
Rushdie, Swift and Carter which have been claimed as magic realist also feature fairy
tale intertextuality. The fantastic events described in these texts, whether a Will o’ the
Wisp, educated chimps or Saleem’s remarkable sense of smell are portrayed in a
matter of fact manner, which has been suggested is the characteristic style of the folk
tale. De Vos and Altmann condense this neatly when paraphrasing Max Luthi:
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Luthi suggests that in the folktale, though not in other genres of oral tales, the 
supernatural is naturalized into the secondary world of the story by detachment.
Although it is entirely mysterious, it evokes no shudder of dread, often not even 
surprise. [...] Within the folktale, the numinous and magical become a matter of 
course, and for this reason Luthi calls the folktale one-dimensional. There is no 
gap between the sphere of the otherworldly and the sphere of the human; they 
exist in the same spiritual dimension.
(De Vos and Altmann 2002; 14)
This “one dimensionality” explains the feeling of recognition we sometimes feel in 
texts as seemingly fantastic events occur in realistic narratives. It is a matter of fact 
that, unlike Lewis Carroll’s Alice, fairy tale protagonists rarely express wonder at what 
is happening. Talking Wolves, Fairies, Witches and Gingerbread Cottages are all 
greeted as though they were everyday occurrences (in the same way that children 
aren’t really sure that their toys don’t have their own lives in the toybox at night) and 
this entirely relaxed and accepting attitude to the numinous, when it is encountered in 
otherwise realistic text, is reminiscent of the fairy tale.
Conclusion
Having defined 8 types of intertextuality it is now time to admit to a certain sleight 
of hand. All of these types are based upon the division between explicit and implicit 
intertextuality. Furthermore, this division itself is arbitrary and we can question where 
the margins between explicit and implicit lie.
I therefore make no great claims for the 8 categories of intertextuality that I have 
sketched out, except they help me make out some kind of order from the chaotic nature 
of intertextuality and help me define which types of intertextuality that are particularly 
important for this study. Though I began categorising the ways fairy tales could be 
used as intertexts with the title, as the most prominent position a text’s relation to a 
previous hypotext could be mentioned explicitly, this is not a hugely important factor to 
my study. Granted, those fictions that contain an intertextual reference in the title such 
as “Bluebeard’s Egg”, Bluebeard, Briar Rose and Sleeping Beauty are a great help for 
anyone scouring a library archive for books that contain intertextual references to fairy 
tales. Until the entire contents of books are contained in searchable library catalogues, 
a computer search of the library archive with popular fairy tale names in the title will be
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the most reliable way to detect fairy tale intertexts32, especially given the title’s 
prominence.
For this study, the emphasis is also on those texts where the fairy tale intertext is 
explicit, rather than implicit. The problem of ever proving the importance of an implicit 
intertext makes concentrating on ‘revealing’ hidden intertexts seem fairly pointless.
This is not to say that I will never suggest that allusion is an important factor to a text, 
rather that allusion on its own is not enough for me to include a text in this study, it 
must be combined with other features that are explicit. Similarly, I will not devote 
significant further space to examining the practices of revision or fabulation: the 
revision of fairy tales has already been the subject of much academic criticism, from 
Zipes’ Don’t Bet on the Prince and The Trials and Tribulations o f Little Red Riding 
Hood to the more recent studies such as Hermansson’s Reading Feminist 
Intertextuality through Bluebeard Stories and Levorato’s Red Riding Hood-centred 
Language and Gender in the Fairy Tale Tradition.
As my idea of postmodernism owes much to Linda Hutcheon’s idea of 
historiographic metafiction as defined in A Poetics o f Postmodernism, the use of a fairy 
tale intertext that leads to features linked with postmodernism such as magic realism, 
or metafictional discussion about the possibility of representation, are those that are 
most important to my study. The most important elements for my study, therefore, are 
elements 7 and 8. Element 7, the metafictional approach to the fairy tale is important 
because of how metafiction has been linked with postmodernism. In all of the texts that 
I analyse, I endeavour to point out a metafictional aspect, even if this layer of self- 
consciousness isn’t immediately evident. In the example of Babel Tower, the 
“Bluebeard” intertext demonstrates the way in which Frederica (and, by implication, the 
reader) organises experience according to predetermined intertexts. At the end of the 
novel, we even begin to feel that despite his flaws, Nigel is perhaps not quite the ogre 
this intertext makes him, his jealousy and rage being caused by his love for his son as
'2 And even then, implicit intertextuality would be impossible to detect with this kind o f search.
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much as anything else. A nasty piece of work maybe, but a metaphorical, not a literal 
Bluebeard.
This is similar to the way in which Sharon Rose Wilson describes Margaret 
Atwood’s use of fairy tale intertexts. Wilson attempts to call attention to the 
metafictional aspect of fairy tale intertextuality in the work of Margaret Atwood, and her 
thesis is summarised in the following quotation:
Atwood’s intertexts serve at least five connected purposes in her work: 1) to 
indicate the quality and nature of her characters’ cultural contexts [...] 2) to signify 
her characters’— and readers’—entrapment in pre-existing patterns; 3) to comment 
selfconsciously on these patterns— including the embedded fairy tales, myths, and 
related popular tradition stories— often by deconstructing constricting literary, 
folkloric, and cultural plots with “transgressive” language [...] and filling in the gaps 
of female narrative; 4) to comment self-consciously on the frame story and other 
intertexts; and 5) to structure the characters’ imaginative or “magical” release from 
externally imposed patterns, offering the possibility of transformation for the novel’s 
characters, for the country they partly represent and for all human beings.
(Wilson 1993: 34)
Note the importance of the “self consciousness” of the usages of these intertexts 
in this passage. Wilson’s thesis depends upon the idea that these intertexts are used 
in a self-conscious manner to reflect metafictively on the text even if  this metafictive 
level is not immediately evident. So, she argues, “[sjome of the psychic pain that 
Atwood characters, notably Marian MacAlpin [...], Joan Foster (LO), Circe (YAH) and 
Offred (HT), experience seems to derive from their unquestioning ingestion of old 
stories or an already written plot line [...] that threatens to limit their life choices” 
(Wilson: 11). The treatment of the fairy tale is here metafictional in those books where 
fairy tales and storytelling are explicitly discussed like Alias Grace, “a novel about the 
ideological power of storytelling” according to Armitt (2000: 91) as well as The 
Handmaid’s Tale, Lady Oracle and The Robber Bride but also in those where the 
metafictional aspect is not fore-grounded like Life Before Man and Surfacing because 
the texts show how the already-written patterns of the fairy tale affect the protagonists. 
Wilson finds the metafictional aspect of these fairy tales where sometimes they are not 
immediately apparent.
I agree that this is possible, but because my thesis is not centred on the work of 
one author I will tend to choose texts where I feel that this metafictional quality is at
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least close to the surface if not immediately obvious. The metafictional treatment of the 
fairy tale is most prominent in those texts that foreground the process of storytelling, 
and therefore chapter 3 will examine these texts that foreground element 8 in close 
detail.
Element 8, the intertextual use of the fairy tale chronotope or architext is an area 
that has been little developed before, and to my knowledge no critic has carried out an 
in-depth analysis of the ways in which texts considered magic realist use the fairy tale 
as an architextual model. Todorov’s categories suggest that the fairy tale is always in 
an entirely different world to our own world, a fact that clashes with Bakhtin’s view that:
[T]he fantastic in folklore is a realistic fantastic [...] Such a fantastic relies on 
the real-life possibilities of human development [... ] in the sense of the needs and 
possibilities of men [sic], those eternal demands of human nature that will not be 
denied. These demands will remain forever, as long as there are men [sic]] they 
will not be suppressed, they are real, as real as human nature itself, and therefore 
sooner or later they will force their way to a full realization.
Thus folkloric realism proves to be an inexhaustible source of realism for all 
written literature, including the novel.
(Bakhtin 2000: 150-1). 
Where events of the fairy tale chronotope mean that a text belongs to a 
marvellous unreal world to Todorov, to Bakhtin this chronotope is realistic, because it 
reveals the demands and aspirations of those who imagined it. Issues of realism are 
especially important for postmodernism (as its 37 index references in Hutcheon’s 
Poetics attest), and the combination of fairy tale (realistic fantastic?) and realism leads 
to some interesting special effects, that lead me to suggest that the mixture of a large 
amount of fairy tale chronotopic images or events with traditional realism results in a 
form of magic realism. Chapter two will concentrate on the use of element seven in 
Kate Atkinson’s Human Croquet, which I will argue, is a magic realist novel precisely 
because of its use of fairy tale intertexts.
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Chapter Two: Architextual/ Chronotopic Intertextuality and 
Magic Realism in Kate Atkinson’s Human Croquet
In chapter one, I claimed that there was an element of intertextuality best defined 
as chronotopic or architextual. I also pointed out the vagueness of both these terms -  
Bakhtin’s chronotope referring to the way certain words and literary symbols are 
associated with certain genres: sitting rooms with the novel of manners, cities with the 
realist novel, the road with the picaresque. I also hinted that this type of architextual 
feature is the cause of one “special effect” in the postmodern novel, namely the 
phenomenon of magic realism1.
In order to discuss what I mean by magic realism, I will take the time to discuss 
Tzvetan Todorov’s categorisation of fantasy so that I can explain why these categories 
may be helpful in analysing this, and, by implication, other magic realist texts, but also 
to prove that magic realism cannot be easily absorbed into any of his categories. This 
link between the fairy tale, metafiction and magic realism is an important item to 
address, due to chapter three’s use of canonical “magic realist” texts in order to talk 
about how the fairy tale is used metafictively to suggest the way in which we make 
sense of our own lives according to formulaic plot structures.
Despite its theoretical vagueness, the term “magic realism”, as Fredric Jameson 
noted, “retains a strange seductiveness”. It is also a term that seems to become ever 
more vague because, like postmodernism before it, it has become a label utilised by 
newspapers and magazines as much as by literary critics. Unlike the “traditional” term 
fantasy, which has been theorised in great depth over the years in studies such as 
Todorov’s seminal The Fantastic (1973) the definition of magic realism is somewhat
1 There are two formulations o f this term that are usually used interchangeably to mean the same thing. 
Zamora and Faris’s collection o f essays is called Magical Realism. Others use the form magic realism, 
which is the form that I prefer. Where the -a l suffix seems to suggest that magic realism is a type o f 
realism, the alternative suggests, to me, an unresolved binary. We usually separate the terms magic and 
realism. In combining the two, next to each other, we sense the paradox that magic realism engenders. 
Where “ magical realism” , by having magic in the adjectival slot subordinates the magic to the realism, 
the alternative, despite its seeming ungrammaticality suggests a satisfying paradox.
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less definite. Indeed, many now simply use the term magic realism where terms such 
as “uncanny” or “marvellous” would be better suited.
This chapter is dedicated to explaining the way in which the introduction of 
certain events from the chronotope of fairy tale into the chronotope of realism creates a 
kind of magic realism2. To do so, I have chosen to analyse a text that alludes 
frequently to fairy tales and that therefore highlights the points of linkage between fairy 
tale and magic realism, Kate Atkinson’s Human Croquet (1998: hereafter referred to as 
HC). HC is a complicated, though rewarding, object of study, and in order to fully take 
account of the way it uses the fairy tale chronotope, it is necessary to look at its other 
features. In chapter one I stressed that the more intertextual elements a text displays, 
the safer it is to say that the intertext is an important one, and this can be seen in the 
way that HC utilises its fairy tale intertexts. Although the primary purpose of this 
chapter is to investigate the importance of element 8, the fairy tale chronotope in 
relationship to magic realism, HC is also typified by the use of element 4, or allusion, 
and element 7, the metafictional. Furthermore, these elements are not separate 
entities, but form a kind of gestalt, so that the chronotopic use of fairy tales, the allusion 
to fairy tales, and the metafictional discussion of fairy tales are inseparably 
intermeshed.
The beginning(s), heteroglossia and chronotopic events
Kate Atkinson’s first novel Behind the Scenes at the Museum (1995), parodying 
Sterne’s Tristram Shandy, signalled its metafictional intent by writing before the 
beginning and having the first-person narrator narrate from the instant of conception 
rather than the more traditional moment of birth. The problem of “beginnings” is also a 
concern in HC; the first line reads, “Call me Isobel. (It’s my name). This is my history. 
Where shall I begin?” (11) before going on to begin, once again, before the beginning 
in its realistic sense, starting instead with a grander opening:
2 Some events have this effect more than others. For example, marriage as a happy ending and travel are 
features o f the fairy tale chronotope, but they do not cause any “ special effects”  when they turn up in 
realist fiction.
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Nothing will come of nothing, unless it’s the beginning of the world. This is 
how it begins, with the word and the word is life. The void is transformed by a 
gigantic fire-cracker allowing time to dawn and imagination to begin.
The first nuclei arrive — hydrogen and helium — followed, a few million years 
later, by their atoms and eventually, millions more years later, the molecules form.
Aeons pass. The clouds of gas in space begin to condense into galaxies and 
stars, including our own Sun. In 1650, Archbishop James Usher, in his Annals o f 
the World, calculates that God made Heaven and Earth on the evening of 
Saturday, October 22, 4004 BC. Other people are less specific and date it some 
four and a half billion years ago.
(HC: 11-12)
The narrator goes on to describe the evolution of trees from the enormous ferns 
of the carboniferous era, and the vast forests that covered the world, before finally 
humans begin to make their impact on the forest in the Bronze Age:
[,..]C/?op! Trees were transformed into other things— into clogs and 
winepresses, carts and tools, houses and furniture. The English forests sailed the 
oceans of the world and found new lands full of wilderness and more forests 
waiting to be cut down.
But there was a secret mystery at the heart of the heart of the forest. When 
the forest was cut down, where did the mystery go? Some say there were fairies 
in the forest -  angry, bad tempered creatures (the unwashed children of Eve), ill- 
met by moonlight, who loitered with intent on banks of wild thyme listening furiously 
to the encroaching axes. Where did they go when the forest no longer existed?
And what about the wolves? What happened to them? (Just because you can’t see 
something doesn’t mean it isn’t there.)
(13)
The first two or three pages are worth analysing closely because of the sheer 
variety of discourses represented. The conventions of the realist novel, represented by 
the opening line’s parody of Melville’s Moby Dick, are quickly dismissed in favour of a 
panoply of beginnings, where the competing beginnings of various discourses such as 
Judaeo-Christian mythology, astrophysics, biology, natural history, history and folklore 
clash with each other .
This is a form of what Bakhtin calls heteroglossia. Bakhtin lauds the realist 
novel as the home of heteroglossia because it depicts an entire society and therefore 
incorporates numerous different types of speech, from the marketplace to the 
legislature. But what we have in “Streets of Trees”, HC’s introductory chapter, is the 
use of heteroglossia on the diegetic level; the level of the narrator, rather than the 
characters. This introduction therefore works as a form of metafiction because it 
defamiliarises the monologic conventions of the narrative style utilised by the realist
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novel3. By mixing different languages (each carrying their own chronotope), Atkinson 
draws attention to the different methods of telling a story, and how the background 
assumptions of these discourses affect the way in which the story is perceived. All of 
the originary discourses utilised in this introductory chapter — religion, history, art and 
science — claim a privileged relation to “truth”. By putting novelistic beginnings in 
competition with those posited by other forms of discourse, we can see a linguistic self- 
consciousness that will run throughout HC.
The introduction of fairies and wolves, the dramatis personae of the fairy tale
whose very mention invokes the fairy tale chronotope, is only a hint of the novel’s
allusion to the fairy tale. Soon after this taster, the reader is given a history of Lythe,
the novel’s setting:
In 1580, or thereabouts, a stranger rode into Lythe, one Francis Fairfax, as 
dark and swarthy of countenance as a Moor. Francis Fairfax, lately ennobled by 
the Queen, was in receipt, from the Queen’s own hand, of a great swathe of land 
north of the village, on the edge of what remained of the forest. Here he built
himself Fairfax Manor, a modern house of brick and plaster and timbers from his
newly owned forest oaks [...]
Some also said that he had a beautiful child wife, herself already with child, 
locked away in the attics of Fairfax Manor. Others said the woman in the attics 
was not his child wife but his mad wife. There was even a rumour that his attics 
were full of dead wives all of them hanging from butcher’s hooks. There were even 
those who said (this even more unlikely) that he was the Queen’s lover and that 
the great Gloriana had borne him a clandestine child which was being raised in 
Fairfax manor. In the attics, naturally.
(14)
After chapter one, we obviously recognise the room full of dead wives as an 
allusion to “Bluebeard”, amongst other colourful folkloric rumours about the mysterious 
stranger, alongside a nod towards Jane Eyre with the mention of the mad woman in the
attic. Again, we witness a clash of discourses: this time between history — the type of
writing that claims absolute realism — and folklore.
Soon, Mary, Francis’s wife “appears” in a suitably fairy-tale-like manner, arriving 
at the manor door on a wild, storm-driven night, naked, yet with “not a drop of rain on
3 Monologism is a term used by Bakhtin to refer to types o f authoritarian discourses, but it is never truly 
satisfactorily defined, rather it functions as the opposite o f ‘dialogisnT, which is viewed as democratic 
and a liberating function o f certain works such as Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment. In The Problem 
o f Dostoevsty’s Poetics Bakhtin defines monologism as “ words that expect no answer”  (1973: 63), and 
this is certainly a feature o f the omniscient narrator utilised in realist fiction, where self consciousness 
over the medium o f language is typically sublimated in favour o f seeing words as an unproblematic way 
o f representing reality.
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her, nor one red hair on her head blown out of its place” (15). Later on, another fairy 
tale allusion is made when the delivery of Mary Fairfax’s first child is related. As in the 
fairy tale titled “The Fairy Nurse” in Andrew Lang’s Lilac Fairy Book, the midwife is 
blindfolded in every room other than the birth-chamber, and instructed never to relate 
what happened that night, which she never does, for she is conveniently struck by 
lightning whilst lifting a tankard to wet the baby’s head (16).
This fantastical strain in the introduction continues for as long as the life of Mary 
Fairfax is described. Elf-like, she is dressed always in green, wandering solitary in the 
forest with only her hound for company, sitting under the lady oak and singing “an 
unbearably sweet song about her home, like a Ruth amid alien green” (16). In a 
moment that recalls the task of the hunter in “Snow White”4 we are told that the estate’s 
game steward is afraid of mistaking her for a timid hart and accidentally shooting her. 
And then she vanishes, coincidentally on a day that her husband returns from the hunt 
with a freshly caught doe. In a final folkloric twist to the tale we are told that a kitchen 
maid saw Lady Fairfax disappearing from underneath the Lady Oak:
[F]ading away until her green brocade dress was indistinguishable from the 
surrounding trees. As Lady Fairfax had grown dimmer, the girl reported, she had 
placed a dreadful curse on the Fairfaxes, past and future, and her monstrous 
shrieks had echoed in the air long after she herself was invisible
(16)
From this point on, the introductory chapter details the decline and fall of the 
Fairfax family in a more realistic manner, briefly detailing the fire that destroyed Fairfax 
Manor and the loss of the family’s land during the South Sea Bubble until the family is 
all but forgotten, “except for Lady Mary who was occasionally sighted, dressed all in 
green, disconsolate and gloomy, and occasionally with her head under her arm for 
good effect” (17).
Fantastic events and rumours cease to be relayed as the narrator charts the 
Fairfax family fortunes, through an abortive renaissance in the mid-nineteenth century
4 It is the hunter’s job in most versions o f “ Snow White”  to go into the forest and murder the king’s 
daughter and cut out her heart and liver for the queen to eat. In the Disney animated version, follow ing 
Perrault, the animal killed by the hunter instead o f the girl, and whose heart and liver are served up to the 
queen, is a deer rather than the boar found in the Grimm version.
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to their eventual home in the new suburbs of the early twentieth century, in the middle 
of what used to be the Lythe forest, in fact, to a new house built on the foundations of 
their ancestral manor. Concluding the introductory chapter is the revelation of the link 
between the narrator and the family story:
Eliza will be my mother. I am Isobel Fairfax, I am the alpha and omega of 
narrators (I am omniscient) and I know the beginning and the end. The beginning 
is the word and the end is silence. And in between are all the stories. This is one 
of my mine.
(20)
This introductory sequence, with its heteroglot mixture of history and folklore, and 
its inference that the life of an individual is effected in real and tangible ways by events 
that seem to be ‘ancient history’ is reminiscent of Swift’s Water/and, where a similar 
history is told of the rise and fall of a local family alongside folkloric rumours about that 
family, which eventually becomes necessary for understanding the life of its 
protagonist.
Isobel’s story
The introductory chapter sets the scene for the novel, and the novel refers back 
thematically to this introduction at key moments. In its metafictional nature, its concern 
with history and folklore, and most of all its foregrounding of the storytelling process, 
whether that story is the family narrative of the grand narratives of science and religion, 
it paves the way for the novel to come.
Isobel Fairfax’s story begins (in the more conventional, realist sense) on a 
specific date:
It’s the first day of April and it’s my birthday, my sixteenth - the mythic one, the 
legendary one. The traditional age for spindles to start pricking and suitors to 
come calling and a host of other symbolic sexual imagery to suddenly manifest 
itself
(23)
As this quotation makes clear, there is a significant narrative shift between the 
first chapter “Streets of Trees”, mostly narrated by a distanced, third-person narrator, 
and the second “Something Weird”, manifested by the use of first person pronoun. The 
first allusion in Isobel’s own first-person narration is therefore, an implicit reference to 
“Sleeping Beauty” in the novel’s second paragraph.
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This paragraph however segues into a world that is suburban, traditionally realist 
rather than fantastic, with mentions of school corridors, buses, and neighbours. It 
introduces key characters at a rapid rate, rooting the protagonist in a family tree, but 
also within a recognisably real social structure— a short brother, absent-minded father, 
missing mother, best friend, kindly neighbour — all within a few pages.
And yet, an element of the fantastic still pervades this quotidian world; Isobel, at 
five foot ten in height, considers herself “[a] gigantic English oak (quercus robustus)”
(25), and calculates that if she were to keep growing at her current rate she would be 
eleven feet tall by the time she was 70. Her shorter brother is described as a 
“storybook dw arf even though we have previously been told that Charles is, at five foot 
four, rather tall for a dwarf (24). On being told that her missing mother had no 
relations, the narrator speculates that she must have had them once, unless, like Helen 
of Troy, she was hatched from an egg (27). In other words, we might take the fairy tale 
exaggerations as evidence of a narrator’s colourful imagination and a certain linguistic 
self-awareness, a mismatch between the style of narration and what is actually being 
described. This comes to particular light in her reflections upon everyday phrases and 
dead metaphors. For example, being told that her mother was “off her head” results in 
her speculating:
As opposed to 'on her head’? But then if she was on her head she would be 
upside down -  and therefore also mad, surely? Perhaps ‘off her head’ as in no 
longer being attached to her head? Perhaps she is dead and wandering around on 
the astral plane with her head tucked underneath her arm like a music-hall ghost, 
exchanging pleasantries with the Green Lady.
(29)
The early fairy tale allusions can therefore be viewed as part of the narrator’s 
style rather than being indicative of any fantastic element pervading the real world 
represented. It is not unreasonable to expect a well-read narrator to invoke 
comparisons to Leda and the Swan, or As You Like It, and we are always given a 
realistic explanation alongside its fantastic comparison so that the fairy tale 
exaggeration always has a realistic alternative, and the fantastic turn of phrase can be 
seen to indicate a more mundane reality. It is this quality that Wendy B Faris terms
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“defocalization”, because the narrative “seems to come from two radically different 
perspectives at once [...] [a] special narrative situation that seems to me to 
characterize magical realism as a genre” (Faris 2004: 43)
With this in mind, we can take the following quotation as a perhaps exaggerated 
description of one character’s possessive nature by comparison to ’’Rapunzel”:
If Audrey does develop womanly curves and wiles then Mr Baxter will 
probably lock her at the top of a very high tower. And if boys ever start noticing 
those womanly curves and wiles then it’s a fair bet that Mr Baxter will kill them, 
picking them off one by one as they attempt to scale the heights of Sithean’s privet 
and shin up the long golden-red rope of Audrey’s beautiful hair.
(26)
It is in this vein that we are given some later fairy tale allusions: Gordon, Isobel’s 
father’s taking of a new wife is compared to Abenazaar’s cry in “Aladdin” “New wives 
for old!” (30); Malcolm Lovat is “a prince out my star”, whose mother is an ogress (38); 
Debby’s compulsive cleaning links her to Aschenputtel when Isobel imagines her 
“separating lentils from the ashes”; and Mrs Baxter’s garden features “beanstalks that 
touch the clouds” (46).
The impression that this is a realistic novel with a very self aware and allusive 
narrator prone to flights of fancy is shattered when the first fantastic event occurs, and 
Isobel is transported back in time to 1918. Her first reaction “I am mad, I think” is 
quickly given an alternative by Charles’s science (fiction) based suggestion, “you must 
have been in a time warp” (51).
Explaining the unreal: Uncanny or Marvellous?
Isobel’s uncertainty about her sanity recalls familiar territory for literary theorists. 
It reminds us of the novella around which Todorov seems to have based his entire 
theory of the fantastic, Henry James’s The Turn of the Screw. According to Todorov, 
the genre of fantasy can be largely separated into two distinct categories. The first is 
the uncanny, where the explanation of supernatural events is just that, that they are 
super-natural, one-off instances that can be explained by reference to the laws of 
reality, but do not cause us to question these laws. Examples of the uncanny can be 
found, for example, in Alice in Wonderland, where Alice’s fantastic adventures are to
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be explained by the fact that she was asleep and dreaming. The other major area of 
fantasy is the marvellous, in which fantastic events are simply accepted as natural. 
The result of this is to create a “world” that subscribes to a set of beliefs and laws of 
operation quite distinct from the rationale of the real world. These are the types of 
fantasy that Tolkien termed “Secondary Worlds” in his influential essay ”On Fairy 
Stories” (Tolkien 1965) and which are best represented in literature by the works of 
Tolkien himself. Lord of the Rings makes no direct claim to represent the reality of a 
twentieth century author or audience.
However, on the border-line, the margin that separates the uncanny from the 
marvellous, Todorov posits a type of fantasy literature that he rather confusingly calls 
the “pure” fantastic. The pure fantastic is a text that the reader cannot place as either 
marvellous or uncanny, and which therefore means that the reader maintains a sense 
of uncertainty which is never resolved. There are very few texts that Todorov 
designates as pure fantastic, but the theory seems to be built around The Turn of the 
Screw which has long been a battleground between critics who attempt to explain the 
text using the explanation of ghosts, and those who go in for a psychological 
explanation5.
This is not the place for a re-treading of the arguments over what constitutes 
fantasy or the fantastic. However, it is relevant to bring up these theories, precisely 
because, in Human Croquet, a similar dilemma is explicitly poised between explaining 
Isobel’s coming loose in time as something that can be explained as ‘uncanny’ or 
‘marvellous’, to use Todorov’s terms. A “strange Quint-like figure” (HC: 143) glanced 
through a window is an allusion that reminds us of James’s riddling text, a fact that
5 As Christine Brooke-Rose points out, however, the possibility o f psychoanalytically reading The Turn 
o f the Screw is one that antedates the text itself by a considerable length o f time. As she astutely 
observes, “ [its] very undecidability was for a long time unperceived, or, when perceived, seems to have 
exacerbated critics into taking up positions for or against one o f the interpretations”  (Brooke-Rose 1983: 
128). In fact, it was not until 1924, 26 years after the tale’s publication, that Edna Kenton suggested that 
it was more than a simple ghost story, and it was Edmund Wilson in 1934 who set out the debate that we 
are now familiar with, with his essay on “ The Ambiguity o f Elenry James”  (129)
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suggests that Atkinson, no stranger to the works of Todorov or James6, is deliberately 
creating the effect Todorov associates with the pure fantastic. Todorov also suggests 
three requirements for the pure fantastic, which Brooke-Rose summarises as:
(1) The reader’s hesitation (produced of course by the ambiguity of the text) 
between natural and supernatural explanations of apparently supernatural events 
must be sustained to the end. (2) This hesitation may also be shared by the 
leading character, i.e., it may be ‘represented’, become one of the themes; the 
reader, at least the naive reader, then identifies with the leading character. (3) The 
reader must adopt a certain attitude toward the text, he must reject a poetic 
reading and an allegoric reading, both of which destroy the pure fantastic (i.e., the 
hesitation).
(Brooke-Rose 1983: 63)
I have already mentioned that Isobel questions her sanity, which we can see as 
fulfilling Todorov’s second requirement; the hesitation over explaining the supernatural 
event is shared by reader and protagonist. This is not to say that HC is an example of 
the “pure fantastic”, as we will see Human Croquet refuses to sit easily into any of 
Todorov’s categories, and it is my contention that this is due to the use of heteroglossia 
that puts fairy tale chronotopes alongside realistic chronotopes. Before I can advance 
this argument however, it is necessary for us to delve further into the narrative and 
analyse further events that make us question what, precisely, is real.
Further Fantastic Events
Time-travel is a chronotope more commonly associated with science fiction than 
with fairy tale. Disparities in time that are found in folklore are more commonly of the 
type where a protagonist spends a day in the world of the fairies, or elves, and returns 
to find a disproportionate amount of years have passed in real time (Washington 
Irving’s “Rip Van Winkle” being a good literary example). Maria Nikolajeva argues that 
“time shift fantasy is the most intellectually demanding of all types of modern fantasy, 
for both writers and readers” and that “more than any other fantasy motif, [it] is 
influenced by contemporary scientific thought, especially the theory of relativity” 
(Nikolajeva 2003: 141-2).
6 Atkinson wrote a PhD on the Contemporary American Short Story at Dundee University. Her 
awareness o f critical thought is thoroughly demonstrated in Emotionally Weird, in the impenetrable but 
eerily credible academic discourse spouted by the “y°un& trendy”  lecturer.
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In the chapter “Experiments with aliens”, a science fiction chronotope is 
introduced when a UFO visits the conservatory, prompting Isobel to ask, “What was 
that? The past? The future? My people from another planet come to take me home?” 
(229). However, this science-fiction chronotope carries within it an allusion to fairy tale; 
one effect that the UFO has is to make an ancient cactus to turn green and flower, and 
when Isobel reaches out to touch the miraculous cactus flower she pricks her finger on 
a spine, another allusion to “Sleeping Beauty”7. At this point the chronotope of science 
fiction is linked with the time-shift in a more conventional manner (reminiscent of the 
‘missing minutes’ that apparently accompany a UFO close-encounter), as there 
appears to be an ‘explanation’ for the quantum disparity which is not the case with 
Isobel’s other, random-seeming time-shifting.
Isobel experiences more extreme time-shifts on a further 3 occasions: once when 
she is transported back to Elizabethan times, the second time when she finds herself in 
a prehistoric forest (158), and again when she goes back in time to see her aunt Vinny 
at around her own age (221). Like the film Groundhog Day, she also lives through the 
same day twice; Christmas eve is repeated, with Isobel making different choices each 
time: for example, the second time (chapter “Killing Time”) she knows to avoid the 
disastrous party (of chapter “Theartofsuccesfulentertaining”), but still ends up in the 
middle of a tragedy nonetheless.
Time-shifting8 is, in fact, one of two broad “types” of fantastic events that occur in 
Human Croquet, the other type being metamorphosis, or shape-shifting. 
Metamorphoses: humans becoming dogs, insects and trees 
The first metamorphosis to occur in Isobel’s narrative is, by her own admission, a 
product of an overactive imagination. It occurs after an observation about rooks flying
7 Remember that sixteen is the age for spindles to start pricking, and a whole host o f other symbolic 
sexual imagery to suddenly manifest itself.
81 use this term mainly because o f the more scientific connotations o f “ time travel”  which implies sci-fi 
gadgetry such as amazing alien spaceships disguised as old style blue police boxes and retrofitted 
Deloreans that have an 88mph sweet spot. The point being that travel seems to imply a mechanical 
methodology, where one can decide what time one is going to through ingenious futuristic machinery, 
where time shift seems to better encapsulate the randomness o f the events, and the protagonist’ s lack o f 
control over the shifts. Doctor Who, I would say, represents time travel, Quantum Leap time-shifts.
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home, where Isobel speculates that they might be afraid of being transformed or 
“shifting into human shape” if they do not get home before the sun sets (68), an 
allusion to the type of fairy tale classified by Aarne and Thompson as “The Brothers 
who were turned into birds” (AT 451), a common European tale type, of which “The 
Twelve Brothers” (KHM 9) is a good example.
A few short pages later, after her father has speculated about the whereabouts of 
her missing brother, and her aunt Vinny has used her seemingly psychic ability to tell 
when there’s someone (or something) at the door, Isobel discovers a dog lying “sphinx 
like on the threshold” which looks strangely familiar:
[...] Theres something in its expression ... the clumsy paws ... the big ears ... 
the bad haircut...
‘Charles?’ I whisper experimentally and the dog cocks one of its floppy ears 
and thumps its tail enthusiastically.
I suppose a better sister would have set about weaving him a shirt from 
nettles and throwing it over his furred-over body so that he could be released from 
his enchantment and resume his human form. I give him some cat food instead.
He’s absurdly grateful
(72-3)
This imaginary metamorphosis is an allusion to tales in which the protagonist’s 
brother is subjected to an enchantment, which she can undo by dint of hard effort and 
skill in womanly crafts. “The Six Swans” (KHM 49) has the protagonist weave a shirt 
made of aspen to free her transformed brothers back into humans; nettles are the 
unlikely textile used in Hans Christian Andersen’s version of this tale, “The Wild 
Swans”.
This first metamorphosis is revealed as a whimsical comparison, in the vein of 
Isobel’s earlier poetic exaggerations when within a few paragraphs she explains: “Of 
course I know the Dog [sic.] isn’t really Charles under an enchantment and anyway he 
comes back from wherever he’s been in time to drink Horlicks with Gordon” (73). This 
imaginary metamorphosis, with its allusion to fairy tale metamorphoses, foreshadows 
some later transformations which are not immediately written off as imaginary.
The next transformation occurs shortly after the house lodger, an unpleasant 
travelling shoe-salesman named Mr Rice, has indecently exposed himself to Isobel. In 
a passage composed entirely of italics and free-indirect discourse, Mr Rice wakes up to
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discover he has been turned into a fly (144-5). There is some ambiguity this time, over 
whether this is a supernatural event, or another poetic and allusive explanation for the 
lodger’s disappearance from the self-proclaimed omniscient narrator, this time recalling 
Kafka’s The Metamorphosis and the fate of Gregor Samsa. Debby and Vinny both 
assume that Rice has simply done a runner to avoid paying rent, and the free indirect 
discourse representing Rice’s thought processes make it clear that he was indeed 
planning to do so, having deposited his clothes and suitcases in a left-luggage locker 
ready to make his escape. The fact that Vinny “brushes a bluebottle away” (145) and 
that Debbie terms the escapee “[a] real insect” (146) while clearing up the pornographic 
debris that the lodger has abandoned can be seen as either explanations as to why 
Isobel has described the flight of the lodger in a fantastic manner, or as ironic jokes that 
the reader is party to because they know the real (fantastic) reason for Rice’s 
disappearance.
At one point Isobel explains that for Latin homework she has to translate from 
Ovid’s Metamorphoses, where “you can’t move for people turning into swans, heifers, 
bears, newts, spiders, bats, birds, stars, partridges and water, lots of water” (163). The 
story that she picks is that of Phaeton’s sisters, who mourned so much for their charred 
brother that they turned into trees. The incorporation of this intertext (an example of 
element 3, for Isobel’s translation is briefly recounted) will become important when we 
happen upon the third extreme case of shape-shifting in the novel, and one which is 
depicted without ambiguity as an event of irreducible magic.
At a drunken and rowdy party, Isobel is accosted by a group of dangerous men, 
friends of the repulsive Richard whom she has previously rejected: “Where’s a time 
warp when you need one?” she asks when he tries to kiss her, “Or the Dog? Or a 
woodcutter?” (227). Tellingly compared to wolves, this “baying pack” of threatening 
men forces Isobel to flee the party “running for [her] virtue” (261). Just when it appears 
that Isobel is in most danger, the third transformation occurs:
I’m done for. All I can do is stand and try and get my breath back, I feel sick 
from exertion and can’t raise a scream no matter how hard I try. It’s like being 
trapped in a nightmare. I lean against the trunk of the silver birch gasping for air
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like a dying fish and send up a small silent plea for help. Why do I have no 
protector in this world, someone watching over me?
I can’t even move, my legs feel as though they’re full of lead shot and my feet 
are rooted to the ground. One of the boys, Geoff, I think, runs straight up to me 
and stops, the mad Dionysian light in his eyes turning to confusion. He seems to 
look right through me. The other one, Clive, runs up to join him, and then bends 
over double to get his breath. ‘Where’d she go?’ he asks, panting. Th is way, 
somewhere.’ Clive says, looking around everywhere except at me. ‘Fucking little 
prick-teaser,’ he adds and puts his hand out on to my left shoulder and leans his 
weight against it as if I’m just part of the tree.
But when I glance down at his hand, I see that where my left shoulder should 
be, where my right shoulder should be -  where my entire body should be, in fact -  
is the silvery, papery bark of the birch. My arms are stiff branches sticking out from 
my sides, my previously bifurcated legs have turned to one solid tree trunk. I 
would scream now, but my mouth won’t open. Call me Daphne.
(262)
Unlike the previous transformations, which can be viewed as definitely imaginary 
and possibly imaginary in that order, this is clearly depicted as a fantastic event.
If we accept Nikolajeva’s argument that time-shift fantasy is linked with twentieth 
century scientific discourses, and is therefore a modern approach to questioning time, 
then shape-shifting is something altogether different. As the explicit intertextual 
references to Ovid in Human Croquet demonstrate, shape-shifting is one of the oldest 
and most widespread motifs of fantasy literature which is evident in fairy tale, folklore, 
and mythology. The first truly impressive class that Harry Potter attends at Hogwarts is 
Professor McGonagall’s transfiguration class, and turning one thing into another is a 
classic form of magic. Nikolajeva attempts to distinguish between fantasy and the fairy 
tale, but this is one chronotope that fantasy literature and the traditional fairy tale share, 
though it is hard to argue with her when she says:
One element that we immediately recognize as characteristic of the fantasy 
chronotope is the presence of magic, or any other form of the supernatural, in an 
otherwise realistic, recognizable world.
(Nikolajeva 2003: 141)
Magical structures
Fairy tale intertexts are the reason for much of Human Croquet’s magic realism. 
The example above, where Isobel’s transformation seems to be verifiably real (one of 
her pursuers mistakes her for a tree!), seems to suggest that strange things are 
happening to Isobel, and to discount the possibility of madness. It is one thing to 
hallucinate that you have turned into a tree, it is quite another for other people to
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mistake you for the tree that you have hallucinated. We will see below, that this does 
not resolve the hesitancy experienced by Isobel or the reader, for this provisional 
acceptance of the supernatural transformation is followed by Isobel waking up to find 
that it is Christmas Eve (again), with the possibility raised that the previous events were 
some kind of dream, “Perhaps I’m dreaming my life” (275). What is certain is that these 
metamorphoses become linked with the frequent allusions to fairy tales occurring 
throughout the narrative. Not only does Isobel allude to tales where brothers become 
animals, and women become trees, the magical chronotope of metamorphosis carried 
by these allusions ends up being represented as part of the events actually happening 
to Isobel.
The link between fairy tale intertexts and the magic realist nature of Isobel’s story 
is at its most evident in the chapters in which Isobel lives and relives Christmas Eve. 
The first of these, “Theartofsuccessfulentertaining” has allusions and significant 
structural resemblances to the tale of “Cinderella”(KHM 21); the second, “Killing time”, 
alludes to “Thousandfurs” (KHM 65) and other tales of familial violence.
You shall go the bal l . .
The first time Isobel undergoes a Christmas Eve tragedy is when she attends a 
birthday party hosted by Malcolm Lovat’s girlfriend, Hilary Walsh. The party, at a nice 
middle-class home, soon descends into teenage Bacchanalia, attempted rape, and 
eventually, a house fire. The main motifs that remind the reader of Cinderella in the 
retelling of this tragic day consist of the fairy godmother, the dress, the missing shoe, 
the ball, and of course the prince.
Isobel is established as a “Cinderella” figure early in the text in an allusion where 
she compares herself to the “perfect” Walsh sisters, Hilary and Dorothy: “Next to them, 
I’m a chimney sweep, a walnut-skinned beggar girl” (44). As I pointed out in chapter 
one, the name Cinderella is a kind of metonym, that signals the way she is linked to the 
mundane drudgery of housework, hence the name that evokes cinders, ashes, or as 
we will see in chapter five, embers.
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Isobel’s neighbour, Mrs Baxter is an obvious contender for a fairy godmother, a 
connection first made when she makes Isobel make a wish on her birthday “like a 
demented fairy godmother” (49) and later when, “’Oh, one day,”’ she says, turning a 
Disney song into a fairy tale prophecy “’your prince will come [she almost breaks into 
song] and you’ll fall in love and be happy’ But what if the prince that came looked like 
Mr Baxter [...]?” (160). As previously mentioned, her garden is described with magic 
overtones (beans that go up to the clouds), (190) and, when Isobel despairs of going to 
the party, it is Mrs Baxter who volunteers to make Isobel a dress, linking her with the 
haute couture fairy of “Cinderella”. Mrs Baxter is connected with female creativity, 
through the fecundity of her garden, her dressmaking abilities and through the following 
scene which talks of her storytelling:
Mrs Baxter knew the same stories as Eliza but when Eliza had told them they 
had frequently ended badly and contained a great deal of mutilation and torture, 
whereas in Mrs Baxter’s versions, the stories all had happy endings. Mrs Baxter’s 
Red Riding Hood, for example, was rescued by her woodcutter father who 
butchered the wolf and slit it open to reveal a grandmother as good as new and, 
needless to say, everyone lived happily ever after. In Eliza’s version, on the other 
hand, everyone usually died, even Little Red Riding Hood.
Sometimes when they got to the end of a story, where everything had been 
put right and justice done, Mrs Baxter would sigh and say, ‘What a shame that life’s 
not really like that.’ Mr Baxter didn’t know about these reading sessions -  Mr 
Baxter disapproved whole-heartedly of fairy stories (‘stuff and nonsense’) although 
whether he had a whole heart was debatable.
(192)
The party, needless to say, stands in for the courtly ball of the familiar 
“Cinderella”, and the role of Malcolm Lovat, who is introduced to the reader as “a prince 
out of my star”, is obvious when Isobel complains: “I’m supposed to be waltzing 
rapturously in Malcolm Lovat’s handsome arms not running for my virtue” (261). Isobel 
also loses a shoe in this mad chase across the garden, an event which reminds us of 
her mother’s missing shoe (see below) but also the key motif of “Cinderella”; the shoe 
lost by Eliza sparks allusions to Cinderella: “If we found its partner would it help us to 
find the true bride (‘it fits, it fits!’)” (62).
It is during this chapter that the most extreme metamorphosis takes place, and 
Isobel turns into a birch-tree. Although this is not immediately reminiscent of 
“Cinderella”, this is mainly because the Disney film of the tale, “the original” to many
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people, resembles Perrault’s uCendrillon", the version which first introduced the glass 
slipper, amongst other things. The Grimm version “Aschenputtef’ (KHM 21 )9, which is 
alluded to early in the book10, features a ‘magic tree’ in a prominent position. After the 
death of Aschenputtel’s mother, and her substitution with the wicked stepmother, she 
plants a hazel tree on her mother’s grave which she waters with her tears when she 
visits three times a day to pray until it grows into a handsome tree, visited by a tame 
white bird who throws down to the protagonist whatever she wishes for.
This tree plays a major role in “Aschenputtel”; after fulfilling her step-mother’s trial 
of separating lentils from ashes, with a little help from tame pigeons and turtle doves 
(which are, of course, linked to the white bird that visits the hazel tree), the step-mother 
reneges on her promise to allow Aschenputtel to the ball11, because she has no clothes 
and cannot dance. So Cinderella goes to “her mother’s” tree and cries “Shiver and 
quiver, little tree,/ Silver and gold throw down over me” (Grimm J and Grimm W 1998: 
124) and the bird throws down a gold and silver dress to her, with slippers embroidered 
with silk and silver. She goes to the ball, she dances, the prince falls in love, and when 
she leaves he pursues her (it is significant that Aschenputtel not only flees the amorous 
royal, but “escapes” him by springing into a dovecote). The prince tells Aschenputtel’s 
father that an unknown maiden has hidden in his pigeon house and the father wonders 
if it could be Aschenputtel, but when they destroy the pigeon house together, they find 
it empty. This process is repeated on the next day, Aschenputtel visits her mother’s 
tree and wishes for a dress, which is more beautiful than the last and astonishes all at
9 The name Aschenputtel is a Germanic rendering o f “ Cinderella” , and some translations o f the Grimm’ s 
tales ditch this Germanic naming in favour o f the more recognisable “ Cinderella”  o f French origin. See 
for example the Routledge version cited in the bibliography.
10 “ Soon I expect we’ ll find Debby in the hearth separating lentils from the ashes”  (46). This alludes to 
the trials that the wicked-stepmother puts Aschenputtel through, and which she accomplishes with the 
help o f the magic tree, and its associated animals. It is interesting to note that Debbie is here associated 
with the victim, Aschenputtel, rather than the oppressor, the step-mother, given that she is Isobel’s 
stepmother, and that Isobel takes up the role o f Cinderella later in the text.
11 In fact, the King has set up a festival lasting three days to which all the beautiful girls o f the kingdom 
are invited, for the purpose o f allowing his son to choose a bride. The famous ’ 12 o clock’ deadline, at 
which point the enchantments o f the Perrault’ s fairy w ill fade, is not the reason this Cinderella runs away. 
Rather, this prince, once he has Iain eyes on her refuses to let loose o f her hand, and wishes to “ bear her 
company”  when she wants to go home. The flight, like the flight in Human Croquet, is more to do with 
keeping chaste until marriage (which in this case has the effect that Cinderella keeps being chased until 
marriage) than with shoddy conjuring skills.
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the ball. Again she escapes the prince, this time by climbing a magnificent pear tree, 
and again, her father and the prince destroy her hiding place to find that she has 
disappeared. The third repetition of Aschenputtel’s wish produces the most splendid 
dress anyone had ever seen, and a pair of golden slippers. However, forewarned is 
forearmed and this prince has set a trap, smearing the whole staircase with pitch, and it 
is this crafty manoeuvre that yields the golden slipper and allows him to go house to 
house with the famous doorstep slipper challenge.
Further differences remain between this version and the conventional tale, which 
are still tied to the motif of the magical tree. When the prince visits Aschenputtel’s 
household, he presents the shoe to both step-sisters in turn. The first finds her toes 
will not fit, and hacks her toe off to get the shoe on. The prince, fooled, takes her “on 
his horse as his bride and rode away with her”. They ride past the hazel tree however, 
where the pigeons on the tree sing to the Prince, warning him “Turn and peep, turn and 
peep,/ There’s blood within the shoe,/ The shoe it is too small for her,/ The true bride 
waits for you” (126)12. He returns the first sister and asks the second to try the shoe. 
This sister’s heel will not fit, so it is lopped off, and the guileless prince rides off again, 
only for the pigeons in the hazel-tree to point out that once again, he’s got the wrong 
woman and the proof is in the bloody shoe. The Prince returns, and on the third 
attempt Aschenputtel puts on the shoe, and they ride away together. Two doves sing 
approval “the true bride rides with you” this time, as they pass the hazel-tree before 
flying over to Cinderella’s shoulders. Finally, in an ending that was absent from the first 
published version of the Grimms’ collection but added later, when the step-sisters 
attend Aschenputtel’s wedding, the pigeons peck out both step-sisters’ eyes as 
punishment for their deceit (see Tatar 1987 for more discussion of the difference 
between the first and second version of “Aschenputtel”).
Isobel’s transformation into a tree is therefore highly significant, as it ties in with 
the “Cinderella” allusions as well as the mythical ones earlier discussed.
I2Note how the symbolism seems to tie the false-brides with unchastely behaviour, marking their 
opposition to Cinderella.
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Aschenputtel’s escape, like Isobel’s, seems to be connected to keeping her virtue, and 
the frustrated college boys, much like the prince, chase her to find she has 
disappeared (in this case, not up a tree but into one). Moreover, the transformation 
occurs when Isobel “sends up a small silent plea for help”, almost as though her wish 
has been fulfilled. The tree, in the Grimm version, represents the influence of the 
dead-mother; as Warner points out “ [Cinderella] variants from all over the world give 
the mother’s ghost some kind of consoling and magical role in her daughter’s ultimate 
escape from pain” (1994a: 205). Isobel’s dead mother, Eliza, is implied here due to 
comments throughout that link her to trees and the wood in general. Like Isobel’s 
ancestor, Lady Fairfax, she appeared out of nowhere, and vanished as abruptly:
“(Eliza) is an unreal woman [...] slipping the bounds of reality the day she walked off 
into a wood and never came back” (25), and she is often described in otherworldly 
ways as if she were a witch, which reminds us of early in the narrative when Gordon, in 
woodcutter mode, is about to fell a tree. “He should be careful,” Isobel comments 
“witches have been known to disguise themselves as elders” (48-9). Through a 
network of similes and intertexts, this moment of irreducible magic can be seen as a 
magic realist variant of the folkloric motif that Aarne and Thompson designated D950, 
or “Magic tree”.
You shan’t go to the ball (or anywhere else for that matter)
The second time Isobel lives through Christmas Eve, the events depicted again 
recall a particular fairy tale intertext. In this chapter the “mystery” of the baby that was 
left on Arden’s doorstep is resolved. It is, as was plainly obvious for quite some time, 
the child of Audrey Baxter, Isobel’s friend. The shock is that it is Audrey’s father, the 
vile-tempered and sadistic Mr Baxter, who fathered the child. When this is revealed, 
Mrs Baxter furiously stabs her husband to death, and the rest of the chapter documents 
Isobel and her friends Carmen and Eunice’s attempts to dispose of the corpse.
If the first Christmas Eve highlighted Mrs Baxter’s role as a substitute mother
figure (or fairy god-mother), the second undermines it. The fact that she created a
dress for Isobel’s party highlights her creative qualities, but the fact the dress fails to
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magically transfigure Isobel into a ravishing beauty (she complains that she looks 
rather like “a huge pink amoeba”) points to her flaws. Isobel complains that she might 
have done better to go and wish under the Lady Oak for “three dresses (one is never 
enough) -  the first as silver as the moon, the second as gold as the sun and the last 
one the colour of the heavens, sprinkled with silver sequin stars” (231).
The wishing under the tree linked with a mother figure for three dresses reminds 
us once again of “Aschenputtel”, and it may be seen that this is a moment where the 
two tale types are compared, and Isobel finds that she would prefer the Cinderella 
version with the tree to the one with the fairy godmother. However, the colour of the 
dresses is also an allusion to a central motif in the fairy tale “Allerleirauh” (KHM 65), 
and labelled tale type AT 51 OB “The Father Who Wanted to Marry his Daughter”, in the 
Aarne-Thompson index. The allusion is particularly pertinent at this point, as this is a 
fairy tale that explicitly addresses the problem of incest13.
In this fairytale, a king undertakes to marry his daughter, after promising his wife 
on her deathbed that he should marry no woman “not quite as beautiful as I am, and 
who has not just such golden hair as I have” (Grimm J and Grimm W 1998: 326-7). 
Despite the protestations of his counsellors, the King puts the idea to his daughter who 
tells him he must first provide her with three dresses: one as golden as the sun, one as 
silvery as the moon and one as bright as the stars. She also challenges him to make 
her a mantle made up of a thousand different types of fur joined together. By doing so, 
she hopes that her father will realise the impossibility of these tasks and finally grow 
out of his transgressive desires. But the king achieves all these tasks and so the 
heroine runs away to another kingdom taking with her the three dresses (stowed in a 
nutshell), a golden ring, a golden spinning-wheel and a golden reel. Disguising her 
beauty by covering herself with soot and wearing the cloak of all furs, she walks deep 
into a forest owned by a neighbouring king where she is discovered by a party of
lj See Ashliman’s 1997 essay “ Incest in Indo-European Folk Tales”  on this tale type at his personal 
website for further details.
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huntsmen, and mistaken for an animal. The huntsmen capture the princess but when 
she pleads for her life, offer her work in the castle kitchens.
After a long time, on the day of a great feast Thousandfurs asks the cook if she 
can leave the kitchen to watch the festivities, and the cook agrees. She then washes 
the soot off her face, and puts on the golden dress, dazzling all at the feast with her 
beauty, and dancing with the king, then vanishing before anyone knows who she is, 
slipping back into her role as kitchen hand. When she arrives back at the kitchen, the 
cook orders her to cook soup for the king, and she cooks him the best soup he has 
ever eaten, slipping the golden ring she took from home into the soup bowl. When the 
king discovers the ring, the cook is summoned and questioned, and she is tricked into 
telling the king that Thousandfurs made it. The cook is dismissed and Thousandfurs 
summoned, but the king does not recognise her in her animalistic garb, she feigns 
ignorance of the ring and is sent away.
This feast sequence is repeated two more times, as Thousandfurs shows off the 
dress as silver as the moon and the one as bright as starlight, before going back to the 
kitchen and re-disguising herself as a servant, cooking the same meal for the king, and 
depositing the golden spinning wheel and reel in the king’s soup dish. On the third 
occasion, the king secretly slips the golden ring onto Thousandfur’s finger while they 
dance and tries to hold on to her after the dance is over. She eventually escapes, but 
in her panic leaves on the star-bright dress below her cloak and doesn’t manage to 
quite cover all of her aristocratically-pale skin with soot. When the king interviews her 
for the third time about the mysterious appearance of a gold objet d ’art in his meal he 
notices the white skin, and the ring he has planted, and when she tries to run away the 
dress gleams from underneath the cloak. The king realises he has found the 
mysterious and beautiful maiden and they are married immediately.
Alluding to this fairy tale in connection with a dress that Mrs Baxter is creating
both foreshadows the forthcoming revelation, and also shows the ways in which Mrs
Baxter’s passive femininity is not enough: Isobel expresses a preference for the three
dresses over the single dress provided by the fairy godmother in “Cendrillon”, which is
92
perhaps a comment on the passive Mrs Baxter’s inability to protect her own daughter 
from Mr Baxter’s incestuous desires.
This allusion also reminds us of the way in which Cinderella and Thousandfurs 
are linked. Aarne and Thompson believe the tales so related that they consider 
“Thousandfurs” to be a variant of the “Cinderella” tale type (Cinderella is 510 and 510A, 
“Thousandfurs” is 51 OB). Both can be seen as tales of “oppressed daughters”, though 
the agents of oppression are different. Cinderella is subject to repression by other 
women, and this fairy tale is particularly relevant for Isobel, because as Marina Warner 
notes, the way that patriarchy worked in the time these tales were told led to 
households containing more than one woman, creating a hotpot of simmering tension 
(Warner 1994: 238). In the past section, it is Eliza’s main wish that Gordon would 
move out, so that she could be away from Vinny and Charlotte, Gordon’s mother. The 
household is still a complex system of petty intrigues and rivalries when Isobel grows 
up particularly in the relationships between Isobel, Debby and Vinny.
Audrey and Mrs Baxter however, are subject to the type of male tyranny 
depicted in the tale type 51 OB. Throughout the book it is clear that Mrs Baxter could 
use a fairy godmother herself, as it is made clear that Mr Baxter beats her, but the 
sexual abuse of Audrey is only revealed in this chapter.
The earlier references to Mr Baxter gain added significance when this chapter is 
taken into account. Above, on page 79, we saw that Mr Baxter is compared to the 
Sorceress in “Rapunzel”. It is at this point that we would do well to remember early 
versions of “Rapunzel” (for example that in the Grimms’ first edition) in which the 
heroine’s forbidden liaisons with the prince are revealed not by her asking why the 
prince weighs more on her hair than the sorceress, but why her clothes no longer fit 
(answer: she is pregnant)14. The difference here is that the ogre’s attempt to keep the 
girl locked away from the world is for entirely selfish reasons. Mr Baxter even shears
14 Other, earlier, recorded versions o f the tale are even more explicit about the heroine’s sexual activities, 
the most notably bawdy version being the story o f “ Petrosinella”  in Basile’s Pentamerone (Tatar 1987: 
45-46)
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off his daughter’s hair as “punishment” for having been with boys, as though she really 
were Rapunzel and the removal of her locks would solve the “problem”.
Just before his death, Mr Baxter is described in comparison to another telling 
fairy tale. After punching Isobel in the face, and waving around his revolver he walks 
over to the mantelpiece and begins to smoke his pipe. The smoke surrounds his face 
in a blue haze, and Isobel wonders “How can be so calm in the face of so much 
domestic mayhem? But then I expect that Bluebeard probably locked up his secret 
butchery and went and made himself a cup of tea afterwards” (282). This comparison 
to the ogre-husband is telling, as we later learn that it is Mr Baxter who killed Isobel’s 
mother in the woods.
The two chapters that document Isobel’s repeating Christmas day are both linked 
to two closely-related fairy tale intertexts. Both days also have a significant death toll, 
with Richard and Hilary dying in a house-fire unintentionally caused by Isobel the first 
time round, and Mr Baxter dying in the second iteration. These deaths could be related 
to the fairy tale allusions, given the violent ends that fairy tale villains meet. The death 
that ends both of these chapters is, however, one that cannot be seen as a form of 
retributive justice, because in both chapters Malcolm Lovat dies in a car accident, 
raising questions of free-will and predestination.
The chapter following the two just described, “There is another world but it is this 
one” (297), is set on Christmas day rather than Christmas eve, but this is a world in 
which Eliza and the Widow are still alive and Malcolm Lovat is actually Isobel’s 
boyfriend and even proposes to her. This time, Isobel warns Malcolm to stop his car, 
but even this cannot save him from his fate as another car careens into them and kills 
him once again. “Perhaps this is an ordeal I have been set -”, speculates Isobel, 
“perhaps I am Janet to Malcolm Lovat’s Tam Lin. Perhaps the Queen of Elfland -  
instead of turning him into a snake in my arms, or a lion, or a red hot bar of iron -  is 
trying to wrest her human tithe from me by constantly killing him. Again and again” 
(305).
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Significantly, these two chapters, which are perhaps the most fantastic and 
dramatic in the book, and certainly feature the most striking and pertinent fairy tale 
intertexts, occur directly before an explanation that would seem to explain all the 
fantastic events realistically. Before I can further elaborate on this explanation 
however, it is necessary to look at those sections of the book that are more 
conventionally novelistic.
History (repeating)
Human Croquet is not constituted entirely by the Isobel’s first person. It is 
possible to see two different narrative styles in the book, the self conscious, allusive 
and highly postmodern narrative of Isobel which is always preceded by a page headed 
with only the word “PRESENT” and the sections of the book headed “PAST” (89-134), 
(167-208) (239-247), (313-341) (359-367), which contain realist depiction of events that 
occurred before Isobel’s birth and in her childhood where the narrative voice changes 
appropriately to the traditional omniscient narration of realistic fiction15. The “Past” 
section of the book relates analeptically the historic events that eventually come to 
influence Isobel’s life, covering the events briefly sketched out in the first chapter 
“beginning” but in greater detail, filling in the gaps. This realist approach to covering 
the history of the Fairfax family in fact takes up over a third of the total length of Human 
Croquet, and so cannot be omitted from any critical discussion of the novel.
It is necessary to remember Faris’s assertion that magic realist texts are 
“defocalized” because they “seem to come from radically different perspectives at 
once”. Here, we have a text where there seems to be two radically different 
perspectives: Isobel’s self aware and metafictional narrative clashing with the 
distanced, omniscient voice that narrates the historical ‘past’ chapters. Faris says that
15 However, this appellation is wrong i f  we take into account the claim at the start o f the book that Isobel 
Fairfax is the novel’s omniscient narrator. As these narratives are linked with Isobel’s own, we can see 
that she is still the focus o f these “ past”  sections, even i f  she is not apparently the narrating agent. It 
could be argued that these sections are part o f Isobel’s own narrative, and that the narrator is simply 
adopting a more traditional and familiar style in which to narrate these historic events (for we question the 
reality o f the events that are told in the omniscient style a lot less than we do those told by first person 
narrators, 1). Though the events in the “ Past”  section o f the book could be considered unlikely, for 
example the baby-snatching that echoes both Waterland and The Importance o f Being Earnest, we do not 
question them in the same way as we question the events narrated by Isobel.
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one of the advantages of the term defocalization is that it “has the advantage of 
differentiating its qualities from the narrative perspective within realism that Gerald 
Prince characterizes as “non-focalized” of as having “zero focalization,” which 
designates omniscient narration” (Faris 2004: 43). Faris uses this coinage in order to 
describe the “strangely indeterminate nature of magical realism’s generic narrative 
stance”, and we will see evidence of this indeterminacy in the way we end up regarding 
the “realist” sections of the novel.
One of the important things to note about this third of the book is that although it 
does not contain events of a truly fantastic nature, it does contain numerous events 
that are redolent of the fairy tale. Isobel’s mother Eliza makes a wish for her daughter 
reminiscent of those made by the fairies in “Sleeping Beauty”: “/wish, Eliza said softly, 
that she will blossom and grow. ‘What a silly thing to wish for,’ Vinny said.” (100). In a 
rare moment where Vinny’s thoughts are directly represented, Eliza is compared to the 
numerous fairy tale mothers who are accused of eating their own children “Why, Vinny 
wondered, was Eliza always trying to eat bits of her children? What a tasty little 
morsel, Eliza murmured in Isobel’s ear while Vinny patted butter aggressively, 
imagining it was Eliza’s head. If Eliza wasn’t careful, Vinny thought, she’d look around 
one day and discover she’d eaten them all up” (121). This picnic is also a major turning 
point in the plot, as it goes badly wrong when Vinny goes to relieve herself in the 
undergrowth and Eliza chooses this moment to go for a walk, swiftly pursued by her 
hapless husband. After some length of time, Charles and Isobel decide to follow them, 
first finding one of their mother’s unsuitable shoes, which recalls the evidentiary 
footwear in “Cinderella”16. They then become lost in a wood, a moment that is 
obviously “Hansel and Gretel”:
16 This shoe is found years later in V inny’s wardrobe, and therefore fu lfils the same function as a piece o f 
material evidence for the children’s mysterious, disappearing mother. It recalls Cinderella’ s footwear in 
other ways too. Not only is it made o f brown suede (before Perrault’s Cendrillon the slipper left behind 
by the put-upon daughter was made o f fur), but it has a mink pom-pom, and also features a rhinestone . 
The shoe seems to recall therefore all the features o f Cinderella’s slipper, in what is either a deliberate 
allusion, or a function o f the shoe being so impossibly glamorous that it features pretty much every type 
o f material a shoe can be made of.
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[...] Charles said he wished they’d brought the uneaten sandwiches with 
them. ‘We could scatter the crumbs,’ he said, ‘and find our way back.’ Their only 
blueprint for survival in these circumstances, it seemed, was fictional. They knew 
the plot, unfortunately, and any minute expected to find the gingerbread cottage -  
and then the nightmare would really begin.
[...] [Isobel] was so hungry that she would have eaten a gingerbread tile or a 
piece of striped candy window-frame, even though she knew the consequences.
(130-131)
The lost and terrified children are disturbed by the noises of the dark and wild 
woods, and when an owl swoops overhead, the children’s fairytale expectations are 
again invoked “’It’s not the owls we have to worry about,’ Charles muttered firmly, ‘it’s 
the wolves’” (131).
The “Past” section of the book seems at first to fulfil the straightforward role of 
giving the reader details about Isobel’s family history in an authoritative and reliable 
manner. If Isobel’s narration is allusive, elliptical, self-aware and showy, the “past” 
sections come as a more traditional account of things that happened, told in a 
conventionally realist sense. However, the conclusion of the book causes us to 
question this seemingly straight-forward division between realism and fantasy, history 
and fiction.
The explanation, and why it doesn’t explain anything
It is at the end of the “perfect Christmas” that the reader receives an “explanation” 
for the fantastic events of the novel: “The cosmic journey I took was the world of the 
comatose” (309). It turns out that the elder felled by Gordon early in the novel actually 
landed on Isobel, and that all subsequent events were actually dreamt by her in her 
comatose state (346)17. At first sight, this appears to be a traditional conclusion in 
which the fantastic events are explained rationally, and are therefore seen as 
delusional, and not much different to Alice waking up to find that she had dreamed her
17 An explanation that may make the “ Sleeping Beauty”  allusion at the start o f Isobel’s narrative either a 
mise-en-abyme or at the very least, an in-joke. It is also notable that the chapter when Isobel fu lly  awakes 
begins with a kiss, but one which seems to come from her mother (Eliza has the g ift o f speaking in italics 
in Isobel’ s narrative), “ Y on go to sleep now, darling” (345).
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experiences in Wonderland18. According to Todorov’s typology, this conclusion would 
place Human Croquet firmly in the category of the uncanny.
However, the world that Isobel wakes up in has many strange similarities to her 
dream world that cannot be easily explained. Rather than discovering a baby on her 
doorstep, Debbie is unwittingly pregnant and delivers soon after Isobel returns home. 
Coincidentally, she gives birth in exactly the way that Isobel conjures up as an excuse 
to cover the mystery appearance of the doorstep baby, “Debbie is fat enough to have 
had a baby without anybody knowing and you do hear about people giving birth without 
expecting to - standing at the cooker heating milk one minute, the next -  a parent” 
(155). The mystery dog did in fact turn up on the doorstep. Mr Baxter has met a 
violent death. As in the dream, Debbie is playing a part in a performance of A 
Midsummer Night’s Dream although it is Hermia rather than Helena: “It’s these little 
differences that are the most puzzling to me, like having permanent deja vu” (352).
If the fantastic events in the novel can be written off as the dream-fantasies of the 
protagonist, we would also expect them to stop happening when she awakes and 
rejoins the real world. Yet in the last chapter of the “Present” sequence, when Isobel is 
watching the play at the lady oak from her bedroom window, Shakespeare appears in 
Isobel’s bedroom.
The magic events that have been witnessed in the main narrative are therefore 
no longer contained within Isobel’s coma, an explanation which would normally seal off 
the supernatural from the real world. The magical nature of Isobel’s narrative survives 
even rational explanation, and ends with the fitting sentiment “Only the imagination can 
embrace the impossible -  the golden mountain, the fire-breathing dragon, the happy 
ending” (356).
The realist nature of the “Past” sections is also infected by uncertainty because of 
the conclusion of Isobel’s narrative. After waking from her coma, Isobel realises that 
there is another patient in the room:
18 On waking in the hospital, Isobel asks rhetorically “ How long have I spent in the underworld?”  evoking 
A lice ’s descent into the rabbit hole as much as Persephone’s time in Hades when she later explicitly 
comments that she feels like “ Alice waking up and finding she dreamt the looking-glass world.”  (351)
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After days, possibly weeks, maybe years, I realize that she’s telling me a 
story. She is my own Scheherezade, she knows everything, she must be the 
storyteller from the end of the world. But how does it begin? Why it begins, as it 
must, she says, with the arrival of the baby -
(309)
Immediately following this quotation is a “Past” chapter, which begins, as it must, 
with the arrival of a baby. This chapter finally reveals the story of the enigmatic Eliza, 
but it does so in a way that causes the reader several moments of recognition. Eliza, if 
we are to believe this chapter, was born “Esme de Breville” offspring of an English 
aristocrat and his Argentinean cattle heiress wife. The de Breville baby suffers the 
misfortune of being snatched from its pram by Maude Potter, who, returning from 
hospital after delivering a still-born child walks through the park where Esme is 
momentarily unattended:
Maude Potter thought she would just lift it out and give it a little cuddle. The 
baby opened its eyes and smiled at her. ‘Oh,’ said Maude Potter. Her breasts 
ached, her womb contracted. This baby didn’t really belong to anyone, she 
thought, lifting it gently out of its covers, had maybe been abandoned? Had maybe 
been put in this park by God himself, to give Herbert and herself the child they 
deserved (Maude was very religious)? Yes the baby had come down to earth like 
a fallen cherub. Or, now Maude becomes very fanciful, a gift child, like little 
Thumbelina, a present from the fairies ... nightclothes tumbled from the Gladstone 
to make room, a little nest, a walnut s h e ll...
(HC: 320 ellipses in original)
This chapter explains realistically some of the mysteries, but it does so in a way 
that doubles events we have seen previously in Isobel’s narrative, so that the chapter is 
haunted with a sense of deja vu. When the baby’s nursemaid returns to the pram, a 
page follows with only two words printed upon it in large type capitals, “NO BABY!”, 
which inevitably reminds us of when Isobel earlier discovered the baby on the 
doorstep, where a page is taken up with only the words “A BABY!” in large type 
capitals. Herbert Potter goes out into the yard to burn the baby’s incriminating finery, 
just as Vinny disposes of the doorstep baby’s shawl on the bonfire. The reference to 
Thumbelina reminds the reader of tales told about “found” babies, just as Isobel 
commenting on “the doorstep baby” suggests that “the baby isn’t just a mysterious mis­
delivery by the baby shop, it brings with it myth and legend - Moses and Oedipus and 
the fairy’s changeling” (153).
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Other events that happen to Esme, now renamed Victoria Angela by the Potters, 
also seem familiar. When she is 12 years old, Herbert Potter begins to sexually abuse 
her, reminding us of the mistreatment of Audrey Baxter. She runs away from home at 
the age of 14, and after a couple of years waiting as a waitress, ends up working as a 
prostitute. It is the gangster who sets her up as a prostitute that gets her a new 
identity, Eliza Jane Dennis, and who “shapes her” into a “high class tart”, taking on the 
accoutrements of the aristocracy that will later make her so attractive and exotic to 
Gordon. It is this gangster who disposes of her child when she accidentally falls 
pregnant; he sells it to a “Dr Lovat”, raising some serious issues over Isobel’s later 
obsession with “the prince”, Malcolm Lovat. This unsettling thought is compounded by 
the fact that one of Eliza’s regular clients is Sir Edward De Breville, who swears that 
there is something “familiar” about her. The chapter also explains Charles’s ginger hair 
as a product of Eliza’s brief encounter with an RAF airman. Fate steps in when the 
gangster is killed by the Luftwaffe and Eliza is rescued by Gordon Fairfax, where her 
story joins up with events that we have already heard told.
The conclusion to this chapter returns to the pivotal moment of the picnic, 
retelling events that explain Eliza’s mysterious disappearance. Eliza’s vanishing into 
the woods is explained here by the fact that she has been having an affair with Mr 
Baxter, who follows her into the woods and murders her with her own shoe in a jealous 
rage19. Finally, we learn from the omniscient narrator that “[o]f course she wasn’t really 
the de Breville’s daughter”, Sir Edward had bought a baby, from “gypsies probably”, to 
appease his infertile bride, once again raising the idea of the changeling.
This rounds off the narrative in a convenient manner, but the fact that the reader 
comes across numerous motifs that we have found before in Isobel’s comatose world 
causes the reader some epistemological consternation. The fact that the chapter 
occurs immediately after Isobel speaks of encountering her own Scheherezade, seems 
to suggest that this chapter is the narrative told by the woman in the next bed, 
especially as both tales begin with a new baby. But it turns out, that the woman in the
19 A fact that reminds us o f the way that Mr. Baxter was a Bluebeard figure in Isobel’s dream world.
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bed next to Isobel’s is also a hallucination; when Isobel asks the nurse about this 
mysterious storyteller the nurse informs her that there hasn’t been anyone in that bed 
(345).
Previously up to this point, it would be quite possible to suggest that Human 
Croquet is novel where magic and realism are handily separated into two different 
sections. The fantastic and magical events take place in Isobel’s dream imagination, 
while real events are charted in a separate section of the book. But this easy 
distinction is challenged at the end of the novel. This chapter seems to fill in the gaps 
far too neatly to be truly realistic, and describes some rather sensational events 
normally associated more with the Gothic than with realistic fiction (adultery, baby- 
snatching, incest, prostitution, more incest, more adultery, and finally murder).
In the end it is impossible to say whether the “past” section is actually a realistic 
account of what happened, or whether it is part of Isobel’s comatose phantasie20. The 
way in which this chapter seems to be loaded with intertexts, from The Importance of 
Being Earnest, Pygmalion and “Thumbelina” to The Winter’s Tale suggests that it could 
be the product of the hyper-literate Isobel’s imagination. A further example that could 
be raised where the distinction between the “realistic” past and “magic” present is 
problematised can be seen when Charles is sent out for adoption by Vinny after 
Gordon’s disappearance. In a page of italics that visually recalls the transformation of 
Mr. Rice into a housefly in the “Present” section, Charles is described metamorphosing 
into a Werewolf, which is not the sort of thing that we expect in a realistic narrative 
(196). The magic in HC cannot be confined to the sections of the book where its 
influence can be designated “uncanny” and delusional. Realism is thoroughly 
destabilised not only by fantastic events, but also by the way in which “real” events are 
compared with fairy tale intertexts. If the fantastic events of the novel cannnot be 
described as examples of the Todorovian marvellous, nor the uncanny, then according 
to his typology, it can only be an example of the “pure” fantastic. However, Todorov’s
20 Undoubtedly a psychoanalytic reading o f Human Croquet could make much o f this aspect o f the novel. 
This, however, is both beyond my remit and not to my taste.
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first requirement, that the reader’s hesitancy between a natural and supernatural 
explanation be sustained beyond the end of the narrative, is not fulfilled satisfactorily 
because a rational explanation exists within the narrative, and also, that rational 
explanation turn out to be unsatisfactory and supernatural events occur which cannot 
be safely contained by the explanation. Throughout HC the reader and protagonist do 
share the hesitancy between supernatural and natural explanation of events that 
Todorov feels is the major feature of the pure fantastic. But by the end of the novel, we 
find that it refuses to be contained safely within Todorov’s theoretical genres.
However, I feel that the best way to explain the effects of Atkinson’s novel is to situate 
it within the genre of “magic realism”.
Magic realism, antinomy, fairy tale chronotopes
Wendy Faris, in her essay, “Scheherezade’s Children”, attempts to draw up a 
checklist of magic realism, which it is useful to quote at length. Her first 5 primary 
“features” of Magic Realism follow:
1) The text contains an “irreducible element” of magic, something we 
cannot explain according to the laws of the universe as we know 
them [...]
2) Descriptions detail a strong presence of the phenomenal world -  
this is the realism in magical realism, distinguishing it from much 
fantasy and allegory [...].
3) The reader may hesitate (at one point or another) between two 
contradictory understandings of events -  and hence experience 
some unsettling doubts. Much of magical realism is thus 
encompassed by Tzvetan Todorov’s well-known formulation of the 
fantastic [...]
4) We experience the closeness or near merging of two realms, two 
worlds [...] Another related boundary to be blurred is the one 
between fact and fiction.
5) These fictions question received ideas about time, space, and 
identity. [...] As Fredric Jameson sets out the project of realism, 
one thing it achieves is “the emergence of a new space and a new 
temporality”. Its spatial homogeneity abolishes the older forms of 
sacred space; likewise the newly measuring clock and measurable 
routine displace “older forms of ritual, sacred, or cyclical time.”
Even as we read Jameson’s description, we sense the erosion of 
this program by magical realist texts
(Faris 1995: 163-174)
Human Croquet receives a rather large tick next to all of these check-boxes.
Irreducible magic is represented by the last minute arrival of Shakespeare in the
present, the phenomenal world is represented by documentation of the minutiae of
everyday life, the reader and protagonist hesitate between contradictory explanations
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of supernatural events, we see the merging of two realms and the boundary between 
fact and fiction eroded by the combination of the spurious histories and the time-travel 
chronotope, and the “past” chapter following the “explanation” seems to suggest a form 
of cyclical time because it provokes a feeling that history is repeating.
Faris goes on to add a list of “secondary or accessory specifications”, which she 
admits is “more provisional” (175) and which again we may find useful when 
considering this novel:
1) Metafictional dimensions are common in contemporary magical 
realism: the texts provide commentaries on themselves, often 
complete with occasional mises-en abyme [...]
2) The reader may experience a particular kind of verbal magic— a 
closing of the gap between words and the world, or a 
demonstration of what we might call the linguistic nature of 
experience. This magic happens when a metaphor is made real.
[...] This linguistic magic, which runs through magical realism 
thrives on the pervasive intertextual nature of much postmodern 
writing and the presence of intertextual bricolage [...]
3) The narrative appears to the late twentieth-century adult readers to 
which it as addressed as fresh, childlike, even primitive. Wonders 
are recounted largely without comment, in a matter-of-fact way, 
accepted-presumably as a child would accept them, without undue 
questioning or reflection.
4) Repetition as a narrative principle, in conjunction with mirrors or 
their analogues used symbolically or structurally, creates a magic 
of shifting references.
5) Metamorphoses are a relatively common event
6) Many of these texts take a position that is antibureaucratic, and so 
they often use their magic against the established social order.
7) In magical realist narrative, ancient systems of belief and local lore 
often underlie the text [...]
8) [...] a Jungian rather than a Freudian perspective is common in 
magical realist texts; that is, the magic may be attributed to a 
mysterious sense of collective relatedness rather than to individual 
memories or dreams or visions.
9) A carnivalesque spirit is common [...] Language is used 
extravagantly, expending its resources beyond its referential needs.
(Faris 1995: 175-190)
This list of specifications serves to remind us just how many of these features 
that Human Croquet possesses. In fact, of these 9 “accessories”, we may note that 
only number 3 and number 6 are absent in Atkinson’s novel, and these two absences 
are fairly easy to explain.
Magic realism in its original Latin-American form shares with the fairy tale the 
sense of ‘matter of fact-ness’ described by Max Luthi
The real fairy-tale hero is not astonished by miracles and magic; he accepts 
them as if they were a matter of course. Supernatural figures endowed with
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magical powers appear, to oppose or help him, not to bear witness for a completely 
different, supernatural world which makes us shudder in horror or ecstasy.
(Luthi 1976: 46)
No-one wonders if they are mad if they can hear the speech of animals in the 
fairy tale, these things are taken for granted, just as the ascension of Remedios the 
Beauty in Marquez’s One Hundred Years o f Solitude is described without characters 
questioning what they saw. Alejo Carpentier in one of the early essays on what he 
calls “the marvellous real” 21, invokes the fairy tale as a way of describing the way that 
magic realism operates when he praises Perrault as one of the greatest influences on 
the genre of the marvellous: “Perrault says something that defines the marvelous. He 
speaks of fairies and tells us fairies would just as soon spew diamonds from their 
mouths when they are in a good mood as reptiles, snakes, serpents and toads when 
they are angered” (Carpentier 1995: 101). We can see how this marvellous logic is 
used in magic realism in One Hundred Years o f Solitude, when Ursula, finding a pot of 
milk is taking too long to boil, raises the lid and finds it full of worms and immediately 
and correctly deduces that her son has been killed.
The term [magical realism] implies a clearer opposition between magic and 
reality than exists within those texts. For the characters who inhabit the fictional 
world, and for the author who creates it, magic may be real, reality magical; there is 
no need to label them as such.
(Zamora and Faris 1995: 3)
As demonstrated above, this unquestioning acceptance of fantastic events as 
real is not the case in HC where such moments cause Isobel to question her sanity but 
I do not believe that this questioning excludes the novel from the category of magic 
realism. In fact, critics of magic realism do not all agree about this particular aspect. 
Faris, as we have seen above, suggests that much magic realism can be encapsulated 
in Todorov’s formulation of the fantastic, which is primarily concerned with the tension 
between natural and supernatural explanation. Amaryll Chanady, on the other hand, 
denies the importance that Todorov attributes to hesitation, suggesting instead that 
magic realism demands precisely that the reader does not hesitate. Chanady suggests
21 Carpentier’s formulation “ marvelous real”  arises in contradistinction to the fact that the term Magic 
Realism was a term originally used to describe the works o f expressionist art during the Weimar republic.
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that magic realism is characterised by “authorial reticence” which is when the author 
does not allow us to question the events depicted in the text, no matter how unusual 
they are.
Authorial reticence has a less complex function in magical realism than in the 
fantastic, where it creates suspense, uncertainty, and greater reader participation 
and acceptance of the contradictions in the text. In magical realism, it serves the 
purpose mainly of preventing the reader from questioning the narrated events, as 
no attention is drawn to the strangeness of the world view. The unnatural is 
naturalized by commenting as little as possible on it, and reducing the distance 
between the narrator and the situation he is describing. This use of authorial 
reticence to eliminate distance is quite different from that in the fantastic, where the 
narrator stresses the singularity of the events and the fact that he cannot integrate 
the supernatural within his conventional perception of reality, while at the same 
time withholding certain details in order to arouse the reader’s interest.
(Chanady 1985: 160)
The reader is given no choice but to accept the supernatural as natural because 
the narrator is their only source of information, and we are given no reason to suspect 
they are unreliable. Chanady’s description of the matter-of-fact way the reticent 
narrator of magic realism tells their story is reminiscent of the narration of fairy tales, 
where magical events are described as though they needed no explanation. The 
reader of One Hundred Years of Solitude does not hesitate between attributing the 
supernatural events as natural or supernatural because they are described in a matter- 
of-fact way by the narrator, and there is no alternative ‘rationalist’ viewpoint embedded 
in the text that would allow us to question it. Rather, the suspension of disbelief that 
Coleridge described in his Biographia Literaria takes over (Swinfen 1984: 4), and we 
accept the supernatural as real, something that Chanady describes as akin to taking up 
a belief system that is not our own. This is the position that the reader of the fairy tale 
must assume. In fact the main difference between the fairy tale and magic realism in 
Chanady’s thesis is the co-presence of the two codes; for a text to be magic realist it 
must include as much commonplace happenings as magical ones:
A fairy tale in which monsters, witches and elves appear in a fictitious world 
totally removed from our conventional view of reality is obviously different from a 
story in which a human protagonist in an everyday world suddenly encounters an 
apparently supernatural being. In the former, nothing surprises the characters, 
since magic is the norm, while in the latter, the protagonist is surprised and often 
terrified by a situation that his culture has taught him to reject as impossible. The 
fairy tale belongs to the mode of the marvellous, which has its own laws of 
verisimilitude that differ from those of accepted logic, but the second example 
belongs to the fantastic, since the world view coincides with our own, and is
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threatened by an event which does not fit into the logical code expressed by the 
rest of the text.
(Chanady 1985: 2-3)
As we will see in chapter three, supernatural events in Angela Carter’s Nights at 
the Circus and Salman Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children come with attendant disbelief 
and questioning, and though these archetypal examples of British22 magic realism 
begin by questioning the marvellous, they end with plunges into the fantastic, such as 
Fevvers spreading her wings, or in Waterland Dick Crick disappearing eel-like into the 
river, a trend repeated in Human Croquet, with the appearance of Shakespeare. It 
seems that British magic realism is more disposed to raise questions about the nature 
of reality than its Latin counterparts, as I will demonstrate in the next chapter, and 
therefore the specification that Faris labels number 3 is less common in British fiction23.
It is the constant references to fairy tales that gives Human Croquet its magic 
realist effect. Chanady writes:
A narrative in which a ghost is briefly introduced at the end, without any 
previous indication of such an outcome, can appear humorous or inconsistent.
The absence of a convincing realistic framework usually prevents the reader from 
being disconcerted by a supernatural event, since there is no obvious contrast 
between the plausible and the impossible.
(Chanady 1985: 15)
The fairy tale allusions that abound within HC, mean that the introduction of 
irreducible magic events (the fairy tale chronotope par excellence24) does not seem 
inconsistent, Allusion (element 4) brings within it the seed of chronotopic intertextuality, 
something that works to destabilise the chronotope of realism which is monologic as it 
can abide no competitors -  a realist novel that features aliens or UFOs is no longer
22 There is an obvious problem in using the term “ British”  in conjunction with Rushdie, but as we w ill see 
in chapter 3, his most analysed work o f magic realism, like Carter’s, features a voice o f dissent that 
actually questions the magical events within the narrative.
2'’ The other “ accessory specification”  not present in Human Croquet is number 6, or the subversive facet 
o f magic realism. The type o f subversiveness we find in British Magic Realism is less overtly and 
traditionally political than fiction reared in the unstable political climes o f South America, but this is not 
to say that it is apolitical. Theo L D ’haen points out that Carter refers to feminism in terms o f 
“ decolonisation”  ) (1995: 202), and a type o f politics where the personal is the political is evident in 
Human Croquet, to the extent that it criticises the idealised “ nuclear”  family. This coincides with Wendy 
B Faris’ assertion in Ordinary Enchantments that magic realism contains a strong feminine thread 
whether or not the author is a woman (2004: 170).
24 The fairy tale is still the genre that most people w ill think o f when it comes to miraculous 
transformations. Though HC highlights that metamorphosis has a history stretching back into classic 
mythology, most contemporary readers w ill recognise magic as a fairy tale element. This is reflected in 
the current favoured term for fairy tales used by folklorists -  “ magic tales”  (Ashliman 2004: 38-40).
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realist. As Zamora and Faris point out, “realism intends its version of the world as a 
singular version, as an objective (hence universal) representation of natural and social 
realities -  in short [...] realism functions ideologically and hegemonically” (Zamora and 
Faris 1995: 3).
The introduction of a second chronotope, or “code” as Amaryll Chanady calls it, 
creates what she calls an “unresolved antinomy”, and it is the “antinomy of the text that 
produces the ambiguity of the fictional world and thus the disorientation of the reader” 
(Chanady 1985: 12-14). The co-presence of these two codes, which are usually 
mutually exclusive, means that the supernatural phenomenon remains inexplicable 
(Cornwell 1990: 22). In the case of HC, the fairy tale code being placed alongside the 
realist one means that when the rational explanation of the supernatural fails, the 
tension between trying to pick a natural or supernatural explanation vanishes, and we 
simply accept the novel for what it is, a story. Though the novel does seem to 
resemble Todorov’s idea of the pure fantastic for quite some time, when the natural 
explanation is debunked, so too is concern over whether to attribute the story to a 
coma or the supernatural. It is in cases like this that we can feel secure in using the 
term magic realism. Todorov admits that his categorisation applies mainly to 
nineteenth century texts, and Brooke-Rose highlights the way Todorov has problems 
trying to account for Kafka’s Metamorphosis, where the shape-shifting is presented as 
both unusual and normal at the same time (Brooke-Rose 1983: 66), and the “dream” 
explanation is debunked on the first page, “It was no dream” (Kafka 1999: 9). It should 
come as no great surprise that the surrealism of Kafka has been posited as a major 
influence on magic realism by critics such as Angel Flores (Flores 1995: 113). The 
allusion to Kafka that is Mr Rice’s transformation into a bluebottle is therefore 
significant.
In the case of Human Croquet, we have a good example of a text where the
introduction of a fairy tale chronotope alongside a realistic chronotope creates the
effect of magic realism. In the final “future” chapter that briefly relates events that
happen after the end of the narrative, we find Isobel explaining matter-of-factly that:
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Mrs Baxter met a mysterious end, the only person who truly disappeared -  
walking, they say, into the side of a green hill one day. Some say that at the 
moment she vanished she was transformed into the Queen of Elfland and wore a 
dress of greenest green and a crown of glittering gold. But that was just rumour.
(376)
The novel has come full circle from the first chapter, where the historiographic
(realist) portrayal of the Fairfax family competes against folkloric rumours. The last
chapter of the “past” series, which is the novel’s penultimate chapter, goes back in time
four hundred years instead of documenting events that happen to Isobel’s immediate
family. It gives a realist version of Lady Fairfax’s mythic disappearance that suggests
that she simply rides away with her lover instead of any magical ending, but this
chapter is undermined by the fact that it creates an uncanny sense of deja vu. Francis
Fairfax is described as yet another sadistic Mr. Baxter figure, who sexually abuses his
ward, Margaret who falls pregnant, and Lady Fairfax vanishes into the woods that have
been such a feature of all the interlocking narratives. Here, in the world of events
unknowable to any narrator that has not taken up the conventional mantle of
omniscience, are depicted events that resemble other motifs that recur prominently in
the fabric of this text.
This tension between realism and magic, history and folklore which leaves the
reader finally unsure how to explain the supernatural events, or even the “realist”
events in the text can be seen as another form of historiographic metafiction. Faris,
citing a chapter in Brian McHale’s influential Postmodernist Fiction suggests that
through magic realism’s blurring of fact and fiction that “magical realism is central to
postmodernism” (Faris 1995: 173). This point of view is reiterated in Theo L D’Haen’s
essay “Magical Realism and Postmodernism”, where after reading Carter’s Nights at
the Circus, Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children and Fowles’s The French Lieutenant’s
Woman he boldly proclaims “the cutting edge of postmodernism is magic realism”
(D’haen 1995: 201).
Many of the features that make HC a magic realist text can be derived from its
intertextual use of the fairy tale, and the problematic co-presence of a fairy tale
chronotope with the realist one. In its usage of the fairy tale, but also myth, and
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mythical patterns in literature25 we can see the way it destabilises realism by the 
inclusion of other, older forms of storytelling, and it is for this reason that I agree with 
Zamora and Faris when they suggest that:
[W]e may suppose that the widespread appeal of magical realist fiction today 
responds not only to its innovative energy but also to its impulse to re-establish 
contact with traditions temporarily eclipsed by the mimetic constraints of 
nineteenth-and twentieth-century realism.
(Zamora and Faris 1995: 2)
Faris talks of “the magic o f fiction rather than the magic//? it” (Faris 1995: 173). 
The metafictional nature of Atkinson’s text, and its usage of fairy tale intertexts seem to 
suggest a similar thesis, that storytelling itself is a magical process. Todorov himself 
observes “the supernatural is born out of language [...] not only do the devil and 
vampires exist only in words, but language alone enables us to conceive what is 
always absent: the supernatural” (1973: 82). Todorov is quite correct that language 
itself is a medium that facilitates the supernatural, but wrong to suggest that the 
supernatural exists only in words. The introduction to Angela Carter’s “The Werewolf” 
explains how these “words” that indicate the “always absent” have a power over our 
perception of reality:
To these upland woodsmen, the Devil is as real as you or I. More so; they 
have not seen us nor even know that we exist, but the Devil they glimpse often in 
the graveyards [...] At midnight, especially on Walpurgisnacht, the Devil holds 
picnics in the graveyards and invites the witches; then they dig up fresh corpses, 
and eat them. Anyone will tell you that.
(Carter 1992: 108)
Todorov’s discussion of fantasy has a very particular relationship with realism. 
Todorov betrays his underlying assumptions of what is “real” when he explains the 
fantastic thus: “In a world which is indeed our world, the one we know, a world without 
devils, sylphides, or vampires, there occurs an event which cannot be explained” 
(Todorov 1973: 25). The pronoun that he uses to bond critic and reader belies his 
twentieth century, rationalist worldview. The world “we” are presumed to live in totally 
discounts folkloric creatures such as vampires and witches. Armitt notes the
23 The fairy tale is not the only intertext in Atkinson’s novel, but the other texts it alludes to can be said to 
have mythical or fo lkloric aspects to them. The Shakespearean intertexts are those that are Shakespeare’ s 
most fantastic, such as the fairy-laden A Midsummer Night’s Dream and the literary intertexts, especially 
the important ones like Kafka’s Metamorphosis tie in with the novels concern with metamorphoses.
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implication of a world without devils is that this is a world without angels either, and so 
presumably without God because, “the deity and the diabolic gain meaning in terms of 
each other” (Armitt 1996: 34). As Faris reminds us, this post-enlightenment conception 
of the “real” is entirely historical and subjective, and “some readers may hesitate more 
than others” over what is real and what is fantastic (Faris 1995: 171).
Therefore, when Chanady writes that:
Magical realism does not occupy a distinct area of literary production separate 
from that of mimetic writing, as does the marvelous domain of fairy tales, where the 
laws of logic and verisimilitude are constantly infringed without affecting our 
“normal” perception of reality, in a temporary suspension of disbelief
(Chanady 1995: 130)
She buys into the notion that the fairy tale is purely a flight of fancy that has 
nothing to do with the real world, something that Carter’s evocation of the belief system 
of rural France in “The Werewolf” denies. Though Chanady is correct to point out that 
magic realism is ultimately a mode of writing that would be unimaginable without the 
prior establishment of codes of realism, she is wrong to suggest that the fairy tales do 
not affect our perception of reality, and HC shows just how much of an effect that fairy 
tales have over our imagination. As Max Luthi writes:
It is not only the real world that has an effect on us; the story-book world, with 
its invisible images, is absorbed by our mind more easily and imperceptibility; this 
world is preformed and predestined to enter the treasury of our imagination and 
thus to take part in the building of our world view.
(Luthi 1976: 67)
Fairy tale intertexts have long been used in the novel, and some of the 
chronotopes of the fairy tale can be successfully absorbed by the realist novel without 
causing any of the effects noted above. But the introduction of the fairy tale 
chronotope of irreducible magic causes problems due to the rationalist assumptions 
underlying the realist novel and leads to the “special effect” of magic realism. Scott 
Simpkins suggests that the magic in magic realism acts as a supplement, and there is 
a certain undeniable logic to this assertion: magic realism relies just as much on its 
drawing of the ‘phenomenal world’ as it does on irreducible magic (1995: 145).
But the fairy tale chronotope acts as a supplement in the way described by 
Derrida. In Of Grammatology Derrida argues against Rousseau’s definition of the
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supplement as “an inessential extra added to something complete in itself”, by pointing 
out that anything complete in itself cannot, by definition, be added to. A helpful analogy 
can be made by thinking of the weekend newspapers that come with ‘supplements’: 
they are not a part of the paper proper (and are even bound separately), yet any 
newsagent attempting to charge extra for them would find themselves with angry 
customers.
Therefore, if “magic” is a supplement, it works precisely to highlight the way in 
which realism establishes itself precisely by suppressing older forms of storytelling.
The fairy tale represents archaic forms of communal storytelling that thrived before the 
availability of print and general literacy. Elizabeth Deeds Ermath in The English Novel 
in History suggests that the realist novel is responsible for propagating and creating 
ideas of ‘community’ and ‘history’ that we now take for granted as commonsense and 
timeless. Element 8, or the intertextual use of the fairy tale chronotope works as a 
supplement because it brings to the fore alternate, older, ways of viewing the world. As 
Linda Hutcheon argues of magic realism, “this kind of realism was less a rejection of 
the realist conventions than a contamination of them with fantasy and with the 
conventions of an oral story-telling tradition” (Hutcheon 1988: 208)
H C s metafictional and postmodern effect is in no small way formed by the way 
that by the end of the novel, we even view the ‘omniscient’ sections of the novel with 
suspicion. Realism is just another way of telling a story, and is ultimately, no more 
reliable than the first person fairy tale. Human Croquet works to show the way in which 
we utilise pre-existing stories to try and explain the world, as Isobel at one point makes 
clear: “I’ve been cheated by my own imagination. The imagination unbound, 
unconfined by cause and effect. But then how else can we make things work out right? 
Or find redemption? Or real right justice?” (HC: 351)
The imagination’s role in making sense of the world is a major feature of the texts
that will be examined in chapter three. Chapter three will look in more detail at novels
which use fairy tale intertexts to create a metafictive effect (element 7), specifically
those novels which highlight the process of storytelling, and the way in which the fairy
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tale provides a way to understand the narrator’s own life. These texts, like HC, have 
magic realist effects that can be linked to their usage of fairy tale intertexts, and as we 
will see, they also raise questions about the stories that we live by, especially that 
“grand narrative”, history.
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Chapter Three: Metafictive Intertextuality: Defining the 
“Storyteller” Chronotope
... we are all poets, though not many of us write poetry; and so are we all 
novelists, that is, we have a habit of writing fictional futures for ourselves.
(Fowles 1996 [1969]: 339)
I was born in the city of Bombay ... once upon a time. No, that won’t do, 
there’s no getting away from the date: I was born in Dr. Narlikar’s Nursing Home on 
August 1 5 ,  1947.
(Rushdie [1981] 1995: 9)
In chapter one, I suggested that there was an element of intertextuality that could 
be defined as metafictional, which approximated the category of intertextuality that 
Genette called “metatextual” or the type of intertextual relationship usually found 
between criticism and its object. This chapter is concerned with the metafictional use 
of fairy tale in postmodern fictions.
The type of metafiction utilised here is different from the examples of Element 7 
we saw in chapter one, where the criticism of fairy tales was mostly specific, like the 
criticism of “Bluebeard” in Bluebeard’s Egg. In this chapter, the criticism-in-the-text is 
less oriented towards a single fairy tale, but the process of storytelling itself, for which 
the fairy tale serves as a paradigm. This chapter will therefore define a specific formal 
feature that I will label “the storyteller” , and highlight the ways that this formal feature 
causes metafictive effects that are derived from the way that they utilise their fairy tale 
intertext.
The intertext that all the postmodern narratives I will be examining play with is 
that famously ‘other’ fairytale alflaila wa-laila, or as it is usually translated The 
Thousand and One Nights1. Referring to the Arabian Nights as a fairytale raises further 
problematic issues. Firstly I must acknowledge that it raises a problem of definition for 
my study, especially the term ‘fairy tale’: If anything, the Nights sequence is surely, an 
ifrit (or Genie, Djinn, or Jinnie depending on your translation) tale. Celtic and European 
folkloric creatures, like fairies to pick an example entirely at random, are notably
1 This collection is known variously as The Thousand and One Nights, The Arabian Nights, and the The 
Arabian Nights ’ Entertainments. I w ill refer to this collection o f eastern fairy tales however as the 
Arabian Nights, borrowing Muhsin Mahdi’s solution for referring to this text which flags up both its 
“ oriental”  origin, and the part o f the title common to all English versions.
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absent. On the other hand, the Nights is a model of a perfect postmodern, postcolonial 
text. As Muhsin Mahdi points out, the collection lacks an author, and is a fluid and 
polymorphous entity, without even a single ‘master’ text for us to privilege with the 
reassuring label of ‘authenticity’. Its place of origin is unknown despite decades of 
research, with some tales attributed to Iranian folklore, others to Indian, and still others 
that originate in Europe. The very unity of the Arabian Nights is even questionable, 
with many of the tales seemingly ‘tacked on’ in an attempt to make the text live up to its 
title and contain a thousand and one tales. Mahdi suggests that the Nights as we know 
it could almost be said to have been fabricated in Paris and Cairo in the early 
eighteenth century (Mahdi 1995: 1).
Salman Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children [1981 hereafter MC], Angela Carter’s 
Nights at the Circus [1984 hereafter A/C], Graham Swift’s Waterland [1983], Margaret 
Atwood’s The Handmaid’s Tale [1985 hereafter HT], A.S. Byatt’s The Djinn in the 
Nightingale’s Eye [1994 hereafter TDITNE] and Kate Atkinson’s Emotionally Weird 
[2000 hereafter EW\ are united in the emphasis that they present upon the storyteller 
and the process of narration. Furthermore, not only do these texts focus intensively on 
the figure of the storyteller, they are also heavily marked by fairy tale and folkloric 
intertexts that draw attention to traditional storytelling.
This may not seem a particularly striking insight, until we realise that in each of 
these novels the stories being told are the life-stories of the fictional protagonists. The 
question must be asked, why do these authors find it necessary to portray the act of 
storytelling in such great detail? Why are we presented with characters seeking to find 
meaning in their own lives by telling them in terms that we recognise as deriving from 
fairy tale discourse? I would like to suggest that these novels rely for a great deal of 
their effect upon ‘fairy tale’ storytelling. They incorporate an oral narrative including 
recognisable fairy tale motifs addressed to a physically present narratee. Calling this 
‘fairy tale’ storytelling may be viewed as problematic because my primary definition, an 
oral narrative told to a physically present narratee describes a multitude of possible 
narrative types: jokes, psychoanalysis (analyst/ analysand), explanations, legal
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testimony, phatic communion, standard everyday conversation, countless types of 
speech acts take place within the framework I have just described, and terming it the 
basis of ‘fairy tale’ storytelling could be seen as a naive and ahistoric view of the 
transmission of folklore, ignoring storytelling in groups, in ritual or the countless other 
means of transmission. This may be the case, but I would like to point to the 
emergence of a similar ‘storytelling’ motif in film. For example, Rob Reiner’s The 
Princess Bride (1987) and Tim Burton’s Edward Scissorhands (1990) both begin by 
framing the main narrative within a storytelling context, the former a grandfather 
reading his sick grandson his favourite childhood story, the latter an old woman telling 
her granddaughter a story from her youth (which, like all Burton’s films, resembles a 
fairy tale in content). These framing devices act as a motif indicating the genre of film 
is fantastic, rather than realistic2, and perhaps more importantly, simulate the traditional 
oral transmission of fairytales, as though these films were in some way part of folk 
tradition despite being Hollywood manufactured commodities.3
To begin analysing the reappearance of storytelling, and its effects, it is 
necessary to first define exactly what we mean by a novelistic ‘storyteller’, 
differentiating this new breed of storytellers from its literary ancestors. First of all, I will 
explain my use of the term ‘Storyteller’. This would seem to be a step back from the 
accepted terms of literary criticism where ‘narrator’ is the usual, if not canonical, term 
for any narrating agent: Katie Wales in her Dictionary of Stylistics defines the narrator 
as any ‘person who narrates, who tells a story, whether factual or fictional’ (Wales 
1997: 316). In order to avoid the use of a term that covers such a wide variety of 
applications, I will use storyteller to give a degree of specificity to a particular type of 
narrating agent, operating within a specific type of narrative context.
2 The frame o f storytelling and the participants (an old person telling a story to a young person) can be 
seen as an entirely different chronotope from other forms o f framing, for example the suspect telling a 
story to a detective framing device used in The Usual Suspects ( 1995).
3 This may be compared to the classic Disney style o f opening, as in Snow White where the viewer is 
presented with a wonderfully illustrated book accompanied with a voiceover into which the camera 
slowly zooms until we are, as it were, inside the book. This opening is memorably parodied in Shrek, 
where instead o f going ‘ inside’ the book the pages are ripped out to be used as lavatory paper as the voice 
o f the ogre lampoons fairy tale cliches.
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I take storyteller to mean a character who is personified within a text, and who 
orally narrates his or her stories to a narratee, who also appears as a character within 
the text. If we imagine the text as constituting a ‘world’4 we can view this as analogous 
to the situation of the storyteller in the ‘real’ world, where a narrating agent relays an 
oral narrative to one or more listening narratees. This particular form of narration has 
traditionally been described as a ‘framed’ narrator where the ‘frame’ metaphorically 
delimits the epistemological boundaries of each embedded narrative. Frankenstein 
[1818] and Wuthering Heights [1847] are nineteenth century examples of this practice 
and useful as a point of contrast that highlights the unsuitability of the ‘frame’ when 
talking about postmodern novels. In both of these novels the frames act to make the 
reader aware of who is telling each embedded story, so that each story is attributable 
to a particular character and a relatively unproblematic storytelling situation. We can 
easily distinguish the narration of Lockwood from the subordinate frame of Nelly Dean 
in Wuthering Heights, just as the boundaries between Walton’s narrative and Victor 
Frankenstein’s are clearly marked.
However, the use of ‘frames’ that allow the reader to distinguish easily between 
different layers of narration is, as we shall see below, just as problematised as any 
conception of worlds as hermetically sealed ontic spaces, in postmodern fiction. 
Another reason for using the term ‘storyteller’ when referring to specific types of 
narration in postmodern fiction is that the use of this term constantly reminds us of 
Walter Benjamin’s ideas about the storyteller which will be addressed in the next 
chapter, and links the storyteller in postmodern fiction with the folkloristic storyteller of 
the oral tradition.
Discussion of the ‘storyteller’ as a formal feature of a certain set of texts can be 
further enhanced by use of narratological theory, especially the typology of narrators 
categorized initially by Gerard Genette and furthered by Mieke Bal and Shlomith
4 Referring to the “ world”  o f the text is an increasingly popular practice as evidenced by the rise o f 
“ possible worlds”  theory which draws on philosophy and new physics in order to discuss the literary text 
and its ontological relation to “ our”  world (c.f. Ronen 1994). However, the increasing popularity o f this 
metaphor is fundamentally incompatible with the novels which I am discussing where the hermetically 
sealed concept o f a world is radically challenged by incessant intertextuality.
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Rimmon-Kenan. The terminology used by Genette, and adapted by Rimmon-Kenan 
and Bal, as presented in Rimmon-Kenan's Narrative Fiction [1983] and Genette's 
Narrative Discourse [1972] and Narrative Discourse Revisited [1988] will help us define 
the storyteller even more specifically. These texts propose models of narrational levels 
and voices considerably more precise and useful than traditional terms such as 
‘omniscient narrator’, but have the disadvantage of sometimes opaque and 
overcomplicated terminology.5
The following diagram, reproduced from Genette’s Narrative Discourse Revisited, 
presents a graphical version of embedded narration which would not be incompatible 
with traditional notions of ‘framing’, where each level of narrative can be further 
embedded ad infinitum in the manner of Russian dolls.
Diagram A (reprinted from Genette 1988: 95)
For our purposes, the most important point about this diagram is the fact that the 
storyteller would be represented by position B. He or she is a character telling a story 
within a story. An archetypal example of a narrator in position B would be 
Scheherezade, the narrator of the Arabian Nights. Scheherezade, before she even 
opens her mouth to speak, is a character within the narrative of the Nights sequence, 
an intelligent and talented Vizier’s daughter who is able to overcome the perverted
3 It would be entirely possible to label a narrator an "extra-intra-homodiegetic external focal izer" (as is for 
example Saleem Sinai in Midnight's Children) using Rimmon-Kenan's model. It is easy to see why the 
use o f these terms has not caught on.
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desires of the murderous sultan Scharyar by getting him addicted to plot. Due to the 
way that Scheherezade is introduced in the third person and as a character, it is 
obvious that she is not the narrative agent of the text held (/heard) by the reader 
(/listener)6, known as the extradiegetic narrator. As a character in an oral narrative she 
is constituted only with words; as character in literary fairy tale she is written text. The 
above diagram is useful in helping us visualise the position of the storyteller within the 
text, for we generally only know of his or her existence via the voice of what 
narratologists designate the ‘first-degree’ narrator, or through the words of the narrator 
occupying the superior ontological position. In the case of the Nights, this first degree 
narrator is an unnamed external narrator: both extradiegetic (taking no active part in 
the narrative) and heterodiegetic (the narrative is not about this narrator). Any 
character telling a story within a story is, in narratological terms, a second-degree or 
intradiegetic narrator.
The Arabian Nights is also a good text for explicating embedded storytelling 
because the depiction of storytelling does not end with Scheherezade. For example in 
the famous tale “The Fisherman and the Jinnee” Scheherezade tells the story of how a 
malevolent jinnee is tricked back into the bottle that imprisoned him by a cunning 
fisherman, but then in order to explain his imminent clemency in freeing the jinnee, the 
fisherman tells the jinnee “The Tale of King Yunan and the Sage Duban” in which the 
king tells his vizier “The Tale of King Sinbad and his Falcon”, “The Tale of the Husband 
and the Parrot” and the vizier tells the king “The Tale of the Prince and the Ogress” at 
which point the fisherman stops pontificating to the jinnee and the narrative of the first 
frame continues (Zipes 1997b:35-69).
6 With this example, it is easy to justify this terminology by thinking o f the Nights sequence in its original 
folkloric form. When orally narrated, it would be obvious to the physical narratee(s) that the storyteller, 
the physical narrator telling the story o f Arabian Nights was not Scheherezade but a real person 
occupying an ontologically superior universe to that o f the story. Thinking about the term diegesis in this 
manner complies with Genette's definition o f diegesis as "not the story but the universe in which the story 
takes place - universe in the somewhat limited and wholly relative sense in which we say that Stendhal is 
not in the same universe as Fabrice" (Genette 1988:18). This makes the definition o f diegesis far more 
lucid as a term about the ontological "universe" in which the story takes place, and allows us to see the 
oral narrator as extradiegetic.
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After his liberation, the jinnee leads the fisherman to a lake where the fisherman 
catches marvellous speaking fish, which he takes to the king. In attempting to get to 
the bottom of the conversational fish enigma the king goes to the lake and encounters 
a young sultan whose lower half was turned to stone, who then proceeds to solve the 
riddle of the garrulous pisceians, and the King helps him get the use of his legs back, at 
which point, we could say, reverting to the metaphor of the frames, that this particular 
frame tale is closed. Looking once more at the diagram A we can identify 
Scheherezade in position B, the fisherman and young sultan in position C and the King/ 
Vizier would be in position D if we had room to extend the diagram infinitely. Each of 
the narrational levels is discrete, and we are never in any doubt of each story’s 
originator, who are all classed as hypodiegetic narrators (they exist at a level ‘below’ 
another level of diegesis).
Extradiagetic
narrator Primary (diegetic) level
J  Extradiagetic
narratee
Secondary and tertiary (hypodiegetic levels)
 ¥  ¥  ¥  ¥ '
Author [[Narrator { Scheherezade { Fisherman} King Yuman { } Sage Duban} Jinnee} Scharyar} Narratee]] Reader
 4 *_______±___4
Intradiegetic
narrator(s)
I Intradiegetic 
I narratee( s)
Diagram B: embedding in Arabian Niehts 
Using Genette’s diagram to analyse the Arabian Nights however, soon leads us
to the revelation that it is insufficient in one major respect. In all the levels of narration
of the Nights we are aware not only of the sender but also of the receiver in each
communicative situation, as the following diagram illustrates, a particularly large
oversight when the narrator and narratee switch role.
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Therefore I would like to propose that the diagram be amended as below:
Diagram C: revision of Genette’s diagram
Of importance here is the addition of a narratee in each frame. The advantage of 
this slight amendment is that it depicts both agents of the communicative situation, and 
that it doesn’t prioritise the sender, because, as we shall see below, the receiver is just 
as important in any narrative. It also shows which parts of the narrative are heard by 
which listener: we wouldn’t expect King Yuman to know anything about the frame of the 
fisherman, but we can see graphically that the jinnee can hear (and know) of the 
subordinate tale. I will discuss further revisions in more detail below.
The above diagram more accurately represents the embedded or layered nature 
of the narrative situation of the Arabian Nights, if only because of the inclusion of the 
narratee. However, what cannot be accounted for within the diagram is the relation of 
the story to the narrator. For example, there is a marked difference in the 
epistemological possibilities of a story about oneself when compared to a story about 
another. We can rely on narrators whose narration relates their own past because they 
have interior access to their own emotions, knowledge and perceptions at the time. 
Conversely, when a narrator attempts to relay the narrative of another and lays claim to 
the same "interior access" then the question "How do you know?" must be asked
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(discussed below on page 124 ). Therefore, further distinctions are necessary to reveal 
the relation of the narrative to the narrator: a narrator who does not participate in the 
story is termed "heterodiegetic" whereas the one who takes part in it, at least in some 
manifestation of his/her self is "homodiegetic" (Genette 1980: 255-6). Using these 
terms we can see that Scheherezade is an intradiegetic narrator 'because before 
uttering a single word she is already a character in a narrative that is not her own' but 
also 'since the story she tells is not about herself, she is at the same time a 
heterodiegetic narrator' (Genette 1988: 84). This distinction is vital, because, as we 
shall see below, the fairy tales told in the texts we are analysing are not about others, 
but about the self. They are all fictional autobiographies told as though they were fairy 
tales.
To conclude my definition of what I term ‘the storyteller’ I would like to make 
reinforce the following four points.
1. The storyteller is intradiegetic: they are characters telling a story within 
the text.
2. The reader is at some point forced to consider the context in which the 
transmission of the narrative takes place: whether this due to the 
presence of a narratee as in MC, NC , Waterland or TDITNE or a more 
unorthodox technique, as in HT  or EW  \s of minor relevance.
3. The text intertextually alludes to or incorporates fairy tale intertexts.
4. The narrative is homodiegetic: that is, about the narrator
Having outlined these major features I will now study each of these features in 
turn. The final feature of “the storyteller”, that the narrative is homodiegetic, will only 
briefly be mentioned in this chapter, because it raises more questions about the nature 
of storytelling and autobiography than could fit into a single chapter and because many 
of the unusual effects caused by the storyteller stem from the ontological issues raised 
by this fact.
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1. The S toryteller is intradiegetic: A Storyteller w ithin the text
It is no coincidence that my exposition of the storyteller relied upon an analysis of 
Scheherezade and the Nights. This text is used by both Gerard Genette and Shlomith 
Rimmon Kenan in their analyses of the narrator and embedded storytelling, and 
therefore my selection fits into a critical tradition of using the Nights to explain certain 
features of narration. More pertinently, the Arabian Nights, is one of the intertexts used 
explicitly in Midnight’s Children, The Djinn in the Nightingale’s Eye and Nights at the 
Circus. It is the palimpsestic foundation (the hypotext) underlying the structure of these 
texts , and by drawing attention to this fact by naming their model explicitly, the Nights 
works as a parallel to, and metafictional comment upon, the storytellers in these 
novels.
In all of these texts we witness characters orally narrating their life stories to 
another character who acts as narratee, arguably the reader’s surrogate in the world of 
the text. In Midnight’s Children we have Saleem Sinai reflecting upon his similarity to 
Scheherezade as he tells his story to the incredulous narratee, Padma, while 
simultaneously writing his ‘autobiography’. In Nights at the Circus the famous winged 
aerialiste Fevvers relates her life story to an equally sceptical journalist, Jack Walser.
As detailed above this form of framing is not a recent innovation and is not even 
restricted to the novel, as we have seen it is used in the Arabian Nights, not to mention 
The Odyssey when Odysseus relates his adventures to King Alcinous, so I would 
therefore not wish to extend my use of the term ‘storyteller’ retrospectively over the 
entire history of literature for, as I will argue in chapter four, the trope is important 
because of a particular set of contingent historically grounded set of circumstances.
Or, to suggest a tautological truism, postmodern effects are due not to immanent 
features in the text itself but to postmodern (or late capitalist) society.
If we have a story told by a character within the text, we can instantly start talking 
about reliability. Wayne C. Booth’s invention of the ‘unreliable narrator’ in his The 
Rhetoric of Fiction (1961) has proved one of the more enduring and popular 
instruments in the ‘common sense’ critical toolbox. I use the term common sense
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because calling a narrator ‘unreliable’ seems on the surface of things ideologically 
neutral, and yet it exists only in a set of circumstances where we see subjective 
viewpoints as questionable, as though there were such thing as ‘objective’ viewpoints. 
The ideological implication that there is such a thing as verifiable external truth, a 
staple of enlightenment philosophy that remains part of western ideology, underlies the 
blanket assumption that subjective narrators are always unreliable, and that conversely 
omniscient narration is implicitly reliable and thus privileged. In the following chapter I 
will therefore refer to the ‘unreliable’ narrator only in quotation marks in an attempt to 
both defamiliarise this term and highlight the unreliability of the term as it is commonly 
used.
The ‘unreliable’ narrator arose in almost dialectical opposition to the conventional 
omniscient narrator in the nineteenth century and reflects the fascination with 
epistemology evident in fiction of this period7. Epistemology, or “the investigation of 
what distinguishes justified belief from opinion” (OED) was a major issue of concern in 
the nineteenth century due to the loss of faith in providential plots and the rise of 
science as a paradigm for truth. Both history and science attempt to answer the basic 
question of epistemology “what can we know for certain about the world?”, and then 
attempt to create procedures to root out subjective opinion by establishing rigorous 
tests of ‘proof.
The problem of how reliable any narrator can be is posited in all texts featuring 
the storyteller situation, as we can see by looking briefly at a few representative texts. 
Saleem from Midnight’s Children constantly confounds the reader’s suspension of 
disbelief by taking up the mantle of the omniscient narrator and narrating events that he 
could not possibly have been a witness to8: for example, the story of his grandfather 
meeting his grandmother, which he describes as though he could account for
7 This can easily be seen by comparing the embedded narration o f Frankenstein with that o f Wnthering 
Heights: unlike Walton, Lockwood is immediately identified as unreliable when he mistakes a heap o f 
dead rabbits for a cushion fu ll o f cats. This immediate flagging o f the subjective observer as unreliable is 
not evident in Frankenstein precisely because at that historical time the omniscient narrator was not as 
fu lly  developed as it later became in 1847 as we shall see below.
8 This, as we have seen in the discussion o f Human Croquet, has metafictional consequences.
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everything from the weather to the inner thoughts of the protagonists even though the 
‘source’ of his information is the scant evidence found by opening an old tin trunk:
Most of what matters in our lives takes place in our absence: but I seem to 
have found from somewhere the trick of filling in the gaps in my knowledge, so that 
everything is in my head, down to the last detail, such as the way the mist seemed 
to slant across the early morning a ir ... everything, and not just the few clues one 
stumbles across, for instance by opening an old tin trunk which should have 
remained cobwebby and closed.
(MC\ 19)
Omniscient narration is a purely literary form of discourse (it does not and cannot 
exist as a speech genre) and is usually accepted as trustworthy by the reader as it is 
normally used by hetero-extradiegetic (omniscient) narrators9. However, when it is 
appropriated by a fallible, intradiegetic and ‘unreliable’ narrator as it is by Saleem who 
gets dates muddled and occasionally lies to the reader, the device of ‘omniscience’ is 
defamiliarised. As a character in a text attempting to claim the discourse of authors 
who can only exist outside of the text, Saleem breaks the typical rules of homodiegetic 
narration as described by Genette:
Homodiegetic narration, by nature of convention [...] simulates autobiography 
much more closely than heterodiegetic normally simulates historical narrative. In 
fiction, the heterodiegetic narrator is not accountable for his information,
“omniscience” forms part of his contract and his motto might be this retort by a 
character of Prevert’s: “What I don’t know, I guess and what I don’t guess, I make 
up.” As for the Homodiegetic narrator, he is obliged to justify (“How do you know 
that?”) the information he gives about scenes from which “he” was absent as a 
character, about someone else’s thoughts, etc., and any breach of that trust is 
paralepsis.
(Genette 1988: 78)
Genette’s point that homodiegetic narrators are obliged to account for their 
information highlights the reason why we so often view intradiegetic narrators as 
unreliable. Their accounts will always necessarily be subjective and personal, and if 
they attempt to use the omniscient mode, well, that only makes them more suspicious. 
Paradoxically, in trying to make his account more ‘true’ by appropriating the devices of 
realist literature, Saleem succeeds only in making the reader distrust him more. 
Rushdie’s comment on Midnight’s Children is revealing on this score: ‘I tried to make it 
as imaginatively true as I could, but imaginative truth is simultaneously honourable and 
suspect’ (reprinted in Grant 1998: 9).
9 Indeed, we may speculate that the ‘ somewhere’ Saleem has found the trick o f omniscience from is in 
fact the novel, the only place it can exist.
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In this way MC dramatises the clashing of oral versus written discourses, which 
we witness even in the first line of the novel (see epigraph) where the typical distancing 
motif of fantasy, ‘once upon a time’, clashes with the specificity of historical discourse 
‘August 15th 1947’. The clash between fairy tale and historical discourse is also a 
major feature of Waterland. The first person narrator of Waterland, Tom Crick, fittingly 
a history teacher, conflates history and fairy tale, reports regional folklore and sightings 
of supernatural phenomenon alongside natural history, dates and history on the grand 
scale such as the French revolution and the First World War.
Accentuating the ‘unreliability’ of the fictional narrator is something that all of the 
texts that I have identified as united by the trope of the storyteller do to some degree. 
The first ‘volume’ of Nights at the Circus in which Fevvers plays the role of 
Scheherezade is focalized by the ‘rational’ journalist Jack Walser, who consistently 
expresses doubt or disbelief at her story. Interior access to the thoughts of Walser 
whether via direct thought representation or free indirect thought representation has the 
effect, typical of free indirect thought, of making the reader feel close to and 
sympathise with the character (Short 1996: 315).
This prioritisation of Walser's thoughts in the "London" section of the novel 
means that the reader's viewpoint is indelibly coloured by Walser's focalisation. Walser 
is out to prove Fevvers a ‘humbug merchant’ and therefore, our typical reaction to a 
narrator presented as a character within the text (that of distrust) is reflected within the 
narrator/ narratee situation. Walser's sceptical and ‘rationalistic’ viewpoint on Fevvers' 
narrative is a metonymic function of the reader's own introduction to the world of the 
text; like Walser, the typical reader shares expectations of realism in the text, and 
Walser's determination to prove the ‘artifice’ behind what he perceives as the 
confidence trick appears to be the motivating force behind the storyline. Walser casts 
himself as an objective observer (Peach 1998: 133). He has 'the professional necessity 
to see all and believe nothing' and this 'habit of suspending belief extended even unto 
his own being' (A/C: 10).
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2. The context o f transm ission: narratees
The sense of unreliability in Nights at the Circus is augmented considerably by 
the presence of a sceptical narratee whose thoughts constantly interrupt and question 
the narrative of the storyteller. This, in itself, is a marked departure from the Arabian 
Nights, or the Odyssey, where the narratee seems to fade away after the narrative 
begins proper; in the Richard Burton translation of the Nights, Sharyar’s role is reduced 
to merely giving Scheherezade permission to continue at intervals in the middle of 
stories.
In fact, the presence of a narratee is one of the major features of what I call the 
storytelling situation, and to explain its importance I will use the theories of Mikhail 
Bakhtin, whose theories address the difference between written and spoken language 
and the political nature of all language use. My use of multiple Bakhtinian terms such 
as heteroglossia, polyphony, dialogism, and the chronotope is due to the tendency of 
these elements to congregate together, as noted by Sue Vice:
The equality of voices in the polyphonic level is realized dialogically, as being 
on the same plane means they can hear and respond to each other. The three 
elements dialogism, polyphony, and the chronotope work together, the latter 
facilitating the other two categories by placing the voices in the same space.
(Vice 1997:56 my emphasis)
We will see the truth of this statement after we examine the ways in which 
Bakhtin’s terms apply to the works we are addressing. We have seen above that a 
storyteller attempting to utilise a discursive feature of a written or ‘complex’10 genre, 
omniscience, is problematised due the reader’s awareness that an ‘unreliable’ 
intratextual narrator should not be able to do so. We can see this clash between 
discourses as a postmodern reflection on what Bakhtin terms heteroglossia. We can 
therefore reinterpret the attempted use of privileged discourses such as the 
historiographic mode and omniscient narration by subjective narrators like Crick from 
Waterland and Saleem from Midnight’s Children as demonstrative of the underlying 
rules that govern our language use. The artifice behind these seemingly impersonal 
and objective discursive formations is lain bare by the attempt to utilise them by
10 Complex is the term that Bakhtin uses in “ The Problem o f Speech Genres”  (Bakhtin 1994: 62)
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subjective consciousnesses who are not familiar enough with the language of power to 
suppress the subjective origin of the text, or the types of discourse that do not usually 
occur in historiography such as rumour, folklore and hearsay: spoken genres every 
one11. Once this is established, Bakhtin’s comments in “Discourse in the Novel” can be 
linked to the struggle these narrators have trying to claim this language in the service of 
their own stories.
Language is not a neutral medium that passes freely and easily into the 
private property of the speaker’s intentions; it is populated -  overpopulated -  with 
the intentions of others. Expropriating it, forcing it to submit to one’s own intentions 
and accents, is a difficult and complicated process.
(Bakhtin 2000: 294)
This raises an interesting point: if, for Bakhtin, the novel’s importance can be 
traced to its ability to incorporate heteroglossia then shouldn’t oral narration negate this 
advantage, a regression to a less democratic and representative type of storytelling? 
The short answer is no. We must never lose sight of the fact that the storyteller is not 
the same thing as a real oral storyteller. Nothing can erase the fact that our contact 
with the storyteller is through a printed text, and the texts that I have chosen for 
analysis all self-consciously draw attention to the artifice that is required in writing and 
reading any literary text. The storyteller is a metafictive trope, it draws attention to and 
highlights the process of narration and the complexity of the boundaries between 
speech and writing.
In fact, Midnight’s Children, Nights at the Circus and Emotionally Weird all depict 
the struggle of turning oral narration into written biography. The Scheherezade of A/C’s 
first volume, Fevvers, views her narratee Walser as an amaneusis who, as a journalist, 
with access to the privileged modes of discourse, can translate her story from its 
unmistakably low origins to the realm of socially acceptable discourse, a lasting and 
legitimate document. Similarly, MC is supposedly Saleem’s autobiography; the time of 
writing and details of his conversations with his narratee only exist because he chooses 
to write them. He is not only orally narrating, but also writing, using both the ulterior
11 Anecdotally this can be seen in the ‘rumour’ columns o f tabloid newspapers where the writers are 
identified with pictures, address the reader conversationally and spend a great deal o f time talking about 
themselves. The pretence o f conversationality is kept up at great effort.
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mode of narration (narration after the fact, typical of omniscient narration and 
autobiography) and also the simultaneous mode (the time taken to narrate the story is 
dramatised as in Sterne's Tristram Shandy) (Rimmon-Kenan 1999: 89-90). The reader 
is first made aware of this paradox when Saleem discusses the events he has 
previously described as if he were an entirely oral presence, "these events which have 
tumbled from my lips ... Let me be direct now, and say" (MC: 30), despite having 
previously highlighted that he is writing when he documents the illiterate Padma's 
objections: "But what is so precious [...] to need all this writing-shiting?" (24). This 
description, which could be seen as a metaphoric pretence of immediacy used to place 
author and reader within the same imaginary world space as folkloric 
storyteller/listener, is reinterpreted in light of the next page, where the reader first 
becomes aware of Saleem's double presence as narrator within-the-text and narrator- 
of-the text:
I have been interrupted by Padma, who brought me my dinner and then 
withheld it, blackmailing me: "So if you're going to spend all your time wrecking 
your eyes with that scribbling, at least you must read it to me." I have been singing 
for my supper - but perhaps she will be useful, because it's impossible to stop her 
being a critic.
(MC\ 32)
This is the first exposition of the narrative situation, and although it clears up any 
confusion that may have been engendered in the reader caused by Saleem's 
appropriation of verbs connected with oral narrative, it also instantly alerts the reader to 
the ‘unreliability’ of Saleem as a narrator: the first thing Padma does is force Saleem to 
correct a mistake he made when he introduced her: 'Things are always getting her 
goat. Perhaps even her name: understandably enough, since [...] she had been named 
after the lotus goddess whose most common appellation [...] is "The One Who 
Possesses Dung'" (24).
"What do you know, city boy?" she cried - hand slicing the air. "In my village 
there is no shame in being named for the Dung Goddess. Write at once that you 
are wrong, completely."
(32)
Like Walser in Nights at the Circus, the presence of Padma here causes the 
reader to question the veracity of the narrative and its narrator. In fact, the narratee in
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the text generally has one of four functions each of which I have endeavoured to 
represent in my revision of Genette’s diagram depicting embedded narration on page 
120:
1) To question the narrator (this is generally the case when the narrator is also 
the focalizing consciousness of the text as in Midnight’s Children, Waterland and 
The Handmaid’s Tale). Often the questions are answered, interrupting the 
narrative and creating a digression, at other times the questions may have no 
effect on the primary narrative itself. This function is represented in Diagram C 
by the question mark within a thought bubble.
2) As an agent of focalization, where the narratee’s consciousness determines 
how we view the narrator and his or her narrative. This particular type of narratee 
sometimes ends up becoming the narrator, as in Conrad’s Heart o f Darkness or 
Henry James’s The Turn of the Screw, and this is the motive behind Fevvers’ 
narration in Nights at the Circus. For this reason I thought it particularly important 
that the narratee in Diagram C has a mouth, not only to represent their 
conversational interjections but also to represent the potential for retelling. This 
also explains why in each separate frame there exists a narrator and narratee: as 
Bakhtin highlights in “The Problem of Speech Genres” every utterance is geared 
towards a certain response and is itself a ‘rejoinder’ to previous utterances. No- 
one speaks just for the sake of speaking, all communication is inherently 
responsive and, ultimately, there are always two participants in any utterance, 
even if the only person attentively listening to the embedded story is the narrator 
(as in Balzac’s The Wild Ass’s Skin). Representing a narratee in every frame 
helps highlight the motivation of the hypodiegetic narrator(s) and accentuates the 
physical context in which the story is told.
3) To motivate the narrative (provide a reason for the retelling) or to expedite 
it. This function can be fulfilled simply by the presence of the narratee, as in the 
Arabian Nights, where Scharyar’s presence is the motive for storytelling and we 
can therefore say that this function is fulfilled in any text where the narrator must
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tell his story to a particular narratee. There are also narratees whose presence 
shapes the direction of the text more overtly. Padma, for example, cajoles 
Saleem into resolving unsatisfying plot-lines '"What happened to the plumpie?" 
Padma asks, crossly. "You don't mean you aren't going to tell?"' (61) and 
hurrying along the narrative:
But here is Padma at my elbow, bullying me back into the world of linear 
narrative, the universe of what-happened next: "At this rate," Padma complains,
"you'll be two hundred years old before you manage to tell about your birth.
(MC: 38)
This function is represented in diagram C by the semi-permeable nature of the 
narrator’s utterance (or, in English, the dashed line that makes up the speech bubble). 
This stresses the fact that the narration takes the expectations of the narratee into 
account, that the narrative is not hermetically sealed and separate from the actual 
physical situation in which it is portrayed but is instead indelibly coloured by the place 
and time of the telling and the narratee’s responses. As Vice notes, this ‘mixing of 
intentions of speaker and listener’ (Vice 1997: 45) is a characteristic of dialogism, 
which we shall discuss in more detail below.
4) The fourth type of function fulfilled by the narratee is that of a criticising the 
narrative, the type of criticism-in-the-text that we saw in chapter one defined as 
metatextual intertextuality, or the relation between commentary and its object 
(element 7). This may be as simple an act as questioning the credibility of a 
certain event, or stretch to criticism of rhetorical style as exemplified by the 
following quotation from Emotionally Weird:
While the kettle was coming to the boil I went to the toilet—
~ In the same sentence? Nora objects, it’s been nothing but ringing phones 
and boiling kettles, doorbells and toilets, since you began.
(El/I/: 10412)
This function may be seen to share features with the first and second functions. 
Often the criticism takes the form of questioning, and sometimes the criticism interrupts 
the narrative only figurally, as objections placed inside the thought representation of the
12 In this and all follow ing quotations from Emotionally Weird I w ill retain the distinct typographical 
differences between different sections from the original hardback edition. Different typefaces signify 
different authors and different ‘worlds’ , and play a huge part in the novel as a whole.
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focalising character that do not interrupt the process of narration in the world of the text 
but nevertheless interrupt the reader’s perception of that process. In diagram C this 
function is represented by the exclamation mark within the thought bubble13.
This function is particularly important in postmodern novels because the effect of 
having an active critic portrayed within the text heightens the metafictive qualities 
already present by portraying the storyteller attempting to relate their life story. Again, 
E W supplies illuminating examples, notably when the narrator/ narratee tables turn and 
(Elea)Nora, the critical narratee for most of the novel, begins to tell her own life story:
Donald set about replacing his lost children, first with a girl, Deirdrie, who went 
to be Honoria’s playmate almost straight away, then a boy, Lachlan, followed 
swiftly by Effie and then, finally, fourteen long years later, the after-thought that 
was Eleanora—
‘You mean you? I think you should tell this in the first person.’
~ Why?
‘To make it more real.’
~ I would prefer it if it was less real.
CEW: 188)
‘ I think I see. I f  Mrs Macbeth died now, or indeed i f  Aileen Grant died now, Watson 
Grant would get the money. But i f  Aileen divorces him he won’t get any money when Mrs 
Macbeth dies?
~ I like this exposition, Nora says, everything being explained in black and 
white, you should do more of it.
(EW: 208)
These examples work to break the frame of the main story and remind us of the 
context in which the story is being told. Due to the constant questioning, interrupting, 
and thought representation about the narrative itself we never lose sight of the 
originating subject (the storyteller) or the immediate storytelling situation. This 
foregrounds the process of storytelling considerably, as can be seen when we compare 
a text with constant interruptions to one that breaks the frames only rarely. In the 
Arabian Nights the actual storytelling context melts away and the frame story of 
Scheherezade seems to become only a conceit binding the collection of stories rather
13 Obviously, my use o f a thought bubble can be itself questioned. As we see below, often the criticism is 
voiced. However, in my opinion representing this, and the function o f questioning the narrative, with a 
thought bubble is more appropriate because these functions are essentially the narratee’s thoughts on the 
narration and as Nights at the Circus demonstrates, these objections can be presented to the reader 
through the focalization process and remain unvoiced.
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than its organising principle or the primary narrative.14 It becomes possible to forget 
that Scheherezade is the primary narrator; that the voices of all the hypodiegetic 
narrators are actually Scheherezade’s voice and that the storytelling has a purpose in 
itself, identified by Rimmon-Kenan:
Some hypodiegetic narratives maintain or advance the action of the first 
narrative by the sheer fact of being narrated, regardless (or almost regardless) of 
their content. [The Arabian] Nights is a classic example. Scheherezade's life 
depends on her narration, and the only condition her stories have to fulfil is to 
sustain the Sultan's attention.
(Rimmon-Kenan 1999: 92)
It is significant that ABC’s 2000 television reinterpretation of the Arabian Nights 
featured interruptions by the sultan, objections to the fantastic nature of some of the 
tales and further narrative at the level of the main frame, much like we see in Midnight’s 
Children, or Rob Reiner's film, The Princess Bride (1987). The effect gained, 
unsurprisingly, is to foreground the importance of Scheherezade’s narration and 
strengthen the allegory about the importance of storytelling that is the primary frame 
tale.
At this point, I would like to direct attention again to diagram C. My aim was to 
make Genette’s diagram more reflective of the active position of the narratee in the 
texts under analysis, but it is worthwhile quoting Bakhtin’s reflections upon the practice 
of presenting “speech diagrams” at length:
Still current in linguistics are such fictions as the “ listener” and “understander” 
(partners of the “speaker”), the “unified speech flow,” and so on. These fictions 
produce a completely distorted idea of the complex and multifaceted process of 
active speech communication. Courses in general linguistics (even serious ones 
like Saussure’s) frequently present graphic-schematic depictions of the two 
partners in speech communication—the speaker and the listener (who perceives 
the speech)— and provide diagrams of the active speech processes of the speaker 
and the corresponding passive processes of the listener’s perception and 
understanding of the speech. One cannot say that these diagrams are false or that 
they do not correspond to certain aspects. But when they are put forth as the 
actual whole of speech communication, they become a scientific fiction. The fact is 
that when the listener perceives and understands the meaning (the language 
meaning) of speech, he simultaneously takes an active, responsive attitude toward 
it. He either agrees or disagrees with it (completely or partially), augments I, 
applies it, prepares for its execution and so on. And the listener adopts this 
responsive attitude for the entire duration of the process of listening and 
understanding, from the very beginning -  sometimes literally from the speaker’s 
first word. Any understanding of live speech, a live utterance, is inherently 
responsive, although the degree of this activity varies extremely. Any
14 This may be due to the myth o f a version that actually contained a thousand and one nights, which led 
many editors and publishers into forging additional tales and treating the frame story as a repository (or 
dumping ground) for any oriental story that didn’t have an identifiable author (Mahdi 1995: 11).
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understanding is imbued with response and necessarily elicits it in one form or 
another: the listener becomes the speaker. A passive understanding of the 
meaning of perceived speech is only an abstract aspect of the actual whole of 
actively response that is actually articulated.
(Bakhtin 1994: 68)
Whilst I cannot possibly claim that the diagram is perfect, I believe it does 
succeed in representing the important role of the narratee and more accurately depict 
the storytelling situation in the texts I am studying. The importance of the narratee’s 
place within the formal structure of the novel can be further explained using Bakhtin's 
concept of dialogism, as this type of narratee dramatises a situation where 'every 
utterance, every sentence, is orientated towards an implied response, is in "dialogue" 
with utterances that have already been made and interacts with the social situation 
around it.' (Wales 1997: 123). For Bakhtin dialogism is an inherent feature of 
language, a view most evident in “The Problem of Speech Genres” where Bakhtin 
describes written forms as secondary speech genres, stressing the similarities between 
written texts and utterances. Writing, like speech, needs to be understood as part of a 
continual chain of utterances, a scientific paper, although it may seem to be 
autocthonous is in fact written in response, as a rejoinder to previous theories and 
when viewed in this way we can see how for Bakhtin all communication is dialogic. 
However, some forms are more dialogic than others, and Bakhtin also uses the term 
monologic (even though it seems hard to imagine a truly monologic utterance) which 
he defines as “words that expect no answer” (Bakhtin 1973: 63) but the nature of his 
definitions seem to suggest a sliding scale rather than a binary opposition between 
monologic and dialogic discourses.
This dialogic quality is evident when we compare the nature of these texts where 
the truth is in question and no one has the final or authoritative word with the written 
genres which, as we have seen above, some of the narrators attempt to utilise. The 
omniscient narrator generally has the final word when assigning meaning to texts as 
there is no-one to question their assignation of certain qualities to characters or their 
representation of events. Although a reader can question the likelihood of, say, 
spontaneous combustion in Charles Dickens’s Bleak House there is no voice of dissent
1 o o  1
incorporated within the text itself15. Compare this to the disbelief articulated by Padma, 
Nora or Walser at unlikely or fantastic events in the narratives of Saleem, Effie and 
Fevvers. By incorporating dialogism to the extent where a narrator’s version of events 
is constantly interrogated by the expectations of the listener, these texts highlight the 
importance of the listener, and by implication, the reader, in the creation of meaning. 
This of course opens up the text to a variety of possible readings and interpretations, 
for if the storyteller’s narrative is questioned within the text then the reader already has 
two alternative ready made viewpoints on ‘what actually happened’ to choose from, 
and can decide which, if any, of the versions they believe.
The reader’s ultimate power, to believe or not to believe, to read or not to read, is 
in fact highlighted when Saleem makes direct addresses to the reader, reminiscent of 
early metafiction such as Tristram Shandy (see Waugh 1993: 70).
Please believe me that I am falling apart.
I am not speaking metaphorically: nor is this the opening gambit of some 
melodramatic riddling, grubby appeal for pity ... I ask you only to accept (as I have 
accepted) that I shall eventually crumble into (approximately) six hundred thousand 
and thirty million particles of anonymous and necessarily oblivious dust. This is 
why I have resolved to confide in paper, before I forget.
(MC: 37)
This passage carries with it an implied dialogic response, namely that a reader 
would automatically presume that Saleem is ‘speaking metaphorically’, and is typical of 
other addresses to the reader within the text. However, these addresses have the 
effect of further undermining any trust that the reader has in the narrator, as Saleem 
overtly attempts to control the reader’s understanding of the narrative, to reduce 
possible interpretations to a single monologic explanation that is always undermined by 
the dialogism of the narrative situation. Again, the idea of authorship, is highlighted. 
Foucault claims in “What is an Author?” that the author, rather than a genius who 
generously puts ‘an inexhaustible world of significations’ into the text, as we usually 
see him/ her, actually functions to limit the number of possible interpretations (Foucault 
1979: 158-9). We will examine this claim further in chapter 4, but for now we can see
15 This is a simplification; Dickens’s August 1853 preface to the novel edition o f Bleak House famously 
appeals to the historical accounts o f spontaneous combustion in response to George Henry Lewes’ 
criticism o f its unlikelihood. However, whether a preface counts as part o f the text itself is another 
argument entirely.
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how Saleem is attempting to limit the possible interpretations a reader could make of 
his text, but is thwarted by the clumsiness of his authorial style.
The attempt to shift from a spoken first-person account of one’s life to a written 
genre dramatises what Bakhtin calls the shift from a primary speech genre to the 
novel. He calls this a secondary speech genre where ‘primary genres lose their 
immediate relation to actual reality and to the real utterances of others’ (Bakhtin 1994: 
62). This accounts for the non-referentiality of fiction, but also the abstraction that 
occurs when a text is written in more monologic forms of discourse, where the 
utterances of others may exist on the diegetic level but the narrator’s final godlike 
judgement is unchallenged.
Finally, a further effect of dramatising storytelling is that a chronotope of 
storytelling is established, and it is the presence of the narratee that creates this 
chronotope of storytelling. By constantly bringing us back to the moment of storytelling, 
the immediate context of the communication, a depth of field16 is brought upon the 
‘present’ of the novel. Again, comparison with the Arabian Nights reveals this 
chonotopicity for, as we have already seen, the primary frame of storytelling does not 
melt away as it does in that fairy tale; it is impossible to forget about the ‘actual’ 
storyteller and his or her audience. Also, if one thinks of the novels, we are aware 
where and when the storytelling takes place; whether it is in a London dressing room, a 
Bombay pickle factory, a hotel room, a Hebridean island, a classroom or even an 
anonymous place on "’The underground female road”. With this sense of space, 
inevitably comes the sense of time:
Like the duration of the act of narration, the place in which it occurs need not 
be mentioned, nor does the reader feel the need for such specification.
(Rimmon-Kenan 1999: 91)
Because physical space in which the narrative takes place is represented, the 
duration of the narration is also inevitably represented. Again, this leads to the unusual 
effect of foregrounding the act of storytelling itself; we are not presented with the 
narrative as product, as it inevitably appears on the shelves of a bookshop, but as
161 am indebted to Damian Grant’s discussion o f ‘Tessellation’ for this term (Grant 1998: 39).
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process. The physical presence of the narrator and the narratee combined within a 
specified physical context ultimately reminds the reader of what is missing from his or 
her own experience of narrative in its reified ‘commodity’ forms; the novel, movies, 
television serials. Linda Hutcheon calls this emphasis on process rather than product 
“Process Mimesis” and identifies it as one of the features of metafiction, which I will 
return to when analysing the metafictive effects of the storyteller below (Hutcheon 
1984).
The importance of the chronotope of storytelling is one of the main reasons why I 
believe the narrator Offred, in Atwood’s The Handmaid’s Tale, can be viewed as a 
storyteller, even though in that text there is no physically present narratee. Offred is 
not writing her story, like Saleem or Effie, nor is she ‘telling’ in the traditional sense to 
another human being. Indeed for much of the text, it seems as though we have a fairly 
traditional (but highly self conscious) first person narrative. This view of the narrator 
can be held until the final chapter when the primary story ends, and we are left with a 
commentary upon Offred’s narrative conducted by future historians. At this point we 
learn that the text we have been reading has been reconstructed, possibly not in the 
correct order, from audio-cassettes. The whole narrative must be reinterpreted in the 
light of this information; instead of a planned, whole and written testimony we have 
unplanned, fragmented and oral storytelling.
Given this situation we may tenuously suggest that the tape-recorder acts as the 
narratee. Although this may seem a contrived attempt to make The Handmaid’s Tale 
fit with my previous criteria, it can be seen that the medium on which Offred’s narrative 
is transmitted gives the text characteristics shared by narratives that feature a more 
conventional storytelling situation. Narrating to a tape-recorder intensifies the implied 
dialogic response in the narrator’s voice, where the narrator speculates as to how the 
reader is interpreting the narrative17. Likewise, the dialogic responses that occur as 
interruptions in Nights at the Circus and Midnight’s Children here take place in the 
“Historical Notes” chapter. Here we see all four features of the narratee deferred in
17 Something that, o f course, would be unnecessary i f  the narratee was actually physically present.
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time: questioning the narrator, providing an alternative point of view from which to see 
the narrator (an ironic ‘historical perspective), criticizing the narrative (for its value as 
historical testimony) and, arguably ‘moving the narrative along’. Although it might 
seem odd to say that this chapter moves the narrative along, it does affect the way we 
see Offred’s narrative because it denies the reader any form of closure. The future 
historians simply do not care what happened to Offred in the end (she is not an 
‘important’ or historical character, as perhaps the commander is), as the reader does, 
but simply about her tale’s value as a historical document.
Although until the last chapter we have no idea that Offred is narrating her story 
to a tape recorder, the revelation of the way in which the narrative was told infuses the 
entire text with a chronotopic depth. Moments of self consciousness, direct addresses 
to the reader like “this is a reconstruction” (HT: 144) and “ You can mean thousands” 
(50) suddenly become more important when we realise that this novel too is depicting 
the process of narration, in a way that highlights the alienation forced upon the 
storyteller; the “you” that means thousands is the same “you” addressed by song lyrics, 
a stand-in that indicates the absence of the other, the receiver, the listener.
Likewise, the fact that the story is tape-recorded also highlights the place and 
time in which the story is told. After learning of “the Underground Femaleroad” the 
claustrophobia of the text is intensified; the narrative voice is not ‘looking back’ on 
danger and captivity, but this danger is sustained even in the telling itself. Anecdotally,
I recall my first reading of the text was permeated by concerns over the time and place 
of writing. Offred’s narrative is relayed in the present tense, and this is one of the 
reasons why the captivity and ordeals she undergoes seem so powerful. This use of 
the present tense is a feature The Handmaid’s Tale shares with Ann Frank’s Diary, 
where atrocities are described in the present tense, heightening their emotional impact 
and their perceived temporal ‘nearness’ to the speaker. Again, the effect heightens the 
significance of the oral method of transmission: after reading the final chapter, we can 
speculate that the reason for the story being told in the present tense is because the 
ordeal is not yet over, there is no point where she has escaped captivity, where she
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can narrate in safety. Offred’s narrative resists closure because it is obvious that she 
has not been able to relay her experiences in writing. “The Pen between my fingers is 
sensuous, alive almost, I can feel its power, the power of the words it contains,” says 
Offred, recalling a moment where she breaks the Gileadan taboo against women 
writing at the prompt of the commander, who plays the wolf to Offred’s Little Red Riding 
Hood (196). The oral transmission of her tale makes clear to the reader that she still is 
alienated from the pen that is power in patriarchal society.18
It is important that Offred’s tale is spoken not written, because it places her in a 
continuum of female storytelling. As Marina Warner notes, women’s voices have long 
been seen as dangerous by men, and much fairy tale content is in fact barely masked 
protest against the institutions of patriarchy (Warner 1994a: 27-51). For centuries 
women, denied education or even literacy, were able to voice their discontent in the 
tales told to their peers. Denied access to forms of “serious” writing, the voice of the 
repressed can be seen in fairy tales that condemn arranged marriages, like “Beauty 
and the Beast” which, significantly occurs in many redactions by various ‘bluestocking’ 
French fairy tale writers during the first ‘fairy tale’ boom in the salons of Louis XIV. 
Warner highlights the realism of this fairy tale, which describes a situation that the 
contemporary female audience would find familiar; fathers giving away (or on some 
occasion selling) their daughters to men who might well strike them as monsters (278). 
The importance of the oral means of transmission; the resonances that Offred’s voice 
strikes with the voices of the repressed, expressed in fairy tales for centuries combines 
with the distanced, supercilious questioning of the historians to create a chronotope as 
distinctive as any of the other texts. The time of storytelling; the method; the context 
and purpose of storytelling becomes clearly important. As a final, shining example, the 
appearance of Elvis Presley lyrics in chapter ten suddenly becomes more significant
18 Also, the pen is overt in a way that recording onto cassettes is not. Writing produces a visible artefact, 
which is physical evidence, and whose contents can be appraised in a short amount o f time by skim- 
reading. Audio recording on the other hand requires long periods o f attention; you can not easily appraise 
the contents by running the tapes at quadruple speed, for example. It is significant that the future 
historians, however, encounter the narrative in manuscript form. A stable, ‘ fixed’ form is the first thing 
that the historians impose upon the chaotic fragmentation o f the illic it tape recordings.
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when we realise that one of the tapes Offred is recording onto is labelled “Elvis 
Presley’s Golden Years” (314). In novels that feature the storyteller, as Offred 
continually reminds us, context is everything.
3. The Intertextual allusion or incorporation of fairy tale intertexts
We come now to the fact that these fairy tales are about the teller’s own life, only 
to discover that fairy tales have always been about the teller’s own life. Marina Warner 
in From the Beast to the Blonde delves into what Jameson would call the ‘political 
unconscious’ of fairy tales to expose their historic foundations and what she finds is the 
lore of the oppressed, women and the peasantry, disguised in dream-like metaphors 
easily interpreted by their listeners but not so easily today. The fairy tales of many of 
the French courtesans, such as Madame D’Aulnoy, rail against the injustices 
perpetrated by society upon women such as arranged marriage and treatment of 
women as chattels. These fairytales are politics and allegory mixed together to create 
in the listener an understanding of the wrongs of the political system. The fairy tales of 
the storytellers too inevitably portray historically contingent political circumstance: if, as 
Jameson claims, “history is what hurts”, the storyteller reminds us of the way in which 
the modern reader experiences narrative as a commodity (Jameson 1981: 102).
“What hurts” in these circumstances is the alienation of the subject in postmodern 
society, where the individual’s relationship to the world is uncertain. Understanding the 
self as more than part of a cog in the globalised machinery of late capitalism, indeed 
understanding the self in relation to history, requires the technique of narrativisation: 
the documented boom in popularity of genealogy over recent years can be seen as an 
attempt to understand ‘se lf by understanding one’s life in relation to one’s ancestors, 
creating a family narrative in which to understand one’s own life and eventual death.
This is only one political area that the storyteller foregrounds; the different texts 
under analysis vary in the other political concerns they manifest, from the feminism in 
The Handmaid’s Tale and Nights at the Circus to the postcolonialist overtones of 
Midnight’s Children. The storyteller, by foregrounding the process of narrativisation 
and a storytelling situation vastly different to the readers own experience, brings our
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attention to the means of production that govern contemporary storytelling. Indeed, by 
the juxtaposition of a form that is generally held to be the property of a ‘folk’ culture, the 
fairy tale, and written forms that are always legally the property of the author, the 
storytellers can be seen to bring attention to these ideas of ‘ownership’. This is a 
particularly important point to emphasise because it is generally held that fairy tales 
lack any real political or social significance and are mere escapism. As the studies of 
Marina Warner and Jack Zipes make clear, this has never been the case, and it is not 
the case in postmodern fairy tales either.
The use of fairy tale motifs within fictional autobiography is, like the formal device 
of the storyteller, not a new occurrence. Dickens’s Great Expectations and Charlotte 
Bronte’s Jane Eyre are both laden with allusions to fairy tales and folklore, from 
“Bluebeard” and “Cinderella” to the Arabian Nights. However, I would suggest that the 
way in which these intertexts are used in the postmodern novels that are my focus is 
radically different.
In Great Expectations and Jane Eyre, fairy tale discourse is used to present a 
compellingly ‘realistic’ depiction of the psychology of youth. Both the young Jane and 
Pip see the world through expectations garnered from fairy tales: this is most tellingly 
depicted in Pip’s mistaken visions of Mrs Havisham as a fairy godmother type figure, 
beneficently fulfilling his wish to be a gentleman in order to marry Estella; a scenario 
we recognise from fairy tales as the brilliant metafictive lecture incorporated in TDITNE 
suggests: “’The emotion we feel in fairy-tales when the characters are granted their 
wishes is a strange one. We feel the possible leap of freedom — I can have what I 
want — and the perverse certainty that this will change nothing; that Fate is fixed’” 
(254).
However, in the case of both these novels, the fairy tale suggests a more 
immature way of viewing the world. Pip’s fairy tale expectations are shattered by the 
fact that his wealth comes from a more realistic source than the philanthropy of an 
otherworldly aristocrat, the hard labour of the convict Magwitch. A similar mis- 
recognition of plot is at work in Jane Eyre, where Jane’s and the reader’s expectations
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of a plot not dissimilar to Cinderella (‘working girl makes good’) are confounded by the 
revelation of Rochester’s “Bluebeard” qualities.
Neither Jane Eyre nor Great Expectations feature a ‘storytelling’ situation, 
however, and therefore questions of author, fiction and historiography are absent. 
These are formative texts of the English bildungsroman, and are therefore more 
concerned with creating an idea of ‘development’ and ‘self rather than deconstructing 
it. Likewise, texts that do feature a character that fulfils most of the formal features of 
the storyteller may not have the same effects outlined above. For example, Samuel 
Taylor Coleridge’s ancient mariner or Joseph Conrad’s Marlow both share many 
features that we have used to define ‘the storyteller’. They tell an oral narrative to a 
narratee within a written text, and that narrative is their own life story which in both 
cases contains fairy tale motifs. Both these narratives draw attention to storytelling: the 
ancient mariner’s penance is to offload his story on any unsuspecting wedding guest at 
every opportunity which highlights the way experience can be turned into cautionary 
narrative and depicts the narrative contract that binds speaker and listener, reader and 
author. Marlow, on the other hand, shows the problems of narrative, its inability to 
portray the ‘real’:
‘...He [Kurtz] was just a word for me. I did not see the man in the name any 
more than you do. Do you see him? Do you see the story? Do you see anything?
It seems to me I am trying to tell you a dream —  making a vain attempt, because 
no relation of a dream can convey the dream-sensation, that commingling of 
absurdity, surprise, and bewilderment in a tremor of struggling revolt, that notion of 
being captured by the incredible which is of the very essence of dreams ... ’
[ . . . ]
No, it is impossible: it is impossible to convey the life-sensation of any 
given epoch of one’s existence,— that which makes its truth, its meaning — its 
subtle and penetrating essence. It is impossible. We live, as we dream — 
alone...’
(Conrad 1995: 50 unbracketed ellipses replicated from original)
The difference between these romantic, modernist and postmodernist storytellers 
can be seen in the differing self-awareness of the narrators. For Coleridge, narrative 
can depict truth in an unproblematic manner: the ancient mariner’s cautionary tale is 
successful both in representing the mariner’s experiences and in its goal of inspiring 
god-fearing awe in its narratee. Marlow, on the other hand self-reflexively despairs at 
the inability of narrative to portray and transmit the ‘truth’ of experience. We can also
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see the way in which the embedded narrative structure depicted on Diagram A breaks 
down under a modernist storytelling scenario. The frames are not stable as they are in 
Frankenstein, so we cannot disentangle Kurtz’s story from Marlow’s because of the 
oral nature of Marlow’s intradiegetic homodiegetic narration, and because Kurtz’s story 
has become part of Marlow’s. The postmodern storytellers go even further than this, 
depicting the ways in which narrative structures society, memory and our sense of self.
How then is the fairy tale used in tales featuring the storyteller, and what makes 
this use different from that of its predecessors? The following four categories highlight 
effects resulting from the foregrounding of the fairy tale intertext in postmodern 
‘storyteller texts. The fairy tale in these texts functions:
i. As an easily recognisable form of discourse used in opposition to written 
forms.
ii. A schema or template which moulds one’s interpretation of one’s own life
iii. To suggest an alternative view of the world from realism (magic realism).
iv. Allusively, to suggest parallels between characters.
We will see in chapter four that the fairy tale is used as a form of easily 
recognisable discourse that opposes written or monologic forms: “Once upon a time”, is 
used in Midnights Children and Waterland to denote an alternative way of 
understanding the world to historiography. This can be seen as a way of 
understanding self that existed prior to writing and autobiography, both historically and 
in real terms: everyone has a ‘story’ of key events in their life, whereas few people 
have an autobiography. In this guise, fairy tale magical chronotopic events can be 
perhaps viewed as a product of oral narration: most people’s first experience of oral 
narration comes in the form of the fairy tales which are told to us as children, and 
perhaps the context of oral narration subconsciously activates this mode of discourse. 
The “Historical Notes” chapter of The Handmaid’s Tale also displays this recognition of 
fairy tale discourse: the historians who reconstruct Offred’s tale christen it “The 
Handmaid’s Tale” in homage to Geoffrey Chaucer (HT. 313) because the oral, fairy tale 
like testimony, recalls the narration of Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales.
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The second way in which the fairy tale intertext can be viewed is as a schema, or
template into which the chaos of events can be fitted. We will see this to be the case in
Chapter four when the narrator of Waterland, Tom Crick’s, mother relates experiences
from her own life as fairy tale. For now, it is enough to reiterate that the predictable
roles in the fairy tale of hero, false hero, bride, helper, sought after object, etcetera,
make the fairy tale an easy way of converting experience into narrative. Indeed, in
explaining the importance of schemata for organising the chaos of lived experience into
understandable patterns and therefore the tendency towards stereotypes in the press,
Roger Fowler suggests:
The world presented by the popular press, like the world we feel we live in, is 
a culturally organized set of categories, rather than a collection of unique 
individuals. If we imagined the world as a vast collection of individual things and 
people we would be overwhelmed by detail. We manage the world, make sense of 
it, by categorizing phenomena, including people. Having established a person as 
an example of type, our relation with that person is simplified: we think about the 
person in terms of the qualities which we attribute to the category already pre­
existing in our minds. In so far as we regard the category of person as displaying 
strongly predictable attributes or behaviour, the category may harden into a 
stereotype, an extremely simplified mental model which fails to see individual 
features, only the values that are believed to be appropriate to the type [...]
[...] “groups” such as “young married women”, “immigrants”, “teachers”,
“capitalists” and “royalty” are imaginary, socially constructed concepts, almost as 
fictitious as trolls at bridges and princesses in towers.
(Fowler 1998: 92, 94)
Mick Short notes the way that fictions play a large part in the establishment of our
schemas, giving the example that he has never seen beyond the front desk of a police
station but has a good idea, from novels and films, of how those arrested are
interviewed, charged and put in the cells. (Short 1996: 227) Schema theory is typically
related to cognitive psychology, a school of psychology that view the similarities of the
human brain to a computer, but Peter Brooks suggests a way in which applying a fairy
tale schemata in order to understand ones life might be desirable in more traditional
psychoanalytic terms:
It is as if the individual, in order to be able to narrate his life story to himself in 
such a way as to make it coherent and significant, had to reach back toward the 
idea of a providential plot which, for better or for worse, would subsume his 
experience to that of mankind, to show the individual as a significant repetition of a 
story already endowed with meaning.
(Brooks 1998: 280)
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The third effect of the fairy tale intertext is to incorporate a genre that has entirely 
different rules of representation from historiography, which utilises the same 
conventions as realism. As we saw in chapter two, the incorporation of fairy tale 
discourse within the same text as conventional realism can be seen as a cause of what 
has been called, the ‘magic realism’ of the texts under analysis. It is an interesting fact 
that of the texts I have used to define the storyteller chronotope all but one (HT) can be 
called magic realist.
The incorporation of fairy tale discourse also imports fairy tale logic into the 
discursive structure of the novel as a whole. When Fevvers escapes a Bluebeard-like 
collector in Nights at the Circus by boarding a model locomotive in the second volume, 
when Dick Crick dives into the water never to resurface in Waterland, the incorporation 
of fairy tale narrative allows the reader to see the events in more than one way: the 
boundaries of the possible and impossible are shifted.
In TDITNE, the logic of the fairy tale dictates that when Gillian Perholt rubs the 
oriental glass bottle a djinn will appear. Similarly, the different formulaic genres, 
‘jumbled up like a box of biscuits’ that make up Emotionally Weird, from Mills & Boon 
romance and high fantasy to the detective novel, are subsumed in a fairy tale like logic 
when Effie (the character) reverses a character’s death by burning one of the 
embedded narratives “the expanding prism of J” which parallels the fatal accident, 
before Effie (the narrator) exclaims metafictively ‘Now that’s magic realism’ (EW: 283). 
Of course, this again raises the question of ontology, as it is quite obvious that we 
would not expect such a cure for death to work in our world; this question over which 
world to place the narrative logic in leads to the effect of magic realism.
The fourth result of intertextually embedding fairy tale narrative, through allusive 
practices from explicitly comparing characters to recognisable fairy tale characters to 
more illicit or subliminal references was covered in chapter one. However, for the 
moment one can think of the dress that Offred is forced to wear when going to market 
in The Handmaid’s Tale: “What do you think of when you see someone in red carrying 
a basket?” says Atwood (Wilson 1993: 271) making plain the reference to “Red Cap” or
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“Red Riding Hood”. This allusion on the level of character description is highly relevant 
because that particular fairy tale has transformed over the years from a cautionary tale 
about the danger of wolves into an invective against female sexuality, a trend 
documented in Zipes’ The Trials and Tribulations o f Little Red Riding Hood and of 
course highly relevant to the narrative.
4. The narrative is hom odiegetic.
The orality of the [fairy tale] genre remains a central claim even in the most 
artificial and elaborate versions [...] [they] imitate speech, with chatty asides, 
apparently spontaneous exclamations, direct appeals to the imaginary circle round 
the hearth, rambling descriptions, gossipy parentheses, and other bedside or 
laplike mannerisms that create an illusion of collusive intimacies, of home, of the 
bedtime story, the winter’s tale.
(Warner 1994a: 25)
Perhaps the most important aspect of the storyteller as a formal trope is that the 
narrative is about the storyteller, or homodiegetic. I mentioned at the start of this 
chapter that embedded or framed storytelling is not new, but that nevertheless that this 
trope has postmodern effects in the novels under analysis. The novels analysed in this 
and the next chapter depict a scenario where the reader witnesses someone 
attempting to make sense of their life through narrative, which is inherently a 
metafictional trope.
The storyteller creates an interesting effect in that it is very hard to talk about this 
conceit without sounding naive. Saleem Sinai, Gillian Perholt, Fevvers et al. do not 
exist. They are fictional characters written by authors who remain outside the text, and 
yet in writing about texts that feature a storyteller, it is very hard not to write that 
‘Saleem says this’, or ‘Gillian is motivated by that’. We are all aware that HT  has not 
been put together by future historians, but written by Margaret Atwood. However, one 
must take the “Historical Notes” chapter seriously if only to see how it changes the 
reader’s perspective on the preceding narrative. This is indicative of how much the 
storyteller facilitates what Bakhtin calls polyphony, Bakhtin notes that some of 
Dostoevsky’s literary characters are referred to as if they were real by critics ‘as if the 
character were not an object of authorial discourse, but rather a fully valid, autonomous 
carrier of his own individual world’ (Bakhtin 1973: 5). Vice’s summation of the
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polyphonic novel almost perfectly describes the situation that the storyteller trope 
engenders:
In a polyphonic novel, characters are represented not as objects, who are 
manipulated and commented upon by an omniscient narrator, but as subjects, on 
an equal footing with the narrator (their voices are constructed in exactly the same 
way as this figure’s voice), whose own word about themselves and each other is all 
that we know about them.
(Vice 1997: 114)
The introduction of a narratee whose voice acts dialogically and polyphonically, 
combined with the depth of field supplied by the chronotope of storytelling, all leads to 
a situation that foregrounds the act of authorship, and the fact that we cannot discuss 
these texts without sounding naive and seeming to confuse the narrator with the author 
suggests the extent to which questions of authority and biography are raised.
In the next chapter, I will look further at the autobiographical nature of the fairy 
tales told by the storytellers and explain the importance of storyteller trope. This 
chapter defined the storyteller, in the next chapter I will attempt to explain precisely why 
the storyteller chronotope became important at this particular point in history and 
furthermore, why the fairy tale is such an important intertext in texts featuring the 
storyteller.
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Chapter Four: The Role of the Storyteller in a Postmodern
World
... throughout history, stories have been told, chiefly, but not always at 
bedtime, in order to quell restless thoughts; [children’s] need of stories is matched 
only by the need adults have of children to tell stories to, of receptacles for their 
stock of fairy-tales, of listening ears on which to unload those most unbelievable 
yet haunting of fairy tales, their own lives;
(Swift [1984] 1992: 7)
In his influential essay, “The Storyteller; Reflections on the Work of Nikolai 
Leskov” (1977), Walter Benjamin laments the decline of the art of storytelling. He 
contrasts the idea of the folkloric storyteller, a social, political and fundamentally 
physical presence with the idea of the author whom, he argues, is asocial and is able to 
tell stories without physical presence but also without actively being a part of the 
everyday world. The crux of Benjamin’s argument, as in his “The Work of Art in the 
Age of Mechanical Reproduction”, rests upon the concept of ‘aura’, which he argues in 
that essay, is a quality of immanence and originality that is lost in mass-produced art. 
Just as we cannot see the surrounding architecture and the physical texture when 
Michelangelo’s Sistine Chapel ceiling is photographically reproduced on a postcard, 
poster or t-shirt, we cannot see the face, hear the voice, of the storyteller in a 
commodity driven system where the novel is one among many mass produced 
commodities designed to exploit the public’s insatiable desire for narrative.
What then, are we to make of the subset of postmodern fiction that foreground 
the process of storytelling? If the novel has displaced the storyteller, what are we to 
make of the storytelling characters who question the primacy of written discourse, and 
challenge the reader’s expectations of generic forms. If the storyteller is dead why 
does he (or more often, she) refuse to lie down?
In chapter three I formally defined a type of narration that is used metafictively in 
a number of postmodern novels. These novels model themselves explicitly on the 
Arabian Nights and use fairy tale intertexts to make the reader question the difference 
between oral and written ways of understanding the self.
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This chapter will investigate the effects that the metafictive trope of the storyteller 
causes, and postulate a theory as to why this intertextual use of fairy tales as a model 
for storytelling is something that the authors of these texts found important.
Who’s telling this story? Autobiography and fiction
One of the major features of the storyteller is that the story told is about the self. 
This act, creating fairy tales about the self, leads to a foregrounding of authorship. Of 
course, because the storyteller is an intradiegetic character, telling his or her life story 
and not the author, the storyteller can be seen as a variant form of the fictional 
autobiography, an established genre which goes back to Defoe’s Moll Flanders and 
Robinson Crusoe but one with its own problems. As Paul De Man notes in 
“Autobiography as De-Facement”:
Autobiography seems to depend on actual and potentially verifiable events in 
a less ambivalent way than fiction does. It seems to belong to a simpler mode of 
referentiality, of representation, and of diegesis. It may contain lots of phantasms 
and dreams, but these deviations from reality remain rooted in a single subject 
whose identity is defined by the uncontested readability of his proper name.
(De Man 1984: 68)
The novel, however, does not remain rooted in a single subject; the proper name 
on the cover is that of the author, not the character. This small detail makes all the 
difference in the way that we read the texts, as De Man himself was aware. Imagine 
picking up a copy of Midnight’s Children without a cover. How would we know whether 
it is autobiography or fiction? We generally rely on paratextual features like the cover 
of the work to equate the ‘author’ with a real person, a referent outside the world of the 
text, and if the T in the text does not tally with this real person we read the work as 
fiction1.
Texts containing the storyteller problematise the construct of the ‘author’, which 
we take for granted in our critical discourse and our ‘common sense’ understanding of 
the world to the extent that The Oxford Companion to English Literature does not have 
an entry for the word author, a situation analogous to a dictionary of religions not 
having an entry for ‘God’. This demonstrates the point made by Michel Foucault that
1 There is always a possibility o f oversimplification when talking about autobiography, and there are 
numerous postmodern attempts to challenge the norms o f the genre; notably Philip Roth’s The Facts and 
Roland Barthes’ autobiography, Roland Barthes.
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the unit of “the author and the work” appears to be fundamental, making other 
categories such as genre, schools and concepts seem weak, secondary constructs in 
comparison (Foucault 1979: 141). Foucault claims that the concept of the author came 
about when authors became subject to punishment, that is, when their discourses 
could be transgressive (148). Texts featuring the storyteller play with this concept; 
something that we find whenever talking about the intradiegetic storyteller; Saleem 
Sinai is a fictional character, and yet the easiest way to talk about MC is to play along 
and pretend that he is real. The frustration of the historians reading The Handmaid’s 
Tale is that inability to find the author, whose identity is hidden precisely to escape 
possible identification and punishment.
The reason that this causes the historians problems can be seen if we look 
closely at the meaning of the word ‘author’, its use and its equivalents in the English 
language. As Foucault points out, the question of the author ties in with the question 
“What does it matter who is speaking?” (141). This is a question that gives all 
historians problems and that lies at the very heart of conventional historiography, for 
this question must be solved in order to say how ‘authentic’ a testimony is. Finding out 
‘who is speaking’ matters very much indeed to historians, as evidenced in the division 
between primary and secondary sources. The historian judges the reliability of a 
source by his or her relation to the events investigated, and those who were verifiably 
present at key events are judged to have more valuable (or authentic) testimony than 
those who were not. In historiography, as in fiction, some narrators are more reliable 
than others.
This leads us back to the question of the ‘unreliable’ narrator. In chapter three 
we looked at the phenomenon of the ‘unreliable narrator’ and noted its date of birth in 
the nineteenth century. The significance of this fact can only be seen by examining 
other pertinent theories about the nineteenth century, the century which saw the 
development and popularisation of literary realism and invented the novel as a 
commodity, the century held to be the ‘golden age’ of the novel by critics as diverse as 
Peter Brooks, Mikhail Bakhtin and Georg Lukacs.
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Elizabeth Deeds Ermath argues in The English Novel in History 1840-1895 that 
the invention of realism and the invention of historiography are inextricably linked. 
According to Ermath’s thesis, “[t]he chief contribution of the nineteenth-century novel is 
precisely the construction and dissemination of the historical narrative code and its 
particular accompanying values” (1997: 68). The historical narrative code is something 
that has been internalised and seems ‘natural’ to a modern reader and includes such 
paradigm shifts as the move from providential to historical plots and, more importantly 
for our concerns, the evolution of the omniscient narrator. For Ermath, the omniscient 
narrator is the voice of history, providing a unified temporal perspective that resists 
individualisation to the extent, she argues, that it cannot be called a narrator at all:
The narrator’ is really only a name for the most powerful function of the 
historical convention: one that -  it bears repeating -  precisely can not be 
individualized. [...] ‘the’ so-called narrator is really a discursive function that 
maintains the link between now and then: a function that maintains a single-point 
perspective in time.
(Ermath 1997: 88)
Ermath argues that we must use the term ‘nobody’ rather than the term narrator 
when talking about this discursive function (77). We have already seen what happens 
when a storyteller, who cannot but be individualized, tries to appropriate the voice of 
nobody in chapter three’s analysis of Midnight’s Children. To fully draw out the 
implications of Ermath’s argument, it is necessary to break the word nobody into its 
components: no and body. No-body can not have a voice, as by definition it lacks the 
physical presence and speaking equipment of the individualised human narrator. 
‘Nobody’ is a discursive function that can only exist in a society that is dominated by 
writing and its descendant, print, where stories are not told orally by individuals but by 
‘authors’ in mass-produced texts.
Walter J Ong in Writing and Technology reminds us that writing is a technology 
that has changed the way literate peoples view themselves and the world. The fact 
that we have to be reminded that writing is a technology is proof enough of how much 
we have internalised it, started to see it as natural. He dates the internalisation of 
writing and print into the psyche of western society in the late eighteenth and
nineteenth century, a theory backed up by the creation of the ‘nobody’ or omniscient
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narrator. Ong and Ermath’s theses are complementary: by combining them we can 
see both how writing enables the creation and naturalisation of the historical code, 
’nobody’ can not exist without writing. We will return to this point when examining the 
effect of writing upon memory.
For now it is enough to note that the reader’s ‘common sense’ response to the 
storyteller — viewing them as ‘unreliable’ and questioning their versions of events 
according to interiorised historical criteria — is derived from the historic code and 
omniscient, ‘nobody’ narrator invented in the nineteenth century due to the 
interiorisation of writing and print. The storyteller, by foregrounding the fact that writing 
and speech are not so easily separated, that stories have tellers, problematises any 
conception of the author as the godlike creator outside of the text. The binary between 
objective omniscience and subjective knowledge is deconstructed in Graham Swift’s 
Waterland where the narrator reports rumour and superstition (elements usually 
excluded or included only at ironic distance in historical discourse) for example 
rumours about Sarah Atkinson’s prophetic powers (83-4) alongside more traditional 
historic sources such as court transcripts (110) and most strikingly, folklore about the 
eel (196-204) alongside reference to learned monographs on the eel in natural history 
(198-200). The types of discourse usually privileged by historiography are presented 
alongside those it normally represses, leading the reader to question not only the 
events portrayed, but also the reliability of the narrator who is misusing the code.
What then is the relation between the author, history and the storyteller? First, 
the omniscient author is a discursive feature much like that used in history or scientific 
papers: it effaces the individuality and subjectivity of its originating subject in order to 
lay claim to some scientific objective realm of knowledge. Just as history pretends not 
to be an individual’s personal interpretation of available facts by adopting a form of 
discourse where all reference to T is suppressed, so too the originating subject is 
suppressed in realism where ‘nobody’ is the narrator. The narratorial function becomes 
one of voicing the concerns of society; “It is a fact universally acknowledged, that a 
single man in possession of a fortune, must be in want of a wife” or, “All happy families
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are alike but an unhappy family is unhappy after its own fashion” is not an individual’s 
opinion, like those expressed by the narrator of Fielding’s Tom Jones, but the 
concretisation of social norms into a ‘voice of society’.
Indeed, realism at its height completely eschews personality, as can be seen in 
Flaubert’s aspiration to leave no creator in the text resulting in his use of style indirect 
libre as an attempt of achieving ultimate ‘impersonality’. Ermath quotes Baudrillard 
“There were societies without the social [...] just as there were societies without 
history” as she explains the emergence of the interlinked nineteenth century 
conceptions of history and society (Ermath 1997: 120 italics replicated from original). 
The realist novel was instrumental in convincing the reading public that there was such 
a thing as an integrated society, and spreading the new non-providential view of 
history, where decisions made could easily have gone the other way and history is 
essential in charting the key moments at which these divergences occur. George 
Eliot’s Middlemarch is a sterling example here, with its constant metaphors relating 
society to the web, and its panoply of characters whose lives could have been 
altogether different if they had just made slightly different decisions: such as Dorothea 
not marrying Causabon, Lydgate not marrying Rosamond or Mary Garth burning Peter 
Featherstone’s will.
These analyses of the omniscient author and realism are important precisely 
because they are the yardstick by which we instinctively measure anything that does 
not conform to the norm. The ‘unreliable’ narrator cannot exist unless you also have 
some concept of a reliable narrator to oppose it. As we have seen, the ‘reliable’ 
narrator is a nineteenth century construct that is inextricably intermeshed with the 
nineteenth century concepts of history and society. Indeed, the methods we use to 
judge the reliability of a narrator in fiction are identical to those used to judge the 
reliability of a narrator in historiography or autobiography: 1) Was the narrator present 
at the events narrated 2) Is the narrator detached from the narrative, does he or she 
have a ‘stake’ in what he or she represents? 3) How distanced is the narrator from the 
events that took place, was it years or minutes before they recounted their testimony?
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Presence is a major factor, therefore in determining the reliability of historic or 
fictional testimony. Whether the narrator was actually there is judged more important 
than their particular biases that may colour their recollections: as we have seen above, 
the reader baulks at Saleem Sinai’s impudence at narrating events where he was not 
present. This reliance on presence is akin to what Jaques Derrida terms 
logocentricism a term he uses in Of Grammatology to deconstruct the traditional 
binaries of speech and writing, presence and absence. Since Plato, Derrida argues, 
speech has been judged superior to writing; in the Phaedrus Plato points out that 
writing can not answer questions, it can not be interrogated, but on interrogation 
dumbly affirms what it said in the first place. We can not ask a written text what it 
means, or to explain itself better, or question it as we can a physically present speaker. 
As Culler highlights in his explication of the frequently obtuse and opaque Derrida, 
Plato’s objection to writing is partially motivated as an attempt to set philosophy above 
language, to claim its arguments are structured by logic, reason and truth and not 
rhetoric (Culler 1983: 91): “Philosophy defines itself as what transcends writing and by 
identifying certain aspects of the functioning of language with writing, tries to rid itself of 
these problems by setting aside writing as simply an artificial substitute for speech”
(92). Derrida extends this analysis to show how the father of linguistics, Ferdinand De 
Saussure, reaffirms this hierarchical binary when he speaks of writing as a means of 
representing speech that does not need to be taken into consideration when studying 
language because it is a technical device, or secondary accessory.
This seemingly innocuous move is representative of the western tradition of 
thinking about language: speech is seen as natural, direct communication and writing 
as artificial and oblique representation of a representation (100). However, by a series 
of brilliant logical moves, Derrida shows how Saussure and Plato’s arguments are in 
fact predicated on writing itself, how they contradict themselves even in their setting of 
speech over writing and presence above absence. These biases are reflected in 
historiography, where interviews even years after the events are seen to be a reliable
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source of information because they come from a ‘primary’ source who was present at 
events.
Recent studies of memory actually suggest that presence at an event does not 
necessarily make ones recollection of it reliable. John Kotre in White Gloves recalls 
how a key witness in the Watergate trials renowned for his powers of recollection and 
dubbed ‘the human tape recorder’, in fact gave very inaccurate testimony (Kotre 1995: 
36). This case is unusual because everything that the witness, John Dean, recounted 
had also been recorded on audio tape and so his testimony could be checked against 
recordings made at the time, but it is illuminating because it shows how human 
memory is fallible and does not accurately depict events as they really happened. 
Dean’s memories falsely portray him as the centre of events, and with the benefit of 
hindsight he reverses predictions that turned out contrary to his expectations at the 
time. However, at the time of his testimony, Dean was so confident in his recollections, 
so meticulous in detail that it was thought that he could only have exceptional, tape- 
recorder-like memory. Kotre refers to studies that have demonstrated that if a 
witness’s memories are vivid and full of detail, if the witness is perceived as having 
nothing to gain, talked despite pain, spoke with emotion, was consistent and confident, 
and calmly looked questioners in the eye then they are usually judged as truthful and 
their memories deemed accurate even though research has shown that that these 
criteria have no bearing on accuracy of recall (37).
These indicators of witness reliability describe an ideal witness who would turn 
out to be an omniscient narrator: a narrator with nothing to gain (because they are 
outside the textual world they depict) recalling events that are vivid and full of detail 
(what Barthes called the “reality effect” of having objects meaningless to the plot being 
described to signify the realist nature of the work). As we will see below, the topic of 
memory and its fallibility is one area that the storyteller chronotope brings to the fore 
because the storyteller depicts characters attempting to transmit their memories (which 
are sometimes questioned by their narratees. The storyteller raises issues of 
unreliability because it resituates the transmission of narrative within a context, a
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chronotopising of storytelling that makes us realise its importance of storytelling as a 
way of understanding the world.
Process mimesis
As we noted above, texts that contain a storyteller show not only an 
autobiography but the process of creating an autobiography. The presence of a 
narratee foregrounds the importance of the listener/ reader and creates a chronotope 
of storytelling which also foregrounds the originating subject. This concentration on the 
creation of meaning, the act of authorship that occurs in the process of autobiography 
is similar to the phenomenon of the ‘author’ appearing within the text, a phenomenon 
which David Lodge suggests motivations for:
The foregrounding of the act of authorship within the boundaries of the text, 
which is such a common feature of contemporary fiction, is a defensive response, 
either conscious or intuitive, to the questioning of the idea of the author and of the 
mimetic function by modern critical theory.
(Lodge 1990: 19)
Lodge’s argument that the portrayal of the author within the text is a defensive 
response to the questioning of the idea of the author in critical theory must here be 
interrogated. As we have seen above, the storyteller operates in a dialogic space 
where his or her every utterance is in danger of questioning, so attempting to reclaim 
the status of ‘author’ in its nineteenth century, Promethean sense, is the last thing that 
this trope attains2. It does, however, remind the reader (and the critic) that the author 
can not be erased from the communicative situation, and also reminds us that all 
authorship takes place in a real world political situation and from individual and varying 
motives.
Luigi Cazzato in his essay “Hard Metafiction and the Return of the Author- 
Subject” (1995) claims that postmodern texts in which a figure claiming to be the author 
appears to discuss the text with the reader (notable examples are John Fowles’s The 
French Lieutenant’s Woman, Kurt Vonnegut’s Slaughterhouse 5 and Salman Rushdie’s 
Shame) work to relocate the authors’ position within his or her own text, to reclaim the 
link between the originating subject and the end product, defamiliarising language that
2 Although, it could be argued that the dialogism on the primary diegetic level is an attempt by the author 
to control or preempt the reader’s own response to the text.
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seems to have no originator, faceless and powerful communications like newspaper 
editorials and propaganda3. He terms this metafictional anxiety and suggests that 
postmodern authors express metafictional anxiety in order to highlight the central role 
of the originating subject, which reinforces the view of storytelling as a link in a chain of 
utterances rather than an act of godlike parthenogenesis (35).
This intrusion of the author into the text has paradoxical effects. According to 
Patricia Waugh and Brian McHale the more the author appears within the text the less 
he or she exists, because the barrier between real world author and text is absolute, 
the “author” that appears within the text is just as fictional as the characters (McHale 
1991: 219). Cazzato calls this claim bizarre, saying that of course the author cannot 
enter the text because the author is real and the text is fictional (a gross over­
simplification, as we shall see below). However, the storyteller seems to exist to cause 
both these interpretations of the ‘author within the text’ problems, precisely by 
simulating a genre that as De Man highlighted, seems to belong to a simpler mode of 
referentiality, rooted in a single subject identified by his or her proper name. We have 
no problems with the author appearing within the autobiography to discuss storylines 
from the position of narrator or taking part in narrative on the level of character as we 
do with the novel and its creator. Why does the split subject of the novel (between 
author and narrator) create such differences?
Perhaps we can attribute this difference in expectations to the question of 
fictionality. The author in the text causes us more problems in fiction than in 
autobiography precisely because we take autobiography to be referential in a far less 
problematic way than fiction. But how do we define what is fiction? Jack Zipes in his 
treatise upon the brothers Grimm suggests that some of the tales collected in their 
Kinder und Hausmarchen are autobiographical (Zipes 1988: 50, 54-59); arguing that 
the many tales in which a soldier outwits a malevolent king or the devil are exaggerated 
versions of real stories, reflecting the common soldier’s distrust of his superiors. Is the
3 Or, as we have seen above “ words that expect no answer” , in Bakhtinian terminology: Monologic 
discourse types. Ermath’s definition o f the omniscient narrator as ‘nobody’ suggests that w riting creates 
monologic discourses.
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exaggerated autobiographical tale fictional when it is told for the first time by the 
individual who has converted his or her experience into narrative? Is the tale still 
referential when told by a person sitting across from you in the room? When exactly 
does the personal, exaggerated narrative become fictional4? I believe Zipes himself 
provides the answer to this question when he reminds us that the reader must 
constantly bear in mind that we are dealing with multiple representations and voices 
within the narrative structure of each tale which can be briefly paraphrased as follows:
• The viewpoint of the informant, most likely (in the case of the Grimms) an 
educated female who memorised a tale told by a peasant or from a book
• The viewpoint of Jacob or Wilhelm who revised it
• The viewpoint of the submerged creator of tale, probably a peasant, 
artisan, soldier, or journeyman who sought to represent his or her 
experience through symbolical narrative at a given time in history
• Finally, the viewpoint of intervening tale tellers who pass on narrative from 
author to listeners and future tellers.
(Zipes 1988: 51)
These multiple viewpoints muddy the relation of teller to event; the original teller 
becomes ‘submerged’; the point behind his or her original tale may be contradicted by 
the agenda of the current teller. The extra positions that writing creates, the difference 
between narrator and author, between implied and real reader lead to an entirely 
different view of the story. Of course, this question highlights the fictionality of fiction 
itself. If we go back to historical sources like Geoffrey of Monmouth, the difference 
between myth (fiction) and history (the real) is entirely neglected and events that we 
now see as mythical, like the founding of Britain by a descendent of Aeneas is 
described as an actual historic act. This is a phenomenon that can also be seen in 
hagiography and folklore where the fictional and historic are often irrevocably 
intertwined, one needs only think of such examples as Joan of Arc, Robin Hood or Dick
4 De Man’s discussion o f autobiography makes clear that we cannot automatically state that symbolism 
instantly makes the narrative fictional, Phantasms and dreams are features o f many archetypal 
autobiographies, from Augustine to Rousseau.
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Turpin. Fiction has not always been a viewed as a separate and inferior genre, and in 
recent times theorists and philosophers have become increasingly aware that 
fictionality is not an immanent feature of certain texts, but something that operates to a 
varying degree in all texts that feature some form of plot (Ronen 1994: 10). Ronen 
suggests “only as a only as a pragmatically determined property can fictionality 
distinguish Anna Karenina as a fiction from Michelet’s nonfictional History o f France 
despite the considerable number of fictional components that the latter contains” (10).
The emergence of fiction as a separate genre to be ghettoised in its own section 
of the bookstore is evident if we examine the views of the readership at the birth of 
serialisation in nineteenth century fiction, such as Eugene Sue’s Les Mysteres de 
Paris, which was published serially in the Journal des Debats from June 9 1842 to 
October 15, 1843. Peter Brooks notes that the author was bombarded with letters from 
Parisians who took the fictional for the real and implored Sue to dispatch the hero, 
Rodolphe, to thwart real criminal designs (1998: 163-4). This confusion between the 
real and the fictional was no doubt exacerbated by the fact that Sue’s narrative 
appeared daily on the front page of a broadsheet, an intermingling of fact with fiction 
unimaginable today. The confusion of these letter-writers was down to the fact that the 
pragmatic function allowing readers to determine the difference between fiction and 
non-fiction was less well developed and certainly not taken for granted by the vast 
majority of the population in this historical period.
It is the spreading of writing and print, and its interiorisation into the western 
consciousness that permits the creation of the fiction/ non-fiction boundary. The 
marketing of the novel, the reader’s easy recognition of the standard packaging of the 
novel compared with the autobiography (the author’s name and a title that only makes 
sense within the context of the book), is compared with the packaging of the 
autobiography, with the subject’s proper name, a photograph of the subject and 
usually, a generic title like “an autobiography”, “my autobiography” or more classically
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“confessions”5. The absolute separation of autobiography and fiction is however only a 
recent development; before the Russian formalists and the American new criticism, 
novels were frequently understood in relation to their author’s life: David Copperfield 
was read in relation to Dickens’s own upbringing, Jane Eyre understood in the context 
of the Bronte children’s own harsh schooling. Fiction was a form of autobiography, 
autobiography a form of fiction. The lines between the two were blurred, at best, and it 
is no coincidence that it is only in the nineteenth century (Robert Southey coined the 
term autobiography in 1809 [Drabble 2000: 53]) that the autobiography became an 
established genre in the English language.
Tzvetan Todorov suggests autobiography is defined by the author’s identification 
with the narrator, and the narrator’s identification with the chief protagonist. The 
second identification helps differentiate autobiography from biography or memoirs; the 
first distinguishes autobiography from the novel, even if a novel may be full of elements 
drawn from the author’s life (Todorov 1990: 13-27). This identification separates the 
referential historical genres from the fictional genres because the reality of the referent 
is clearly indicated. In this way the speech act of autobiography codifies both semantic 
properties and pragmatic properties: The character-narrator identification suggests one 
must speak of oneself and the author-narrator function facilitates one’s claims to be 
telling truth and not fiction. However, Todorov, interestingly goes on to say that 
autobiography is a “speech act that is widely distributed outside literature: it is practiced 
every time anyone tells his or her own story” (27). This definition of the 
autobiographical genre does not negate the problems of defining a story as fictive or 
not.
In suggesting that genres are pre-existing discursive formations used in everyday 
language, Todorov is clearly close to Bakhtin’s concept of speech genres. However,
3 Recently autobiographies have been released with more novelistic or cryptic titles like Richard 
Branson’s Losing my Virginity. 1 doubt whether this trend would be the case i f  the standard bookshop 
layout were not structured on the lines o f fiction and non-fiction (so Biographies are also found in an 
entirely different area from fictional autobiographies or autobiographical fiction). It w ill also be 
interesting i f  these novels are renamed when the puns on which they are based are not so easily readable 
by readers o f the future (assuming that they are ever reprinted).
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as we have seen above, we can only identify people’s oral stories about themselves as 
the same genre as autobiography because of the existence o f autobiography in its 
written, clearly packaged and commodified form. Indeed, Todorov’s definition of 
autobiography is an easy target for deconstruction, due to its clearly logocentric biases: 
it presumes that the written form is an extension of the spoken, and identifies a speech 
act on the basis of writing6. We can therefore recognise its logocentric biases 
according to Culler’s analysis which makes clear that ’’Logocentrism [...] assumes the 
priority of the first term and conceives the second in relation to it, as acomplication, a 
negation, a manifestation, or a disruption of the first” (Culler 1983: 93).
The identification of author with narrator, narrator with protagonist is based on 
writing, not on speech where author and narrator are condensed into one, “I”. Ong 
suggests that the concept of authorship is one that is unthinkable in a primary oral 
society (that is, any society where writing has not been internalised into the psyche): 
How can one own words? The invention of print, and the easy dissemination of 
identical copies in their thousand are necessary prerequisites before a concept of 
authorship is codified into the legal system, and henceforth into the psyche. 
Furthermore, Todorov’s definition depends on the author’s intention in claiming to tell 
‘truth’, but as we have seen truth can takes many different forms of which historical 
truth, as we now know it, is only one: what if the narrator’s idea of truth is different from 
our own?
Autobiography is what Bakhtin calls a secondary speech genre, but it does not 
arise naturally out of writing down one’s own life, rather in conjunction with the 
emergence of the historic code and the internalisation of writing and print into the 
psyche as we shall see when looking at memory and narrativization below. By 
referring to written genres as secondary speech genres, Bakhtin highlights the relation 
between speech and writing, without positing an absolute break between the two.
6 Derrida deconstructs Saussure on precisely this basis: after Saussure claims that w riting is a technology 
that does not affect real language (speech) he then goes on to identify the sign by talking about the written 
phoneme. Despite his claim that writing is external, writing turns out to be the best way for him to 
explain the concept o f the sign.
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Although secondary speech genres lose their immediate relation to the real utterances 
of others, this distancing is, as we have seen, due to the nature of writing.
Metafictive effects caused by the storyteller
The storyteller, by defamiliarising narrative as we are used to experiencing it, and 
re-familiarising the reader with storytelling in an oral context, causes the reader to think 
about such commonplaces as the relation of the author to the work and the work to the 
life, as well as larger scale issues such as the problem of epistemology and the effect 
of writing upon consciousness. By drawing attention to the devices that we generally 
ignore when thinking about fiction, and portraying the act of fiction-making in such 
depth, we can identify the storyteller as a metafictive device.
Metafiction is usually defined as “fiction about fiction” or fiction that draws 
attention to its own status as fiction (Hutcheon 1984:1, Cazzato 1995: 28, Drabble 
1999: 665). Tristram Shandy and Don Quixote are generally agreed to be early 
examples of metafiction, and Patricia Waugh argues that metafiction arises at the 
inception of all new art-forms, from Elizabethan theatre and eighteenth century fiction 
to early film, precisely because the structures that the writers and audience will later 
take for granted are still being established and are still obviously arbitrary and strange. 
This is an intoxicating theory, which convincingly explains both Sterne’s constant 
playful attempts to highlight the unusualness of the novel and Shakespeare’s incessant 
stage metaphors. Waugh’s theory allows one to see that metafiction is not new and is 
certainly not ‘the death of the novel’ as certain critics assumed, plus it highlights the 
fact that metafiction does not necessarily equal postmodernism, as some critics have 
assumed. After highlighting the fact that metafiction is a natural occurrence and not a 
perversion or corruption of art, we need to investigate why metafiction is utilised in 
these novels
The storyteller, as we have seen, draws attention to problems related to 
epistemology. By highlighting the originating subject behind all knowledge, and 
showing how opinion is masked by the technologies that we have invented in writing to 
efface the subjective, the storyteller relocates historical testimony as a personal story,
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and reminds us that individual lives are wrapped up in the grand movements of history: 
the effects of the First World War upon the Cricks, Indian independence upon the 
Sinais and the effect of the Gileadan regime upon Offred all bring vast historical 
movements back to the human scale, where individuals attempt to make sense of them 
using the fairy tale.
The storyteller also raises questions of ontology. The basic question behind 
ontology can be summarised as “what type of world are we living in? How real is this 
world?”. Ruth Ronen points out that literary theorists have always suggested that 
fiction creates “worlds” as we can see when critics talk about the “world” of the text or 
separate “worlds” of discourse (Ronen 1994: 1-20). Indeed, Ermath suggests that 
fiction is at the root of many of our everyday assumptions about the world, as she 
highlights the way in which the view of society as an integrated unified entity was 
manufactured in the nineteenth century in the work of authors like Dickens and Eliot 
(Ermath 1997: 120-130). Both of these viewpoints reflect the increasingly popular idea 
that fictionality is not an immanent property of a certain type of texts, but a feature of all 
human constructs, from society and religion to jurisprudence and legislature. An 
extract from Cazzato’s essay on metafiction reflects this idea:
... fiction “makes (itself) strange” in order to attract attention to its functioning 
and, by the same token, to put its world in relation to the world of reality. In doing 
so the author undermines the sacred fictional illusion of reality and makes it difficult 
for the reader to place him or her self in (or identify with) the world of fiction.
(Cazzato 1995: 28)
As the phrase “sacred fictional illusion of reality” makes clear, Cazzato is 
suggesting that metafiction operates to highlight the fictionality of reality itself.
Cazzato’s standpoint might be dismissed as solipsistic in its approach to ‘the real’, but 
it is in fact highly political. Jean Baudrillard in The Gulf War Did Not Take Place claims 
that the 1990-1 Gulf War did not ‘take place’ like a conventional war, an observation 
prompted by a CNN live broadcast switching to a group of journalists in the Gulf to find 
out what was happening ‘on the spot’, only to find that the journalists in the Gulf were 
watching CNN to try and find out what was happening ‘on the spot’ (1995: 2). This 
moment for Baudrillard epitomises the hyperreal nature of postmodern life: the news is
162
producing the “reality” of the war not only for viewers but also for those involved (Lane 
2000: 95). Reality is not ‘out there’ being reported by representational media, but 
actually being created by these representations. It is important to note the title of 
Baudrillard’s essays. He does not say that the Gulf War did not happen but that they 
did not take place. The use of the spatial description highlighting place over the 
temporal description suggests that the war was not fought over territory, like traditional 
wars, but over the airwaves and television stations. The traditional ‘place’ of war, the 
battlefield, no longer exists except as a metaphor. No-one can deny the ghastly toll of 
that particular conflict in terms of human lives and environmental tragedy, but one can 
point to the fact that both the viewers at home and the generals in the Persian Gulf’s 
attitudes to the war were shaped by television and mass media, not by the physical 
circumstances of the war.
If we are to accept that society and reality is, to a degree, fictional, then we must 
recognise that pointing out the illusory nature of society and reality is a subversive act 
because it pulls away the curtain to reveal the smoke and mirrors sustaining the 
illusion. In Midnight’s Children Saleem reflects upon this fact in a comment that recalls 
the potential subversiveness of fairy tales:
Numbers, too, have significance: [...] 1001, the number of night, of magic, of 
alternative realities - a number beloved of poets and detested by politicians for 
whom all alternative versions of the world are threats;
{MC: 217)
Fiction is here viewed as a kind of ‘alternative reality’, a point of view that again 
reminds us of the different “worlds” of fiction and therefore the ontological concerns 
created by fiction. The question “which world does this story take place in” is one that 
narratives featuring a storyteller constantly raise. We automatically assume, when 
reading an autobiography that the narrated events take place in this world, just as we 
normally assume that fiction takes place in a parallel or possible world, linked to our 
own but fundamentally separate. Again, let us go back to the cover-less Midnight’s 
Children. We don’t know if the originating subject is split into author and narrator, or 
whether the author and narrator are one, so we’re not exactly sure if it belongs to fiction
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or autobiography. What then are we to make of documented historical personages 
such as Indira and Sanjay Gandhi appearing within the mystery text?
Brian McHale, who claims that ontology is the distinctive feature that separates 
postmodernist fiction from earlier modernist fiction, suggests that characters from that 
other intertext ‘history’ should be called trans-world characters, highlighting the difficulty 
readers have when they come across them in situating them, deciding which world they 
belong in7. In tackling this question, McHale argues:
[...] the appearance in fictional worlds of individuals who have existed in the 
real world: people such as Napoleon or Richard Nixon, places such as Paris or 
Dublin, ideas such as dialectical materialism or quantum mechanics. There are not 
reflected in fiction so much as incorporated; they constitute enclaves of ontological 
difference within the otherwise ontologically homogenous fictional heterocosm.
(McHale 1991: 28)
Tzvetan Todorov and Gerard Genette appear in The Djinn in the Nightingale’s 
Eye and Henri Toulouse-Lautrec is responsible for the famous poster of Fevvers in 
Nights at the Circus. It is enough to note that when real people occur in a real 
autobiography, no such ontological questions are raised8. McHale’s explanation also 
extends to the vertiginous effects that the representation of historical events has in 
Waterland, Midnight’s Children and Nights at the Circus: the reader is unsure of 
whether Crick’s history of the Fens or Sinai’s memories of the invasion of Bangladesh 
contain any truth. The simulation of historical or scientific discourse by the narrators in 
these texts is partially responsible for creating this feeling of uncertainty: in Waterland 
we know the First World War really happened, but what about other events, told in the 
same way? For example, how do we know whether the more obscure events 
recounted by Crick are true, such as the draining of the Fens by Cornelius Vermuyden, 
or the Atkinson brewery fire? Which events are fiction, and which are real? These 
‘enclaves of ontological difference’ create a sense of uncertainty where the recognition 
of certain historical events leads one to wonder if other events narrated are similarly
7 It became quite obvious which world Indira Gandhi believed her portraiture in Midnight’s Children 
belonged in when she took Rushdie to court for libel in 1984, a suit that raised issues o f biographical 
authority, the relation to historical events narrated in fiction with historic events and people and political 
accountability. Just as The Satanic Verses later proved, the boundaries between fiction and history are 
fraught with danger.
8 Although epistemological questions, such as “ did this really happen” , are definitely raised.
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based in reality. However, it is important that we do not attribute this sense of 
instability solely to the simulation of historical discourse in these novels, the same 
effect is demonstrated whenever a recognisable historical event or person is referred 
to. Indira Gandhi is not mentioned in conventional historiographic terms in Midnight’s 
Children; it is not until the end of the novel that we find out that the fairy tale malevolent 
witch, who Saleem claims has orchestrated his downfall, shares the name of India’s 
then prime-minister. Similarly, events told as fairy tale can cause the same ontological 
uncertainty as those told in historical discourse. The fairy tale like descriptions of the 
French Revolution sit alongside fairy tale like descriptions of family history in Waterland 
and create the same effect:
When the children of the French Revolution threw off their tyrannical father 
Louis XVI and their wicked step-mother Marie Antoinette (who, as it turned out, 
were only like figures in a puppet show, you could pull of their heads, just like that), 
they thought they were free. But after a while they discovered that they were 
orphans, and the world which they thought was theirs was really bare and 
comfortless. So they went running to their foster-father Napoleon Bonaparte, who 
was waiting by the old puppet theatre; who’d dreamed up for them a new drama 
based on old themes and who promised them an empire, a destiny— a future.
(Swift 1992: 335)
Linda Hutcheon in her Poetics o f Postmodernism suggests the existence of a 
form of postmodernism that she labels historiographic metafiction (1999: 5). This kind 
of fiction incorporates concerns about narrative in literature, history and theory and 
questions the separation of the literary and historical focusing on what the two modes 
of writing share rather than on how they differ (105). We have seen above that the 
novels under analysis here all raise questions about the domain of historiography, from 
the problems of autobiographical writing to the representation of historic events, and 
the difficulties raised by this trope have forced us to reconsider our prejudices about 
literary realism, omniscient narration, history and autobiography. Hutcheon claims that 
Midnight’s Children, Nights at the Circus, and Waterland are all prime examples of 
historiographic metafiction because of the way they question historiography and 
counter history as a ‘grand narrative’ with history on the human scale. One of the 
primary ways that these texts question historiography’s status as a grand narrative, 
separate from fiction, is by incorporating a storyteller, alerting readers to the constructs
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that determine how we read a text: the construct of the author, the split subject of 
author and narrator, the effacement of the individualised subject and subjectivity 
caused by omniscient narration, the genre of fiction, and the idea of representation.
Cazzato, in his analysis of metafiction argues that contemporary metafiction is 
the product of postmodern or late capitalist society. By foregrounding the author, texts 
that Cazzato classes as ‘hard’ metafiction, act to reinscribe the narrating subject. He 
suggests that Roland Barthes, in his famous essay “The Death of the Author”, had 
“fallen into the trap of reification”, and that metafiction acts to try and remind the reader 
of the originating subject: by applying a Marxian reading we can see that the story-as- 
commodity produces the same sense of alienation as any other reified product, it 
appears to have just magically “appeared” to the reader, who has no sense of who the 
author really is, or why they write. Surely, only alienation could lead to the suggestion 
that the author is dead? However, As Walter Ong points out, writing is alienation (Ong 
1999: 82) and one of the reasons that Plato attacks writing in the Phaedrus is because 
writing is alienated from its “parent”, it is an orphan whose originator can not answer 
questions on its behalf. As Patricia Waugh explains, “To write of “I” is to discover that 
the attempt to fix subjectivity in writing erases that subjectivity, constructs a new 
subject” (Waugh 1993: 135).
If writing leads to alienation, then print is reification. Ong points out that the 
technology of printing can be seen as the model of the industrial revolution and the 
invention of mass production, with its prerequisites of an assembly line approach, 
creating thousands of identical complex objects made up of replaceable parts (118-9). 
“[I]t was print, not writing, that effectively reified the word, and, with it, noetic activity”, 
writes Ong (119) before going on to sketch out the legal implications of the easy 
dissemination of innumerable cheap copies of an authors work:
Print created a new sense of the private ownership of words. People in a 
primary oral culture can entertain some sense of proprietary rights to a poem, but 
such a sense is rare and ordinarily enfeebled by the common share of lore, 
formulas, and themes on which everyone draws. With writing resentment at 
plagiarism begins to develop.
(Ong: 131)
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Print led to the creation of copyright laws. The availability of printing presses in 
the nineteenth century meant that many novels were quickly copied and sold at a 
fraction of the original price, with no money being paid to the author. Indeed, the boom 
of fairy tales in nineteenth century Britain was partially due to the fact that there is no 
need to pay authors’ royalties for fairy tales.
The Literature of Exhaustion
Metafiction can in some ways be seen as a product of this ‘ownership’ created by 
writing. John Barth’s 1967 essay on metafiction, “The Literature of Exhaustion” claims 
that conventional plots have all been ‘used up’ and this is the reason that authors had 
turned to telling stories about stories. At first sight Barth’s claim is an odd one; human 
societies have used stories and myths for millennia to understand and explain their 
sense of self, so how could stories be seen as a finite resource? However, if we look 
into the workings of copyright Barth’s sense that the possibilities of literature have been 
exhausted seem more and more credible. Consider the case of music: there are only a 
set number of notes, and therefore a limited number of possibilities of combination.
The langue or underlying grammar of music means that there are a finite number of 
possible melodies, so just as the rules of grammar limit the possible sentences one can 
create, so the parole is actually limited. The invention of ways in which to record 
music, beginning with standard notation paper meant that these possibilities were 
recorded. This meant that music could be planned, and it became infinitely richer and 
more complex due to the ability of composers to synchronise dozens of instruments. 
Just as the invention of writing allowed storytellers greater scope to tell stories about 
entire societies, so too writing gave the composer of music the ability to create aural 
works of astonishing complexity. However, it also meant that these combinations of 
notes now had “authors”, or composers who now ‘owned’ these sequences, even 
though many classical composers, such as Liszt and Dvorak reworked motifs from folk 
music. Traditional melodies that had been used for generations were now “owned” 
purely because someone had written them down.
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The invention of ways of recording sound at the end of the nineteenth century 
consolidated the idea of music copyright, and can be seen as equivalent to the 
invention of printing — audio recording led to the possibility of thousands of identical 
products being produced by the techniques of mass production — indeed, records 
were ‘pressed’, the indentations created in an comparable way to the printing press. 
This reification of music leads to the phenomenon today where if an artist wittingly or 
unwittingly records a combination of notes that bears resemblance to a previous 
recording they risk financial punishment and losing the ‘recording credit’ which 
identifies them as the creator of the song. Quite literally, music as a reified commodity 
leads to the possibility of music becoming ‘used up’.
The study of stories by formalist and structuralist critics makes clear that, like 
music, there are a limited number of possibilities of combination, structured by a 
grammar or pre-existing code that determines the possible stories that can be told. 
Critics like Claude Levi Strauss and Vladimir Propp, highlighted the grammatical 
structures that lie behind all storytelling by analysing traditional forms of narrative, the 
folk tale and myth. Northrop Frye, in his Anatomy of Criticism highlights the mythic 
nature of all narrative. For Frye, the symbols and narrative patterns of myth recur 
throughout all literature, and realist literature is no exception;
The more literature distances itself from myth, moving from ‘romance’ through 
the ‘mimetic modes’, the more ‘real’ it appears; though, as Frye indicates, this 
appearance is deceptive, as is evident once we reach the self conscious exposure 
of a device favoured by ‘irony’.
(Coupe 1997: 160)
Frye suggests that there are four modes of literary narrative, which can be placed 
in temporal sequence: ‘romance’, which covers fairy tale and myth, the ‘low mimetic’ 
which includes comedy and the novels of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century, the ‘high mimetic’ which covers what we typically think of as realism, and the 
‘ironic’ which, according to Frye, is characterised by modernist works such as Heart o f 
Darkness. Underneath these different modes, however, lies the structure of myth and 
this is something that ironic modes of narrative, such as metafiction and 
postmodernism spotlight:
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With the final narrative mode [irony] we are forcibly reminded that the first and 
founding mode, namely myth itself, has been ever-present beneath the apparent 
realism of literature and we witness the reaffirmation of its ‘formal cause’. Just as 
literature descends from myth, through romance downwards, so does irony return 
to myth.
(Coupe: 165)
So, it is entirely possible that literature could be ‘used up’ due to writing and the 
legal institutions that writing and print create. There are only a limited number of 
possible stories and only a limited number of ways of telling them, and the systems that 
govern the usage of these stories, the legalistic apparatus that governs production, 
prohibits the retelling of another’s stories as Ong highlights:
[M]odern writers, agonizingly aware of literary history and of the de facto 
intertextuality of their own works, are concerned that they may be producing 
nothing really new or fresh at all, that they may be totally under the ‘influence’ of 
others’ texts. Harold Bloom’s work The Anxiety o f Influence (1973) treats this 
modern writer’s anguish. Manuscript cultures had few if any anxieties about 
influence to plague them, and oral cultures had virtually none.
(Ong: 134)
By foregrounding the process of storytelling, and the ways in which the 
storytellers tell the story of their lives using patterns derived from the fairy tale that Frye 
would recognise as constitutive of the ‘romantic’ mode, the storyteller is an ‘ironic’ 
mode that returns to the formulaic patterns of what Frye calls myth. A metafictive, or 
ironic mode of fiction, therefore leads us back to the romantic, mythical sources on 
which narrative is based, and forces the reader to question the ways in which this origin 
of narrative is displaced and repressed by written forms of narrative.
It is for this reason that I limit my definition of the storyteller to the era of late 
capitalism. It is my contention that the storyteller is reflective of a particular contingent 
historic set of circumstances in which it has become necessary to remind the reader of 
previous forms of storytelling in order to highlight the artificial nature of contemporary 
storytelling. Much like Benjamin’s essay “The Storyteller”, the storyteller as it has been 
defined in chapter three highlights the ways in which the reader’s experience of 
narrative has changed. In The Political Unconscious Fredric Jameson, in the process 
of historicizing the centrality of ‘wish fulfilment’ in the work of Freud, points out that 
there is an “increasing abstraction of experience in modern society” (Jameson 1981:
65) and the storyteller often reflects extensively on this abstraction, as we shall see
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below when looking at the totalitarian ego in Midnight’s Children. Those storytellers
who do not have Saleem’s sense of self-importantness, such as Byatt’s Gillian Perholt,
have considerably more difficulty in finding a place in history:
‘And now,’ said the djinn, ‘I have told you the history of my incarcerations, and 
you must tell me your history.’
‘I am a teacher. In a university. I was married and now I am free. I travel the 
world in aeroplanes and talk about storytelling.’
Tell me your story.’
(Byatt 1994: 226-7)
Not only are we alienated from the traditional experience of storytelling, but there 
is also a concomitant alienation from the events of history: few people can claim to 
have truly been key players in historical events, perhaps the reason that 
autobiographies tend to be published only be the rich and powerful. One of the 
metafictive effects of the storyteller as a device is that it shows the ways in which 
humans attempt to find a place for themselves in society and history through the use of 
narrative.
As we have seen, the primacy of written discourses, monologic or ‘nobody’ 
narrators, is subverted by the storyteller. The storyteller forces the reader to consider 
the originating source of all discourses in a new light, and highlights the centrality of 
storytelling to human experience. Indeed, Linda Hutcheon suggests that 'the process 
of narrativization has come to be seen as a central form of human comprehension, of 
imposition of meaning and formal coherence on the chaos of events' (Hutcheon 1999: 
121).
Narrativization as a central form of human comprehension
In depicting the process of narrativization, the storyteller shows how humans 
attempt to make sense of their lives by explaining it in easily available codes such as 
the fairytale. It is easy to see the value of the fairytale as a schemata around which to 
organise experience, it offers well defined roles and structures, and for this reason we 
often see characters attempt to explain their situation in this way. A good example can 
be seen in Waterland where Crick tells of a story that his mother, Helen Atkinson used 
to tell him:
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My mother told it differently (so I never knew whom she meant or how false 
modesty was being dismissed): Once upon a time there was a beautiful girl at a 
parade of soldiers, and the silly soldiers with their rifles bumped into each other 
and forgot how to march because they all wanted to look at the beautiful girl. And 
the general turned red, and then he turned purple ...
(Swift 1992: 218)
However, Crick later learns that this story, told by his mother as fairy tale, is 
actually part of her own life story, a parade meant to inspire patriotism in the public at 
the time of the First World War that went badly wrong due to her presence. In this 
example, the characteristic distancing motif of fairy tale discourse “Once upon a time” 
is used to telescope the story (the beautiful girl is not T or individualised, the parade 
isn’t to drum up support for the 1914-18 war). This motif which is used to differentiate 
the world of fairy tale from the world of history should mark the story as fictional, and 
yet, as Crick and the reader learn, there is a kernel of historical and autobiographical 
truth to the narrative. It is a recollection of real historic events, told as fairy tale. It is 
enough to recall the seminal study of the fairy tale by Vladimir Propp suggested that 
the fairy tale was structured like a grammar: a form with fixed easily predictable rules. 
Perhaps, the reasons why these narrators relate their experiences as fairy tale is 
because it is the simplest available method of transmission, and does not require vast 
levels of information about physical details that would slow down and divert a narrative, 
or well-rounded or extensively described characterisation as a written genre like literary 
realism.
Hayden White in Metahistory suggests that history is intimately related with
fiction. His main thesis can be briefly summarised as follows: History, in turning a list of
dates and events (a chronicle) into a logically ordered and thematically coherent plot
borrows devices from fiction. The choice to plot, say, the execution of Louis XVI as a
tragedy or a romance is an entirely arbitrary one and it could be represented either way
depending on the personal views of the historian or the society which is interpreting the
events. This means that history is not separate from fiction. When White summarises
his thesis in his introduction it is clear that he sees the historian as performing an act
very much like the novelist when he says ‘I believe the historian performs an essentially
poetic act, in which he prefigures the historical field and constitutes it as a domain upon
171
which to bring to bear the specific theories he will use to explain “what was really 
happening” in it.’ (White 1993: x)
Although the historian, unlike the novelist, is forced to turn a certain set of 
established data, or the chronicle for the basic ingredients of his or her narrative, 
White’s claims shake the foundations of historiography, which like philosophy would 
like to claim that its truth lies outside language on a bedrock of “truth”.
In showing how individuals interpret their own experiences and attempt to tell 
others about them, the storyteller has much to say on the subject of subjectivity, or the 
ways in which humans make sense of the universe. Indeed, this depiction of turning 
experience into narrative can be said to be some of the storyteller’s metafictive effects.
Linda Hutcheon argues that metafiction, or as she calls it process mimesis, is just 
as important an artistic endeavour as realism, which she terms product mimesis, 
because narrative is an essential way in which the human subject orients themselves in 
the real world, how we create a sense of self and of community. And indeed, the 
storyteller is a form of process mimesis, as it shows how narrators make sense of 
events by turning to pre-established schemas in order to turn their lives into an 
understandable narrative.
Recent studies of subjectivity such as Kotre’s White Gloves and Mark Freeman’s 
Rewriting the Self suggest that narrative is a fundamental way in which humans 
interpret the universe, form our ideas of self and organise our lives. Freeman claims 
“the very act of making sense of ourselves and others, is only possible in and through 
the fabric of narrative itself” (Freeman 1995: 21). Kotre talks of ‘autobiographical 
memory’, suggesting that events in our lives take on shape only as part of a larger 
pattern. Key memories that seem momentous may only become important to us in 
retrospect, when they tie in with our current idea of self. Kotre gives the example of a 
psychologist named Linton, who, in an experiment on memory wrote notes of what 
happened to her every day and saved them. When reviewing the notes five years later 
she was surprised to see that the day she met her future husband was not marked as a 
particularly important event, the only mention on the card was of her meeting a shy
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scholar. The event had taken on importance over the intervening years, until the day’s 
significance in memory far exceeded the status she had given the meeting on the day it 
occurred (Kotre 1995: 98). Unlike Freud, who at one point believed that memories 
could be trusted as ‘true’9, Kotre and Freeman believe that memory is a reconstruction. 
This view, first posited by Frederick Bartlett suggests that memory is not referential in a 
simplistic “how a person remembers an event is how it happened” way (Kotre 1995:
34). Just as historical narrative is an interpretation of events that uses fictive modes of 
emplotment to explain, so memory organises events into a story in order to help us 
understand and remember them. In Jean Paul Sartre’s existentialist manifesto,
Nausea, the narrator, Roquentin, understands this process well enough:
[F]or the most commonplace event to become an adventure, you must -  and 
this is all that is necessary -  start recounting it. This is what fools people: a man is 
always a teller of tales, he lives surrounded by his stories and the stories of others, 
he sees everything that happens to him through them; and he tries to live his own 
life as if he were recounting it.
(Sartre 1965: 61)
Further reflections on the unreliability of memory are evident in the narrative of 
Offred:
This is a reconstruction. All of it is a reconstruction. It’s a reconstruction now, 
in my head, as I lie flat on my single bed [...] When I get out of here, if I’m ever 
able to set this down, in any form, even in the form of one voice to another, it will 
be a reconstruction then too, at yet another remove.
(HT: 144)
The implication of seeing memory as a reconstruction is that the self too 
becomes yet another construct, as we can see when we look at one of the basic 
principles that we take for granted when speaking of the self: that of development. 
Freeman notes that development, despite its usual connotations of moving forwards in 
time, can only be predicated backwards. From the standpoint of the present, we look 
back to decisions we made in the past, and explain how we have become the people
9 Freud said in the late 1930’s “ In mental life, nothing that has once been formed can perish” , which 
seems to imply that ‘ true’ memories exist. However, Freud changed his mind a lot during his career, and 
his beliefs in the case o f the “ W o lf Man”  seem to suggest an entirely different perspective on memory. 
When he edited the case notes in 1918, Freud reversed his earlier suggestion that the primal scene o f The 
W o lf Man’s neurosis —  his memory o f witnessing parental intercourse at the age o f one and a h a lf—  
was in fact a real memory, and suggests it is more likely a phantasy but ultimately suggests that the case 
is undecidable, and what is more, it matters little whether the event really happened or not because the 
subsequent history o f neurosis remains unchanged (Brooks 1998: 276-7).
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we are today, indeed “the concept of development is itself fundamentally inseparable 
from the process of narrating the past, which, as we have already learned, has a
markedly fictive dimension to it” (Freeman 1995: 9).
As an example, Freeman, points to that archetypal autobiography and record of 
development, St. Augustine’s Confessions where the outcome of what has happened 
over the course of Augustine’s life, namely his conversion to Christianity, has largely 
determined what will and will not be recounted (20). In other words, Augustine’s 
conception of self has been formed by his conversion — he is now a Christian, he was 
lost then — and his recollections of ‘development’ will therefore be selected to portray 
this narrative which he has decided best sums up his life. Freeman suggests that 
Augustine’s story is itself a “function of writing” (20) suggesting that writing itself 
accounts for the way in which Augustine views and charts his life. In this assertion,
Freeman is close to De Man who has this to say about the matter:
We assume that life produces the autobiography as an act produces its 
consequences, but can we not suggest, with equal justice, that the 
autobiographical project may itself produce and determine the life and that 
whatever the writer does is in fact governed by the technical demands of self­
portraiture and thus determined, in all its aspects, by the resources of his medium?
(De Man 1984: 69)
De Man and Freeman both turn the traditional idea of autobiography on its head: 
it is not the events in life that are narrated, rather the written form of the autobiography 
suggests a way in which people can organise their experiences and make sense of 
their lives.
Storytellers who attempt to write their autobiographies: Midnight’s Children’s
Saleem and Emotionally Weird’s Effie, for example, depict the way in which
autobiographical memory works. In a study on the workings of memory, the
psychologist Anthony Greenwald said that when it comes to fashioning personal
history, the self is a “totalitarian ego”. In a number of experiments, Greenwald found
that individuals tended to over-estimate their own contributions to group efforts and that
people often overperceive themselves as the intended target of group action, just as
leaders of countries often misconstrue the actions of other countries as intended to
provoke them personally (Kotre 1995: 113). We need only think of Saleem’s
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perception of himself as a microcosmic representation of India itself, and the way in 
which he sees himself as the centre of all events, “Let me state this quite 
unequivocally: it is my firm conviction that the hidden purpose of the Indo-Pakistani war 
on 1965 was nothing more nor less than the elimination of my benighted family from 
the face of the earth” (MC: 338).
Saleem’s sense of his own centrality to historic events is simply an especially 
strong example of the totalitarian ego at work. This narrator is only a particularly 
exaggerated example of how we all try to understand our lives with reference to history: 
as Kotre says, “On days of great significance our individual stories are momentarily 
aligned with history itself, and we say, if only indirectly, ‘I was there’” (98). Questions 
like “where were you when you heard Kennedy was shot” or more recently “where were 
you on 9/11” show how we relate ourselves to events in the outside world. By telling 
the story of where we were, the narrative becomes, to a small degree, our own so that 
we can relate to the world even in the smallest degree. Saleem attempts to place 
himself in a causal role in his country’s history in order to claim a direct relation 
between his actions and the world at large. Tom Crick’s attempt at understanding the 
concatenation of circumstances that leads to his own present is likewise an attempt to 
understand the self, and how its role is historically determined. Rather than showing 
how his choices affected the world, he shows how the world affected the choices 
available to him, a story that requires over 200 years of history before finally reaching 
any form of resolution. In both these texts, and Atwood’s Handmaid’s Tale the relation 
between the individual and history is a major focus, and looking at the ways in which 
the self tells stories in order to make sense of its connection with history is a primary 
concern of the storyteller. In other texts, such as Carter’s Nights at the Circus, 
Atkinson’s Emotionally Weird and Byatt’s The Djinn in the Nightingale’s Eye history 
with a capital H, world events like wars, revolutions and the like don’t get a look in.
However, in these particular cases, I maintain that understanding the self in 
relation to history is still a major concern of the storyteller. Hutcheon suggests that 
historiographic metafiction is a product of both postcolonial and feminist discourse, and
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the ex-centric or centrifugal challenges of these discourses (Hutcheon 1999: 57-73). 
This ex-centricity is reflected in the storytellers themselves: the majority of whom are 
women (Fevvers, Gillian Perholt, Effie, Offred), and of the two men one is a colonised 
other (Saleem), and the other is a marginalized teacher with working class roots. None 
of these characters had any chance of influencing world events, and Saleem’s claims 
seem over-the-top even to his listener, Padma whose presence further de-centres 
Midnight’s Children by pushing its male narrator into directions its male narrator had no 
intention taking (Hutcheon 1999: 69). The storyteller shows how we attempt to 
construct a sense of self, both by attempting to narrativize our lives, and in our 
attempts to relate our lives to history through narrative patterns derived from ‘romantic’ 
modes of literature.
Making meaning vs. Absurdity and death
Why is this sense of self important? What is the motivation of the storytelling 
impulse in these narratives? We can answer these questions by again looking at 
Benjamin’s “The Storyteller” , where Benjamin suggests that what we seek in narrative 
is that knowledge of death which is denied to us in our own lives. “Death,” writes 
Benjamin, “is the sanction of everything the storyteller can tell” (1977: 94). Peter 
Brooks in his Freudian analysis of the desire for plot, and the human need for stories, 
roundly agrees with this sentiment, and suggests that “narrative has something to do 
with time-boundedness and [...] plot is the internal logic of the discourse of mortality” 
(Brooks 1998: 22).
Indeed, in those narratives under analysis, death is a major concern. In Nights at 
the Circus Fevvers’ is aware that her life as a performer is strictly limited, the first wish 
Gillian Perholt makes in TDITNE is to reverse her aging, Offred is in mortal peril, and 
Crick is about to be ‘retired’ thus ending his working life, due to his infertile W ife’s 
attempt to steal a child. In fact, the threat of death hangs over the whole narrative, as
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the nuclear holocaust obsessed narratee, Price, makes clear. It is no coincidence that 
none of the storytellers in these narratives have any offspring10.
Perhaps the most explicit and plaintive explanation of this motivation can be seen 
in Saleem’s explanation for his own writing:
... time (having no further use for me) is running out. I will soon be thirty one 
years old. Perhaps. If my crumbling, over-used body permits. But I have no hope of 
saving my life, nor can I count on having even a thousand nights and a night. I 
must work fast, faster than Scheherezade, if I am to end up meaning - yes 
meaning - something. I admit it: above all things I fear absurdity.
(Rushdie 1981: 9)
The story becomes an attempt to avoid the absurdity of death, and writing is an 
attempt to ‘leave something behind’, to once and for all fix an authoritative version of 
self. The reason that Saleem will crumble into approximately six million pieces as soon 
as he has finished his narrative is because he will be unable to sustain the illusion of a 
unitary self that is produced by writing itself. The romantic philosopher, Jean Jacques 
Rousseau, to whom we will return below when considering the ways in which writing 
changes memory, sees his autobiography as interchangeable with his life, most 
tellingly summed up in his claim that he will hand his Confessions to St. Peter at the 
gates of heaven. The autobiography has become the definitive version of the self.
The question of identity, claims Rousseau — and this is what makes him at 
least symbolically the incipit of modern narrative — can be thought only in narrative 
terms, in the effort to tell a whole life, to plot its meaning by going back over it to 
record its perpetual flight forward, its slippage from the fixity of definition. To 
understand me, Rousseau says more than once in the confessions, most 
impressively at the close of Book Four, the reader must follow me at every moment 
of my existence; and it will be up to the reader, not Rousseau to assemble the 
elements of narrative and determine what they mean.
(Brooks 1999: 33)
‘I have been a swallower of lives; and to know me, just the one of me, you’ll have 
to swallow the lot as well’ {MC\ 9) says Saleem, more than once. Indeed, as we see in 
all the storyteller narratives, stories of the self are inexorably tied in with stories of the 
other. We can see that the story of ‘the Wiltshire wonder’, a fellow inmate in Madame 
Schreck’s freakshow / brothel, as narrated by Fevvers in Nights at the Circus (A/C: 64- 
68) is actually fundamental to Fevvers’ understanding of her own life.
10 Offred has lost her daughter, presumably for good, so Saleem in Midnight’s Children could be argued 
as the only exception to this rule. However, the child he in itia lly calls his son turns out to be the 
biological offspring o f his enemy, Shiva, incidentally the name o f the Hindu god o f destruction and death.
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The ‘wonder’ who is a ‘perfectly formed’ (64) woman of under three feet in height, 
is obviously a key narrative to understanding Fevvers for three reasons: Firstly, she is 
physically unique, as Fevvers herself claims to be and her physical difference makes 
her subject to the erotic gaze of men, “I’d rather show myself to one man at a time than 
to an entire theatre-full of the horrid, nasty, hairy things” (64), says the ‘Wonder’ at one 
point reminding us of Fevvers’ audience and one Royal observer’s meditations ‘upon 
the erotic possibilities of her [Fevvers’] ability to hover’ (18). Secondly, her life story is 
told as a fairy tale, with many recognisable fairy tale motifs, and therefore mirrors 
Fevvers’ own narrative. The narrative of the wonder relies on the listener being willing 
to believe that her mother was seduced by the king of the fairies, just as Fevvers 
claims she herself was hatched. Thirdly, Fevvers tells the story of the wonder orally 
and in the first person. Stories about other people are usually told in the third person to 
ensure that the listener does not confuse the “I” who is the subject of the story and the 
“ I” who is the narrator. Fevvers’ use of the first person here betrays the extent to which 
the narrative of the wonder is in fact relevant to her own narrative as well as 
demonstrating the problems raised by embedded narratives in speech as opposed to 
writing. On Diagram C, the Wonder’s tale would be represented by position B, but the 
semi-permeable barrier between worlds is foregrounded here by the way Fevvers’ use 
of the first person pronoun to tell the Wonder’s tale subsumes someone else’s tale into 
her own
This unusual use of the first person is made clear further on in the novel, because 
this framed (hypodiegetic) narrative is later compared with a more ‘reliable’ frame 
narrative: the written testimony of Toussaint. Because Toussaint’s testimony is written, 
and has an “all too checkable address” combined with written evidence of Toussaint’s 
existence in the medical journal The Lancet (60) a sceptical reader of the same 
mindset as the narratee, Walser, would be more likely to credit it as reliable than the 
spoken, and uncheckable narrative of the wonder. Here, because of the medium of 
writing, the narrating “I” can not assimilate the narrative of the other. This case shows 
the extent to which the narrating self assimilates the narratives of others in order to
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further understand its position in the world, in the same way as the narratives of Crick’s 
ancestors or the rebellious Moira in The Handmaid’s Tale help those narrators 
understand their selves further.
The narcissistic nature of memory, its tendency to place the self at the centre of 
all activity can be seen as another focus of narratives that metafictively foreground 
narrativisation through the use of a storyteller. Indeed, Linda Hutcheon’s analysis of 
metafiction leads to some interesting insights into the nature of the storyteller. 
Hutcheon’s objective in Narcissistic Narrative is to deconstruct the early criticism of 
metafiction; that it is narcissistic in the pejorative sense. The implication of those critics 
who derided metafiction as narcissistic is that it represents the death of the novel, 
much like self awareness led to Narcissus wasting away in Ovid’s Metamorphoses. 
However, Hutcheon shows that these critics effectively misread both Ovid’s story and 
Freud’s theories about primary narcissism, because Narcissus lived on both in the 
flower that bears his name and in the underworld, and Freud saw primary narcissism 
as an essential development in the human psyche.
Hutcheon’s re-reading of the myth of narcissus suggests other ways in which the 
myth can be illuminating when applied to metafiction. For example, in the texts under 
analysis here, the fact that the narratives construct the narrator’s idea of self can be 
viewed, in the psychoanalytic sense as narcissistic according to Stolorow’s definition: 
“mental activity is narcissistic to the degree that its function is to maintain the 
cohesiveness, stability and positive affective colouring of the self-representation." 
(Stolorow 1986: 197). Their narratives, like the pool in which Narcissus is entranced by 
his own image, reflect the narrators’ image of self rather than their external 
appearance.
The goddess Nemesis, who is the cause of Narcissus’ ironic self-awareness in 
the myth, can be seen to be awareness of mortality: whether it is death as in Midnight’s 
Children, The Handmaid’s Tale or Emotionally Weird, the spectre of nuclear holocaust 
in Waterland, or age as in Nights at the Circus and The Djinn in the Nightingale’s Eye. 
This is a form of motivation not unique to fiction, and was perhaps the classical raison
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d ’etre of the autobiography until it recently became yet another product designed to 
cash in on celebrity, and we can view Rousseau’s image of handing over his 
Confessions to St. Peter at the gates of heaven as proof of this view of ‘summing up’, 
or finding meaning in ones’ life. The motivation of these fictional autobiographers is to 
be remembered, to leave behind something of their selves and here again we can see 
points of comparison. As Hutcheon points out, Narcissus is immortalised in the flower 
that bears his name; his immortality is the consequence of his self-obsession, just as 
the storytellers hope their own narratives will resound long after their own deaths.
Their self reflection has become concretised in the artful autobiographies that will 
remain. It is as if Roland Barthes’ claim that “the birth of the reader must be at the cost 
of the death of the author,” (Barthes 1984: 148) had reached its mythopoeic goal. As 
Brooks notes, the moment of death is the moment that a life becomes transmissible 
(Brooks 1998: 28) and Ong too highlights the link between writing and death:
One of the most startling paradoxes inherent in writing is its close association 
with death. This association is suggested in Plato’s charge that writing is inhuman, 
thing-like, and that it destroys memory. It is also abundantly evident in countless 
references to writing (and/ or print) traceable in printed dictionaries of quotations, 
from 2 Corinthians 3:6 The letter kills but the spirit gives life’ and Horace’s 
reference to his three books of odes as a ‘monument’ (Odes iii.30.1), presaging his 
own death. [...] Robert Browning calls attention to the still widespread practice of 
pressing living flowers to death between the pages of printed books, ‘faded yellow 
blossoms/ twixt page and page’. The dead flower, once alive, is the psychic 
equivalent of the verbal text. The paradox lies in the fact that the deadness of this 
text, its removal from the living human lifeworld, its rigid visual fixity, assures its 
endurance and its potential for being resurrected into limitless living contexts by a 
potentially infinite number of living readers
(Ong 1999: 81)
In narratives featuring the storyteller, writing is not seen as a mere external 
technology. The device of the storyteller ‘lays bare’ the devices of literary 
communication and such naturalised constructs as the author, omniscience and 
fictionality, but nevertheless writing is seen as a fundamental way in which humans 
make sense of their sense of self. The storyteller inevitably reminds the reader and 
writer of the alienation present in the storytelling situation in postmodern society, but, 
as Ong highlights, alienation is a necessary step along the road to greater
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understanding: without writing and the alienation it brings, study as we now know it 
would be impossible (82).11
Indeed, rather than reinforcing what Jaques Derrida calls logocentrism , or the 
prioritisation of presence over absence in western metaphysics, the storyteller 
deconstructs the traditional speech/ writing binary by showing that speech is always 
already infected with writing. In the chapter “ ...That Dangerous Supplement...”
Derrida deconstructs the speech and writing binary proposed by Rousseau in his 
Confessions. Rousseau condemns writing as a destruction of presence and a disease 
of speech (Derrida 1976: 142). However, when talking about his shyness around 
women, Rousseau suggests that his behaviour in their presence does not allow them 
to know the ‘real’ him. The implication is that by reading his autobiography the reader 
will get to know the ‘real’ Rousseau, a thought succinctly formulated in the following 
quotation from the Confessions:
I would love society as others do if I were not sure of showing myself not just 
at a disadvantage but as completely different from what I am. The decision I have 
taken to write and to hide myself is precisely the one that suits me. If I were 
present people would never have know what I was worth.
(Rousseau in Derrida 1976: 142)
Writing, which Rousseau has previously claimed as a destruction of presence 
and a disease of speech turns out to be the best way he has of expressing himself. 
Culler highlights the fact that “Writing can be compensatory, a supplement to speech, 
only because speech is already marked by the qualities generally predicated of writing: 
absence and misunderstanding” (Culler 1983: 103). In his Confessions Rousseau 
describes writing as a supplement “Languages are made to be spoken, writing serves 
only as a supplementary to speech” (Derrida 1976: 144), however Derrida uses the 
logic of the supplement to point out the flaws in this claim: a supplement may be 
something that is added on, but the very possibility of adding a supplement indicates 
that the thing itself is incomplete (Culler 1983: 102).
11 Indeed, although alienation is a product o f capitalism and the era o f mass production, according to 
Marxist teleology, it is still a progressive step onwards from feudalism and serfdom. Alienation is, for 
Marx, on the whole a good thing because it leads one to question their relation to the means o f production 
and find it lacking, thus setting in motion the whole process o f self awareness and, eventually, revolution.
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Derrida further deconstructs logocentrism in Dissemination where he analyses 
the Platonic dialogue Phaedrus where Plato argues against the technology of writing.
In the Phaedrus Plato has Socrates, acting as a character, argue against writing by 
reciting an Egyptian allegory in which the god Theuth presents his invention, writing, to 
the chief god Thamos. In rejecting writing, Thamos argues:
The fact is that this invention will produce forgetfulness in the souls of those 
who have learned it because they will not need to exercise their memories (...), 
being able to rely on what is written, using the stimulus of external marks that are 
alien to themselves [...] rather than, from within, their own unaided powers to call 
things to mind [...]
(Derrida 1981: 102)
Derrida goes on to argue that the terms in which Plato discusses writing, as 
poison, have in fact been mistranslated over the years. Translators over the centuries 
have translated Plato as claiming that writing is a “poison”. However, Derrida goes on 
to point out that the term Pharmakos which has typically been translated over the years 
as “poison”, can also mean “remedy: and therefore Plato’s discussion of writing is far 
more ambivalent than has been thought: it is an artificial addition which both cures and 
infects (Culler 1983: 142). Translators over the years have selected one meaning and 
placed it over the other, repressing the ambiguity that characterises Plato’s own 
treatment of writing in favour of privileging one term above the other in a hierarchical 
binary.
Thamos’s (and supposedly, Socrates’) objections to writing will be familiar to 
most modern readers as it almost exactly echoes contemporary objections to the use 
of computers, calculators and other ‘memory’ devices. However, the storyteller 
reminds us that writing is both poison and remedy: Although writing can suppress 
subjectivity and by its very nature causes alienation, it gives us new ways to relate our 
lives to history and understand our selves:
[Ljife histories are indeed artefacts of writing; they are the upsurge of the 
narrative imagination. This, however, is hardly reason to fault them or to relegate 
them to the status of mere fictions. We too, as selves are artefacts of the narrative 
imagination. We, again literally, would not exist, save as bodies, without imagining 
who and what we have been and are: kill the imagination and you kill the self.
Who, after all is said and done, would want to die such a death?
(Freeman 1995: 223 My emphasis)
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The logocentric binary of speech versus writing and presence versus absence 
are deconstructed in the novels that feature the storyteller. Here, the stimulus of 
‘external marks’ is intrinsic in the way we see the world. Like Don Quixote or Emma 
Bovary, the influence of easily recognisable literary genres can be seen to structure the 
way we see the world, and ourselves. It is not enough for Saleem to simply tell his life 
story, he must have it in a recognisable authoritative written form. Fevvers’ tells her 
story to Walser in the hope that he will create an authoritative biography out of her 
disjointed and marvellous fairy tale. Crick needs to rely on that seductive master- 
narrative, history, in order to make sense of his own life story.
Mark Freeman argues that the very idea of self taken for granted in western 
society is a contingent and historically determined concept, that has been forged by 
writing, in such autobiographical tomes as St. Augustine’s and Rousseau’s 
Confessions. He goes on to suggest that “[t]he idea of the self, as we have come to 
know it, and the idea of history are in fact mutually constitutive” (Freeman: 28).
Writing the self indeed creates the concept of self that we take for granted today. 
The technology of writing facilitates the invention of written genres which in turn alter 
the ways in which we perceive both the world itself and ourselves as subjects. Just as 
Elizabeth Deeds Ermath proposes that realism constructs and promotes the historical 
code, clearing the path for the view of history today as a cosmic highway which 
includes everything from Homer to Holographs (Ermath 1997: 69) so too Kotre and 
Freeman show how our idea of self is forged from the genres of the autobiography and 
the bildungsroman. It is as Ong suggests; writing is a technology and technologies 
“are not mere exterior aids but also interior transformations of consciousness and 
never more so than when they affect the world.” (Ong 1999: 82)
Ong even suggests that our conception of human psychology has in no small 
way been influenced by the differences between ‘flat’ characters that thrive in oral 
narrative and ‘round’ ones in written. Freud understands real human beings as 
psychologically structured, not like an oral hero like Achilles, but like an Oedipus 
interpreted out of the world of nineteenth-century novels (Ong: 154). “The drift in
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human consciousness toward greater individualism” writes Ong “had been served well 
by print” (Ong: 131) showing how the interiorisation of writing fundamentally shifts the 
understanding of world and self. By showing the ways in which storytellers attempt to 
understand their selves through narrative and by problematising constructs such as the 
author, the self and history, the storyteller leads to a form of metafiction where our 
ways of looking at the world are shifted.
It may seem contradictory to talk about the storyteller, who, as we have seen 
typically speaks and is manifested as an oral presence, as causing the reader to think 
about the extent to which writing structures our consciousness, especially as part of my 
definition of the storyteller depends upon him or her utilising recognisable fairy tale 
motifs or devices to relate their life story. However, this structure reminds the reader of 
the nature of communication; the necessity of the addresser (speaker/ author) the 
message (speech/ text) and the addressee (listener/ reader)” according to Jakobsen’s 
semiotic model of communication.
The storyteller deconstructs the binary of speech and writing and shows that 
speech is always already infected with writing. By depicting a traditional oral 
storytelling situation within a reified commodity, the novel, those authors who utilise the 
storyteller draw attention to the differences and similarities between speech and 
writing. The way in which these storytellers attempt to make sense of their lives, the 
narratives patterns that they utilise can be seen to comply with expectations that are 
derived from written discourse: the need to present the self as a unified and single 
entity, the need to relate ones actions to the wider tapestry of history. Even if one uses 
the fairy tale to explain one’s life, one cannot escape the structuring impulses that are 
interiorised along with writing. Indeed, the variety of ways that present themselves to 
make sense of one’s life (fairy tale/ history) highlight the fact that there is more than 
one way to make sense of self, and show the ways in which more traditional oral 
methods may differ from contemporary methods.
The storyteller, as it is used in the texts under analysis here, is therefore not 
simply a nostalgic longing for a prelapsarian world of oral storytelling. Benjamin’s
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lament for the decline of the storyteller, and its claim that storytelling loses something 
by the ‘absence’ of the storyteller, replaced instead by the shoddy construct of the 
apolitical author, does not tally with the subversive metafictive possibilities opened up 
by the textual storyteller. Just as the content of fairytales was often subversive, due to 
the teller’s low social status or sex (Jameson 1981: 105), the textual storyteller is 
subversive because it points to the arbitrariness of constructions such as the author, 
history, and fictionality.
Indeed, the fairy tale itself is not a ‘pure’ oral genre, as Marina Warner notes:
Oral purity is [...] a quest doomed to failure; the material of fairy tale weaves 
in and out of printed texts, the Greek romances, The Arabian Nights, [...] language 
conducts from mouth to page and back again, and orature, or in the west, oral 
literature, has not existed in isolation since Homeric times.
(Warner 1994a: 24)
Although the fairy tale is typically seen as a speech genre, and there are all kinds 
of romantic ideas of the Brothers Grimm going round and listening to peasants narrate 
their stories inside quaint and authentically dilapidated cottages, the fact remains that 
the fairy tale has not existed in isolation over the past two hundred years and has been 
affected by writing. Many of the narratives garnered by the Grimms, for example, were 
re-worked versions of tales also known from Boccaccio, Basile and Perrault. The 
Grimms’ informants were as likely to be well-read middle and upper class women than 
the peasantry, and many of the tales they collected to understand better the German 
volk were in fact of French origin (Zipes 1988). Written versions of fairy tales can 
inspire spoken version which in turn are crafted into new written versions, a process 
that can be seen in the differing versions of “Cinderella” and “Sleeping Beauty” in the 
versions of Basile, Perrault and the Grimms.
Furthermore, the fairy tale as we now know it has been crystallised by the act of 
writing. Investigation of certain tales, such as “Cinderella”, for example has proven that 
the tale has been told in thousands of different forms that have been told in countries 
thousands of miles apart, from Egypt, China, Scandinavia and Africa to Western 
Europe over thousands of years (Zipes 1988: 137). Marina Warner notes that the 
earliest extant version of Cinderella to feature a lost slipper was written down around
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AD 850-860 in China, but this version is written in a way that assumes the reader 
would already be familiar with the story, suggesting that this version is by no means the 
ur-text or ‘original’ (Warner 1994a: 202). However, the form of “Cinderella” that is 
dominant today is the result of Charles Perrault’s 1697 version ‘Cendrillon’. This 
version is the first to feature both the fairy godmother, and the glass slipper, which 
were later immortalised in the 1950 Walt Disney version of Cinderella.
As Zipes notes ‘[f]olklorists have generally felt called upon to defend the “purity” 
of the oral genre and its resilient character against the “creeping disease” of literary 
adaptation and the production of the tales in distorted but attractive forms as 
commodities to make money’ (Zipes 1988: 135) but this view of ‘oral purity’ simply 
reinforces a logocentric view of the world, and ignores the fact that seventeenth century 
(Perrault) and nineteenth century (Grimm) versions of certain tales would be lost 
forever were it not for the medium of writing. Zipes suggests that ‘[m]emory is 
historical, and the oral tales can only retain basic elements of tales from other 
generations. Literature can thus complement the oral tradition’ (136). The logic of the 
complement reminds us of Derrida’s analysis of writing as supplement: a complement 
is “something that completes” (OED) suggesting that the oral version on its own is not 
enough. It must be studied against a written version, and written versions are 
necessary in order to compare versions from other sides of the world and over the 
centuries in order to analyse how tales have changed and how they reflect the society 
in which they are told.
This brief analysis of the fairy tale’s relationship with writing, reminds us that the 
fairy tale is not unaffected by writing. Indeed, in common with the other forms of writing 
investigated above that we now see as natural we can even date the fairy tale as we 
know it as a product of the nineteenth century. This is not to suggest that there were 
no fairy tales before the nineteenth century; rather that the way we view the fairy tale 
now has more in common with the way that the Grimms saw the fairy tale, as an agent 
for socialising children and fostering national identity, than the way Perrault or Basile 
did.
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Therefore, any suggestion of the fairy tale operating in a binary relationship with 
writing is intrinsically flawed: in any culture where writing has become internalised the 
whole world of language becomes related to writing, and it becomes impossible to ‘go 
back’ to an oral means of understanding the world. Nevertheless, the fairy tale does 
represent a way of understanding the self through narrative that is more commensurate 
with oral cultures rather than written cultures. Furthermore, the storyteller itself, by 
utilising ‘oral’ ways of understanding the world and the self highlights the difference 
between these oral and written means.
This historical and political context is essential in understanding narratives 
featuring the storyteller chronotope as what Jameson would call a ‘socially symbolic 
act’. By raising questions related to historiography and metafiction, they highlight the 
constructs of author, history and fiction which have been internalised in our society. In 
a society in which the author has become a fundamental principle, and naturalised to 
the extent that it now underwrites global capitalism in a most insidious way, it is vitally 
important to challenge the ideological construct of the author. The concept of the 
author, and the mechanisms of copyright that were created as a result of this idea have 
become enshrined in late capitalism as the notion of ‘intellectual property’. Intellectual 
Property has become an important area in world politics, to the extent that the UN has 
created an organisation for enforcing Intellectual Property rights, called The World 
Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), an organisation dedicated to naturalising 
and enforcing the ideological construct of the author, in some cases through 
international sanctions.
It is for this reason that I do not agree with Cazzato in his claim that Barthes had 
“fallen into the trap of reification”. It is undeniable that the author is far from dead, and 
has gone from strength to strength over the last fifty years; however, if you look at 
Barthes’ argument in the spirit of 1968 (when it, and Foucault’s remarkably similar 
“What is an Author?” were written) then it displays the same utopian socialist drive 
manifested towards the end of Foucault’s “What is an Author?”. Foucault, after 
showing the author as an ideological construct goes on to say:
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I think that, as our society changes, at the very moment when it is in the 
process of changing, the author function will disappear, and in such a manner that 
fiction and its polysemic texts will once again function according to another mode, 
but still with a system of constraint— one which will no longer be the author, but 
which will have to be determined or, perhaps, experienced.
(Foucault 1979: 160)
This hopeful sentiment, is what I see in Barthes’ essay: a recognition of the
puissant nature of the author as an ideological construct, but a hope that by revealing
the author and intellectual property as a construct it will eventually lose its power to
limit meaning. The author is the “certain functional principle by which one impedes the
free circulation, the free manipulation, the free composition, decomposition, and
recomposition of fiction” (159) and only with the death of the author will the free
circulation of all types of ideas and discourses be possible.
Returning to Benjamin's "The Storyteller", I would argue that the texts featuring a
storyteller in fact operate against the trend that Benjamin saw as the author being
"isolated" and unconcerned with society, as their concern with history illustrates. The
omniscient narrator may perhaps seem to be detatched from society, but the storyteller
resituates narrative within a real world communicative situation, and it does so in the
form of fairy tales, which Benjamin so admires. Benjamin noted "the first true
storyteller is, and will continue to be, the teller of fairy tales. Whenever good counsel
was at a premium, the fairy tale had it, and where the need was greatest, its aid was
nearest [...] The fairy tale tells us of the earliest arrangements that mankind made to
shake off the nightmare which the myth had placed upon its chest (Benjamin 1977:
102). The storyteller chronotope highlights the importance of storytelling and reminds
us of the ways in which we all use narrative in order to make sense of our lives. The
fairy tale operates in these texts as a model of storytelling and fictionality, and situates
the stories that are told within an endless chain of fairy tales that reflect the
experiences and concerns of their speakers.
It is impossible not to notice the difference between the difference between
Benjamin’s idea of myth and Frye’s. Where Frye sees myth in an essentialist and
humanist light, as a type of formulaic narrative that underlies all human stories as
based upon the same underlying patterns, Benjamin speaks of myth as a nightmare,
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which fairy tales are there to liberate us from. For Frye, whose writing bears the 
influence of the Jungian thought that structures other notable works on the fairy tale of 
the time, such as Campbell’s The Hero with a Thousand Faces, fairy tales are another 
form of the ‘romantic’ stage and another type of myth. As we shall see in the next 
chapter, Benjamin’s view of myth pre-empts later negative criticism of myth.
Chapter five will examine the interaction between fairy tale and myth, and 
question whether the fairy tale works to “shake off the nightmare of myth”, or whether 
at some times the fairy tale itself can become myth. To do this, it will be necessary to 
examine Roland Barthes’ idea of myth, and analyse a text that shows the fairy tale both 
as a repressive force, and at the same time, as a force that acts to rejuvenate the 
world.
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Chapter Five: Battling the Nightmare of Myth, Terry 
Pratchett’s Fairy Tale Inversions
It is customary in academic texts to ‘introduce’ the works of Terry Pratchett 
(one of Britain’s best selling authors and one of the most popular fantasy writers of all 
time), or mention that his greatest achievement, the Discworld series, takes place on 
a flat world carried through space on the back of four elephant caryatids which stand 
on the back of an enormous turtle. And even though I have ironically just repeated 
the cycle of introducing the author and his world, it is only because ultimately, those 
facts are irrelevant: Pratchett’s work is important for this thesis because it addresses 
the nature of the myths we live by and the fantasies that govern our daily existence. 
Zipes writes that we sometimes refer to myths and fairy tales as lies, but adds “these 
lies are often the lies that govern our lives” (Zipes 1994: 4).
This chapter will examine the playful intertextual use of fairy tales in a 
postmodern fantasy text where the fairy tales operate metafictively in order to 
comment upon the way that formulaic stories operate. Terry Pratchett’s 1991 novel 
Witches Abroad (hereafter referred to as WA) is part of his hugely popular Discworld 
series which is marked by its mix of fantasy and comedy, making it doubly damned 
as far as ‘serious criticism’ is concerned. It tells the story of three witches who are 
forced to venture abroad to save a girl from being married to a prince. As we will 
see, it combines intertextual elements, from “The Golden Ball”, “Little Red Riding 
Hood” and “Sleeping Beauty”, although the main, and most important intertext is 
“Cinderella”.
The strategy used by Pratchett in his treatment of these fairy tales is typical of 
what, in chapter one, I labelled “revision”: his use of the fairy tale is similar to that of 
feminist revisers, in that his revisions highlight the patriarchal assumptions underlying 
the classical fairy tale and change the stories in order to make them more equitable. 
Where in chapters three and four fairy tales have been seen in a positive light,
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providing a means by which humans can understand their lives W itches A broad  
shows how the fairy tale can be a negative force used to make people conform to 
societal rules.
Witches Abroad
The Discworld series, at 34 titles and counting, has been called “a great 
experiment” in worldbuilding (Clute 2000: 7). The series can be subdivided into four 
or five separate categories, depending on their protagonists and subject matter, and 
all of these different series are concerned with the way humans make sense of the 
world through stories, but arguably, none more so than the series which follow the 
adventures of the Discworld’s witches1..
The earliest of these books, E qual Rites, is the first Discworld novel to feature a 
female protagonist, and tells of the Disc’s first (and only) female wizard. This novel 
can be seen as only tangentially part of the Witches series, its Kunts lerrom an  style 
makes it more in keeping with other Discworld novels that chart the development of a 
young protagonist, such as Mort, Pyram ids  or G uards! G uards E qua l R ites  develops 
the rules of the Discworld, specifically drawing out a comparison between male and 
female magic, which will be enhanced throughout the Witches series, where 
“headology”, a combination of (un)common-sense and guile is seen to be a superior 
form of magic to the academic and showy thaumaturgy of the wizards.
It is the second novel in the Witches series that sets the tone for the following 
instalments. W yrd S isters  introduced the idea of the coven comprising Granny 
Weatherwax, Nanny Ogg and Magrat Garlick. The coven’s importance is something
1 Witches Abroad is part o f a group o f Discworld novels that has been labelled the Granny Weatherwax 
series, after their most important protagonist (Silverberg 1999: 4, Clute 2000: 15). However, it would 
be more accurate to label them the “ Witches”  series because although the first o f these books features 
only one witch, the series has expanded over the years, and could now be said to incorporate two 
novels in which Ms. Weatherwax only plays a cameo role, The Wee Free Men and A Hatful o f  Sky . 
Penelope H ill notes that Equal Rites seems to take place in a ‘parallel universe’ to the subsequent 
novels, as the social reforms hinted at by the end o f that novel do not seem to have any effect on the 
universe at large: Unseen University remains a single sex institution and it seems that there never have 
been female wizards. Again, this would seem to suggest that titling this novel, and the others the 
“ Granny Weatherwax”  series, on the basis that she is in all o f them, but Nanny Ogg, Magrat Garlick 
and Agnes N itt are not is an untenable position (H ill 2000: 54-55)
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that Pratchett attributes to both practical and mythical reasons. The practical one is 
that when two of the witches fall out, there is a third who will be there to make them 
patch things up. The mythical reason is the importance of the three types  of witches, 
which correspond with mythical representations of the three types of women in 
patriarchal Indo-European mythology: the maiden, the mother and the crone (Sayer 
2000: 92-3). Where Esme Weatherwax, from the outset, fulfils the stereotypical 
expectations of the crone-witch, Gytha Ogg is introduced as an unconventional 
mother figure with a brood of affectionate grown-up children and a taste for strong 
liquor and bawdy songs. Magrat is introduced in W yrd S isters  as the reader’s 
representative, someone just starting out on the road of witchery and who has a 
distinctly ‘new age’ view of witching that contrasts with the earthier witchcraft of the 
two elder witches.
W yrd S isters  is a parody of M acbeth  told from the perspective of the witches 
(the title is a “writerly” intertextual reference to the novel’s hypotext), and the most 
palimpsestic of the Discworld novels. Discworld novels are usually parodies without 
an incipit (Clute 2000: 10), but this is the first Discworld novel that is actually based 
upon one particular hypotext, rather than the broader generic use of parody that 
typifies Pratchett’s other novels. Though W yrd S isters  features parodic moments 
derived from multiple intertexts, from H am le t to  the first Superm an  movie, its basic 
structure is firmly based on the Scottish play. The importance of the Shakespearean 
intertext in W yrd S isters  is linked to the metafictive nature that will become a hallmark 
of the Witches series. The usurping king and his manipulative wife in this version of 
M acbeth  commission a play from the Discworld’s equivalent of Shakespeare in order 
to change the world and make their new subjects begin to fear the witches who were 
their midwives and doctors. The novel, like W itches A b road  after it, is intensively 
focused upon the power of the story to structure the world.
The intertextual and metafictive premise of W itches A broad  is established very 
early on, with a long passage worth quoting in full:
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[...] stories are important.
People think that stories are shaped by people. In fact, it’s the other way around. 
Stories exist independently of their players. If you know that, the knowledge is 
power.
Stories, great flapping ribbons of shaped space-time, have been blowing 
and uncoiling around the universe since the beginning of time. And they have 
evolved. The weakest have died and the strongest have survived and they have 
grown fat on the retelling . . . stories, twisting and blowing through the darkness.
And their very existence overlays a faint but insistent pattern on the chaos that is 
history. Stories etch grooves deep enough for people to follow in the same way 
that water follow certain paths down a mountainside. And each time fresh actors 
tread the path of the story, the groove runs deeper.
This is called the theory of narrative causality and it means that a story, 
once started, takes a shape. It picks up all the vibrations of all the other 
workings of that story that have ever been.
This is why history keeps repeating all the time.
So a thousand heroes have stole fire from the gods. A thousand wolves 
have eaten grandmother, a thousand princesses have been kissed. A million 
unknowing actors have moved, unknowing through the pathways of story.
It is now impossible for the third and youngest son of any king, if he should 
embark on a quest which has so far claimed his older brothers, not to succeed.
Stories don’t care who takes part in them. All that matters is that the story 
gets told, that the story repeats. Or, if you prefer to think of it like this: stories are 
a parasitical life form, warping lives, in the service only of the story itself.
It takes a special kind of person to fight back, and become the bicarbonate of 
history.
Once upon a time . ..
(WA: 8-9)
This m etafictive e lem ent is a persistent thread throughout the D iscworld series, 
a world where m illion to one shots always com e off (although nine hundred thousand 
to one shots a ren ’t quite so fortunate). Though the D iscworld series is re lentlessly 
intertextual, it is in th is novel tha t the m etafictive e lem ent that d iscusses storyte lling is 
m ost evident, and it is also th is novel in which fa iry  ta les are explic itly  incorporated 
and subverted, m aking it the obvious choice fo r analysis, a lthough there are m any 
o ther D iscworld novels that could have been substitu ted2.
The orig inal subversive tw ist utilised in W yrd S is te rs , o f te lling events from  the 
w itches ’ point o f view, is reprised in W itches Abroad, so that the m arginal position of 
w itches in fa iry ta les becom es sign ificantly expanded. The usage of borderline 
figu res3 has been noted as a particu larly postm odern phenom enon, as Linda
2 Other Discworld novels such as Hogfather, The Amazing Maurice and His Educated Rodents, Lords 
and Ladies and Maskerade all spring to mind.
3 The witches at one point are tellingly described as “ borderline cases”  (151).
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Hutcheon notes in her chapter on the “ex-centric” (Hutcheon 1999: 57-73), and
Pratchett uses it to give a new perspective on well known stories.
In this case, the novel begins with the death of a fairy godmother, Desiderata
Hollow4, and her final act, leaving her magic wand to Magrat Garlick5. This is a
particularly well executed piece of reverse psychology (or “headology”) because
along with the wand she sends a note instructing Magrat the duties of her new job:
‘I niver had time to Trane a replaysment so youll have to Do. You must goe 
to the city of Genua. I would of done thys myself only cannot by reason of bein 
dead. Ella Saturday must NOTTE marry the prins. PS This is important.’
[...]
‘PSPS Tell those 2 Olde biddys they are Notte to come with Youe, they will 
onlie Ruine everythin.’
(WA. 34 deliberate spelling mistakes replicated) 
Leaving the wand to Magrat with a note that forbids the accompaniment of 
Granny Weatherwax and Nanny Ogg provides the necessary impetus to get all three 
witches to leave their home and begin the unusual task of ensuring that the young 
girl does not marry a prince, which, as Granny Weatherwax points out “Should be an 
easy enough wish to grant anyway, [...] [mjillions of girls don’t marry a prince” (39). 
Little does she know that fairy godmothers come in pairs (the “good” one, and a “bad” 
one) and that Ella Saturday’s other godmother is using the power of stories to make 
sure that she marries the prince against her wishes.
From this point, the witches embark upon a long period of travel from their rural 
home kingdom of Lancre to the distinctly New Orleans influenced city of Genua, a 
city of voodoo, ‘gators and gumbo. This peripatetic structure is typical of many 
fantasy works; the road, as Bakhtin notes, is one of the oldest chronotopes, central to 
Greek Romance, and much utilised in the fantasy genre (Bakhtin 2000: 90). It also 
allows Pratchett to parody other fantasy works, and to create comic situations in
4 An obvious use o f allegoric naming that stresses the fairy godmother’s role as donor in the process o f 
wish fulfilment (Desire), and the inevitable complaint that getting everything you wish for isn’t 
necessarily a good idea (Hollow). Desiderata, literally translated means “ things missing and felt to be 
needed” , which o f course, is the basis o f wishing (Breebart 2002)
5 Fairy godmothers are witches in the novel, a fact which also explains how the malevolent guest in 
“ Sleeping Beauty”  is sometimes cursed by a bad fairy godmother, sometimes by a witch: this 
conflation o f the two allows the reader to see how whichever way one looks at it, the malevolent 
presence in these fairy tales is always an old woman.
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which the witches singularly fail to understand and appreciate foreign customs. In 
addition to increasing the gag quotient, the episodic nature of the road chronotope 
also allows for some character development, allowing time for the reader to 
understand the commonsense nature of the witches.
The first striking detail is the lack of real magic utilised by the witches. Apart 
from riding broomsticks and Magrat’s use of her magic wand to turn absolutely 
everything she points it at into a pumpkin, whether she wants it to become pumpkin 
shaped or not, there is very little magic done by the witches in the novel6. In a 
section of free indirect thought representation focalised by Magrat, Nanny and 
Granny’s approach to magic is explained:
Sometimes [...] she really wondered about the others’ commitment to 
witchcraft. Half the time they didn’t seem to bother.
Take Medicine, for example. Magrat knew she was much better than them 
at herbs. [...] She could fractionally distil, and double-distil, and do things that 
meant sitting up all night watching the colour of the flame under the retort. She 
worked at it.
Whereas Nanny just tended to put a hot poultice on everything and 
recommend a large glass of whatever the patient liked best on the basis that 
since you were going to be ill anyway you might as well get some enjoyment out 
of it. [...]
And Granny . . . she just gave people a bottle of coloured water and told 
them they felt a lot better.
And what was annoying was that they often did.
Where was the witchcraft in that?
With a wand, though, things could be different. You could help people a lot 
with a wand. Magic was there to make life better. Magrat knew this in the pink 
fluttering boudoir of her heart.
(WA: 80)
On the way to Genua, the mundane nature of most witchcraft is demonstrated. 
Granny Weatherwax uses her knowledge of dwarfs (spotting mining by-products) to 
get on the right path after Magrat’s poor map-reading skills have got them lost and
6 Both the magic wand and the broomstick could be seen more as devices than actual magic, something 
made obvious in the treatment o f these magical accoutrements as commodities in the Harry Potter 
books, where broomsticks are branded like automobiles. The functioning o f these devices may seem 
magical, but then so does the remote control to anyone who doesn’t have a degree in electrical 
engineering, or the internal combustion engine to non-mechanics. The mundanity o f the broomstick is 
emphasised by the fact that Granny Weatherwax’s broomstick is reluctant to fly, and has to be 
regularly inspected by dwarven engineers. Arthur C Clarke famously claimed that “ Any sufficiently 
advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic” , and Gregory Benford that “ Any technology 
distinguishable from magic is insufficiently advanced” . This technological view o f the magic wand is 
confirmed when the working o f the wand is described -  rather than pointing it and wishing, the fu lly  
qualified fairy godmother changes its setting by twisting the gold and siver rings into a new position 
explaining Desiderata’s ‘PSPSPS’ to Magrat that “ it has a tindincy to resettt to pumpkins”  (WA: 34)
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then uses her fearsome reputation to gain entrance into the Dwarven tunnels. 
Admittedly, this practical witchcraft is undermined when Magrat, in what could be 
regarded as her first piece of fairy godmothering, uses the magic wand to save 
trapped dwarf miners by transforming a rockslide into pumpkins. However, this 
episode is indicative both of Magrat’s idealistic view of magic and also her lack of 
control over the wand (or the situation), because the last thing she wants the wand to 
do is turn rocks into pumpkins. When the dwarves give the witches a boat that 
follows an underground river to Genua and they are approached by a sinister 
creature, their response is just as down to earth:
Two pale glows appeared at the edge of the lamplight. Eventually they 
turned out to be the yes of a small grey creature, vaguely froglike, paddling 
towards them on a log.
It reached the boat. Long clammy fingers grabbed the side and a 
lugubrious face rose level with Nanny Ogg’s.
‘’ullo,’ it said. ‘It’sss my birthday.’
All three of them stared at it for a while. Then Granny Weatherwax picked 
up an oar and hit it firmly over the head. There was a splash and distant cursing. 
’Horrible little bugger,’ said Granny, as they rowed on, ‘Looked like a 
troublemaker to me.’
‘Yeah,’ said Nanny Ogg. ‘It’s the slimy ones you have to watch out for.’
(WA: 59-60)
This brief parody of Tolkien’s middle-earth novels begins when the witches 
discover the dwarven mine and ends when they leave it, beginning with a discussion 
on the point of invisible runes marking the door to the mines (how do you know if 
they’re done correctly?) and ending at the point where a Gollum-esque creature gets 
short shrift from the witches.
Other non magical events that occur during the section of the novel based 
upon the traditional ‘road’ chronotope include the entirely accidental slaying of a 
vampire (which while in bat form finds itself concussed when the shutters barring a 
window are violently thrown open, subject to a barrage of garlic sausage and then 
eaten by Nanny’s feral tomcat). Being accidentally in the path of a bull-run in a 
region that resembles Spain is dealt with by the witches’ self-confidence, and the use 
of the “mystic Horseman’s Word”— ostensibly a mythical means used by master 
blacksmiths to tame even the wildest stud stallion, but in reality a whispered threat of
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castration. And finally, as the witches get closer to Genua on the Discworld 
equivalent of a Mississippi paddleboat, the reader is treated to a masterclass in 
headology when Granny Weatherwax takes on a group of card-sharps who have 
previously swindled Nanny Ogg out of the group’s travelling money and broomsticks.
This episode is a key point in the novel for two reasons. Primarily it shows the 
importance of guile and “headology” over magic. Granny does not use magic to win 
the game, although she does use it to eliminate the unfair advantages that the 
cheaters utilise: a mirror behind her back which would show the gamblers her cards 
is smashed by a glass that slips out of the hand of a barkeep that had been rude to 
her moments earlier. In almost the same instant a contraption holding an ace falls 
out of the lead gambler’s sleeve. It also shows Granny Weatherwax’s propensity for 
breaking rules. Although, as we shall later see, she rails against stories, it is made 
quite plain that she is working this story to her advantage:
All witches are very conscious of stories. They can feel stories, in the same 
way that a bather in a little pool can feel the unexpected trout.
Knowing how stories work is almost all the battle.
For example, when an obvious innocent sits down with three experienced 
card sharpers and says ‘How do you play this game, then?’, someone is about to 
be shaken down until their teeth fall out.
(102)
Granny’s victory against the cheats is mainly due to the psychological games 
she plays with her opponents: acting like a helpless old biddy, feigning ignorance of 
the game’s rules, taking out the cardsharp’s advantages like mirrors, hidden cards, 
stacked hands and marked decks, and being deliberately irritating and playing mind 
games to irritate her hapless opponents, are all, along with raw talent at the game, 
more important to her victory than any form of magic. This reluctance to use magic 
where headology will suffice will remain a major theme throughout the novel. 
Sleeping Beauty
The episodic period of travel is important to the novel because it allows the 
reader to get an insight into the ways that Granny Weatherwax works. The witches 
meet with the challenge of foreign climes as they make their way to their destination,
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all of which are surmounted in typical down-to-earth style. The only reference to fairy 
tale intertexts during this period occur when the focus of the narrative shifts to portray 
events happening simultaneously in the fairy tale kingdom of Genua. During this 
section of the novel, the fairy tale intertext is suspended, as the typical fantasy 
chronotope of the road is dominant.
However, as they near their destination, fairy tale intertexts become 
increasingly prominent. A page or so after leaving the paddleboat, the witches come 
across a bramble covered castle. To no one’s great surprise, the occupants of the 
castle are all asleep and atmospherically covered with dust and cobwebs, “There’ll 
be a spinning wheel at the bottom of all this” comments Granny knowingly before 
Nanny Ogg compares it with the work of Black Aliss:
‘Now there was a witch who knew how stories worked,’ said Nanny. ‘She 
used to be in as many as three of 'em at once.’
Even Magrat knew about Black Aliss. She was said to have been the 
greatest witch who ever lived -  not exactly bad, but so powerful it was 
sometimes hard to tell the difference. When it came to sending palaces to sleep 
for a hundred years or getting princesses to spin straw into Glod [sic], no-one did 
it better than Black Aliss.
(WA113-4 deliberate Glod pun included)
We learn that Black Aliss met her end at the hands of two children, pushed into 
her own oven in the gingerbread cottage she started inhabiting when she latterly 
became, as the witches politely put it, eccentric, and this leads on to another 
comment by Granny Weatherwax about stories:
T ha t’s what happens, [...] You get too involved with stories, you get 
confused. You don’t know what’s really real and what isn’t. And they get you in 
the end. They send you weird in the head. I don’t like stories. They’re not real.
I don’t like things that ain’t real.’
She pushed open a door.
‘Ah. A chamber,’ she said sourly. ‘Could even be a bower.’
(114)
In a thicket of rose bushes, the witches find a pretty thirteen year old girl near 
to a spinning wheel, which Nanny Ogg disposes of by picking it up by its treadle and 
hefting it through a window. The way that the witches are unfazed by the magical 
castle is explained by the premise in the introduction about stories repeating 
themselves, with Nanny Ogg claiming she has seen this story happen before and
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heard about it happening events dozens of times7. Again, the ‘showiness’ of the 
whole story is criticised by Granny: “That’s fairy godmothering [...] Always do it 
impressively. Always meddling, always trying to be in control! Hah! Someone got a 
bit of poison? Send everyone to sleep for a hundred years! Do it the easy way” (115).
Subverting the traditional (happy) ending of this fairy tale Granny Weatherwax 
wakes the castle, but the witches are forced to flee when it seems that the girl 
recognises her, and a man in fading robes staggers out of a room and seeing her, 
calls the guards. When they have escaped the castle, Magrat wonders aloud 
whether they did the right thing —“I’m sure it was a job for a handsome prince”— 
which leads to leading to a pragmatic reading of the fairytale:
'[...] Cutting your way through a bit of bramble is how you can tell he’s 
going to be a good husband, is it? That’s fairy godmotherly thinking, that is!
Goin’ around inflicting happy endings on people whether they wants them or not 
eh?’
‘There’s nothing wrong with happy endings,’ said Magrat hotly.
‘Listen, happy endings is fine if they turn out happy,’ said Granny, glaring at 
the sky. ‘But you can’t make 'em for other people. Like the only way you could 
make a happy marriage is by cuttin’ their heads off as soon as they say “I do”, 
yes? You can’t make happiness
Granny Weatherwax stared at the distant city.
‘All you can do,’ she said, ‘is make an ending.’
(118)
The logic of “Sleeping Beauty” is questioned by Granny, and rightly so. You 
never know which kind of prince you’re going to get. Will he resemble the genteel 
prince who wakes the heroine with a kiss in the Grimms’ “Little Brier Rose” (KHM50) 
or will it be the prince who rapes the sleeping beauty while she is still comatose in the 
older, bawdier version of the tale “So/e, Luna, e Talia” in Basile’s Pentamerone (cf. 
Warner 220)? This first tale defused by the witches, is one that bears its socialising 
role quite openly. Jack Zipes suggests that within the classic fairytale is an
7 And she has heard o f it happening all the time, because it has. “ Rural Myth”  explains Nanny Ogg, 
which o f course is the equivalent o f the Urban myth, which are explained in a footnote early in the 
novel, “ people are wrong about urban myths. Logic and reason say that these are fictional creations, 
retold again and again by people who are hungry for evidence o f weird coincidence, natural justice and 
so on. They aren’t. They keep on happening all the time, everywhere, as the stories bounce back and 
forth across the universe”  (WA: 9).
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ideological payload that is used to “socialise” children, and make them conform to 
societal norms. He says of Perrault’s “Sleeping Beauty”:
The princess is actually endowed with the following ‘gifts’ by the fairies: 
beauty, the temper of an angel, grace, the ability to dance perfectly, the voice of 
a nightingale, and musicality. In other words, she is bred to become the ideal 
aristocratic lady. Further, she is expected to be passive and patient for a 
hundred years until a prince rescues and resuscitates her [...] Such docility and 
self-abandonment are rewarded in the end when the prince returns to set things 
right. Perrault then added a verse moral which sings a hymn of praise to 
patience.
(Zipes 1991 [1983]: 24)
The heroine of this tale is rewarded for her passivity, a state of affairs most 
conducive to any patriarchal system. This questionable happy ending is subverted 
by Pratchett, and its dubious logic is challenged. The passive princess is rescued by 
one of the only types of fairy tale women who can be judged as active and in control 
of their own destiny: the witch. Witches make their own endings, and looking at most 
“classical” fairy tales, it is the witches who are in control, and who are usually later 
punished for their affrontery (among the ‘ogres’ in the Grimms fairy tale collection, 
Tatar notes three different types: beasts and monsters, social deviants like robbers, 
and then the most common type of ogre: women (Tatar 1987: 139))
Little Red Riding Hood
The next fairy tale that the witches encounter has also been shown to carry a 
patriarchal subtext in Jack Zipes’ 1983 study The Trials and Tribulations o f Little Red 
Riding Hood. While navigating a forest, the witches run into a young girl who is 
wearing a red cloak and carrying a basket to her bed-bound grandmother. The 
witches, like the readers, recognise the pattern of this story immediately, even if the 
little girl (and presumably her mother) do not8, the little girl is even dubious about the
8 Incidentally, the double-nature o f this cautionary fairy tale is also parodied by Pratchett. Nanny Ogg, 
famed for her ‘wanton’ youth, suggests that the red cloak could be a harmless coincidence, as she too 
had a red cloak when she was fifteen. Denying this possibility, Esme reminds Gytha that she lived next 
door to her grandmother and didn’t have to worry about wolves. “ Except old Sumpkins the lodger” 
interjects nanny, and later on when they meet the w o lf she brings this up again, “ Took me right back, 
seeing a great big hairy slathering thing heading towards me, [...] Did you ever meet old Sumpkins?’ . 
Whether Old Sumpkins was a werewolf, or whether Nanny is just making plain the connection between 
the predatory w o lf and the predatory male that Perrault himself suggests in the rhyme that ends his 
version o f “ Little Red Riding Hood”  is satisfyingly undecidable.
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witches because they might be the wicked witch that her mother also warned her 
about9. The distant sound of falling lumber fails to reassure the witches:
‘Woodcutters!’ said Nanny. ‘It’s all right if there’s woodcutters! One of them 
rushes in
Tha t’s only what children get told,’ said Granny, as they sped onwards.
‘Anyway, that’s no good to the Grandmother, is it? She’s already been et!’
‘I always hated that story,’ said Nanny. ‘No-one ever cares what happens 
to poor defenceless old women.’
(WA: 122)
After tricking their way into the grandmother’s cottage, Nanny Ogg takes the 
place of Red-Riding Hood’s bewildered grandmother, “Oh blimey, I never realised 
you had teeth that big (126), before Granny Weatherwax steps out and clouts the 
wolf with a cast-iron frying pan, rendering it unconscious. While it is asleep she uses 
her affinity for “borrowing”, or putting her own mind into the mind of other creatures, 
to find out why it is walking on its hind legs, talking and trying to enter human abodes:
A normal wolf wouldn’t enter a cottage, even if it could open the door.
Wolves didn’t come near humans at all, except if there were a lot of them and it 
was the end of a very hard winter. And they didn’t do that because they were big 
and bad and wicked, but because they were wolves.
This wolf was trying to be human.
There was probably no cure.
(129)
“Someone” has made the wolf think it is a person, and this inability to be 
neither one thing nor the other, an outsider amongst both wolves and humans, is the 
motive force that drives the story. This is one version of the story that has almost as 
much sympathy for the wolf as the old woman and the little girl. When the 
woodcutter arrives for the obligatory happy ending, the wolf voluntarily lays its head 
down on a stump to be executed, after which Granny Weatherwax insists that it is 
given a full burial. And then after the “happy” ending, Granny talks with the
9 This inability o f the characters to recognise which tale they are taking part in is, o f course, necessary 
for the plot. Otherwise, all a girl would have to do is wear a blue cloak, and wolves would pose no 
danger whatsoever. It is also, I suspect, a telling comment on the consolatory nature o f the classical 
fairy tales. The girl, on seeing three women carrying broomsticks, accompanied by a cat, two o f whom 
wearing pointy hats at first suspects witches, but is soon fooled when Magrat says that they are actually 
flower fairies because that is what she would prefer to believe despite the evidence o f her eyes. The 
grandmother too, is quite easily fooled into thinking that both Nanny Ogg and Granny Weatherwax are 
flower fairies, and she chastises them for not doing the washing up even after she left a bowl o f m ilk 
out for them, which goes to show the ‘wish fulfilm ent’ nature o f belief in fairies which Pratchett goes 
on to criticise in the next book o f the Witches series, Lords and Ladies.
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woodcutter, and finds out that the wolf has been lurking around the edges of villages 
for years, but no one had ever tried to talk to it, and that the grandmother was 
similarly isolated from society because ironically, the villagers mistake her for a witch, 
“she lives all by herself in the wood right” [...] and . . . she’s got a hook nose and 
she’s already muttering to herself [...] and she’s got no teeth, right?” suggests the 
woodcutter (131).
Granny then refabricates the story anew, rearranging it so that some kind of 
satisfactory ending is given to the old woman who was nearly eaten by a wolf 
because people were afraid she might be a witch:
‘I bet you can’t wait to be up and repairing her cottage for her, and getting 
the garden back in good order, and seeing she has fresh milk every day and a 
good supply of wood, right? In fact I wouldn’t be surprised if you wasn’t 
generous enough to build her a new  cottage with a proper well an’ all.
Somewhere near the village so she don’t have to live alone, right? You know I 
can see the future sometimes and I just know  that’s what’s going to happen, 
right? *[...]
‘I knows it can be a dangerous job woodchoppin’. People can get hurt.
Trees can accidentally fall on 'em, or the top of their choppers can suddenly 
come off and cut their head open.’ The woodcutter shuddered as Granny went 
on: ‘So what I’m goin’ to do is a little spell to make sure that none of this ‘appens 
to you. On account of me bein’ so grateful. Because of you helpin’ the old lady.
Right? Just nod’
(132-3)
Rather than being the valorous hero who steps in and saves the girl and 
grandmother, this woodcutter is portrayed as an ignorant yokel, whose stupidity and 
naive belief that all old women are witches is what led to the hazardous situation in 
the first place. The basic premise of this classical fairy tale is taken apart to show the 
marginalized point of view that underlies and subverts it: why is a bedridden 
grandmother living alone in woods? Why is it that no one cares what happens to the 
old woman?
Perrault’s “Le petit chaperon rouge” is the first literary version of this tale, and 
one in which both the grandmother and the little girl get eaten. Recent criticism 
suggests that Perrault’s story was based upon well known oral tales from the south of 
France and north of Italy in which the young girl is tricked into eating her 
grandmother’s flesh and drinking her blood, and escapes the (were)wolf through her
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own cunning in most versions of the tale, although she does occasionally get eaten 
(Zipes 1991: 28). Sympathy for the grandmother is hardly evident in these older 
versions, and it is only in the Grimms’ 1812 version uRotkappchen” that the 
grandmother makes it through the tale alive, a case where we can see the Grimms 
making the tale suitable for their bourgeois nineteenth century audience. Bettelheim, 
unsurprisingly given his belief in the importance of the happy ending, lauds the 
Grimms’ redaction as the one which enabled “Little Red Riding Hood” to become the 
popular tale it is today (Bettelheim 1976: 167). The Grimm version also significantly 
desexualises the tale (thereby allowing Bettelheim to pontificate at length on the 
‘unconscious’ ramifications of the text that are on the surface level of Perrault’s 
version). Their protagonist becomes an innocent child rather than a young woman, 
and Perrault’s obvious allegorical level where the wolf is referred to as “a smooth 
tongued seducer” in the moralistic rhymes that end the tale is sublimated (Perrault in 
Bacchilega 1997 :56). It is the Grimm version that introduces the saviour figure of 
the woodcutter, who just happens to be in close proximity to the cottage, and who 
slices open the wolf’s belly to rescue both Red Riding Hood and her Grandmother, 
an innovation that stresses the inability of women to save themselves which is an 
obviously patriarchal change when compared to the versions where it is Red Riding 
Hood’s cunning that saves her life. It is nevertheless a constant that the audience’s 
sympathy remains more with Little Red Riding Hood than her grandmother, and that 
although some versions have granny rescued from the wolf’s gullet, she is less likely 
to survive the ordeal than Red Riding Hood and grandmother being alive is a kind of 
optional extra in those versions that end happily.
Some feminist critics have argued that the death of the grandmother is 
essential to the tale. Yvonne Verdier argues that the cannibalism in versions of the 
tale that predate Perrault’s symbolically represents the cycle of life and the girl’s 
incorporation of her grandmother’s knowledge, (the grandmother dies and is reborn 
in the young girl). That the wolf sometimes asks the girl to cook the grandmother’s
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flesh shows the cultural nature of the consumption and the centrality of domesticity in 
defining “women” in archaic times. According to Verdier the wolf is “merely a 
mediator or the representation of an aged woman” (Bacchilega 1997: 56). However, 
we might think that the knowledge of an old woman who doesn’t know not to open 
the door to wolves is of dubious value, and in fact the old woman in Pratchett’s 
version is scrupulous about visitors showing identification before they gain 
admission.
Witches Abroad’s version of Little Red Riding Hood brings out the hidden 
voices of the tale. The grandmother becomes important, and the reason for her 
close brush with death is not due to any mystical notions of the cycle of life, but 
because of society’s lack of respect for the old and infirm. The wolf here is no sexual 
predator, but a real predator warped through human interference. The sympathy for 
the wolf in the novel can also be explained by an insight suggested by Marina 
Warner:
Perrault’s retelling continues an important aspect: the possibility of 
confusing wolf and granny. In Perrault’s version, the wolf cannot be clearly 
distinguished from Red Riding Hood’s beloved grandmother: that is the crucial 
collapse of roles in his story. (A children’s glove puppet today neatly combine 
granny and wolf as a Janus-faced head under a single mob cap.)
The wolf is kin to the forest-dwelling witch, or crone; he offers us a male 
counterpart, a werewolf who swallows up grandmother and then granddaughter.
[...] Both dwell in the woods, both need food urgently (one because she is sick, 
the other because he has not eaten for three days,) and the little girl cannot quite 
tell them apart.
(Warner 1994a: 181-2) 
Pratchett’s version manages to reflect this confusion and the voices that are 
marginalized in the traditional folktale, specifically the voices of the old and even 
more unusually, the wolf, become central to his retelling.
Already we can detect a common thread in Pratchett’s use of fairy tale 
intertexts. They deconstruct the ossified “classical” fairytales in order to question the 
underlying presumptions that we normally do not pay any attention to when reading 
the fairy tales. This technique, common in feminist revisions of fairy tales, is utilised 
for a humanist agenda that values people above stories, in strict opposition to the
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way that the “other” fairy-godmother who sees the stories as more important than 
their people10.
The fairy godmother
The witches learn from the woodcutters of other odd occurrences in the woods,
involving animals acting in human ways. They are told of a family of bears living in a
nearby cottage (“Goldilocks and the Three Bears”), and three little pigs (“The Three
Little Pigs”), the bear’s neighbours, who were eaten by the big bad wolf but these are
only mentioned in passing, to allow an explanation of these fairy tale events:
‘Someone’s been here before us. Passing through. Someone who knows 
about the power of stories and uses 'em. And the stories have . . . kind of hung 
around. They do that, when they get fed . . .’
‘W hat’d anyone want to do that for?’ said Nanny.
‘Practice,’ said Granny.
{WA. 135)
The reader can already guess who is responsible for the crafting of these
stories because we are introduced to Lady Lilith de Tempscire before the
protagonists proper, as she taunts the dying Desiderata Hollow whose approach to
fairy godmothering seems to reflect Granny Weatherwax’s pragmatism more than
Magrat’s idealism:
'[...] Kitchens, mainly. It always seemed to be about kitchens. Balls 
sometimes, but generally it was kitchens. [...]
‘It’s a big responsibility fairy godmothering. Knowing when to stop, I mean.
People whose wishes get granted often don’t turn out to be very nice people. So 
should you give them what they want -  or what they need?’
[ . . . ]
‘There were two of us. Godmothers go in twos, you know. Me and Lady 
Lilith? There’s a lot of power in godmothering. It’s like being part of history.
Anyway, the girl was born [...] and Lilith wished for her to have beauty and power 
and marry a prince. Hah! And she’s been working on that ever since. What 
could I do? You can’t argue with wishes like that. Lilith knows the power of a 
story. [ . . . ] !  hear she runs the city now. Changing a whole country just to make 
a story work!’
(15)
As the witches ieave the forest the disagreement between the idealistic Magrat 
and pragmatic Granny reaches Defcon II when Magrat complains that the only magic
10 L ilith ’s view o f the participants o f the stories broadly resembles that o f structuralist critics. Like 
Propp, she considers the tales in terms o f actants and structure, rather than as a telling o f someone’s 
life, or affecting real people.
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they do is headology, glaring at people, tricking them and taking advantage of their 
gullibility:
‘You like people who need help, because when they need help they’re weak 
and helping them makes you feel strong ! What harm would a bit of magic do?’
‘Because it’d never stop at a bit, you stupid girl!’
Magrat backed off, her face flushed. She reached into her bag and pulled 
out a slim volume which she flourished like a weapon.
‘Stupid I may be,’ she panted, ‘but at least I’m trying to learn things! Do you 
know the kind of things people can use magic for? Not just illusion and bullying!
There’s people in this book that can . . can . . walk on hot coals, and stick their 
hands in a fire and not get hurt!’
‘Cheap trickery!’ said Granny.
They really can!’
‘Impossible. No-one can do that!’
‘It shows they can control things! Magic’s got to be more than knowing 
things and manipulating people!’
‘Oh? It’s all wishing on stars and fairy dust, is it? Making people happier?’
‘There’s got to be some of that! Otherwise what’s the good of anything?
[...] Haven’t you got any romance in your soul?’ said Magrat plaintively.
‘No,’ said Granny. ‘I ain’t. And stars don’t care what you wish and magic 
don’t make things better and no-one doesn’t get burned who sticks their hand in 
a fire. If you want to amount to anything as a witch, Magrat Garlick, you got to 
learn three things. W hat’s real, what’s not real, and what’s the difference -  ‘
(137)
There is one final story-based assault on the witches before they reach Genua, 
which we can anticipate when they first set foot on the yellow brick road that leads to 
the ‘diamond city’. Before long, a farmhouse drops on Nanny Ogg’s head, and a 
group of singing dwarves are gleefully running around the farmhouse that the 
stunned witch finds herself in until they knock on the door, “’Er, [...] is the old witch 
dead?’/ ‘Which old witch?’ said Magrat [...] ‘Er, [...] can we have her boots? (142)11.
It doesn’t take long before this incident is attributed to Lady Lilith, who is not very 
pleased with Nanny Ogg’s unwillingness to follow the plot of The Wizard o f Oz, 
“Witches ought to be squashed when a farmhouse lands on them [...] All squashed 
except for their boots sticking out./ Sometimes she despaired. People just didn’t 
seem able to play their parts properly” (146).
In fact, for the first third of the novel, the majority of references to fairy tale are 
always connected to Lilith, the fairy godmother who controls a city. While the witches 
circumnavigate the disc, we begin to learn exactly what it is like to live in such a city.
11 Which are red, but in witch fashion have an iron toecap and heavy walking boot practicality rather 
than the ruby red dancing shoes that feature in the MGM Wizard o f Oz
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Genua was a fairytale city. People smiled and were joyful the livelong day. 
Especially if they wanted to see another livelong day [...] There wasn’t a lot of 
crime in Genua these days. At least, not what would be considered crime 
elsewhere. Things like theft were easily dealt with and hardly required any kind 
of judicial process. Far more important, In Lilith’s book, were crimes against 
narrative expectation. People didn’t seem to know how they should behave.
Lilith held a mirror up to Life, and chopped all the bits off Life that didn’t f i t . .
(75)
The contrast between the utopian fairytale world, and the dystopia of enforcing 
one is harshly highlighted here, in a scene where a toymaker is prosecuted for not 
whistling, singing, or telling stories to children, a crime which requires him being sent 
to the dungeons for re-education a fate that had previously befallen an inkeep 
prosecuted for not being fat and not having a big red face.
Lilith’s utopian ‘fairy tale kingdom’ is reminiscent of nothing else but Walt 
Disney World, Florida. It is therefore no surprise that the castle from which Lilith 
governs Genua bears a marked resemblance to Disneyland’s “Sleeping Beauty’s 
Castle”, “It wasn’t a castle like the ones back home, which expressed very clear 
ideas about inside and outside and were built to keep the two separate. This was, 
well, a fairytale castle, all icing-sugar battlements and tiny, towering turrets” (WA: 
162).
Lilith’s Genua is a perfect example of what Jean Baudrillard labels the hyper- 
real or a third-order simulation. This idea takes a little explaining. Baudrillard defines 
first-order simulation as a representation of reality, such as a novel, a painting or a 
map. The theoretical second order simulation blurs the boundaries between reality 
and representation, Baudrillard gives the example of Borges’ “Exactitude of Science” 
where cartographers create a map so detailed it ends up covering exactly all the 
territory it charts so that map and reality become indistinguishable. The third order 
simulation is “the generation by models of a real without origin or reality” (Baudrillard 
1983: 2). Baudrillard views Disneyland as a perfect example of this “hyperreality”, 
and we can say the same thing of Genua, a place where “the model precedes the
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real” , the model here being the fairy tale stereotypes which Lilith uses to structure the 
real world (Lane 2000: 86).
Genua itself is a satisfying metaphor for the struggle between reality and 
hyperreality. The impractical castle12 that dominates Genua is, like Disney World 
Florida, improbably situated in the middle of a vast swamp which is as good a symbol 
for the disconnection between fantasy and reality as can be imagined. It is said of 
Lilith that “she wants to make it [Genua] a Magic Kingdom, a Happy and Peaseful 
[sic] place”, the “Magic Kingdom” is of course, a registered trademark of Walt Disney 
World Florida and Disneyland is “the happiest place on earth” (WA. 96).
Lilith’s plan to make a perfect society based upon stories is reminiscent of Walt 
Disney’s plans for “an Experimental Prototype Community of Tomorrow” (EPCOT), a 
utopian community that Disney never saw in his own lifetime that he planned based 
upon his experiences with Disneyland. This prototype community, a town of 20,000 
inhabitants was to “provide the public with a commercial theme park showcasing both 
technological progress and romanticized 'traditional' American values [...] in which 
every aspect of life including language was controlled and designed” (Brittain-Catlin 
2003). It could be said too of Disney that he was attempting to hold a mirror up to 
life, and chopping off all the bits that didn’t fit.
Disney’s dream, later realised in the Disney Corporation’s building of the 
“Celebration” village next door to Walt Disney World in 1996, was to create the 
perfect American town13. The brochure for Celebration plays up to the idea of an 
imaginary prelapsarian America:
12 Richard J Lane writes that the Disney castle is a second order simulation “ [which] look more real 
than the real, because [it] embod[ies] all o f our childish and romantic notions o f what a castle should 
ideally look like”  (Lane 2000: 89). However, he fails to account for the fact that our childish and 
romantic notions are derived from Disney’s films, so that in fact, the fake castle o f “ Sleeping Beauty is 
the wr-castle for most children, to which no real fortification can compare.
It would be anachronistic to suggest that Pratchett was im plic itly referring to Celebration, which was 
not populated until 5 years after the publication o f Witches Abroad. However, simply reading Walt 
Disney’s plans for EPCOT reveals as much as you would need to know about the building o f this 
American wonderland and its repressive nature, and more evidence about the sort o f regime necessary 
to make a fairy tale world would be obvious from the rules in place at Disney’s theme parks, where, for
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There was once a place where neighbors greeted neighbors [sic.] in the 
quiet of summer tw iligh t... There is a place that takes you back to that time of 
innocence ... A  place of caramel apples and cotton candy, secret forts and 
hopscotch on the streets.”
(Ross 1999: 18).
Celebration is a pastiche of “Mom’s Apple Pie” Americana, with its neo- 
traditional architecture of clapboard exteriors in fetching pastel shades, along with 
front porches and picket fences (in PVC of course, because wood rots too quickly in 
the humid Florida air) just as Lilith’s Genua is a pastiche of the world of fairy tales. 
Celebration is also just as restrictive and conservative as Uncle Walt’s vision; to 
Disney “the residents, like their houses, would constitute a perfectly-maintained 
tourist attraction. They would be tenants and not landowners, and therefore without 
voting rights; pensioners and the unemployed were ineligible” (Brittain-Catlin 2003)14. 
A similar kind of de-facto segregation is at work in Celebration, where high house 
prices ensure that the majority of residents are middle class and white. Where Uncle 
Walt would have had rules to keep out the undesirables like the infirm and 
unemployed (no beggars or hawkers are to be found on the streets of Genua either), 
Celebration proves that you can achieve a form of social exclusion simply by allowing 
residents to “buy” their houses at a high market price which are beyond the reach of 
the poor or working class. Owning the house does not provide total freedom to do as 
you wish however; Celebration’s image is maintained by a number of by-laws that 
insist that no more than two people are allowed to sleep in one bedroom, curtains 
must all be a regulation white, and lawns must be mown regularly (Moran 2003). 
Moran suggests that these rules are aimed primarily at maintaining property values,
example, it is a sackable offence for the actors playing cartoon characters to remove their cartoon 
costume heads within sight o f the public, even i f  they are suffering heat exhaustion.
14 Similarly Celebration has a town hall, because a town-hall is necessary for any pastiche suburban 
town, even though it has no elected government. The town-hall, appropriately enough is just the 
headquarters o f the Disney Celebration Corporation (the town has no public forums, perhaps a 
deliberate oversight given the way these could be used for protests and other forms o f democratic 
action). The semiotics o f Celebration are fascinating; it has porches to enhance the ‘neighbourly’ feel, 
even though the original purpose o f the porch in Florida is now outdated -  with air conditioning, there 
is no need to sit outside until the stifling heat within the house becomes bearable. It even has a water 
tower as you enter that has no real purpose and is simply there because water towers are part o f the 
whole expectations o f the bygone age. (cf. Kurtz 2000)
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but the rules are also a measure of social control that acts to keep the town looking 
like the American suburbia parodied in Pleasantville and Edward Scissorhands, and 
free of over-fecund or bed-swapping reprobates who have a taste for coloured 
curtains and an aversion to lawn-care. Films like Pleasantville show precisely what is 
missing from the idealistic “picket fence” utopian ideas of an American past: namely 
that they represent only the white suburbs in an age of segregation15. Celebration, 
like Disneyland or Genua is a further example of what Baudrillard calls “the 
hyperreal”:
What if the nostalgic past Disney is trying to create never actually existed?
What if the world was never safe, you only thought it was? What if life was never 
easier than it is right now? Then the entire town and the images of the past that it 
evokes are merely simulacra, images referring to what were only images to 
begin with. Baudrillard writes, 'When the real is no longer what it was, nostalgia 
assumes its full meaning. There is a plethora of myths of origin and of signs of 
reality." The simulacrum of Celebration appears to us as more real than the real 
architecture of strip malls and entertainment destinations that replicate 
throughout American cities: each new city looking more like the next. Celebration 
is hyperreal because it looks like what a collective memory dictates it should and 
the myth that surrounds that memory is unwavering.
(Kurtz 2000)
According to Baudrillard, what distinguishes the third order simulation is the 
way in which reality becomes irrelevant: “Disneyland is there to conceal the fact that 
it is the “real” country, all of “real America, which is Disneyland [...] Disneyland is 
presented as imaginary in order to make us believe that the rest is real, when in fact 
all of Los Angeles and the America surrounding it are no longer real, but of the order 
of the hyperreal and of simulation” (Baudrillard 1983: 25). America is postmodernism 
incarnate, and Disneyland exists to divert the attention; in the same way that prisons 
tell citizens that they are free (because they are not in prison), Disneyland tells 
citizens that rationality holds sway outside its boundaries.
Genua under Lilith is Uncle W alt’s EPCOT: a utopian city that is founded upon 
exclusion, and which is a third-order simulation based upon an imaginary ideal. 
Ironically the high street of Celebration is possibly one of the only places where you
15 The rise o f the suburbs around centres o f population (such as the migration o f the Italian Americans 
from New York to New Jersey) was a direct result o f the newly prosperous whites attempting to get 
away from black people.
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won’t find Disney World memorabilia or a GAP store, because they would be out of 
place in its conservative setting, substituting instead pastiche nineteenth century 
stores. No doubt if Lady Lilith were in charge of Celebration the “traditional” stores 
would be staffed entirely with red faced and flustered shopkeepers.
Cinderella
On reaching Genua, the fairy tale intertexts become focused upon a revision of
“Cinderella”, with the twist that it is Magrat’s job as fairy godmother to prevent her
charge from marrying the prince. Magrat finally meets Ella Saturday, nicknamed
“Embers” (Emberella) who firmly expresses her wish not to marry the prince:
‘I’m not going to that ball!’ she snapped. ‘I’m not going to marry the prince!
Do you understand?’ [...] ‘He looks slimy. He makes my flesh crawl,’ said 
Embers darkly. ‘They say he’s got funny eyes. And everyone knows that he 
does at night!’
[...] ‘Well it shouldn’t be too much to arrange. I mean, normally it’s marrying 
princes that’s the hard bit.’
‘Not for me it isn’t,’ said Embers. ‘It’s all been arranged. My other 
godmother says I’ve got to do it. She says it’s my destiny.’
‘Other godmother?’ said Magrat.
‘Everyone gets two,’ said Ella. ‘The good one and the bad one. You know  
that. Which one are you?’
[...] ‘Oh the good one,’ [Magrat] said. ‘Definitely.’
‘Funny thing,’ said Ella. ‘That’s just what the other one said, too.’
(WA 178)
Simultaneously to Magrat’s conversation with Embers, Nanny Ogg and Granny 
Weatherwax are discovering the city, and the motivations behind Ella’s other fairy 
godmother. It transpires that Ella is unknowingly the rightful heir of the Baron who 
once ruled over Genua and died of poisoning one night, leaving behind a suspicious 
will that granted his estate to the Due whom, as we have seen earlier, is controlled by 
Lilith (74-5). By marrying the Due, Ella would legitimate his rule, little though she 
knows it. The Witches learn this by talking to Mrs. Gogol, a voodoo lady who lives in 
the miasmic swamp in a shack-on-legs reminiscent of Baba Yaga’s hut, at which 
point it is also revealed that Lady Lilith is actually Esme’s sister, Lily Weatherwax, a 
fact that Granny has been keeping from the others.
The subversive nature of this anti-Cinderella story can be seen in a few 
snippets of dialogue between Magrat and Ella:
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‘What you want to do is make a career of your own,’ said Magrat 
encouragingly, to keep her spirits up. ‘You want to be your own woman. You 
want to emancipate yourself,’
‘I don’t think I want to do that,’ said Ella, speaking with caution in case it 
was a sin to offend a fairy godmother.
‘You do really,’ said Magrat.
‘Do I?’
‘Yes.’
‘Oh.’
(188)
Though Magrat’s proto-feminism is sometimes played up to make her appear a 
figure of fun, she does have a point. The use of marriage as a happy ending to the 
fairy tale is often restrictive, and a quick trawl through the pages of any fairy tale book 
reveals countless women who are auctioned off as a matter of convenience for their 
parents. The standard fairy tale reward to a hero of ‘half my kingdom and my 
daughter’s hand in marriage’ hardly seems to take the daughter’s feelings into 
account, and as we saw in the chapter covering Human Croquet, the violent actions 
of the Prince and Cinderella’s father seem to be haranguing the poor girl into 
marriage. Marriage, Witches Abroad shows us, is more than just a happy ending, 
and in fact works as part of a socio-political power network. This fact is often lost 
upon modern western readers for whom arranged marriage is a relic, but as Marina 
Warner points out, concern about arranged marriage is at the root of many popular 
fairytales, most obviously in fairytales like Beauty and the Beast where the heroine is 
given over by the father to another man (Warner 1994a: 273-297).
Ella is forced to do all the housework in a run-down house, and is zealously 
guarded by two beautiful sisters who are actually snakes transformed into human 
form by Lilith’s magic. The witches go about wrecking Lilith’s plot in typical down-to- 
earth style by destroying the accoutrements that would make Ella stand out at the 
ball. Nanny Ogg gets the coachmen who were to drive Ella to the ball dead-drunk, 
Magrat does a hatchet-job on the beautiful dress that Lilith has given Ella to wear and 
uses her wand to turn the ornate coach to take Ella to the ball into a pumpkin before 
Granny turns the horses free, leaving Lily with “No dress, no footmen, no horses and 
no coach [...] I’d like to see her gei out of that one. Stories? Hah!” (201). But
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Granny Weatherwax has forgotten about the other godmother who, true to her role in 
the fairy tale, transforms Ella’s raggedy dress into a spectacular one, turns the 
pumpkin back into a coach and replaces the coachmen and horses with mice and 
rats (after turning the original coachmen into beetles and treading on them).
The witches manage to intercept the coach before it reaches the palace by 
transforming Greebo, Nanny Ogg’s vicious tomcat, into human shape16. Innate fear 
of a cat, even in human form stops the rat/horses dead in their tracks, and the 
witches pack Ella off to Mrs Gogol’s shack in the swamp and substitute the similarly 
sized Magrat to show up at the masque in the fancy dress and the glass slippers 
(with the help of a two pairs of woolly socks to make them fit).
While Magrat acts the courtier, her confidence bolstered by a spell placed on 
her by Granny Weatherwax that will last until the clock strikes midnight, Granny and 
Nanny snoop around the palace. For a brief moment there is the suspicion that the 
Due might be a Bluebeard figure when, in his green bedroom, the Witches discover a 
round wooden portal in place of a bed:
They walked around it. Flies rose up and hummed away.
Tm thinking of a story,’ said Granny.
‘Me too,’ said Nanny Ogg, her tone slightly shriller than usual. There was 
this girl who married this man and he said you can go anywhere you like in the 
palace but you mustn’t open that door and she did and she found he’d murdered 
all his other. . . ’
Her voice trailed off [...]
‘Put it like this,’ said Nanny, trying to be reasonable against all odds. ‘What 
could we possibly find under there that’s worse than we could imagine?’
They each took a handle.
{WA: 222)
The witches discover the Due’s secret and hurry off to the ball to try and make 
sure that the story the Due wants to happen does not take place. However, the story
16 This confirms what we saw earlier on the paddleboat, that witches always cheat. Granny 
Weatherwax doesn’t hold with transforming people into other things, because it is a lot easier to leave 
someone human but make them someone think that they’re a frog which has the bonus of providing 
amusement to passers by. Unlike Lilith’s transformations however, this is of a domesticated animal 
(marginally in Greebo’s case), and though for “wolves pigs and bears, thinking that they’re human is a 
tragedy [...] [f]or a cat it’s an experience” (220). Or, as Nanny Ogg like all cat lovers insists “Greebo’s 
nearly human anyway” (208). This refusal to follow her own advice is also explained by Nanny Ogg, 
“when Esme uses words like “Everyone” and “No-one” she doesn’t include herself’ (280).
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seems to have assimilated the witches and their interference into its structure17. 
Granny finds the future disturbingly easy to predict because the usual panoply of 
choices that can be made in any situation are narrowed down to the story, a “three 
dimensional cliche”: “’it’s all got to happen,” complains Granny, “[...] everything. The 
kiss, the clock striking midnight, her running out and losing the glass slipper, 
everything.’ [...] ‘Y ’know.’ Said Nanny Ogg. ‘Clocks don’t strike midnight. Seems to 
me they just strike twelve’” (233-4).
In an effort to prevent the “happy ending”, the witches sabotage the clock, 
resulting in premature midnight, and Magrat, returning to her old self, realises what 
she is dancing with and escapes the ball, leaving a glass slipper behind her and 
taking the other one off so that she can run faster. As the Due theatrically holds the 
abandoned slipper up to the light, Granny seizes upon a weak link in the story, steps 
forward and takes the shoe from the Due’s hands then drops it on the floor where it 
smashes into a thousand pieces.
Granny’s overt intervention at the ball creates the first showdown between 
herself and Lily who steps in to save the story. Taunting a triumphant Granny with 
the fact that shoes come in pairs, she takes the other slipper forcefully from Magrat 
who has been intercepted by the snake/sisters before she could leave the palace, 
telling the Due, “It’ll fit her”.
In a parody of the traditional search for a bride sequence that ends 
“Cinderella”, the shoe is forced onto Magrat’s foot and the Due declares that it does 
indeed fit but, as a voice at the back of the crowd observes, anything would fit if you 
were allowed to put on two pairs of hairy socks first. Lilith realises that she has the 
wrong girl, but proclaims “it doesn’t matter, Esme, because it is the right slipper. So 
all we have to do is find the girl whose foot it fits (244).
17 As illustrated by L ilith ’s easy reversal o f the witches’ wrecking tactics into a satisfactory crisis
solved magically by the fairy godmother.
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Once again, the Witches step in to the story and subvert its logic, as Nanny 
Ogg pushes the way to the front of the crowd and puts on the glass slipper, which fits 
perfectly18:
‘See? You could have wasted the whole day.’
‘Especially because there must be hundreds of five-and-a-half [...] -narrow 
fit wearers in a city of this size,’ Granny went on. ‘Unless of course, you 
happened to sort of go to the right house at the start. If you had, you know, a 
lucky guess?’
‘But that’d be cheatin ’,’ said Nanny.
(245)
The search motif is comically undermined here, reminding us of the 
convenience with which the prince finds Cinderella. Supposedly, the shoe will only fit 
the true bride, but, in a defamiliarising, somehow more realistic milieu, do we really 
believe that the Prince simply allows any girl of marriageable age to try on the shoe, 
or do the pretty ones get the first try? By seizing the initiative, Nanny Ogg takes 
Cinderella’s place (without having to usurp her like the sisters do in the Grimm 
version, by chopping off their toes or heels19). It also gives a comedic twist to 
psychoanalytical readings of the tale20, like Bettelheim’s, where the shoe represents 
a vagina:
19 The bleeding feet o f the false brides is read by Bettelheim in terms o f menstruation, which is a 
disturbing reading when you consider what this implies, namely, that Cinderella is the true bride 
because she has not menstruated, “ [Cinderella] does not bleed from any part o f her body”  and “ she is 
not aggressive in her sexuality but waits patiently to be chosen. But once she is chosen, she is not at all 
reluctant”  (Bettelheim 1976: 270). There seems to be some confusion over menstruation and sexual 
unchasteness (the other sisters are “ sexually aggressive”  and their feet bleed, unlike Cinderella’s), and 
earlier Bettelheim suggests the glass slipper is a symbol for Cinderella’s virg inity (264). Ultimately, 
what arises is a problematic reading o f the Grimms’ version o f “ Cinderella” , “Aschenputter in order to 
make it fit Freud’s utter failure to convincingly account for the female sexuality in his theory o f the 
Oedipal complex, but due to the concomitant problems o f proving this, he seems to suggest Cinderella 
is all about getting the girl who is too young to successfully procreate. Historically, this might be an 
insightful reading o f “ Cinderella” , especially given the importance o f the female’s virginity in the 
patriarchal system o f primogeniture, but Bettelheim ignores any historic readings o f the tale in order to 
push his theory o f the magical healing properties o f the fairy tale.
20 Pratchett is aware o f the psychoanalytic readings o f fairy tale symbolism, and these are brought up at 
several points. “ A ll this for one prick [ . . . ] ”  Granny Weatherwax says about the enchanted castle,
bringing up the traditional reading o f the spindle in “ Sleeping Beauty”  before she goes on to say 
“ Gytha [...] I can feel you grinning. You can save the tu’penny-ha’penny psychology for them as 
wants it”  (115).
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‘We know how this bit goes, see. The Prince goes all round the city with 
the slipper, trying to find the girl whose foot fits. That’s what you was plannin’
So I can save you a bit of trouble, how about it?’
There was a flicker of uncertainty in Lily’s expression.
‘A girl,' she said, ‘of marriageable age.’
‘No problem there,’ said Nanny cheerfully.
(245)
But even though Nanny Ogg is a self-proclaimed “disgusting old baggage”, she 
proclaims that she draws the line at sleeping in the same bed as the Due because 
the Due isn’t Bluebeard at all, he a frog that Lilith has transformed into the shape of 
an attractive prince. Lilith is running two fairytales at the same time, which is another 
reason why the ball is important: the kiss puts the seal on the Due’s human form in 
addition to rounding off the Cinderella story21.
All this is to no avail, however, as Lily uses her (showy) magic to freeze 
everyone in the hall before the story spins further out of control, and dismisses the 
interventions made by the witches as irrelevant, “Whoever will remember who was at 
the ball? They’ll just remember the flight and the slipper and the happy ending”
(246). She imprisons the witches in the dungeon, although she expects them to 
escape because she is the “good” one and the good godmother wouldn’t harm her 
prisoners. How the witches escape is another riff on the Cinderella hypotext.
Cinderella, as we saw in chapter two is aided by the spirit of her dead mother in 
some versions of the tale. Emberella’s mother is still alive and kicking in the person 
of Erzulie Gogol, consort of the Baron that ruled over Genua. It is Emberella’s dead 
father, reanimated as a zombie by Mrs. Gogol’s voodoo, who acts to secure her 
rightful inheritance. Where in “Aschenputtel” the dead mother’s benign influence is 
signalled by the magic birds who give the girl her dress amongst other things, Mrs 
Gogol’s bird of choice is a large black rooster, Legba22 which leads Emberella to her 
mother’s shack in the swamp and signals the approach of Baron Saturday who 
arrives as the incarnation of carnival to rescue the witches from the dungeon.
22 Legba is the name o f the voodoo spirit o f the cross-roads, “ where the Above meets the Below. He is 
"on both sides o f the mirror". He leans on a stick, and another o f his symbols is the macoutte (straw 
sack). Chickens are sacrificed to him by twisting their neck t il l they are dead.”  (Breebart 2002)
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The entrance of Baron Saturday at the peak of the carnival outside the palace 
is the force that finally undoes Lilith’s plots. Mrs Gogol’s magic has made Baron 
Saturday more than just an undead ex-lover, she has infused him with the essence of 
the swamp, he has become the avatar of “what you have to have first, before you get 
the swamp” (254). Lily’s magic, which was powerful enough to keep Mrs Gogol 
isolated in the swamp away from her child cannot affect him, and in trying to destroy 
the Baron with her magic she ends the enchantment holding the Due in human shape 
before that story is ended when the Baron puts his foot down (on the Due). Lilith is 
forced to flee and this ends the Cinderella intertext, but not the story. First there 
must be two showdowns between witches that reveal the underlying motivation of 
Pratchett’s use of fairytales.
The magic of Myth and Mirrors
In explaining the motivations that led her to take control of Genua, Lilith places
herself firmly in the tradition of Utopians like Disney:
‘You see this country? It’s all swamps and fogs. There’s no direction. But I 
can make this a great city. Not a sprawling place like Ankh Morpork, but a place 
that works.’
The girl doesn’t want to marry a frog.’
‘What will that matter in a hundred years’ time?’
'It matters now.’
(247)
Progress, as Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer noted in the Dialectic of 
Enlightenment is important story, or what Lyotard would call a “grand narrative”, the 
myth that “our own civilized reason[has] the true power to improve the living and 
working condition of all human beings” (Zipes 1994: 4). Or, as Granny Weatherwax 
puts it “Progress just means bad things happen faster” (WA: 250). Where Lily 
Weatherwax tries to make the world a better place by making it conform to fairy tales, 
Esme Weatherwax suggests a more pragmatic route:
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‘Mind you,’ said Magrat, ‘I don’t like swamps. If it wasn’t for the frog and 
everything, I’d see Lily’s point.
Then you’re nothing but a daft godmother,’ snapped Granny [ . . . ] ' You can’t 
go around building a better world for people. Only people can build a better 
world for people. Otherwise it’s just a cage. Besides, you don’t build a better 
world by choppin’ heads off and giving decent girls away to frogs.’
(250)
Witches Abroad then, can be read as a critique of the hyper-real23. The cost of 
living in a fairy tale world is clearly spelled out in terms of repression and exclusion:
‘It’s so spotless,’ said Magrat. ‘Makes you wish you were a better person, 
really.’
[...] ‘Amazing, really, needing all these guards in a city where people are so 
clean and quiet,’ said Magrat.
‘Perhaps there’s so much niceness to be spread around they need a lot of 
people to do it,’ said Nanny Ogg.
(154)
Progress is not the only myth that Lilith believes in. Lilith’s rule of Genua can be 
seen as an example of how fairy tale has become myth. Myth, according to Roland 
Barthes, is “frozen speech”:
Myth consists in overturning culture into nature or, at least, the social, the 
cultural, the ideological, the historical into the ‘natural’. What is nothing but a 
product of class division and its moral, cultural and aesthetic consequences is 
presented (stated) as being a ‘matter of course’; under the effect of mythical 
inversion, the quite contingent foundations of the utterance become Common 
Sense, Right Reason, the Norm, General Opinion, in short the doxa (which is the 
secular figure of the origin.)
(Barthes 1972: 165)
The fairy tales intertextually incorporated into Witches Abroad are all the 
“classical” fairy tales, recognisable to contemporary audiences: “Little Red Riding 
Hood”, “Sleeping Beauty”, “Cinderella”, “The Frog Prince”. The obvious benefit of 
these fairytale intertexts is that the primary audience recognises them and therefore 
get the jokes that arise from their subversion. Utilising unknown or obscure intertexts 
would inevitably reduce the effectiveness of their humorous payload. Perhaps 
another reason for the prominence of the “classic” fairytales is hinted at in the long 
quotation from the opening above, where the narrator speaks of stories evolving,
“The weakest have died and the strongest have survived and they have grown fat on
2'’ I use the term hyper-real here to avoid confusion over terms, especially the term ‘postmodern’ , which 
can refer to a type o f art that subverts a way o f life dominated by image and consumer-capitalism or 
can refer to that way o f life and hence can be either a positive or pejorative term.
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the retelling” (1996: 8-9), he says, a fact that is self evident when one thinks about 
the vast diversity of collected folktales, but the relative obscurity of all but a few 
popular fairy tales. Evolution does not happen in a vacuum; the law of natural 
selection tells us that adaptation to environment is the key to evolutionary success, 
and the “classic” fairy tales have all adapted successfully to the demands of an 
bourgeois capitalist world, surviving the transition from rural and oral culture to and 
industrial and written one.
As Jack Zipes recognises, the success and perpetual popularity of these tales 
is due to their becoming myth. They carry with them the societal norms that we wish 
children to conform to, as though these standards were obvious and eternal, rather 
than simply reflecting the ideologies that are the construct of a particular historically 
contingent ruling class:
All the tools of modern industrial society (the printing press, the radio, the 
camera, the film, the record, the videocassette) have made their mark on the 
fairy tale to make it classical ultimately in the name of the bourgeoisie which 
refuses to be named, denies involvement; for the fairy tale must appear 
harmless, natural, eternal, ahistorical, therapeutic.
(Zipes 1994: 7)
The analysis of the classical fairy tales used in Witches Abroad above shows 
that the values taught by these fairy tales are directed at making their audience view 
the world in a certain way. Sleeping Beauty is rewarded for her passivity, Red Riding 
Hood is punished for her disobedience, and, as Maria Tatar notes in The Hard Facts 
of the Grimms’ Fairy Tales, women who take on an active role are demonised and 
sometimes compelled to “put on [the] red-hot shoes and dance the night away” 
(I/1/A270)24. We have seen that Granny Weatherwax does not hold with this function, 
and disapproves of the way that stories predetermine people and make them less 
than human, and her deconstruction of the stories in each case acts as an 
intertextual revision which, by giving the narrative point of view to someone typically
24 This comment is from L ily  who refuses to admit that she is beaten because she used stories. The red 
hot shoes refers to the ending o f Snow White that the Grimms used in their later editions o f the book, 
where the wicked queen is forced to attend the marriage, and then compelled to wear red hot shoes as 
punishment for her wrongs, and dances to her death.
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excluded from the fairy tale, exposes and subverts the underlying premises of 
fairytales which we usually ignore.
Esme’s distrust of stories can also be seen as a critique of the hyperreal. 
Pratchett makes the link between the hyperreal in our world and his fantasy world 
very early in the novel when he writes:
All across the multiverse there are backward tribes* who distrust mirrors 
and images because, they say, they steal a bit of a person's soul and there's 
only so much of a person to go around. And the people who wear more clothes 
say this is just superstition, despite the fact that other people who spend their 
lives appearing in images of one sort or another seem to develop a thin quality.
It's put down to over-work and, tellingly, over-exposure instead.
Just superstition. But a superstition doesn't have to be wrong.
* Considered backward, that is, by people who wear more clothes than they
do.
{WA. 10 *- represents a footnote in the original text)
In what Guy Debord memorably called the “society of the spectacle”, we 
instantly recognise that Pratchett is referring to what we now call “celebrities”, about 
whom so many of the stories we find in daily publications such as tabloid newspapers 
revolve. The existence of gossip columns highlight the desire for “stories”, just as the 
phenomenon of reality TV, and its cast of people trying to “be someone” helps us 
understand Debord’s assertion that “The whole life of those societies in which 
modern conditions of production prevail prevents itself as an immense accumulation 
of spectacles. All that was once directly lived has become mere representation” 
(Debord reprinted in Lane 2000: 99).
Postmodern societies are characterised by the abundance of stories that 
surround their subjects and that are to be found in all forms of the mass media. The 
fairy godmothers of our society are the ones that convert the chaos of events into 
stories, people in positions of power who use the formula of stories to make the 
public think about events in ‘mythical’ ways: spin-doctors, PR consultants and 
editors, all of whom work at the behest of the political elite and the ultra-rich. The 
formulaic coverage of the ‘fairy tale wedding’ or the ‘political scandal’, not to mention 
wars, shows precisely how people can become dehumanised by media portrayal that
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puts them firmly in a ‘role’ in a story whether they like it or not. We understand 
people in terms of their roles in stories, and those in power attempt to manipulate 
those stories to their own ends25. Witches Abroad highlights that stories especially 
ones that seem innocuous like fairy tales, are actually powerful tools in manipulating 
the way that people understand the world and their place in it. Lilith, with her 
command of stories and her ability to view everything that is happening in the world 
creates a dys/utopia reminiscent of Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four.
One of the reasons for this comparison between Lilith and Orwell’s “Big 
Brother” is due to the way that Lilith uses mirrors25. At the top of one of the castle’s 
towers is an octagon of mirrors that acts as a magical panopticon, allowing her to see 
events from the perspective of any reflection, whether it be a glint on the surface of 
water or a silvered mirror. Inhabitants of Genua are kept in line by the possibility that 
they are being observed (Lilith installs lots of mirrors in the dungeon27), and so 
conformity is the result of the citizens assuming that they are being watched at all 
times. Mrs Pleasant, the palace cook, for example makes sure that she stays plump 
and keeps her arms covered with flour so that she looks the storybook cook, and on 
first meeting Nanny Ogg ushers her away from the kitchen, with the explanation that 
the walls have ears (169). Not only is Genua a hyper-real city, it is also one that is 
structured, like all modern cities on the panopticon, the device that Foucault criticised 
in Discipline and Punish as a structuralist model of how power operates in society.
25 These formulaic stories are not only fairy tales, but also other genres that have become mythical such 
as the western. George W Bush’s cowboy rhetoric can be seen as an attempt to convert complicated 
political struggles into the language o f the western, where the good guys can be identified by the colour 
o f their hat. Change the story and the heroic CIA-funded mujahadin freedom fighters o f yore, 
defending their homeland against the evil Soviet empire become (quite literally in the case o f Osama 
Bin Laden) the repressive Taliban/ A l Quaeda2' o f today
26 O f course, a m irror in a text leads to a Lacanian reading, which is the tack that Sayer follows in her 
analysis o f the novel. Her reading, like most psychoanalytical criticism, elides the political and 
historical meaning from the novel however, and she even suggests that Granny Weatherwax restores 
patriarchy (Sayer 2000: 97), a reading that ignores the subversive way that Granny deconstructs the 
fairy tales.
27 The re-educational dungeon would be the Discworld equivalent o f Room 101. Never has being 
taught how to whistle sounded more sinister.
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Lilith’s great power is attributed to this mirror magic -  at several points in the 
novel the Lancre witches are stunned by the feats that Lilith is capable of, from 
permanent transformation of snakes into beautiful women, to the ability to freeze 
time. The magic mirror is more traditionally associated with “Snow White”, where the 
witch-queen is, like Lilith, excessively worried about outward appearances. But this 
is not only a literal mirror, but also a metaphor for all forms of representation. The 
mirror is a traditional metaphor for art and the idea that art “holds a mirror to life” is a 
well known cliche28. Lilith’s command of the mirror is such though, that she can 
make the boundaries between reality and fiction break down, so that the reality 
begins obeying the rules of the stories:
[T]he stories . . .  to ride on stories . . .  to borrow the strength of them . . .  the 
comfort of them . . .  to be in the hidden centre of them . . . Can you understand 
that? The sheer pleasure of seeing the patterns repeat themselves?
(273)
‘What about stories?’ said Magrat.
‘Lily is using them,’ said Granny. '[...] Look, she don’t want your Ella to 
marry that Due man just because of politics or something. That’s just an .. . 
explanation. ‘S not a reason. She wants the girl to marry the prince because 
that’s what the story demands.’
‘What’s in it for her?’ said Nanny.
‘In the middle of ‘em all, the fairy godmother or the wicked witch .. . you 
remember? That’s where Lily is putting herself. . . like [...] Remember that time 
last year when the circus thing came to Lancre? [...] there was that man in the 
middle, you remember. With the moustache and big hat?’
‘Him? But he didn’t do anything much,’ said Nanny [...]
That’s why he was the most important one there,’ said Granny. ‘It was the 
things going on around him that made him important.’
What’s Lily feeding the stories?’ said Magrat.
‘People,’ said Granny. She frowned.
‘Stories!’ she said. Well, we’ll have to see about that
(194)
Lily’s power is the power of representation. Toads become princes just 
because she says so. She feeds people to the stories and derives power in return,
28 As Nanny Ogg says o f the theatre in Wyrd Sisters: “ It's art, [.. .] It wossname, holds a mirror up to 
life.'”  (Pratchett 1997: 213), an allusion to Hamlet where the Danish prince coaches the actors “ to hold, 
as 'twere, the m irror up to nature; to show virtue her own feature, scorn her own image, and the very 
age and body o f the time his form and pressure.”  III.ii.20-3
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much like a modern day spin-doctor (194)29. Explaining Granny Weatherwax’s 
hatred of stories, the narrator explains “She hated everything that predestined 
people, that fooled them, that made them slightly less than human.” (239)
There is ultimately an opposition set up between Lily Weatherwax, who 
represents everything unreal (and hyper-real), and Esme who, as we saw above 
suggested that “If you want to amount to anything as a witch [...] you got to learn 
three things. What’s real, what’s not real, and what’s the difference - “(137). The 
opposition is further spelt out when Lilith contemplates the idea of the anti­
godmother, someone who instead of constructing stories, goes around 
deconstructing them:
[Lilith] wondered whether there was such a thing as the opposite of a fairy 
godmother. Most things had their opposite, after all. If so, she wouldn’t be a bad 
fairy godmother, because that’s just a good fairy godmother seen from another 
viewpoint.
The opposite would be someone who was poison to stories and, thought 
Lilith, quite the most evil creature in the world.
(146)
This function of the two women “mirroring” one another is accentuated by the 
fact that physically they are almost identical, “Give or take the odd laughter line and 
wrinkle, [Lily] was Granny Weatherwax to the life” (231) The first time Mrs Gogol 
appears in the novel, she says “’Even mirrors have their reflection. We got to fight 
mirrors with mirrors.' She glared up through the trees to a slim white tower in the 
distance. We've got to find her [Lilith’s] reflection” suggesting that Mrs Gogol too, is 
implicated on bringing Granny to Genua (10). Where Granny wears black, Lily wears 
white, and in some respects their philosophies are strikingly similar; Lily says she
29 L ilith ’s power also falters when she becomes a visible part o f the story rather than working it from 
behind the scenes. “ That’s how it works when you turn the world into stories [.. .] You shouldn’t turn 
the world into stories [...] but i f  you do, then you’ve got to know when the story ends” (270). A t the 
time o f writing, I cannot help thinking o f Alistair Campbell, who, like the Wizard o f Oz, lost his 
position o f power when he became part o f the story, and not the controller o f it. This comparison to the 
propagandist is also merited by a phrase used by L ilith  when she is trying to get the witches to leave, 
“ I t ’s a city far away o f which you know little”  which echoes Neville Chamberlain’ s famous speech 
explaining Britain’s refusal to intervene when Nazi Germany invaded Czechoslovakia, “ How horrible, 
fantastic, incredible, it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas-masks here because o f a 
quarrel in a faraway country between people o f whom we know nothing” . The implications to anyone 
who recognises that speech are obvious.
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killed the Baron because “he didn’t show any respect. If you’ve got no respect, 
you’ve got nothing”, a phrase previously uttered by Granny in a different context 
(247). It is for this reason that the long period of travel between Lancre and Genua is 
so important: it allows us to see exactly how the two witches are opposites in their 
ideas about magic and wish fulfilment. Where Lily is a utopian and uses her powers 
freely, Esme is a pragmatist who scarcely uses her magic at all. Where Lily ignores 
the minute details in favour of the bigger picture, Esme is a humanist who values 
people more than stories. Rather than using magic to give people what they think 
they want, Granny’s magic “gives people what they know they really need, not what 
we think they ought to want” (260).
This is an ironic state of affairs, given the way in which fantasy as a genre is 
usually critically dismissed for being “escapist”. Eric Rabkin suggested that fantasy 
and science fiction are similar to the fairy tale because of the importance of wish- 
fulfilment in those genres, but this is a novel about why wish-fulfilment is a bad thing 
(Rabkin 1980). Witches Abroad not only breaks down the classical fairy tales so that 
we can see the unpleasant assumptions that underlie them, but also criticises stories 
(myths) that cause people to view the world inaccurately.
The return of the real
Lilith is finally vanquished after a series of show-downs, the first of which is the 
appearance of Baron Saturday in the castle. The Lancre witches have done their bit 
by deconstructing the story-structures that Lily has so carefully plotted, but the 
intervention of the Baron demonstrates the way that the carnivalesque can challenge 
authority.
Bakhtin’s concept of carnival comes about in his analysis of Rabelais where he 
claims that critics have misunderstood and misread Rabelais’s humour because they 
do not fully understand how it is linked to a kind of folk humour based upon the 
medieval festivals where fools were crowned as kings, and the whole world enters a 
period of topsy turvy subversion. Carnival is not a play to put on to amuse an
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audience, “while carnival lasts, there is no other life outside it ...it is a special 
condition of the entire world, of the world’s revival and renewal (Bakhtin 1984: 7) 
Andrew Butler suggests that one of Bakhtin’s comments on Rabelais as a 
literary producer of the carnivalesque could equally be applied to Pratchett:
[His] images have a certain undestroyable non-official nature. No dogma, 
no authoritarianism, no narrow-minded seriousness can exist with [these] 
images: these images are opposed to all that is finished and polished, to all 
pomposity, to every ready-made solution in the sphere of thought and world 
outlook’.
(Bakhtin in Butler 2000: 47)
It has already been mentioned that Genua resembles New Orleans, and one of 
the things that the two share, apart from voodoo ‘gators and gumbo, is the 
importance of carnival:
All year the people of Genua were nice and quiet. But history has always 
allowed the downtrodden one night somewhere in any calendar to restore 
temporarily the balance of the world. It might be called the Feat of Fools, or the 
King of the Bean. Or even Samedi Nuit Mort, when even those with the most 
taxing and responsible of duties can kick back and have fun.
(WA: 195)
Desiderata’s notes make plain the importance of Carnival in undermining the 
strictures of Lilith’s utopia:
’But no-one can stop Mardi Gras [...] If anything canne be done it be on 
Samedi Nuit Morte, the last night of carnivale, the night halfway between the 
Living and the Dead, when magic flows in the streets. If L.. is vooneruble it is 
then, for carnivale is everything she hates
(97)
The Baron enters the palace as the spirit of carnival, appropriate given the fact 
that he is based upon the real voodoo spirit, Baron Samedi. Baron Samedi (French 
for Saturday) is a trickster figure, typically invoked as part of the Mardi Gras festival, 
and Baron Saturday, when he enters the palace is wearing the traditional garb of 
Baron Samedi: the silver tipped cane, and the top hat. Dancing, twirling and leaping 
across the room, accompanied by the pounding of drums Lilith’s magic is unable to 
stop him because at that point he is, explains Granny Weatherwax, the swamp, the 
river and the whole world (258).
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This explanation only makes sense when we consider what the swamp 
represents, and we need only look a few pages earlier to guess what that is: “Lily 
threw up her hands. ‘What do you want, then? It’s your choice. There’s me . . .  or 
there’s that woman in the swamp. Light or dark. Fog or sunshine. Dark chaos or 
happy endings” (247). The swamp, like the carnival, represents chaos. Miasmic, it 
resists attempts to structure it, and though you might build Walt Disney World on it, 
some day the swamp will come back and swallow whatever structures have been 
superimposed upon it.
Witches Abroad can be seen as a carnivalesque work on several levels, above 
and beyond the actual carnival it depicts. Firstly, Pratchett, as his popularity attests 
is perhaps the nearest we have to Bakhtin’s written folk humour (Butler 2000: 47). 
Parody, the literary device that characterises Pratchett’s work, is a carnivalesque 
device (Vice 1997: 152) and as we have seen, the Witches go about comically 
undermining those fairy tales that are examples of frozen speech. Though this does 
not seem to be the parody of “sacred texts” that Bakhtin talks about when he gives 
examples of monks parodying holy texts such as sermons and treatises, Jack Zipes 
highlights that even the classical myths are no longer ‘Myths’ in the strictest sense 
(that is, as stories that we believe in as explanations to the state of the world -  we no 
longer believe that the sun is towed by a cart and horses, for example). The reason 
that the parody of sacred texts is important for carnival is because these texts are 
mythicized and authoritative, and seem natural and eternal. Therefore, the fairy tale 
is a form of sacred text due to the way it has become myth, and therefore 
“dehistoricized [and] depoliticised to represent and maintain the hegemonic interests 
of the bourgeoisie. Classical myths and fairy tales are contemporary myths that 
pervade our daily lives in the manner described by Roland Barthes in Mythologies" 
(Zipes 1994: 6). The fairy tale, originally an oral genre but ossified into a mythical 
structure is subjected to carnival laughter, which works to revise and subvert it. As 
Zipes comments, “Only innovative fairy tales are antimythical, resist the tide of
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mythicization, comment on the fairy tale as myth” (1994: 5-6). Vice writes that 
“Carnival is the opposite of a time of terror or purges” which is why Lilith, totalitarian 
fairy land despot, loathes it, “it was hostile to all that was immortalized and 
completed” (Vice 1997: 153).
Another carnivalesque feature is personified by Baron Samedi. Vice writes that 
to Bakhtin, “Death and renewal are central to carnival, represented most often by the 
carnival act of ‘the mock crowning and subsequent decrowning o f the carnival king" 
(Vice 1997: 152 author’s emphasis). Baron Samedi is the gatekeeper of death in 
Voodoo lore, and Baron Saturday as an undead man granted great power on this, 
the last night of his un-life (Death comes to claim him after he restores Ella to the 
throne) is instrumental in handing power over to Ella at the peak of the Carnival, 
which is itself a renewal for the city.
After forcing Lily to retreat through the power of carnival Mrs Gogol then seems 
to step in, taking Lilith’s place as the power behind the throne, with her daughter as 
the ruler. This is one of the criticisms of the carnivalesque: the world is turned topsy 
turvy for a brief while, and then, when the chaos ends, retains its usual shape, almost 
as though carnival were a safety valve where the oppressed can ‘blow off steam’ for 
a limited period, but that period of ‘subversion’ in fact exists simply to make sure the 
system is able to cope with its injustices.
Granny Weatherwax intervenes at this point so as to ‘end’ the cyclical story, 
where Mrs Gogol and Ella would simply replace Lily and the Due. “This aint right, 
you know” she complains:
‘She’s the one who ought to rule, fair enough. And you used magic to help 
her this far, and that’s all right. But it stops right here. It’s up to her what 
happens next. You can’t make things right by magic. You can only stop making 
them wrong’
(260)
This leads to a show-down between the witch and the voodoo priestess, with 
the stake set by Granny Weatherwax, “No more magic in the affairs of Genua [...] No
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more stories. No more godmothers. Just people deciding for themselves. For good 
or bad. Right or Wrong. [...] And you leave Lily Weatherwax to me” (261).
Mrs Gogol uses the voodoo doll she created to represent Lilith against Granny 
Weatherwax to good effect, but “headology” wins out over magic, as Granny thrusts 
her own arm into a flame30, which causes the voodoo doll to catch light and burn, but 
leaves her own arm unscathed. Headology here is a form of hyper-critical thinking: if 
one really believes that by controlling a mannequin one has the power to harm a 
person, then sure enough, harm befalling the person should logically be reflected 
back on the mannequin. After her defeat, Mrs Gogol vows not to interfere in the 
affairs of state, even denying her kinship when asked by Ella they know each other. 
But we are left in little doubt that Ella will be a preferable ruler to Lilith, even if she 
has had little training for becoming a monarch, because the one wish that Ella makes 
in the presence of Magrat is to go to the carnival: “that’s what Genua ought to be” 
she says, “Not a few people dancing in palaces, but everyone dancing in the streets” 
(191). On being declared absolute ruler, the first thing she does is end the ball to go 
and dance in the carnival, which is what she has always wanted to do, adding that it’s 
not compulsory for anyone else to do the same. Cynically, Pratchett adds, “The 
nobles of Genua had enough experience to know what it means when a ruler says 
something is not compulsory./Within minutes the ball was empty, except for three 
figures [Baron Saturday, Mrs Gogol and Death]” (266).
This is the end of the main Cinderella intertext, “The wicked witch is defeated, 
the ragged princess comes into her own, the kingdom is restored. Happy days are 
here again. Happy ever after. Which means that life stops here” (267). All that 
remains is to find out what becomes of Lilith, and Lilith’s fate highlights the opposition 
between herself and Granny Weatherwax. A rooftop showdown takes place, where, 
to stop Nanny Ogg and Magrat becoming targets for Lily, Granny Weatherwax fakes
,0 Again, the point o f witches not playing by their own rules is proved, as pages before it is Granny 
who says that “ noone who puts their arm into fire is not burned” .
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her own death by leaping off the tower. But, she returns minutes later, to give Lilith ‘a 
hiding’, not with magic or headology, but “with skin”. On her return however, Granny 
accidentally smashes one of the mirrors in Lily’s panopticon, which causes Lily to be 
sucked into a world of mirrors:
Lily Weatherwax looked out at the multi-layered, silvery world.
‘Where am I?’
INSIDE THE MIRROR.
‘Am I dead?’
THE ANSWER TO THAT, said Death, IS SOMEWHERE BETWEEN NO
AND YES.
Lily turned, and a billion figures turned with her.
‘When can I get out?’
WHEN YOU FIND THE ONE THAT’S REAL.
Lily Weatherwax ran on through the endless reflections.
(278)
This is a satisfying conclusion, which ties in with Pratchett’s critique of the 
hyperreal. Ultimately, Lily fails the test because she cannot differentiate between the 
reflection (or representation) and reality. Esme also ends up in the looking glass 
world because she tried, unsuccessfully, to save her sister from being swallowed by 
the mirrors. A sequence occurs that is almost identical to that above. Granny 
Weatherwax is offered the same decision, with one major difference: instead of 
running through the infinite reflections, she asks a further question:
’Is this a trick question?’
NO
Granny looked down at herself.
This one,’ she said.
(281)
Esme, grounded in the real, knows enough to recognise that she is the only 
real one. This choice is foreshadowed at multiple junctures during the book, with 
comments like “Magrat might always be trying to find herself, but Granny didn’t even 
understand the idea of the search” (128). Where Magrat is very much a 
(post)modern girl, with her self-help books and progressive liberal ideas, Esme is 
rooted in a more traditional, humanist idea of the self. Again, this is a criticism of 
Lilith’s “spectacular” understanding of the world. Explaining the influence of Debord’s 
Society of the Spectacle on the work of Baudrillard, Richard Lane points out “In the
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privileging of the human sense of sight, in the society of the spectacle, Debord 
argues that there is a distancing from the real world accessed most immediately 
through touch” (Lane 2000: 99). Granny’s resistance to the hyper-real comes from 
being in touch with her physical existence, and it is for this reason that her threat to 
teach Lilith a lesson with “skin” rather than magic, is significant.
The happy ending of Witches Abroad leaves Emberella as ruler of Genua, and 
after Magrat sees what wishing, and granting wishes, leads to, sees Magrat dispense 
of the magic wand by throwing it into a river where it passes out of history. The 
witches head back to Lancre.
Conclusion
Witches Abroad demonstrates that fantasy literature can reflect the concerns of 
society just as succinctly as realist (or magic realist) literature: the reign of the hyper­
real and way that fairy tales can become repressive myths that, like the panopticon, 
are part of a society’s power structures, are all successfully exhibited by Pratchett in 
this novel.
If the novel takes a critical look at fairy tales, it also shows how fairy tales can 
be liberatory if they are wrested from the control of the bourgeoisie back into the 
hands of the subversive folk humour that Bakhtin identified as essential to the 
carnivalesque (and you don’t get much earthier humour than Nanny Ogg’s )31. Fairy
11 Lady L ilith  De Tempscire, the ball-organising despot o f Genua is a direct descendent o f Perrault’ s 
fairy godmother whose introduction displaced the mother as the g ir l’ s magic helper. Where in earlier 
versions, represented by the Grimms’ “ Aschenputtel”, the g ir l’ s dead mother is implicated in her rise, 
Perrault’ s tale seems to imply that all it takes to be accepted into the bourgeoisie is a particularly astute 
fashion adviser and patron (Zipes 1991: 30). It is also particularly relevant that L ilith  is depicted as a 
social-climber:
I f  you wanted to get anywhere in this world - and she'd decided, right at the start, that 
she wanted to get as far as it was possible to go - you wore names lightly, and you took 
power anywhere you found it. She had buried three husbands, and at least two o f them 
had been already dead.
And you moved around a lot. Because most people didn't move around much. Change 
countries and your name and, i f  you had the right manner, the world was your mollusc.
For example, she'd had to go a mere hundred miles to become a Lady.
She'd go to any lengths now ..  . (WA: 17-8)
It is interesting that L ilith ’s assumed name, is merely a French translation o f “ Weatherwax”  with a 
feudal “ De”  stuck on for good measure.
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tales originated as wish fulfilment from the point of view of the common people until 
they became a form of (children’s) literature and were edited to reflect this new role 
of socialising children into bourgeois values. Pratchett reclaims the fairy tale by 
exposing the values that underlie the classical fairy tale, and putting them back in a 
context where they can be subverted. The story of Emberella turns out not to be the 
one about the passive girl who a prince chooses to marry, but the girl who ends up 
ruling a city. By ingraining a kind of earthy realism into the fairy tale, and holding 
fairy tale solutions up to rational ridicule (what do you know about a prince who 
chops through bramble other than he’ll be handy with the hedge trimmers?),
Pratchett breathes life into the classical fairy tale, and renews the power that these 
formulaic narratives had before they were appropriated by the bowdlerising 
educators who stripped the vitality from the fairy tale to make them “more suitable for 
children” or maybe, to make children “more suitable” as citizens.
The various embedded fairy tales in Witches Abroad could be seen as 
examples of element 5, “re-vision”, which, as I noted in chapter one, has been 
successfully utilised by feminist writers to undermine the sexism of some of the 
classical fairy tales. But Pratchett’s use of revisionism can be seen as a mixture 
between elements 5 and 7, a kind of “metafictional revision”. Pratchett uses the fairy 
tale to highlight the extent to which humans understand their lives through formulaic 
narratives like fairy tales and how this belief in fantasies structures their perception of 
the world. Witches Abroad is postmodern in the sense suggested by Linda 
Hutcheon, as a form of art that “questions centralized, totalised, heirarchized, closed 
systems: questions, but does not destroy [...] It acknowledges the human urge to 
make order, while pointing out that the orders we create are just that: human 
constructs” (Hutcheon 1999: 41). A quotation from The Science o f Discworld 
confirms this:
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Discworld does not run on scientific lines. Why pretend that it might?
Dragons don’t breathe fire because they’ve got asbestos lungs -  they breathe 
fire because everyone knows that’s what dragons do.
What runs Discworld is deeper than mere magic and more powerful than 
pallid science. It is narrative imperative, the power of story. It plays a role 
similar to that substance known as phlogiston once believed to be that principle 
or substance within inflammable things that enabled them to burn. In the 
Discworld universe, then, there is narrativium. It is part of the spin of every atom, 
the drift of every cloud. It is what causes them to be what they are and continue 
to exist and take part in the ongoing story of the world.
On Roundworld things happen because the things want to happen. What 
people want does not greatly figure in the scheme of things and the universe isn’t 
there to tell a story.
(Pratchett, Stewart and Cohen 2000: 10) 
Pratchett’s Discworld series is always pointing out that humans do not live in 
the real world, but an imaginary one of their own creation:
People don’t live on the Disc any more than, in less hand-crafted parts of 
the multiverse, they live on balls. Oh, planets may be the place where their body 
eats its tea, but they live elsewhere, in worlds of their own which orbit very 
handily around the centre of their heads.
(Pratchett 1998: 9)
These imaginary worlds are inevitably based on stories, whether these are 
grand narratives such as religion, history or progress, or less grand ones, such as the 
fairy tale. This is a point of view reminiscent to Louis Althusser’s pronouncement that 
“[i]deology represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions 
of existence” (Althusser 1998: 294). But in an ironic twist, these beliefs held by 
humans actually affect the physical world around them. Just as Althusser pointed out 
that ideology is not something that is in people’s heads but is actually present in the 
physical world, and manifested in their habits and customs in the famous phrase 
“[i]deology has a material existence” (296), in Pratchett’s world gods, and other 
anthropomorphic personifications (such as the Grim Reaper) exist only because 
people believe in them, and die when belief in them ceases. It is easy to forget 
sometimes that stories have power not just to represent, but to change the world, 
something that Pratchett is intensely aware of:
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[E]ven ordinary books are dangerous, and not only the ones like Make 
Gelignite the Professional Way. A man sits in some museum somewhere and 
writes a harmless book about political economy and suddenly thousands of 
people who haven’t even read it are dying because the ones who did haven’t got 
the joke. Knowledge is dangerous, which is why governments often clamp down 
on people who can think thoughts above a certain calibre.
(Pratchett 1998: 23)
Ultimately, the fairy tale for Pratchett is used as an example of the fantasy 
belief that humans use consciously or unconsciously to structure the world. Though 
Lilith corrupts that element of narrativisation, by taking control of the stories and 
imposing them on others, this does not mean that Pratchett thinks that fantasy is a 
mere consolatory nonsense: far from it, though Witches Abroad deconstructs the 
fantastic classical fairy tale, Pratchett presents fantasy itself as something that is a 
necessary part of human existence:
‘All right,’ said Susan. Tm not stupid. You’re saying humans need , , ,  
fantasies to make life bearable.’
REALLY? AS IF IT WAS SOME KIND OF PINK PILL? NO. HUMANS 
NEED FANTASY TO BE HUMAN. TO BE THE PLACE WHERE THE FALLING 
ANGEL MEETS THE RISING APE.
‘Tooth fairies? Hogfathers? Little—‘
YES. AS PRACTICE. YOU HAVE TO START LEARNING TO BELIEVE 
THE LITTLE LIES.
‘So we can believe the big ones?’
YES. JUSTICE. MERCY. DUTY. THAT SORT OF THING.
‘They’re not the same at all!’
YOU THINK SO? THEN TAKE THE UNIVERSE AND GRIND IT DOWN 
TO THE FINEST POWDER AND SIEVE IT THROUGH THE FINEST SIEVE 
AND THEN SHOW ME ONE ATOM OF JUSTICE, ONE MOLECULE OF 
MERCY. AND YET — Death waved a hand. AND YET YOU ACT AS IF THERE 
IS SOME IDEAL ORDER IN THE WORLD, AS IF THERE IS SOME .. . SOME 
RIGHTNESS IN THE UNIVERSE BY WHICH YOU MAY BE JUDGED.
‘Yes, but people have got to believe that, or what’s the point —‘
MY POINT EXACTLY
(Pratchett 1996c: 270)
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Conclusion
At this point, to prevent overdue strain on the reader’s page turning muscles I 
will set two quotations from different chapters, originally cited on pages 111 and 233, 
alongside each other to faciliate easy comparison.
I’ve been cheated by my own imagination. The imagination unbound, 
unconfined by cause and effect. But then how else can we make things work out 
right? Or find redemption? Or real right justice?
(HC: 351)
‘All right,’ said Susan. Tm not stupid. You’re saying humans need , , ,  
fantasies to make life bearable.’
REALLY? AS IF IT WAS SOME KIND OF PINK PILL? NO. HUMANS 
NEED FANTASY TO BE HUMAN. TO BE THE PLACE WHERE THE FALLING 
ANGEL MEETS THE RISING APE.
Tooth fairies? Hogfathers? Little —‘
YES. AS PRACTICE. YOU HAVE TO START LEARNING TO BELIEVE 
THE LITTLE LIES.
‘So we can believe the big ones?’
YES. JUSTICE. MERCY. DUTY. THAT SORT OF THING.
They’re not the same at all!’
YOU THINK SO? THEN TAKE THE UNIVERSE AND GRIND IT DOWN 
TO THE FINEST POWDER AND SIEVE IT THROUGH THE FINEST SIEVE 
AND THEN SHOW ME ONE ATOM OF JUSTICE, ONE MOLECULE OF 
MERCY. AND YET — Death waved a hand. AND YET YOU ACT AS IF THERE 
IS SOME IDEAL ORDER IN THE WORLD, AS IF THERE IS SOME . . . SOME 
RIGHTNESS IN THE UNIVERSE BY WHICH YOU MAY BE JUDGED.
‘Yes, but people have got to believe that, or what’s the point— '
MY POINT EXACTLY
(Pratchett 1996c: 270) 
Though these quotations are taken from very different novels, themselves part 
of disparate genres, the overall message is the same. Fantasy and the imagination 
are important parts of being human, and we need stories to understand our place in 
the world. I believe this study has shown how some postmodern fictions that use the 
fairy tale as an intertext do so in order to demonstrate the fundamental desire for 
stories.
The assertion by Linda Hutcheon that “the process of narrativization has come 
to be seen as a central form of human comprehension, of imposition of meaning and 
formal coherence on the chaos of events” is central to this study and it is for this 
reason that the texts I chose to analyse were marked by metafictive features 
(Hutcheon 1999:121). “Narrative is what converts knowing into telling [...] and it is
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precisely this translation that obsesses postmodern fiction”, Hutcheon continues, and 
the narratives analysed throughout this study show how the fairy tale is a schema 
often used in postmodern novels to show this conversion of experience into narrative 
according to pre-established codes, and can sometimes be seen as the source of 
some of the fantastic events that occur in postmodern novels.
The reader will have noticed how little “magic” I attribute to the fairy tale itself. I 
do not believe, as psychoanalysts such as Bettelheim and Jung do, that the fairy tale 
is timeless and can be seen to show something deep and essential within the human 
spirit. Over years of research my position has changed from seeing the fairy tale as 
a form that is universal and ingrained in the psyche, to viewing it as one that is 
historically determined and, far from being timeless, speaks volumes about the 
society and historical time in which it was told. And yet, paradoxically, I believe this 
study has demonstrated why the fairy tale is still relevant. It is the formulaic nature of 
the fairy tale, combined with the fact that it is so often the first and only experience of 
oral narrative that we have nowadays (and with CDs of novels readily available, one 
can wonder how much longer the practice of parents telling their children stories will 
last) that gives it its lasting power over the imagination. The fact that the fairy tale is 
the primary oral narrative that people in late capitalist societies encounter also 
explains its hold over the imagination when subjects attempt to tell their stories. The 
fairy tale is not universal across all cultures, as some critics have claimed; the 
trickster tales of the North American Aboriginal peoples bear little resemblance to the 
fairy tales of Europe, unless one is willing to make immense generalisations and 
overlook all of the cultural differences that exist, something that we recognise 
immediately when we look on a collection of fairy tales that does not represent only 
numinous short narratives from Europe, but also from around the world, especially if 
these narratives from Africa, Asia and America have not been selected because they 
resemble European narratives. Such a collection is Angela Carter’s Virago Book o f
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Fairy Tales and Carter’s introduction makes her dismissal of the fairy tale as a
“universal” form quite clear:
I haven’t put this collection together from such heterogeneous sources to show 
that we are all sisters under the skin, part of the same human family in spite of a 
few superficial differences. I don’t believe that anyway. Sisters under the skin 
we might be, but that doesn’t mean we’ve got much in common. Rather I wanted 
to demonstrate the extraordinary richness and diversity of responses to the same 
common predicament -  being alive -[...] stories have seeded themselves all 
round the world, not because we all share the same imagination and experience 
but because stories are portable, part of the invisible luggage people take with 
them when they leave home
(Carter 2001b: xiv)
As Carter’s comments suggest, it is not the fairy tale, but storytelling itself that 
is universal. The fairy tale, with its rigid but elegant structure, short length, and the 
verbal magic that allows things like magic carpets to be conjured up in the 
imagination without the need for computer generated imagery, is simply the form that 
best represents storytelling itself. If Chomsky’s theory about the faculty for acquiring 
language being an innate feature of the human brain is correct, and Pinker is correct 
that this is the result of human evolution, then perhaps the fairy tale still has a grip 
over the imagination because of its simplicity. Its rules, like the rules of grammar 
itself, are easy to pick up, and endlessly adaptable, and so it is an easy way to 
translate experience into narrative. This, I suspect, is the reason for the importance 
of the fairy tale as an intertext.
The approach to intertextuality in chapter one, by identifying 8 different 
elements allowed me to specify accurately which elements I was particularly 
interested in, and then extend my study in the direction of texts which were 
characterised by the usage of those elements. Any sense of intertextuality being the 
relationship between all texts is too vague and all encompassing to be of potential 
use when analysing what Genette called palimpsestic intertextuality, but for a literary 
critic who is concerned with tracing the intertextual relationship between two specific 
texts, I feel the chapter has much to commend it.
The discussion of magic realism in chapter two is a line of approach that I have 
not previously encountered, that is, serious discussion of the similarities between
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magic realism and fairy tale. Though many early critics of magic realism denied its 
link to fairy tale, they did so because they misunderstood the fairy tale. For example 
Angel Flores states that “The practitioners of magic realism cling to reality as if to 
prevent “literature” from getting in their way, as if to prevent their myth flying off, as in 
fairy tales, to supernatural realms” (Flores 1995: 116). But, as the sociohistorical 
analyses of fairy tales by insightful critics such as Jack Zipes and Marina Warner has 
proven, fairy tales are always grounded in the real: the housework, tailoring, making 
one’s way in the world, these were the pressing real concerns of the fairy tale 
audience, and these very real concerns are dealt with in the fairy tale, which is 
always related to our world. I hasten to add that I do not believe that all magic 
realism can be directly attributed to the intertextual use of fairy tale chronotopes 
alongside realistic ones, but that in certain narratives, especially when they are 
narrated to us by an intradiegetic storyteller, the link between the fairy tale and magic 
realism seems to be particularly strong.
The storyteller chronotope which I defined in chapter three is a useful way of 
analysing embedded narration. As an identification of a formal structure it is useful in 
the analysis of recent postmodern texts that depict the act of telling fairy tales about 
one’s own life, for example Tim Burton’s 2003 Big Fish. Burton’s film features the 
storytelling chronotope, and, like those other examples of storytelling I used, 
Midnight’s Children, The Djinn in the Nightingale’s Eye and Midnight’s Children, 
exhibits magic realist features that are presented in a matter of fact way. Big Fish 
tells, in flashback form, the tall tales that Edward Bloom (Albert Finney) told to his 
son William (Billy Crudup) about his life. The film goes through all Edward’s often- 
told stories, which are characterised by fairy tale features: he meets giants, were­
wolves, mermaids, and fortune-telling witches and stumbles across an Elysian village 
that time forgot. Though at the beginning of the film William views his father’s tales 
as lies, by the end he too joins in the narrativization of his father’s life, telling Edward, 
who is dying of cancer in hospital, the tale of his own death, only making it seem an
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adventure, a significant moment that involves the characters from all the tall tales 
Edward has told. Significantly, at Edward’s funeral, we find out that the tall tales that 
made his father so popular during his lifetime, were actually true to some degree.
Big Fish highlights the way that telling ones life story orally can lead to fairy tale 
exaggerations, or as we saw in the introduction “It is not always easy to tell, in tales 
of the marvelous, whether we are dealing with magic or with mere exaggerations of 
actual qualities” (Thompson 1977: 81). Within each of Edward’s stories was a kernel 
of truth, and the metaphoric, fantastic versions that Edward told lead us to 
understand, by the end of the film, just how important storytelling is in order to 
understand one’s life.
Chapter four’s attempt to explain the importance of the storyteller chronotope is 
the only time the study leaves the confines of literature and literary theory. 
Nevertheless, it was important in this chapter to account for modern theories of the 
importance of narrativization, which, as I demonstrated are linked to postmodernism. 
The fairy tale, precisely because it is a synonym for “lies”, is the ideal representative 
of fiction itself, and the use of fairy tale structures and allusions alongside the realistic 
codes generated by autobiography and literary realism has significant effects. T
The subversive revision of fairy tales we encounter in chapter five is the first 
time in this study that the negative criticism of the fairy tale is encountered. Few 
texts demonstrate the turning of fairy tale into myth as well as Pratchett’s Witches 
Abroad and it is for this reason the novel is given such close analysis. Typically, this 
type of analysis is used on feminist texts, or those written by authors who are 
identified as “feminist” in some way or another. The analysis in this chapter shows 
how revision of fairy tales can be used to make a metafictional point about how we 
understand our lives through stories, and a political point, about who controls the 
stories, and the nature of representation in hyperreal societies.
Pratchett’s subversive revision of the classical fairy tales is not an isolated use 
of parody, that most postmodern of forms according to Linda Hutcheon (1999: 35), to
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criticise the hyperreality of late capitalist society. Another postmodern fantasy text 
that acts as a revision of the fairy tale is Dreamworks’ animated film Shrek (2001), 
which I will use here to demonstrate the further applicability of the theories that I have 
used throughout this study.
Shrek depicts a tyrannical Lord who is attempting to evict the fairy tale 
creatures from his kingdom so that he can put his own sanitised, mechanistic utopia 
in its place. Unlike Lady Lilith’s Genua, this Lord’s castle is decidedly not Sleeping 
Beauty’s1, but it is easy to see that Shrek is taking a swipe at Disney: Lord Farquaad 
(voiced by John Lithgow) famously resembles Disney chairman, Michael Eisner. 
Ironically enough, for a film that has its imagery generated entirely by computers, 
Shrek, like Witches Abroad, criticises the hyperreal. Farquaad is getting rid of the 
real fairy tale creatures, who can be unruly and ugly, and replacing them with 
animatronic sources of “wonder”, which do not have bad moods, and perform without 
expecting anything in return2. The fact that the fairy tale creatures live in a swamp, 
like Pratchett’s Genua, can also be seen to link Shrek with Disney whose Florida site 
is built entirely on swamp land. The citizens of Celebration, in fact, sometimes 
encounter alligators in their swimming pools, like dinosaurs returning to take back 
what once was theirs.
I call Shrek a revision (element 5) rather than a tabulated fairy tale (element 6) 
because it explicitly plays upon three well-known fairy tale structures. The first of 
these is the quest narrative; the large green ogre Shrek (voiced by Mike Myers) 
makes an agreement with Farquaad to rescue a princess from a dragon-guarded 
castle in order to keep his shack in the swamp. Princess Fiona’s incarceration is
1 Rather than chocolate box gothic, Lord Farquaad’s castle is a sky scraping castle that looks as if it 
were designed by Le Corbusier (Shrek guesses Farquaad “may be compensating for something”). The 
modernist nature of the utopian state he is trying to build is reflected by his constant aim for perfection 
“Is this not the most perfect kingdom of them all”, he asks the magic mirror and his final words are “I 
will have order! I will have perfection!”.
2 Again, the mirror seems to be a symbol for the hyperreal, because at one point we see Lord Farquaad 
using it as a television. It is amusing that Farquaad also sets up all the public events he attends like 
television game shows, the audience prompted into the appropriate reactions by men with cards reading 
“applause” or “revered silence”.
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reminiscent of “Sleeping Beauty”. The storybook that begins the film tells of a 
princess under an “enchantment [...] of the most fearful sort which could only be 
broken by love’s first kiss”, a motif that associated with the kiss that awakes Sleeping 
Beauty”3, especially as, like in “Sleeping Beauty” many brave knights had perished 
attempting to get to the princess. Fiona (Cameron Diaz) is very careful to feign 
sleep, lips puckered, with a bouquet of flowers clasped in both hands, when the man 
she expects to be Prince Charming enters her tower. Finally, there are elements of 
“Beauty and the Beast”, made explicit in a musical number sung by Robin Hood 
“when a beauty’s with a beast/ it makes me awfully mad”, as the beautiful princess 
begins to learn that the uncouth ogre has his own charms.
As well as this explicit intertextuality, the film also features implicit intertexts 
that inform its structure, especially “The Wedding of Sir Gawain and Dame Ragnell”, 
a “Beauty and the Beast” verse romance from the fifteenth century, which Marina 
Warner summarises in Making Monsters. Briefly told, King Arthur falls under the 
power of a Warlock and will die unless he finds the answer to the riddle, “what is it 
that women truly want”. By coincidence, he comes across Dame Ragnell, described 
as a foul hag with tusks and “hanging paps”, who promises to provide the riddle’s 
answer, but only if Arthur will give her Sir Gawain as a husband. Arthur agrees, and 
is told the answer to the riddle, that women desire “sovereignty”. On their wedding 
knight, Gawain kisses his monstrous bride, and is surprised when she is transformed 
into a beautiful woman. Dame Ragnell tells Gawain that she is bound by a spell, and 
asks whether she would have him “fair by night and foul by day or vice versa”?
3 As we have seen, it was not always a kiss that awakened Sleeping Beauty, and Basile’s version, 
where one of the babies she gave birth to when unconscious sucks the flax out of her finger while 
searching for her breast, is a particularly memorable awakening. Just the Grimms edited “Sleeping 
Beauty” to make it suitable for bourgeois sensibilities, other tales have been altered to make a kiss (on 
the lips) from the prince the thing that breaks the magic spell. For instance, the caveat that it must be 
“love’s first kiss” that breaks the enchantment on Princess Fiona is identical to the wording in the 
Disney film Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs, a large change from the Grimm’s iiSneewittchen,\  
where Snow White is awakened when some clumsy footmen drop the glass coffin whilst transferring it 
from the forest to the Prince’s lodgings (the prince’s motivation for wanting the glass coffin are 
somewhat odd, he seems to prize it as an ornament), a jolt which dislodges the poison apple from her 
gullet, an infinitely more amusing, if  less romantic, ending.
240
Gawain’s answer “do as ye list now, my lady gay” by allowing her sovereignty to 
choose as she wishes, breaks the spell put upon her, and she becomes fair all the 
time (Warner 1994b: 15-16)
Shrek reverses the enchantment: Princess Fiona is an ogre by night and a 
woman by day, because of a spell cast on her by a witch: “By night one way/ By day 
another/ This shall be the norm/ Until you find true love’s first kiss/ And then take 
love’s true form”. The riddling test is replaced with the more traditional kiss to break 
the spell, except in this version when the princess finally kisses Shrek she assumes 
the ogre form permanently. Upon realising that she is still in ogre form after the kiss 
she sobs “I’m supposed to be beautiful”, to be reassured by Shrek, “but you are 
beautiful”, pressing home the moral that one should be comfortable with one’s own 
appearance, and indeed, the movie can be seen in terms of both Shrek and Fiona’s 
becoming comfortable within their own skin, and Fiona especially abandoning the 
self-loathing she feels for her night-time self.
This is not to say that Shrek is an entirely subversive and challenging film. “Be 
yourself is not the stuff of radical politics, and yet, Shrek’s dismissal of always 
attempting to have the perfect country and the perfect body is charming and just a 
little subversive, when we come to think about how much advertising expenditure is 
dedicated to trying to make people think “brand x” will bring them closer to perfection. 
Indeed, the sequel to Shrek, the imaginatively titled Shrek 2 continues the tirade 
against “perfection”, as we are introduced to Prince Charming (Rupert Everett), who 
is a handsome but foppish oaf, and his mother (Jennifer Saunders) the Martha 
Stewart-esque fairy godmother, whose business is based on making people live up 
to the standards society expects of them (she even sings a song about the benefits 
of plastic surgery in getting your fairy tale prince).
Shrek 2 (2004) takes place in the land of Far Far away, the country ruled over 
by Fiona’s mother and father, which bears an uncanny resemblance to Los Angeles, 
the place Baudrillard calls the apotheosis of hyperreality (there’s even a sign saying
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“Far Far Away” on the hills, Hollywood style). If anything, Shrek 2 is more subversive 
than the first movie, showing marriage not as “happy ever after”, but rather “ugly ever 
after”, as the couple, returning from honeymoon experience their first domestic 
arguments over the in-laws. But what is important about Shrek 2 is that it 
demonstrates the way in which the fairy tale expresses the concerns of a particular 
historical context. Like Waterland and Midnight’s Children this text shows the way 
fairy tale structures are used to reflects the concerns of contemporary society. As 
numerous commentators have noted4, in the case of Shrek 2 the issue of race 
relations is layered throughout the movie, which is modelled on Guess Who’s 
Coming to Dinner, with Shrek taking the place of Sidney Poitier, a fact more than 
evident when the king (John Cleese) comments, “so your children will be” before 
Shrek butts in “that’s right, Ogres”. The flaming torches and farm implements 
wielded by the mobs that threaten Shrek take on a new meaning in this light, making 
the inhabitants of this fairy tale land seem like members of the Klan. More racially 
themed elements emerge when Shrek steals a magic potion from the fairy godmother 
to make him more like Prince Charming, the blond haired blue eyed knight who Fiona 
(and her parents) always envisioned her marrying. Not only does Shrek take human 
(and white) form on taking the potion, but Donkey, his all talking, all singing, all 
dancing sidekick (voiced by Eddy Murphy) becomes a stallion, changing colour from 
brown to white, and, at one point, doing something that looks suspiciously like the 
moonwalk, the trademark dance-step of Michael Jackson, whose colour and facial 
features have become increasingly more Caucasian over the years due at least 
partially to the use of plastic surgery.
But at the end of the movie, Shrek returns to his old lime green form, as Fiona 
refuses to give him the kiss that would seal the spell, preferring instead to return to 
their true ogre forms. As it turns out, the King who was so against Fiona’s marriage 
to Shrek, was actually not always quite so white himself. As was obvious from the
4 See, for example, Guillermo 2004.
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moment he mentions “walks by the Lily Pond” to the Queen (Julie Andrews), he was 
himself once green, because he was originally a frog, a form he resumes when he 
saves Shrek from the wrath of the fairy godmother by diving in front of a spell hurled 
at the ogre.
So, what seems to be an essentially populist, popcorn use of the fairy tale, is in 
fact much deeper than it first seems, promoting a view of racial tolerance, valuing 
personality above skin colour or surface appearance, and criticising the sterility of the 
superficial hyperreal world of celebrity. Again, this is not a radically subversive use of 
fairy tale revisions, as perhaps the twentieth century feminist revisions of fairy tales 
were, but it is another example of how the fairy tale represents events of socially and 
political significance in the real world. Escapism is one of the charges that has been 
levelled against the fairy tale, but close analysis of any of the texts covered in this 
study shows that even as they transport us into realms of magic, they do so in order 
to enact and address issues that are challenging to the contemporary audience.
It seems inevitable that the fairy tale will continue to interest the producers and 
consumers of texts for years to come. This may be partially due to the awareness 
that the fairy tale is a popular form which can be used without having to pay anyone 
royalties. An episode of the Simpsons called “Tales from the Public Domain” which 
featured stories from mythology and the Old Testament drew attention to the fact that 
remaking fairy tales and other works that are definitely out of copyright, has its own 
financial advantages. Shrek too, can be seen as an example of this usage which has 
paid off: the films have been a huge financial success, far surpassing the box office 
haul of other popular CGI features like the Toy Story films, Monsters Inc., Ice Age or 
Finding Nemo, and I believe this is due to Dreamworks’ canny usage of the fairy tale. 
Where we have to be “introduced” step by step to the marvellous world of the 
monsters and bogeymen, or the underwater home of the fish, we are all already 
familiar with fairy tales, and so the Shrek films had an immediate advantage over 
their competitors. This advantage is utilised by all texts that use the fairy tale as an
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intertext; the popularity of the classical fairy tale means that it is more likely that the 
intertext will be understood by a high proportion of the target audience. If 
postmodernist fiction is associated with intertextuality, then the texts we have studied 
here are brazen with their intertextual nature by using such obvious intertexts as fairy 
tales.
It is my hope that this study, by setting forward new theories about types of
fairy tale intertextuality, examining the relationship between fairy tales and magic
realism, and looking at the way in which authors have used fairy tales to show the
need for stories, will be of some use for future critics in examining the use of fairy tale
intertextuality. Marina Warner demonstrated great perspicacity when she said:
the enlightenment distinction between logic and fantasy has given way in the 
growing realisation that the structures of the imagination, often highly ordered 
and internally consistent, themselves form understanding. Pleas for a return to 
reason, for simply stripping away illusion, ignore the necessity and the vitality of 
mythic material in consciousness as well as unconsciousness.
(Warner 1994b: 14)
It is this awareness of the need for formulaic texts, the need for fantasy, that I 
see as characteristic of the postmodernist use of the fairy tale. The fairy tale will 
continue to be used in all media, and for purposes both subversive and doctrinaire, 
but with the help of the texts studied here, it will be hard to see the fairy tale as an 
irrelevant or “childish” form of literature ever again.
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Glossary
Chronotope a term coined by Mikhail Bakhtin in the essay “Forms of Time and 
the Chronotope in the Novel” and used by Bakhtin to investigate the representation of 
time in literary writing. The term means, when translated from the Greek “space 
time”, and is derived partially from Einsteinian mathematics (Bakhtin 1994: 84). It is 
used by Bakhtin, as by Einstein, to stress the fundamental interconnectedness of 
time and space, but in the novel rather than the world. Bakhtin describes the effect 
of the chronotope as the ‘concretisation’ of time within the novel where:
Time, as it were, thickens, takes on flesh, becomes artistically visible; 
likewise, space becomes charted and responsive to the movements of 
time, plot and history.
(Bakhtin 2000: 84)
In this immense essay, he sketches out the evolution of different chronotopes, 
from the “road” chronotope that characterises folklore to the chronotope of the sitting 
room that began to dominate in the early nineteenth century.
The chronotope is not, however, solely a device of analysing temporal 
representation within fiction. Bakhtin also claims “it is precisely the chronotope that 
defines genre and generic distinctions, for in literature the primary category in the 
chronotope is time” (85). He goes on to argue, “any and every literary image is 
chronotopic. Language, as a treasure-house of images, is fundamentally 
chronotopic” (251).
One of the problems encountered with the chronotope is that “despite the 
recent boom of Bakhtin commentaries and Bakhtinian text interpretations we are still 
without a systematic concept of “chronotope” (Keunen 2000: 1). As Bakhtin notes, 
every literary image is chronotopic (Bakhtin 2000: 251) which causes the problem 
that “the concept of the chronotope may be puzzling or hard to grasp because it 
seems omnipresent to the point either of invisibility or of extreme obviousness” (Vice
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1997: 201). Vice suggests the easiest example to grasp of the chronotope is the 
road movie, where movement along the road is also movement in time.
Dialogism. For Bakhtin dialogism is an inherent feature of language, a view 
most evident in “The Problem of Speech Genres” where Bakhtin describes written 
forms (the novel, scientific papers etc.) as secondary speech genres, stressing the 
similarities between written texts and utterances. Writing, like speech, needs to be 
understood as part of a continual chain of utterances, a scientific paper, although it 
may seem to be autocthonous is in fact written in response, as a rejoinder to 
previous theories and when viewed in this way we can see how for Bakhtin all 
communication is dialogic. However, some forms are more dialogic than others, and 
Bakhtin also uses the term monologic (even though it seems hard to imagine a truly 
monologic utterance) which he defines as “words that expect no answer” (Bakhtin 
1973: 63) but the nature of his definitions seem to suggest a sliding scale rather than 
a binary opposition between monologic and dialogic discourses.
Heteroglossia is Bakhtin’s term to indicate the heterogeneity of language, and 
translated from his coinage in Russian of the word raznorecie meaning “differentiated 
speech”. It refers to the huge variety of language types used in a society, from legal 
jargon to regional dialect, and the social hierarchy that these language types indicate, 
best illustrated by the prestige status of certain types of language over other; for 
example English received pronunciation over regional accents. These types of 
language, (or discourses) might be linked with different occupational and social 
groups (the jargon of doctors or social workers) or social and regional dialects.
However, the term heteroglossia also indicates the entry of these manifold 
discourse types into the novel (Wales 1997: 218 Vice 1997: 18). According to 
Bakhtin, in the essays “Epic and Novel” and “Forms of Time and the Chronotope in 
the Novel” reprinted in The Dialogic Imagination (Bakhtin 2000: 3-40, 84-258) the 
reason for the supremacy of the novel as an art-form is its ability to incorporate 
heteroglossia into its very structure: novels can feature the language of the public
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square (the locus classicus of Bakhtin’s carnivalesque: a modern equivalent would 
be ‘from the street’) clashing with the language of the social elites. Clashing is here a 
key phrase, for language is never neutral and different social languages are always 
in the process of struggling for superiority.
Metafiction is usually defined as “fiction about fiction” or fiction that draws 
attention to its own status as fiction (Hutcheon 1984:1, Cazzato 1995: 28, Drabble 
1999: 665). Tristram Shandy and Don Quixote are generally agreed to be early 
examples of metafiction, and Patricia Waugh argues that metafiction arises at the 
inception of all new art-forms, from Elizabethan theatre and eighteenth century fiction 
to early film, precisely because the structures that the writers and audience will later 
take for granted are still being established and are still obviously arbitrary and 
strange. Waugh’s theory allows one to see that metafiction is not new and is 
certainly not ‘the death of the novel’ as certain critics assumed, plus it highlights the 
fact that metafiction does not necessarily equal postmodernism, as some critics have 
assumed.
Monologism is a term used by Bakhtin to refer to types of authoritarian 
discourses, but it is never truly satisfactorily defined, rather it functions as the 
opposite of ‘dialogism’, which is viewed as democratic and a liberating function of 
certain works such as Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment. In The Problem of 
Dostoevsky’s Poetics Bakhtin defines monologism as “words that expect no answer” 
(1973: 63), and this is certainly a feature of the omniscient narrator utilised in realist 
fiction, where self consciousness over the medium of language is typically sublimated 
in favour of seeing words as an unproblematic way of representing reality.
Polyphony is a term Bakhtin uses for novels which feature ‘many voices’ 
especially where the voices of characters are not overridden by a third person 
omniscient author. He cites the work of Dostoevsky as a supreme example of 
polyphony, pointing to the numerous debates between characters that run through 
Crime and Punishment as an example of the way that the ‘polyphonic novel is
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dialogic through and through [...] dialogue penetrates within, into every word of the 
novel’ (1973: 40)
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